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The preponderance of thinking in UK counterterrorism circles is that speech that incites 
terrorism (at least online) is not only a contributor to terrorism but it is also a form of 
terrorism/radicalisation/extremism in and of itself. Thus, there is a perceived need to pre-
emptively suppress such speech. Accordingly, counterterrorism laws and regimes in the post 
9/11-7/7 era are marked with a distinct urgency or vigilance that seeks to pre-empt speech 
that incites terrorism. However, inasmuch as these incitement to terrorism legal and 
regulatory regimes (e.g., the incitement to terrorism provisions under the Terrorism Act 2000, 
the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Public Order Act 1986) appear to be stable, they are still 
marked with traces of indeterminability or undecidability that not only expand law’s 
exclusionary violence but also makes law self-inadequating. Such traces of undecidability are 
reflected in the opacity of the law and its overlaps with other criminal laws such as soliciting 
murder, malicious communications and incitement to racial hatred. Another key trace of 
undecidability is evident in the arena of online regulation, which seems to flounder in the 
sense that it struggles to contain the cross-territorial ephemerality and polyphony of online 
speech.  
 
Consequently, this thesis seeks to examine and verify two hypothetical claims, that: 1) 
speech that incites terrorism cannot be contained because speech is inherently divergent and 
iterable. In this sense, regulating speech is thus inescapably confusing, mistake-laden (e.g. 
with false positives online) and inoperable at times; and 2) incitement to terrorism legal 
provisions and policies as well as the fair balancing principles of human rights law are 
undecidable and self-inadequating because they are irretrievably troubled by aporetic 
conceptual operations.  
 
In an attempt to destabilise the calculability and stability that pervades much of contemporary 
thinking on incitement to terrorism regulation enforcement and criminalisation in the UK. 
These claims are critically unpacked through the concept of hauntology, a deconstructive 
concept derived from critically engaging with Jacques Derrida’s scholarship on spectres, 
différance, dissemination, autoimmunity and undecidability. By showing that incitement to 
terrorism laws and practices bear the deep imprint of a pervasive lack of definitive 
determinability, this thesis allows for the tentative ethical possibility of reconfiguring what 
calculable absolutist frames of “incitement to terrorism”, law enforcement, and regulation 
currently disavow.  
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Unless you can goad in boats and throw flowers on that ocean, you are encouraging ghosts 
to haunt you forever; you are encouraging cries in the psychic night. 
  — Kamau Brathwaite 
 
 
I finally know how not to have to distinguish any longer between promise and terror. 
–– Jacques Derrida 
 
You cannot be conscious unless you are haunted. 
–– Renée Bergland 
 
                     
How imprisoned we are in their ghosts. 
–– Dionne Brand 
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“The Spectre of ‘the Terrorist’ has taken on a god-like power, equivalent to the plague 
of earlier times or the Satan of religion.”––Joanna Bourke.1 
 
 
Background and context 
 
Terrorism (the use or display of violence for political gains) has gained currency as a method 
(and an area of scholarship) that holds an incessant “hyper-real”2 resonance of uncertainty, 
insecurity and fear. The last eighteen years since 9/11 suggest that we, in Western Europe, 
are experiencing an interminable spectre of terror,3 a monumental catastrophe of global 
proportions that keeps unsettling us with palpable collective emotions of uncertainty, anxiety 
and imminent precarity. These emotions tend to be most evident in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks that have occurred in Continental Europe (i.e., Madrid, Bulgaria, Paris, Brussels, 
Berlin and Copenhagen) and in the UK (the 7/7 bombings, Lee Rigby’s murder and the 
Manchester and Westminster attacks) in recent years.   
 
In addition to “real world” terrorist incidents and fears like bombs and attacks, the spectre of 
terror today also manifests itself online through all forms of extremist propaganda that keep 
proliferating through the ephemeral infinitude and temporality of social media as if to remind 
us that terrorism has become an inescapable part of our modern psyche (albeit one that we 
can observe and feel) but not touch.4 Concerned with this state of events, western 
governments have been preoccupied with efforts to intercept and take down terrorist 
propaganda with the rationally calculated view5 that the control and removal of these forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bourke, J. Fear: A cultural history (Counterpoint Press, 2005) preface 
2 For Baudrillard, “hyper-reality” relates to signs, symbols, and messages that engender a modern state 
in which fantasy, desire and reality are indistinguishable Baudrillard, J. "Simulacra and simulations in 
Poster, M.(Ed.). Jean Baudrillard: selected writings (1988). pp.166-184 
3 This in a somewhat violent gesture ignores the fact that people elsewhere in different geo-histories 
around the world have always/already been experiencing the spectre of terror pre-9/11 (and post 9/11) 
as a result of western invasions etc. 
4 May, T. Speech to the UN General Assembly 2017 Delivered on: 
20 September 2017 available at: < https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/theresa-mays-speech-to-
the-un-general-assembly-2017> 
5 For the purposes of this thesis, calculation or the calculable refers to an episteme/method/programme 
of risk-benefit or harm–welfare analysis/appraisal that is aimed at achieving a liberal-utilitarian end. See: 
Saghafi, K. “Calculus" in (eds) Oliver, K and Straub, S. Deconstructing the Death Penalty: Derrida's 
Seminars and the New Abolitionism, (Fordham University Press, 2018): 139-155 
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extremist speech will counter their dissemination and thus stop terrorism.6 Whilst this is a 
commendable course of action, it is one that seems to always be compromised by the fact 
that the very foundational frameworks for regulating and countering terrorism i.e., terms like 
“terrorism”, “radicalisation” and “extremism” and the ways in which they are deployed and 
transmitted are extensive and definitionally opaque hence making it practically difficult to 
identify, apprehend and pre-empt speech that incites terrorism.  
 
Moreover, in the event that such enforcement is effective (although in a sense, all 
enforcement is effective in its use of violence and force), the practical cross-territorial, fast, 
resurfacing, and ever-changing characteristics of online content means that regulators are 
always belatedly unable to contain extremist or radical speech. Despite the law’s efforts at 
containment, extremist speech keeps regenerating, multiplying, detonating like an information 
bomb, and never ceasing, on end.  
 
It appears then, that the very unpredictable nature of terrorism and the reverberative affective 
sensations it induces somewhat psychically complicate lawmaking and regulation processes 
further. This is to say; terrorist attacks can be infrequent but can have such a phantasmic or 
strong symbolic significance that insinuates a feeling of inadequacy, helplessness and 
insecurity. As such, governments may feel that they need to do more in order to protect their 
citizens. This is usually done in legislative terms more specifically through counter terrorism 
laws that are disseminated and supplemented by a bio-diversity of players from lawyers to the 
police and law enforcement, to AI design, to regulation. But as this thesis will show, these 
laws bear an irreconcilable conceptual tension an inadequation that is displayed in their 
inability to make distinctions about what terrorism is or what speech that incites terrorism is. 
This is a tension that is also evidenced in laws singular desire to capture the 
incommensurability and unpredictability of something as indefinable and insurrective as 
terror, a phenomena that keeps returning. “It begins by coming back”7 interminably in all 
manner of guises always already befuddling the systems that seek to contain or capture it. At 
any rate, “the threat level always already remains substantial, severe or “highly likely”, –– 
imminent.8 The worst always still remains to come, spectrally, interminably.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The EU maintains that there are links between the continued high level of terrorist threat in the EU and 
internet in its aiding of terrorist organisations to pursue and fulfill their objectives to radicalise, recruit, 
facilitate and direct terrorist activity. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online 
Brussels, 12.9.2018, available at: < http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-terrorist-content-
online-ia-swd-18-408.pdf>. The UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 is also framed on 
this kind of assumption although it also limits its scope to proscribed organisations. 
7 Derrida, J. Specters of Marx (Routledge, 1994) 
8 See MI5 threat levels, available at: < https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels> 
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Thus, terrorism and indeed the desire or impulse to contain speech that incites terrorism 
becomes a ghostly and spectral encounter as it takes on and evokes a symbolic collective 
post-traumatic limbo,9 leaving us in a position where we simply cannot get over what has (not 
yet) happened.  
 
Research questions  
 
The problems this thesis is concerned with are generally problems of undecidability, opacity 
and uncontainability of speech with respect to incitement to terrorism laws and regulatory 
practices in the post 9/11 continuum. Hence, this thesis seeks to explore the following set of 
questions: 
 
1) What are the origins of incitement to terrorism legislation in the UK? 
2) How and why did this legislation come about when it did? What factors shaped it and 
continue to shape it? 
3) Why is it that speech that incites terrorism is conceptualised as a cause of violence in 
and of itself?  How is such “violent speech” distinguished from innocuous speech 
both in law and practice? 
4) What ethical and human rights issues arise when trying to identify, apprehend and 
contain speech that incites terrorism? 
5) How do (and how could) human rights tread the difficult line of having to ensure a 
justifiable balance between countering speech that incites terrorism on the one hand 
and the right to freedom of speech and its related rights on the other hand?   
 
Aims and objectives of the thesis  
	  
The objective of this thesis is to act as a deconstructive intervention10 against much legal 
positivist scholarship (on terrorism and online and offline speech regulation as well as human 
rights) that has sought to examine terrorism legislation and speech regulation and 
enforcement as though they are “determinist”, “stable”, “monolithic” and perfectly capable of 
calculating and containing terrorism and speech that incites terrorism, that views failures to 
regulate as slight aberrations ––which through the right mixture of government policy and 
legal adjustments could ultimately be excised. This thesis argues that such legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Habermas, J. & Derrida, J. Philosophy in a Time of Terror (The University of Chicago, 2003) pp.97-103 
10 As Davies observes, mainstream legal philosophy and scholarship tends to concentrate on positive 
institutionalized law, and not on the multiplicity of the possible dimensions of law which inform our 
multiple existences, Davies, M. “Derrida and law: legitimate fictions." In (ed) Legrand, P. Derrida and 
Law pp. 71-95 (Routledge, 2017); Cornell, D. "Time, deconstruction, and the challenge to legal 
positivism: the call for judicial responsibility." Yale JL & Human 2 (1990): 267 
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perfectibility/determinism is necessarily impossible. It does this by exposing the non-
eliminable undecidability of lawmaking and regulation in the UK particularly with regard to 
incitement to terrorism in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. Such an exposition is done through a 
critical-interdisciplinary analysis, more specifically through a critical-deconstructive reading. In 
using a critical-deconstructive approach that synthesizes and cross-pollinates disciplines,11 
this thesis intends to show that the problems of lawmaking and regulation (as they pertain to 
incitement to terrorism) do not free-float or exist singularly and disconnectedly but that they 
are plural or plurivocal, in the world with others.12 The rationale of this approach is not to 
dissolve the identity of law, but is to enhance the quality of this thesis as an analysis of 
society and social life13 by gathering together and appropriating helpful insights from other 
disciplines in order to understand the multifaceted and interconnected problems of speech 
regulation and counterterrorism “because law, [by] itself can understand nothing”.14  
 
Literature review and concerns of thesis	  
 
Although excellent scholarship (within anthropology,15 feminist jurisprudence, critical race 
theory and critical legal discourses) has been done in the area of counterterrorism,16 human 
rights,17security,18 and regulation,19not many connections between the existing and varied 
fields and sources of study in relation to law and speech regulation have been drawn in the 
existing literature using critical-deconstructive conceptual frameworks. The only exceptions 
within legal scholarship that I have come across are Judith Butler’s scholarship on injurious 
speech20 (although one could argue that Butler’s work is not a legal enquiry) and Uladzislau 
Belavusau’s critical examination of speech in transitional Democracies.21 Discounting these 
texts, many analyses of freedom of speech or freedom of expression in general are still 
formulated within a liberal-utilitarian or liberal-humanist22 (usually a Millian) conceptualisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cotterrell, R. Law, culture and society: Legal ideas in the mirror of social theory (Routledge, 2016) p.6 
12 Critchley, S. Being and Time: ‘Being-in-the-world’ The Guardian (06/06/ 2009) available 
at:<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/22/heidegger-religion-
philosophy?intcmp=239> 
13 Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror 
14 Ibid p.5 
15 Pohjonen, M,and Udupa, S."Extreme speech online: An anthropological critique of hate speech 
debates." International Journal of Communication 11 (2017): 19 
16 Edwards, P. Counter-terrorism and counter-law: An archetypal critique. Legal Studies 38, no. 2 
(2018): 279–97 
17 Gearty, C. Terrorism and human rights. Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 340-362 
18 See Goold, B. J., and Lazarus, L.  (eds) Security and human rights (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019) 
19 Mythen, G. and Walklat, S. "Pre-crime, regulation, and counter-terrorism: interrogating anticipatory 
risk: Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate explore the extent to which risk is being utilised more 
intensively in the development of crime control policies." Criminal Justice Matters 81, no. 1 (2010): 34-
36; Beck, U. World at Risk  
20 Butler, J. Excitable Speech: A politics of the performative (Psychology Press, 1997) 
21 Belavusau, U. Freedom of speech: Importing European and US constitutional models in transitional 
democracies. (Routledge, London 2013) 
22 The right to free expression is grounded in liberal-utilitarian framings of the individual, and based on 
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of speech that in my view pre-calculates/presumes specific kinds of subjects that correspond 
to normative modes of life, law making and governance at play within specific geopolitical as 
well as historical frames of understanding the human,23and hence fails to give credence to (or 
pre-limits) the iterable divergence and heterogeneity of speech. In this sense, most normative 
legal conceptualisations of speech fail to capture the complexity of speech as a social, legal, 
and cultural phenomenon. And even in places where critiques are compelling such as Eric 
Heinze’s critique of normative liberal-utilitarianism in Hate speech and Democratic 
Citizenship,24 Heinze’s reformulation of the familial notion of citizenship or rights still reenacts 
the violence and homo-hegemony of the very liberal frameworks of speech that he is trying to 
critique. Thus, by upholding a reworked notion of autochthony, sovereignty and statehood 
what he calls “citizenship”, Heinze does not address the plural coming/absence of the other, 
and all their heterogeneous and iterable speech. This thesis seeks to attend to this lacuna. 
 
Further, conceptual frames like “security and insecurity”,25 “panic”,26“crisis”,27 “racialising 
surveillance”,28 and “peril”29 are used to analyse terrorism in contemporary scholarship. But 
although these analyses touch on the power and control dynamics30 as well as the psychic, 
perceptive, cognitive and emotional impacts of terrorism generally,31 they do not provide a 
critical-deconstructive frame that allows us to reflect more specifically on the interminable 
phantasmic nature of “speech” or indeed speech that incites terrorism. Put another way, 
these conceptual frames do not explore the ability of terrorist speech32 to spectrally elude 
ethico-legal and regulatory structures in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. This thesis seeks to 
question the ethical horizons enclosed within these frames (especially with regard to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the foundational liberal ideas such as autonomy and human dignity see for example Barendt, E. 
Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2005) Notwithstanding, the problem with liberalism as this 
thesis highlights is that it is predisposed to disavowing the heterogeneous difference of the other. 
23 Butler, J. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009)  pp.137-139  
24 Heinze, E. Hate speech and democratic citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
25 Armborst, A. "Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: The Security–Prevention Complex In eds 
B. Goold and L. Lazarus Security and Human Rights (Hart Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019); Loader, I. "Ice 
cream and incarceration: On appetites for security and punishment." Punishment & Society 11, no. 2 
(2009): 241-257; Bigo, D. & Tsoukala, A. (eds) Terror, insecurity and liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal 
regimes after 9/11 (Routledge, 2008) Bigo, D. Illiberal practices of liberal regimes: The (in) security 
games (Editions L’Harmattan, 2006); Huysmans, J. The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and 
asylum in the EU (Routledge, 2006); Chebel d’Appollonia, A. Frontiers of fear: Immigration and 
insecurity in the United States and Europe (Cornell University Press, 2012); Grewal, I. Saving the 
Security State: Exceptional Citizens in Twenty-First-Century America. (Duke University Press, 2017) 
26 Cohen, S. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (Routledge, 1972); 
Goode, E. and Ben-Yehuda, N. Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (John Wiley & Sons 
2010)  
27 Hall, S., et.al Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982) 
28 Browne, S. Dark matters: On the surveillance of blackness (Duke University Press, 2015) 
29 Stone, G. R. Perilous times: free speech in wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the war on 
terrorism. (WW Norton & Company, 2004) 
30 Bigo, Terror insecurity and liberty, 2008: Bigo’s analyses on terrorism and insecurity draw heavily 
from Foucault’s work on power, biopolitics and control.  
31 Ahmed, S. The ‘emotionalization of the war on terror’: Counter-terrorism, fear, risk, insecurity and 
helplessness." Criminology & Criminal Justice 15, no. 5 (2015): 545-560 
32 The “terms terrorist speech”/ “incitement to terrorism” are interchangeable in this thesis. 
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disavowal of the alterity of the other and the other’s speech) as well as the ideals of certainty 
and coherence that they project by exposing and probing the impossible “contradictions”33 
that plague and sustain their very regulatory structures and lawmaking processes.34  
 
Much of this approach to studying terrorism is indebted to Derrida’s scholarship on terrorism 
as enumerated in texts like Rogues,35 Spectres of Marx, and in Philosophy in a time of 
terror,36where Derrida offers us the language of autoimmunity 37and haunting38 (as concepts 
that tie into other deconstructive concepts such as the heterogeneous, the incalculable, the 
absented, and the unanticipatable like dissemination,39speech, différance, amongst others) to 
show how the sovereign and political-legal orders of nation states become epistemically 
imperiled or unsettled by their desire to capture i.e., “punish or acquit rationally”40 an un-
identifiable terrorist threat. With autoimmunity and haunting, Derrida is able to show how the 
state/sovereign is always already –– “in a quasi-suicidal fashion”41 –– compromised and 
made vulnerable, by its very grammars of capture and securitisation. In the context of 
contemporary post 9/11-7/7 counter-terrorism discourse, these grammars of 
containment/capture are particularly blurred. They are used in a substantially broadened and 
abstract or unrecognisable manner i.e., through what Agamben has called the state of 
exception.42     
 
The work of scholars like Derek Gregory,43 de londras,44 and Conor Gearty45 has already 
done the important work of articulating how these pre-emptive rubrics lead to a draconian 
state of emergency that truncates the liberty and fundamental rights of individuals46 in a wide 
range of contexts e.g., from stop and search to extra-legal detention and internment. This 
thesis does not seek to address these particular aspects of rights and terrorism but it draws 
from them, extends, and situates their critical observations within the context of speech that 
incites terrorism. I am specifically concerned about articulating how these overdetermined or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 These contradictions are not a tout court rejection of law. Rather, they seek to highlight that a certain 
degree of ethical impossibility operates within the structure of law itself. 
34 n.10 
35 Derrida, J. Rogues: Two essays on Reason (Stanford University Press 2005) 
36 Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror; Derrida J, Dissemination (Athlone Press, 1981); Derrida, J. 
Signature event context 1972 Glyph I, 1977; Butler, Excitable Speech  
37 An autoimmune/autoimmunary logic is at play where a system or being “in quasi-suicidal fashion, 
works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its own immunity”. Derrida, Philosophy in 
a Time of Terror, p.94 
38 Derrida, Specters of Marx  
39 Ibid 
40 Spivak, G.C, "Terror: A speech after 9-11." boundary 2 31, no. 2 (2004): 81-111 
41 n.37 
42 Agamben, G. State of Exception (The University of Chicago, 2005) 
43 Gregory, D. "The black flag: Guantánamo Bay and the space of exception." Geografiska Annaler: 
Series B, Human Geography 88, no. 4 (2006): 405-427 
44 de Londras, F. "Can Counter-Terrorist Internment Ever Be Legitimate." Hum. Rts. Q. 33 (2011): 593 
45 Gearty, C. Liberty and Security (Polity Press 2013)  
46 Byrne, E. F., "The Post-9/11 State Of Emergency: Reality versus Rhetoric." Social Philosophy 
Today 19 (2003): 193-215 
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exceptional grammars of capture are tethered to a particular exclusivist calculation of 
emergency/terror/harm that47 ignores and forecloses the heterogeneous speech and multiple 
subjectivities of the other. Which is to say, I am interested in how the discourse on 
terrorism/counter-terrorism 48 in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum inscribes a monolithic 
conceptualisation of harm, terror, citizenship, and ideology that makes certain minoritarian 
opinions unsayable. I am concerned about what this may mean for the right to freedom of 
expression especially for the most marginalised in society.  
 
I am also interested in how the counterterrorism and securitisation discourse of the post 9/11 
continuum (particularly the global war on terror) requires individuals and law enforcement to 
be on guard and alert for even though what they are on guard against is unclear, “abstract”49 
and ubiquitous.50 I thus open out and expand on Zedner’s notion of pre-crime51 to make the 
claim that criminal determinations of terrorism occur within and through a pre-calculated 
homo-hegemonic liberal-utilitarian logic, of deterrence and utility that associates particular 
racialised forms of minoritarian speech52 to “terrorism” even when the very notion of terrorism 
is conceptually inscrutable.53 All these issues and their discursive iterations (i.e., the 
undecidability of harm or risk, the uncontainability of speech, especially as it is transmitted 
multi-jurisdictionally online, and the heightened affective hyper-vigilance or speculative 
diagnostic paranoia of counterterrorism discourse and hence its anti-Muslim racism)54 inform 
my thinking on terrorism in this thesis. I weave into and out of them polyphonically using the 
conceptual framework of hauntology in order to suggest that they compromise and supplant 
the seemingly stable post 9/11-7/7 structures of lawmaking, counterterrorism and speech 
regulation, recurringly, –– without closure.   
 
On the issue of lawmaking, my thinking on law and human rights in this thesis borrows from 
the scholarship of Saidiya Hartman In Scenes of Subjection,55 where Hartman argues that the 
Black subject comes into existence as the object of the law’s violence without ever being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 n.45: Gearty observes that assessments of liberty and security in democracies under a human rights 
calculus can push for “exclusivist priorities in efforts to defend themselves ; See also Baxter, Kimberly. 
"The Enlightenment’s Post-9/11 Legacy." In Civility, Nonviolent Resistance, and the New Struggle for 
Social Justice, pp. 142-162 (Brill Rodopi, 2019) 
48 Chowdhury, K. Human Rights Discourse in the Post-9/11 Age (Springer, 2019); Kostakopoulou, D. 
"How to do things with security post 9/11." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28, no. 2 (2008): 317-342 
49 n.40 
50 I demonstrate in Chapter one that the “unclear” and “ubiquitous” signify a particular incommensurable 
spectral/haunting/visor effect especially when read within the context of online regulation. 
51Zedner, L "Pre-crime and post-criminology?." Theoretical criminology 11, no. 2 (2007): 261-281 
52 Kundnani, A. The Muslims are coming!: Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic war on terror 
(Verso 2014); Abbas, M S. "Producing ‘internal suspect bodies’: divisive effects of UK counter-­‐‑terrorism 
measures on Muslim communities in Leeds and Bradford." The British journal of sociology 70, no. 1 
(2019): 261-282; Nguyen, N. Suspect communities: Anti-Muslim racism and the domestic war on terror. 
(U of Minnesota Press, 2019) 
53 Derrida, Philosophy in a time of Terror p.29  
54 n.40: pp.91-92 
55 Hartman, S. Scenes of subjection: Terror, slavery, and self-making in nineteenth-century America 
(Oxford University Press 1997) 
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considered as fully human by the law. I read Hartman as a critical theorist of law in tandem 
with Derrida.56 I align them both with other critical legal scholars like Kapur,57 Golder,58 and 
Simmons59 as critics of the liberal-utilitarian legal project and its violence, its recursivity of 
unfreedoms, as well as its inadequacy to grasp both new subject formations and new forms of 
political imagination in so far as marginalised people are concerned.60 I draw from and take 
their critiques of law’s liberal-utilitarian impulses61 as generative points from which I can 
analyse the regulation of speech in the post 9/11 continuum and the kinds of speech it 
absents. 
 
To address what I am calling here absented speech, I probe how the liberal-utilitarian tradition 
functions in order to absent such speech. This thesis does not claim to offer a comprehensive 
critique of the concept of liberalism or even a critique of its inseparable and ongoing 
advancements into neoliberalism.62 Rather, it focuses on certain mergings of liberalism and 
utilitarianism (hence the conjugation “liberal-utilitarianism”) to probe how they shape and 
continue to shape as well as sustain the current order and system of law making, rights 
assessments, and risk assessment of “terrorist speech"63 related crimes in the post 9/11-7/7 
continuum. This is done by looking at J.S. Mill’s harm principle, which acts as a norm of free 
expression and guides most thinking on speech and harm analyses within western legal-
juridical orders.64 My overarching claim here is that J.S. Mill’s harm principle genealogically 
scaffolds “harm” under a wider utilitarian calculus of liberty that then forms the conceptual 
basis of what I refer to as liberal-utilitarian speech. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56Derrida, J. The Death Penalty Vol ii (The University of Chicago Press 2017); Derrida, J. Force of Law: 
The Mystical Foundation of Authority 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 920 (1990); Goldberg, J. A. "James Baldwin 
and the Anti-Black Force of Law: On Excessive Violence and Exceeding Violence." Public Culture 31, 
no. 3 (2019): 521-538 
57 Kapur, R. "On Gender, Alterity and Human Rights: Freedom in a Fishbowl." Feminist Review 122, no. 
2 (2019): 167-171 
58 Golder, B. "Beyond redemption? Problematising the critique of human rights in contemporary 
international legal thought." London Review of International Law 2, no. 1 (2014): 77-114 
59 Simmons, W. P. Human rights law and the marginalized other (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
60 Butler, Frames of War p.146 
61 Under a liberal-utilitarian framework law and indeed justice are turned into a utilitarian 
calculation/transaction for the security or utility of society. Thus, the categorical imperatives of Justice 
and indeed law (both criminal and human rights law) in liberal-utilitarian terms then become turned into 
a kind of bio-power deployed to punish some over others: Derrida, The Death Penalty p.68 
62 Kapur n.57; Flikschuh, K. Freedom: Contemporary Liberal Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) 
Shnayderman, R. ‘On “Being Forced to Be Free” between Republican and Liberal Freedom’, Ethical 
Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network 22, no. 2 (2015): 247–70; Svendsen, L.A. 
Philosophy of Freedom (Reaktion Books, 2014) 
63 n.32 
64 Kapur n.57: p.29 Kapur draws us to the symbiotic relationship between human rights and the liberal 
tradition  
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I want to illustrate briefly here, how, and why this thesis addresses and focuses on Mill’s harm 
principle,65 which stipulates that the law must not penalise the sheer expression of repugnant 
ideas except ideas that cause harm. If read closely, Mill’s conceptualisation of harm has an 
inherent tension in the sense that it emphasises commitments to self-determination and 
egalitarianism whilst at the same time upholding and requiring the idea that moral character66 
and virtue need to be upheld for the sensus communis/ good of society/sovereign. Singular 
divergent desires and autonomies are thus enmeshed and obfuscated within a greater idea of 
homohegemonic ideas dependent on virtue, morality, and economic interests.67 For Mill, harm 
thus becomes a calculated formulation of discipline, “a standard of virtue and that maintains 
political stability”,68 measured, rationally distributed, and justified by utility, exemplarity or 
deterrence for the security or well being of society.69 What such a utilitarian grid of political-
legal-ethical calculation means in practical terms is that in most cases the majority (i.e., the 
commonwealth, the parliament, or the sovereign) will be responsible for establishing 
interventions, constraints or laws based on what they will consider to be harmful to the society 
as a whole. These laws determine the extent of grantable privileges and rights (such as 
speech).    
  
Crucially, these rights and privileges are all-inclusive, which means that they are granted to 
minorities also, however, they carry with them a logos/reason and ratio70 of inherent 
“distributive bias,”71 which means that such rights and privileges always already “trade off the 
liberties of a few against the security [and logos, reason, and ratio]72 of the majority”.73Harm 
thus becomes a regulatory intervention or a moral-legal-ethical barometer for the 
sovereign/the monolithic whole that demarcates a consensus that differentiates unacceptable 
or wrong conduct and speech from that which is right or acceptable. In the context of this 
thesis, this means looking at harm, as a measure or charge of what speech is “sayable” and 
what speech is “unsayable”; it means having to look at forms of speech (such as ideological 
speech or speech that incites terrorism) that are restricted and criminalised because they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 I return to this discussion in chapter two in my analysis of Millian speech and harm.  
66 Harcourt, B. E. "The collapse of the harm principle." J. Crim. L. & Criminology 90 (1999): 109 
67 Wolff, J. "Mill, indecency and the liberty principle." Utilitas 10, no. 1 (1998): 1-16 
68 Berkowitz, P. Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton University Press, 1999) 
69 Mill, J.S. On Liberty, 1859 (Broadview Press, 1999) 
70Derrida, The Death Penalty pp.197-198 
71 Goold, B J., and Lazarus, L Introduction in Security and human rights (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019) 
p. 9; Waldron, J. "Security and liberty: The image of balance." Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 2 
(2003): 191-210 
72 Derrida, Rogues p.214 Derrida reading Heidegger’s The Principle of Reason draws us to the fact that 
reason, ratio, reckoning, security [recht richting rechtfertigen] and cognition are all interlinked to the 
homohegemonic command and control of the sovereign.  
73 Waldron, Security and liberty  
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justified/calculated as a cause of substantial harm to the majority interests of “representable 
subjects”.74  
 
What concerns me then in this thesis is an exposition of how the sovereign’s monolithic and 
paternalistic Millian conceptualisation of harm in the context of responds to (or fails to 
respond interminably to) the unanticipatable alterity of the other and why/how it is that such a 
response is sustained. I am thus interested in examining why it is that Mill’s harm principle, 
(and indeed other liberal-positivist frameworks of rights and justice), seems to always already 
eschew an ethics of relation to the other in the sense that when calculating or rationalising 
/justifying harm they privilege questions of utility, i.e., of a closed ends-oriented justice75 in 
opposition to a demand of unanticipatable justice to come that can not be subsumed under 
any teleological schema and is open to the alterity of the other.76 Similarly, I am interested in 
probing how such a calculated, conceptualised determination of harm in the context of 
speech that incites terrorism could be deconstructed (and perhaps “affirmatively 
sabotaged”)77 especially if we are in a position where we want to conjure an unanticipatable 
ethics of justice that is open to the heterogeneous alterity of the other.  
 
Following from my foregoing discussion on Mill’s harm principle and drawing/building from 
and upon the scholarship of Ramshaw78 and Fitzpatrick,79 I want to suggest that Millian liberal 
utilitarian conceptualisations of speech and harm highlight a problematic tension or aporetic 
relation between the singular and the heterogeneous, when calculating harm in relation to 
rights. Because of this inescapable structural tension (of the singular v. the incommensurable/ 
heterogeneous), the heterogeneous other cannot and does not get to fully participate in such 
a deliberative democracy as their rights and identities are always delineated through a 
monopoly of violence and its singular legal-regulatory frame. And in the rare event that the 
other gets to participate, the other only participates under prescribed or pre-calculated notions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Riley, Jonathan. "J S mill's doctrine of freedom of expression." Utilitas 17, no. 2 (2005): 147-179; See 
also Hart, H. L. A. Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford University Press 1963) Hart’s conception of harm 
is similarly Millian. But one wonders which subjects remain “representable” under their particularly 
liberal-European schema. See also n.86-n.93 
75 Despite his insightful critique, Waldron in his discussion of rights and harm constantly makes positivist 
claims that are grounded in liberal-utilitarian reason. He for example, emphasises that “we must insist 
that those who talk the balancing-talk step up to the plate with some actual predictions about 
effectiveness”: n.73, p.210. This is a critique that does not interrupt the “double-bind” economy of the 
force of law, which provides rights/liberties whilst at the same time engenders unfreedom. Further, 
Waldron’s analysis is still pre-occupied with undoing calculations of rights as utility and it does not 
address an unanticipatable justice to come that embraces to the alterity of the other.  
76 Derrida, The Death Penalty p.62  
77 “I write in the conviction that sometimes it is best to sabotage what is inexorably at hand, than to 
invent a tool that no one will test, while mouthing varieties of liberal pluralism”: Spivak, G.C. A critique of 
postcolonial reason (Harvard university press, 1999) p.9; Spivak, G.C. An aesthetic education in the era 
of globalization (Harvard University Press 2012) p.510  
78 Ramshaw, S. Justice as Improvisation: The law of the extempore (Routledge, 2013) pp.38-43 
79 Fitzpatrick, P. Is Law Cosmopolitan? in de Vries, U and Francot, L. Law's Environment: Critical Legal 
Perspectives (Eleven International Publishing, 2011) 
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of liberal pluralism that assimilate the other’s difference in a violent singular/monolithic fashion 
by prioritising the needs of the greatest number, the majority of citizens. To this end, whatever 
harms the marginalised or dispossessed experience is never accounted for. This accounting 
for is a kind of rights recognition that as Ratna Kapur observes is contingent on the subject’s 
“recognisability”.80 
 
If we were to stretch the aporia of the singular v. heterogeneous further, wherein law is a 
singular monopoly structure that seeks to define and also to contain the heterogeneous like 
crime, harm, terrorism or speech, we encounter a moment of legal-regulatory slippage 
wherein the singular/authoritative/calculating structure of law fails irreparably because it 
remains haunted by an originary autoimmune lack to contain the incalculable.81 As such, the 
heterogeneous or multiplicitous (i.e., terrorism, or speech) become especially non-reducible 
problems for law. They remain spectrally or inescapably present, escalated, always already 
present, (before/ after), and in the very moment of their containment or exclusion, –– despite 
law’s best efforts to apprehend, define, identify, or pre-empt them.82 This non-reducibility by 
law of these problems, combined with the resolute liberal reason and insistence of law to 
define/contain and apprehend their heterogeneity, is of critical concern to this thesis. I explain 
how this happens further in chapter one using the notion of deferred speech (différance) or 
the iterability of speech as a synecdoche for the heterogeneous –– i.e., terrorism, incitement 
to terrorism, harm, and speech.  
 
It could be argued that my reading of liberalism so far is reductive that liberalism or indeed 
liberal-utilitarianism as democratic and liberal concepts do have within them a radical bearing 
that holds out a space for the heterogeneity of the other. This is the same line of thinking that 
has been taken up by thinkers like Hans Blumenberg,83 (and Richard Rorty,84 and Chantal 
Mouffe)85 who defend the idea that the modern liberal age possesses a novel quality in the 
form of the idea of “self-assertion” a rational idea that is distinct from a medieval or modern 
secularised religious position that attempts to affirm a more progressive egalitarian and 
inclusive liberal politics. Blumenberg’s concept of the “self-assertion of liberal reason” (which 
provides man with a potentiality for his own fate) is arguably what could lead to the 
inauguration of self-transformative conceptualisations of global citizenship and sovereignty 
that do away with older historical-political horizons. Inasmuch as Blumenberg’s analysis of 
liberalism is luminous and insightful, I find it limiting for my study mainly for the reason that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Kapur, Gender, Alterity, and Human rights p.58  
81 n.75; n.76; Kalulé, P. On the Undecidability of Legal and Technological Regulation." Law and 
Critique 30, no. 2 (2019): 137-158 
82 Ibid: The irreducibility of terrorism as a problem of law is why I do not set out to define terrorism in this 
thesis.	  
83 Blumenberg, H. The legitimacy of the modern age (Mit Press, 1985) 
84 See Hall, D. L. Richard Rorty: Prophet and poet of the new pragmatism (SUNY Press, 1994); Rorty, 
R. "A world without substances and essences." Philosophy and social hope (Penguin Books 1999) 
85Mouffe, C. The return of the political (Verso, 1993) p.3 
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Blumenberg’s idea of self-assertion gestures toward a historical fictionalisation of “man” that 
prevents him from acknowledging the structural origins and transcendental continuities of 
epistemic as well as ontological violence within western modernity that continue to subjugate 
non-European others.86 Put another way, in Blumenberg’s formulations of secularism, 
freedom, liberty and self-assertion, western human “man” still remains “overrepresented”87 
(i.e., historically embedded, contingent and epistemologically grounded) through a particular 
progressive western self-presencing framework of post-Enlightenment bourgeois liberalism 
that attempts to rewrite yet at the same time negates the brutal on-going architectonic history of 
modernity. Thus, Blumenberg’s framework does not attend to the rise of the plantation and 
enslavement, colonialism, and new forms of empire; that centre “rational self-interested 
subjects” as possible outcomes of a cultural epistemology and sovereign force of such self-
assertion.88 And so, following Hortense Spillers, it can be argued that the social mechanisms 
at work within Blumenberg’s homogeneous formation of self-assertion (and thus “difference 
in, and as, hierarchy” and "race") remain reformulated self-referentially as “venerable master 
signs”89 that are never addressed.90 Simply put, Blumenberg’s unified formulation of the 
human/ of a society that “self asserts” is parochial, Eurocentric, and continues to conceal, or 
disavow the alterity and heterogeneity of the other.   
 
In light of this, I want to take on a differently critical reading of liberalism that is also at once a 
critique of law and regulation as norms of governance. I position my thought in line with a 
number of critical thinkers on liberalism like Derrida, Hartman and Wynter who analyse law, 
liberty, and freedom from outside and beyond Eurocentric or Logocentric frames of modernity.  
 
Accordingly, my reading of liberalism in this thesis maintains that liberalism in relation to the 
other is aporetic. This is to say that liberty under a liberal-utilitarian norm, normative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 For Blumenberg, “it is in fact possible for totally heterogeneous contents to take on identical functions 
in specific positions in the system of man's interpretation of the world and of himself. In our history this 
system has been decisively determined by Christian theology.” n.80: p.64. How Blumenberg’s 
theoretical positions are structurally legitimised and hierarchically allocated is never addressed. 
Blumenberg seems to take a position, which does not examine the conditions of dispossession, the 
epistemic recursivity, and violence that self-assertion could engender. Could Blumenberg’s notion of 
self-­‐‑assertion then not be read as a legal and extra-legal self-assertion of self-same power, ipseity and 
violence over/against the non-European other, and to colonial/imperial ends? Doesn’t self-assertion 
allow for the exclusion of other possible subject formations in the name of a politics of progress as 
Butler might ask? See Butler, Frames of War p.141 
87 Wynter, S. "Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: Towards the human, after man, its 
overrepresentation—An argument." CR: The new centennial review 3, no. 3 (2003): 257-337 
88 Bogues, A. Black heretics, black prophets: Radical political intellectuals. (Routledge, 2015) p.1; 
Grosfoguel, R. "Decolonizing post-colonial studies and paradigms of political-economy: Transmodernity, 
decolonial thinking, and global coloniality." Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of 
the Luso-Hispanic World 1, no. 1 (2011) 
89 Spillers, H. J. "All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother": 
Psychoanalysis and Race." Critical Inquiry 22, no. 4 (1996): 710-734 
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governance or regulation purports freedom and yet at the same time, it establishes a 
hierarchy of the human subject and the desires of such a human subject. To illustrate this 
problematic, I pay particular attention to Saidiya Hartman’s91 and Rinaldo Walcott’s92 
formulations of liberalism as a tension of freedom v. unfreedom or subjectivity vs. subjection. 
 
Reading Hartman and Walcott draws light to the fact that within a liberal framework, 
individuals can fit within the state’s vision of law as citizens but they can also still at once 
remain outside the law’s reach of protection insofar as they are not counted as fully human. 
Indeed for Hartman and Walcott, Black individuals and indeed all minoritised/racialised 
subjects are inscribed within the liberal freedoms and unfreedoms of law. They are inside the 
law, yet at the same time also outside it, as managed, racialised and disciplined subjects, “no-
bodies”93 or deviant “monstrous excess[es]”.94 Their liberal “human” freedoms are determined 
by law and at the same time inhibited and truncated by law. Indeed for Walcott 
“enlightenment and post-enlightenment modernist legislative and juridical practices inhibit 
freedom rather than endow it or provide for its proliferation or its coming into to being.”95Thus, 
even where law under the auspices of liberalism claims to have an emancipatory and 
egalitarian effect, such law is still imbricated within precalculated legal-juridical limits and 
unilateral coercions that engender quotidian instances of unhumaning which preclude certain 
incommensurable subjects from equally partaking “of the resplendent, plenipotent, 
indivisible, and steely singularity [i.e., abstract universality] that liberalism 
proffers.96Hartman and Walcott’s critical reading of law and rights within liberal modernity is 
significant exposes the auto-violence/ force of law and resists a presentation of legal 
liberalism as something wholly desirable for the common good through its highlighting of law’s 
inherent impulse to unfreedom and its “curtailment of sovereign personhood”.97 This is an 
inescapable structural dialectic, aporia, or double bind (of freedom vs. unfreedom/subjectivity 
vs. subjugation or subjection) that marks all liberal legal-juridical signatures from laws 
criminalising incitement to terrorism, to internet regulation, to human rights law.    
 
I seek to identify, trace and unpack these aporias through my interrogation of criminal law and 
human rights law as mechanisms of preserving, regulating and governing an ongoing liberal-
utilitarian order in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. I do this so as to move away from a particular 
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92 Walcott, R. "Freedom Now Suite: Black Feminist Turns of Voice." Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of 
Criticism 22, no. 3 (57) (2018): 151-159 
93 Ferreira da Silva, D. No-bodies: Law, raciality and violence. Griffith Law Review 18, no. 2 (2009): 212-
236 
94 Puar, J.Terrorist assemblages Terrorist Assemblages: homonationalism in queer times (Duke 
University Press, 2007) p.99 ; See also Puar, J., and Rai, A. Monster, terrorist, fag: The war on terrorism 
and the production of docile patriots Social Text 20, no. 3 (2002): 117-148; Grewal, Saving the Security 
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95 Walcott, Freedom Now Suite p.157 
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trajectory of legal scholarship that proposes and sustains a linear/universal liberal/globalised98 
framework of progression and egalitarianism for all human subjects without examining the 
historical and ongoing social, epistemic, material, and ethical disavowals sustained and 
engendered by such liberal-utilitarian modes of thinking.99  
 
In a related and inseparable mode of inquiry, I also want to problematise the penal logics of 
criminal law, as they are currently enforced, in particular their pre-determination of what 
constitutes harm by offering a deconstructive reading of it. I want to suggest that the impulse 
toward calculation and programmability, or what Zedner calls pre-crime,100 within incitement 
to terrorism regulation and indeed all forms of legal-juridical ordering carries within its text an 
autoimmune “death drive against the autos”101 (i.e., against the state sovereign’s monopoly 
on violence) that is in fact self-inadequating.102 The inability of the law to affirm the stability of 
what it calculates or determines exceedingly103 on “a scale without scales”104 (e.g. through 
ambiguous and vague terms like “terrorism”, “encouragement”, and “glorification”. terms that 
hide a “nonunifiable multiplicity of concepts”105 contradictions and questions) suggests that 
the signature of law remains haunted by the very incommensurable structure of the offences 
it inscribes and seeks to regulate.   
 
There is of course an important body of work that deals with the ambiguity thresholds of law 
and the difficulties of its interpretation,106 particularly in the arena of terrorism and 
counterterrorism law.107 This thesis draws from and expands on such scholarship (especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 For Derrida globalization has a tendency to maintain a programme of terror that concentrates and 
preserves wealth, rights, and teletechnologies for only a fraction of the western world. Derrida, Rogues 
p.155  
99 Douzinas, C. The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Hart, 
2000); Douzinas, Human rights and empire: the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism (Routledge-
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that of a critical theoretical register like Agamben’s and Vismann’s) by linking the ambiguity 
and non-determinability of law108 and terrorism to notions of autoimmunity and self-
inadequation. Thus, through a deconstructive critique of the vagueness of law, it attempts to 
trace and articulate the autoimmune drive at work within law that undoes and “works against 
law’s sovereign structure leaving ruins” or a sense of socio-political precarity/vulnerability.109 
Further, I link this notion of auto-immunity to an interminable/ spectral precarity (on the part of 
the sovereign) that engenders and sustains modes of discrimination and censorship that are 
conceptually inscribed and instituted by the very inescapable legal/liberal-utilitarian 
overdetermination of what constitutes harm.   
 
In addition to examining laws as they apply to the “real world”, I am also interested in using a 
critical-deconstructive approach to study issues within contemporary technology and Internet 
regulation in the context of terrorist speech. My focus on the iterability and heterogeneity of 
speech and online texts is a preliminary and modest attempt to go beyond common ethico-
legal/regulatory frames of intelligibility110 concerning the Internet and indeed AI,111 that for 
example still (despite their powerful insights) ethically and conceptually subtract problems of 
regulation to liberal-utilitarian norms/rubrics of reason such as the ethics of transparency,112 
diversity as representation, privacy,113the right to be forgotten,114 and the independent 
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verification of data.115 Using the concept of speech (and indeed the ambiguous of concept of 
speech that incites terrorism) as a centre of analysis, I seek to problematise such calculable 
liberal-utilitarian rubrics of regulation further by arguing that the regulation of Internet as a 
textual medium is encumbered by a multiplication of textual/speech relations and concepts 
such as: difference, heterogeneity, sovereign power, control, uncontainability, dissemination, 
and indeterminacy. Drawing from the scholarship of Justin Joque,116 I look at how these 
concepts problematise mechanisms of technology and Internet regulation like filtering, 
blocking, and Notice and Takedowns. The use of these concepts in turn makes way for me to 
undertake a critical consideration of the “ghosts” (or oft-ignored and disavowed yet recurring 
issues) within contemporary studies on Internet and technology regulation.117 It also allows 
me to simultaneously critique the calculating (i.e., penal/panoptic/banoptic) structure118 of 
Internet regulation and its propensity to disavow the heterogeneous speech and alterity of the 
other.119   
Conceptual framework: Theorising hauntology  
 
In the subsequent sections, I show how hauntology functions and how it conceptually 
undergirds this thesis. But before this is done, we must talk about the analytical method of 
deconstruction, from which the concept of hauntology is derived.  
i) A note on deconstruction    
 
Hauntology as a conceptual/theoretical lens derived from deconstruction is a method of 
reading and analysis that draws from the scholarship of Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction at 
its core rejects post-enlightenment absolutist interpretations of progress and teleology that 
claim to possess clarity and a hold on the truth.120 It pays particular attention to the 
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disappearances, mutations, disturbances, silences, recurrences and failings that liberal, 
democratic, and post-enlightenment interpretations and framings tend to overlook.  
 
Crucially, deconstruction is not a question of controversy but one of deciphering,121 one that 
seeks to open up portals of entry for thinking about law and its relation to justice, and to the 
disavowed. By showing how legal regulatory logics bear the deep imprint of a pervasive lack 
of definitive legitimacy and indeed clarity; deconstruction allows for the possibility of justice 
through its critique of what liberal-utilitarian frames of thinking disavow. As Barbara Johnson 
elaborates: “it can thus be seen that deconstruction is a form of what has long been called a 
critique. A critique of any theoretical system is not an examination of its flaws or 
imperfections. It is not a set of criticisms designed to make a system better [or more precise 
/efficient]. It is an analysis that focuses on the grounds of a system’s [ethical] im-
possibility”.122  
 
Criticisms may arise as to the objectivity or one-sidedness of this thesis in respect of its 
deconstructive approach. This accusation of one-sidedness is in fact not a new criticism of 
deconstruction. But it is a significant misreading of deconstruction, for the function of 
deconstruction is to do the work of epistemological and methodological decentering.123 This is 
to say that deconstruction essentially provides us with the tools to turn away from what we 
might take to be the central focus of our problem and to carefully look at the “taken-for-
granted” network of justifications, excuses and expressions within which such problems are 
embedded. In this sense, deconstruction is an analytical exercise that frustrates single and 
dominant expressions of one-sidedness by opening us up to the unarticulated heterological 
connections of problems and the pervasive intersections, mergings, crossings, and relations 
therein.124   
 
ii) Hauntology   
 
Hauntology or hauntologie in French is a critical-deconstructive reading concept or tool 
coined by Jacques Derrida in Spectres of Marx. It is an “ontological” disjunction that is 
“haunted” by, as Derrida puts it, “spectrality” (the concept of a ghost, or spectre125 that makes 
its reappearance and appearance in a traumatic way)126 exposing the “grey ontology”127and 
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linearity of progression of western logocentrism, or in other words capturing the persistent 
troubling ghosts of western modes of thinking and enquiry.128 Thus, hauntology is “a logic of 
haunting” 129 that seeks to articulate and capture troubling intensities and intricacies and 
taken-for-granted practices of knowledge-making and production in contemporary times by 
foregrounding the disenchanting i.e., the in-between or the undecidable or the “unnamable or 
almost unnamable thing: something, between something and someone, anyone or anything, 
some thing, ‘this thing’”)130 the “paradoxical phenomenality”131 that haunts and interrupts 
western norms of law and regulation and governance as they apply to speech regulation. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this thesis, hauntology can be read as a recurrent chain of 
questions of repetition that “begin by coming back”132–– i.e., questions that “interrupt” 
lawmaking and regulation in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. 
 
A crucial part of thinking with hauntology in this thesis is concerned with giving more attention 
to how speech in all its discontinuous iterations leads to a fundamental vulnerability of the 
state sovereign. I get to this place by associating first the very idea of sovereignty to speech. 
In fact, in chapter one, I suggest that speech is what inaugurates, legitimates, and 
memorializes the sovereign.133   
 
I then further problematise speech (through a deconstructive reading of heterogeneity, 
iterability, and dissemination) to indicate that such a notion of sovereignty (especially online 
where speakers are multiplied) is always already untethered, polycentric and always exposed 
to corruption, dissimulation and collapse.134 Thus, all inscriptions that contend with the state’s 
monolithic or unisonant idea of speech present aesthetic problems of différance, capturability 
and calculability that haunt the state endlessly without closure. Perhaps it is for this reason 
that law defines terrorism and incitement in wide terms. And yet, the demarcation between 
what is “harmful” or “not harmful” cannot happen stricto sensu given the very 
programmable/calculable nature of law. And so, in as much as the law tries to calculate, 
measure, and define harm, it is still encumbered by this incalculable inadequation (and its 
contradictions, interruptions, and questions), which are embedded within its very aesthetic 
structure.135 Thus, law turns upon itself in what Derrida calls “a gyratory coincidence between 
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force and law enveloping”.136 At any rate, all these conceptual phenomena –– auto-immunity, 
spectrality, and undeterminability declare this aporetic coincidence and its impossibility. 
 
The concept of hauntology therefore initiates and insists on a discussion of the inadequacies, 
(i.e. the “real and the unreal, the actual and the inactual…to be or not to be”137 negations, 
abstractions, assumptions, and dialectics as well as tensions of the calculable logics) of law 
making, interpretation and enforcement within modernity in the post 9/11-7//7 continuum. It 
probes the inoperabilities, contradictions, insecurities and tensions within law thereby testing 
the very philosophical concepts e.g., egalitarianism, certainty, and the harm principle that it 
presupposes. Thus, it shows that liberal-utilitarian law making as a sequence of modernity is 
scarcely self-sufficient and that geo-historical and socio-political ghosts haunt it in the living 
present.  
 
There are of course structural challenges with using such a method, the most obvious one 
being that it can seem that scholars of deconstruction are tearing down something that they 
are trying to build. But for an issue as immeasurable, incompletely-complex, and elusive as 
speech that incites terrorism, a deconstructive reading is appropriate because it attends to the 
incomplete interruptions/breaks/ returns of terrorism and in doing so, allows us to reckon with 
the very “uncapturability” of the “structures” of “terrorism”, speech and lawmaking. All this is to 
say that a deconstructive reading through the conceptual frame of hauntology gets at a 
crucial understanding of the inescapability, reverse play and heterogeneity of speech and the 
heterogeneity of sovereignty that makes the filtering, blocking, and regulation of content that 
incites terrorism especially online irrevocably difficult.  
 
In using hauntology, I do not seek to condemn or attack lawmaking and its practices of 
interpretation and regulation. Rather, I seek to make an opposite claim i.e., I hope to privilege 
the “unmasterable”138 ghosts or spectres that haunt law making and its enforcement and 
regulation in the post 9/11 -7/7 continuum.139 Thus, I carry out a deconstructive “hovering” of 
the structural aesthetics of law and regulation in order to reveal contemporary underlying 
tensions, blind spots, and vulnerabilities that plague them. This is done to emphasise the fact 
that despite its liberal and modernist intentions and desires,140 legal authority does not and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Ibid p.18 
137 Ibid p.6 
138 Ibid p.7 
139 “The post 9/11-7/7 continuum” like haunting/spectrality “is not dated, it is never docilely given a date 
in the chain of presents, day after day, according to the instituted order of a calendar." Untimely, it does 
not come to, it does not happen to, it does not befall, one day”: Derrida, Specters of Marx, p.3 
140 By exposing contradictions within modernist legal thinking, driven by certain post-enlightenment and 
liberal ideals-such as Kelsen’s idea of “pure law” as well as other notions of, subjectivity as subjection, 
rationality and equality before the law, this thesis acts at once as a critique of these legal ethical 
epistemes. 
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cannot have a singular “superior transcendent existence […] which is objectively identifiable 
and certain”.141  
 
In defence of my use of hauntology as a valid conceptual tool, a number of thinkers especially 
in sociology, cultural theory and cultural criticism (most of them drawing from Derrida’s 
spectral turn) have adopted haunting, spectrality, and the figure of the ghost142 as trajectory 
that enables them to explore and exorcise143 spectral guises and how they incomprehensibly 
“set heads spinning”144 or unnerve societal structures, specifically in relation to immateriality, 
life, death, trauma, memory, obsession and power. Hence, the concept of haunting or 
spectrality has been used to theorise and bring to light ethical, social, political, and indeed 
legal problems145 relating to oft-neglected issues concerning race, gender, ethnicity, and class 
both in the past and present. This thesis moves in a similar theoretical relation with such 
scholarship that attempts to “recover the evidence [/traces] of things not seen”146 i.e., the 
affective-sensorial traces, grafts, and erasures that haunt, and unnerve speech, law making 
and regulation (both from within and without) in the 9/11-7/7 continuum. In this regard, my 
engagement with hauntology affords me with the capacity to expose and to verify certain 
recurring socio-political, ethical and legal failures that psychically define, constitute, and 
preoccupy (yet also still elude) the existence of sovereign power in the post 9/11-7/7 
continuum.  
 
iii) How hauntology relates to law  
 
If I were to highlight, in the most abstract sense, what hauntology means for law i.e., for law 
making interpretation and enforcement, I would say that hauntology deconstructs the non-
irreducible structures that complicate, undermine and blur law’s processes of stability with 
regard to evaluating, perceiving, and apprehending speech rights and speech that incites 
terrorism in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. This observation in fact forms the basis of my two 
interrelated research claims that: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Davies, Derrida and law: legitimate fictions p.73 
142 Gordon, A. F. Ghostly matters: Haunting and the sociological imagination (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008) 
143 Saleh-Hanna, V. Black Feminist Hauntology: Rememory, the Ghosts of Abolition? Champ 
pénal/Penal field 12 (2015)  
144 Derrida, Specters of Marx p.159  
145 Oloka-Onyango, J. "Expunging the Ghost of Ex Parte Matovu: Challenges Facing the Ugandan 
Judiciary in the 1995 Constitution." Makerere Journal of Law (1996): 141-50; Oloka-Onyango, J, Ghosts 
and the law: An inaugural lecture Makerere University (12/11/2015) available at: < 
https://news.mak.ac.ug/sites/default/files/downloads/Makerere-Prof-Oloka-Onyango-Inaugural-
Professorial-Lecture-12thNov2015.pdf:>  
146 Gordon, Ghostly matters, p.195 
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1) Laws that seek to regulate or contain speech are inescapably confusing, 
undecidable and mistake laden because they are compromised and made vulnerable 
by the inherent divergence of speech and; 2) incitement to terrorism legal provisions 
and practices as well as the fair balancing principles of human rights law are aporetic 
and autoimmune in the sense that they are configured calculably yet also 
indeterminably (i.e., under exceedingly opaque and undecidable frameworks) and as 
such, they present us with certain interminable ethical quandaries. 
 
What drove me to making these claims (about speech offences) was the inchoate or 
hypothetical nature of their conceptual form. I was interested in probing the limits (or lack 
thereof) within speech offences and the ways in which they assumed a precautionary link 
between speech and presumed risk147 or violence. I was interested in studying how imaginary 
or inchoate offences became credible or real. I was interested in the illusiveness of 
boundaries within speech offences. I then became interested in interrogating the blurry 
concatenations between haunting and the criminalisation of speech in a way that could 
articulate negative feedback loops and spectral currents such as an incalculable aporia of 
legal containment (singularity vs. incommensurability/heterogeneity) with regard to 
distinguishing threats from non-threats.  
   
Additionally, I was concerned with exploring the obsessive/neurotic/psychic hyper-vigilance148 
of law enforcement procedures and technologies in the context of incitement to terrorism 
online and how they leave us trapped almost psychically in an undecidable interminable 
nightmarish reality of lack, helplessness, loss, trauma, panic, and a reactive 
aggressivity/violence that (at the same time) brings to light some of the unconscious 
processes, recurring phantasmic operations, ghostly opacities, and regulatory aporias of the 
post 9/11 continuum. The concept of hauntology and its multi-layered and interrelated motifs 
of undecidability, indeterminability and différance therefore seemed to be a befitting 
conceptual tool because in addition to providing me with an opportunity to test some of my 
claims, it equipped me with the tools needed to deconstruct recurrent problems of speech and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Amoore, L. The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability (Duke University Press, 
2013); Füredi, F. Precautionary culture and the rise of possibilistic risk assessment. Erasmus L. Rev.2 
(2009): 197; Füredi, F. Invitation to terror: The expanding empire of the unknown (Continuum Intl Pub 
Group, 2007); Beck, U. World at Risk (Polity 2009); Giddens, A. Risk and responsibility." The modern 
law review 62, no. 1 (1999): 1-10 
148 Virilio, P. & Bertrand, R. The administration of fear (Semiotext[e], 2012) pp.50-51;  
On ‘Familialism’ within the context of “the War on Terror” see Cowen, D. and Gilbert, E. Fear and the 
familial In the US War on Terror. In: Pain, R. and Smith, S. (eds) Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday 
Life (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008) pp.49–58; Sunstein, C.R. Why they hate us: The role of social dynamics. 
(2001) Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 25: p.429 72; Kuran, T. Ethnic norms and their transformation through 
reputational cascades. The Journal of Legal Studies 27, no S2 (1998): 623-659; Razack, S.H. A 
Site/Sight We Cannot Bear: The Racial/Spatial Politics of Banning the Muslim Woman's Niqab. 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 30, no. 1 (2018): 169-189; Gearty, C. Liberty and Security 
(Polity Press 2013) 
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proportionality concerning the blurring of criminal-legal boundaries in the post 9/11 -7/7 
continuum.  
 
More specifically, I felt that hauntology would be useful in examining how the visceral/spectral 
becomes logical/ rational, creating what Sunstein calls “probability neglect”.149 In this sense, 
hauntology is also crucial to the meaning and interpretation of incitement to terrorism and the 
spectral effects it produces (such as probability neglect) are inseparable from the very 
unidentifiable yet phantasmic phenomenon of terrorism. Indeed, when probability neglect is at 
work, people’s attention is “affective” i.e., focused on the bad outcome itself, or the worst-
case scenario, and they are inattentive to the fact that it is unlikely to occur because “the 
wrong things [are elevated] into sensational focus [by] hiding and mystifying the[ir] deeper 
causes”.150Consequently, hermeneutic problems that arise when law enforcement and other 
regulators have to distinguish what is “illegal” from what is “objectionable” –– haunting alters. 
Thus, as my exploration of human rights law decisions in chapter five will show, a state of 
exception or “an ambiguous uncertain zone is spectrally replicated where de facto 
proceedings which are in themselves extra or anti-juridical pass over into law and juridical 
norms blur with mere fact hence creating a threshold where fact and law become 
undecidable”.151 The implication of this is that the fair balancing principles of human rights law 
are always already in an autoimmunary logic152 encumbered and self-inadequated through 
their association with liberal-utilitarianism and its own over determination of harm, terrorism or 
incitement, offences which are in reality contested, shifting, and incalculable. 
 
This not only perplexes those within and without enforcement and regulation (since it 
becomes hard to distinguish what incitement to terrorism constitutes) but it also functions 
within monolithic/homogenous logic of the self-same backed by the force of law that it 
requires in order to sustain its very existence. Thus, in as much as law does provide a degree 
of liberty, rights protection, and a measured distributive or calculated justice it is also forever 
marked - in a double bind - by the violence of the “force of law” that disavows the speech and 
alterity of the other.153 This is an irresolvable structural-aesthetic tension, a structural ghost 
within (yet also outside) the mechanism of law that keeps returning to destabilise counter 
terrorism regulation, incitement to terrorism law, as well as human rights law making and 
interpretation in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Ibid  
150 Hall, S., et.al Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982) 
introduction p.vii  
151 Agamben, State of Exception, p.29 
152 n.37  
153 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection; Kapur Gender, Alterity and Human Rights 
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Theoretical (and methodological) clarifications, scope and limitations  
 
This thesis does not purport to offer an exhaustive empirical investigation of terrorism or 
incitement to terrorism under hauntology; this would be an ambitious exercise. Rather, it 
seeks to expose, and critically grapple with some of the conceptual problematics concerning 
lawmaking regulation and enforcement in the context of incitement to terrorism. As a matter of 
urgency, it confronts or leans critically into rather than away from the tensions of incitement to 
terrorism law in the hope of being more attentive to the pressing ethical demands of the 
speech of the other. Of course, I do appreciate that other kinds of scholarship seek to “revive” 
the liberal human rights project and to return to its fundamental values,154 however, such an 
inclination or desire to revive, reconcile, or resolve the problems of law and human rights in 
the context of incitement to terrorism is not at stake in this thesis. 
My reluctance at proposing a revised defining of the term “terrorism” or even distinguishing 
terrorist harms or “threats” from non-threats is in itself an ethical stance that is also at the 
same time a considered methodological resistance to a reassuring ontological reversal, which 
would in effect not undo our confidence in liberal-utilitarian legal rationality and thus sustain 
an ethico-legal autoimmunary suicide.155 From a deconstructive perspective, I am aware of 
the fact that coming up with an operational distinction of say “what is harmful” from “what is 
not harmful” can and could be made and declared in law.156 However, the argument this 
thesis seeks to highlight through a deconstructive reading is that such a normative distinction 
or delimited horizon cannot be enforced, pre-calculated, implemented and interpreted stricto 
sensu. Legal definitions and systems self-present as if they are definitive and clear when in 
fact they are not.157 Thus, any proposed definition of “terrorism” or a distinction of “threats” 
from “non threats” in the context of incitement to terrorism would spectrally subtend, 
acellerate, and multiply the aporetic. It would incessantly defer, invert, supplant, reverse, 
reproduce and return [revenante] the very crises of undeterminability and uncertainty within 
law that I am attempting to problematise.158  
 
The fact that contemporary laws attempt to make these distinctions and still ultimately fail to 
achieve a hold on clarity or definitiveness is suggestive of an inescapable auto-immunity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 See e.g., Goold, Benjamin J., and Liora Lazarus, Introduction Security and human rights 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019) p.3; p.20 
155Derrida, Death Penalty, p.124 See also above n.37 
156 Ibid: My reluctance to define “the other” is intentional. It is an ethical theoretical positioning that 
gestures towards an ethics of the unprogrammable. And so it does not seek to reduce/ delineate who 
exactly should protected by law or awarded justice as this would delimit/pre-programme justice using 
the scales of utility See also Cornell, “Time, deconstruction, and the challenge to legal positivism” p.285 
 Ramshaw, Justice as Improvisation 
157 Saussure notes in a relatable observation, “to speak of a ‘linguistic law’ in general is like trying to lay 
hands on a ghost”: De Saussure, F. Course in General Linguistics, trans. Harris, R. (Open Court, 1986) 
pp.90-91 
158 See Derrida, Rogues pp.6-9 on the conceptual free wheel of reason.  
                                                                                                                             	  
34	  
spectrality, or paradoxical indeterminability within law’s very aesthetic structure. This 
interminable inability to distingush or define - whatever law seeks to contain - declares an 
ethical impossibility that I want to tremble and tarry with, so that I do not perpetuate some of 
the logocentric aspects of what I am trying to undo. Which is to say that the concept of 
hauntology allows for some space to doubt, critique and appraise the current system of law 
making and enforcement (just as it is, as it functions) meticulously, –– with great care.159 
 
Because I am interested in critiquing current frameworks of law in this thesis, rather than lean 
away from these aporetic frameworks, I offer a modest critical reading of law (and its liberal-
utilitarian schematics) that problematises these very frameworks based on their own 
predications, interpretations, necessitations, applications and assertions of what is harmful or 
threatening. It is for this reason that I turn to case law examples to show how the law currently 
functions. To be clear, I do not hold onto these distinctions i.e., of what is harmful/threatening 
and what is not harmful/not threatening within the law as a conceptual end or function. 
Rather, I situate these structural /metaphysical logic of law’s dialectic tensions (self-
referentially) in a differential economy,160 or inhabit their discourse diacritically and 
deconstructively,161 (particularly as it has been deployed in the last 18 to19 years since 9/11), 
in an attempt to discern facere veritatem how the law itself, based on the current statutory 
definitions of terrorism under the Terrorism 2000 Act162 (where, briefly, terrorism is “the use or 
threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public”) calculates or distinguishes, or as I argue, inescapably self-inadequates or confuses 
itself internally or undecidably e.g., through its inescapable auxiliary overlaps with other 
statutory provisions when it attempts to calculate or distinguish, what is harmful or threatening 
from what is harmless or non threatening, as well as how, and when, it identifies and 
apprehends what “glorifies” or “encourages” terrorism as stipulated under the Terrorism Act 
2006. This discussion of “terrorism” and “incitement to terrorism” and how they interact with 
criminal law and human rights, on their own terms, which I do in greater detail in my legal 
analyses in chapters two and four, is important because it provides a crucial foundational 
contextual prop, or standard of assessment that allows me to critique the ways in which 
terrorism is deployed in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. This is methodologically crucial to my 
deconstructive method and its contiguous and subsequent ethical interventions.163 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 This is driven by an ethics that enacts a nonviolent poetics of relation with the other ––following 
Cornell and Glissant. Cornell, D. "Post-structuralism, the ethical relation, and the law." Cardozo L. 
Rev. 9 (1987): 1587; Glissant, É. Poetics of Relation (University of Michigan Press, 1997) 
160 Derrida, J. Positions (Continuum 2004) p.xix 
161 n.77: This is a Spivakian direction that sustains comparisons and navigates deconstructively within 
them through an intimate register of hermeneutic critique.  
162 Whist I maintain this current operational definition in my analysis, I also probe its logocentric 
assumptions. 
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My ethical ideas of the ghost dance in chapter five are tentative proposals that also take the 
law as it is, i.e., as a system that currently funtions within a need to determine, define or 
calculate harm. I envision the ghost dance as a groundless non-definable, mode of ethical 
interpretation that is (as I will suggest) attuned to the alterity of the other. Rather than suggest 
a reformulation of the law (e.g., through a definition of terrorism or a limitation of offences that 
incite terrorism) the ghost dance, admits and acknowledges that law and all legal definitions 
are inherently vague and autoimmunary. In this regard, it attempts to reroute away from the 
violent structure of law by attending more to interpretations and situations of justice that 
exceed law (for justice is distinct from the reason, force and calculability of law, the juridical, 
and politics and can never be reduced to it)164 from within law’s very pre-calculated limits.165  
  
More specifically, I am concerned about the epistemic indifference and exclusionary violence 
to the other that such an overhaul, defining, or clarification of “the other” may signal and 
entail. I hold onto and work with Derrida and Ramshaw’s observations that a pure ethics 
should be unrecognisable, improvised and unprogrammable.166 For this reason, there is in 
this thesis, an ethical necessity to abstain from the liberal-utilitarian paternalising impulse to 
predefine and preprogramme the limits of law for the inferior/oppressed other,167 or to even 
epistemically reconcile or resolve the demands of security with human rights. Whilst such 
scholarship is important, it does not adequately address the recurring violence of the force of 
law within criminal law and human rights discourse.168It also gestures towards a kind of legal-
liberal politics that would yet again stifle the kind of radical freedom and justice for the other 
that I am attempting to reach for, as it would require the enforceability of, a strict determinable 
Kantian knowledge programme169 (of categorical rights and “regulative ideas of reason”170and 
tolerance) that would in a circular motion efface the alterity of the other and repeat the brutal 
spectral effects and unfreedoms of the force of law. These are critical ethical points that this 
thesis seeks to mark and attend to. 
 
The incalculable groundlessness of the ghost dance therefore enables what I think is a more 
adequate and urgent ethical demand as it attends to the heterogeneity of the other and also 
calls into question the topographical re-inscription of a western logocentric liberal-utilitarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Derrida, Rogues p.149 
165 Ramshaw, Justice as improvisation p.115  
166 Ibid; n.156 
167Spivak, G.C. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ In Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, 
eds. Williams, P and Chrisman, L. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993) p.93 
168 Derrida, spectres pp.49-53 
169 For da Silva, the Kantian knowledge programme is characterised by a post enlightenment ethical 
syntax of knowing and determinacy that functions through “the assignation of value” using a “universal 
scale.” See: da Silva, D. F. "1 (life)÷ 0 (blackness)=∞−∞ or∞/∞: On Matter Beyond the Equation of 
Value." Re-visiones 7 (2017) 
170 Dister, J. E. "Kant’s Regulative Ideas and the ‘Objectivity ‘of Reason." In Proceedings of the Third 
International Kant Congress, pp. 262-269. (Springer, Dordrecht, 1972) 
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telos that favours finding perfect pre-emptive solutions to problems rather than attending to 
and attuning to how and why they continue to unsettle us “perennially and recurrently”.171 It 
also grapples with and addresses directly the recurring problematics of the force of law. 
Following Derrida, I want to stress that it is this deconstructive rupture, this aporetic unsettling 
or questioning of freedom and rights (as they are imbricated within the prevailing liberal-
utilitarian order) that exposes us to the possibility of an incalculable relation with the 
heterogeneous alterity and speech of the other.172 
 
Again, I want to emphasise that, together with hauntology, the ghost dance is a 
deconstructive marking of law’s undecidability and inoperability that seeks to undo, recast, 
interrupt, and question liberal-utilitarianism givenness and its coherent173 self-presencing of 
texts.  Both concepts, “hauntology” and “the ghost dance”, suggest that law is disseminated, 
supplanted and supplemented by other regulatory orders and thus cannot be self-contained. 
The importance of underscoring this fact is that it draws our attention to the fact that the 
uncontainability of law lends itself to a corresponding closure of the horizon of the 
heterogeneous singularity of the other. This demands a critical-ethical intervention and is a 
significant reason as to why a deconstruction of law’s calculability is pivotal in this thesis. 
 
At any rate, the concepts of  “hauntology” and “the ghost dance” should not be taken as an 
exhaustive blueprint for lawmaking or interpretation. They are merely intimations of an ethical 
re-imagination, an elsewhere, that attempts to reposition us beyond liberal-utilitarian 
constraints, of contemporary incitement to terrorism laws.    
 
A question may arise as to why this thesis does not engage the right to privacy. Scholarship 
that explores privacy in the context of terrorism174 does exist but a comprehensive 
deconstructive engagement with privacy would go beyond the scope of this thesis. It is for this 
reason that this thesis does not attend to the right to privacy.175 Similarly, although the Article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Johns, F. "From Planning to Prototypes: New Ways of Seeing Like a State." The Modern Law 
Review (2019) 82(5) MLR 833–863 
172 Derrida, Rogues p.150 
173 This thesis departs from legal positivist scholarship that acknowledges the difficulty of defining 
terrorism yet still confusingly insists that a coherent legal international definition of terrorism can or 
should be achieved. See e.g., Saul, B. "Defining Terrorism: A Conceptual Minefield." (2017) 
174 Steeves, V. "Theorizing Privacy in a Liberal Democracy: Canadian Jurisprudence, Anti-Terrorism, 
and Social Memory After 9/11." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20, no. 1 (2019): 323-341; Abbas, M.S. 
"Producing ‘internal suspect bodies’: divisive effects of UK counter‐terrorism measures on Muslim 
communities in Leeds and Bradford." The British journal of sociology 70, no. 1 (2019): 261-282; Farrell, 
H. and Newman. A.L Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle Over Freedom and Security 
(Princeton University Press, 2019); Gearty, C. ‘State surveillance in an age of security’, in F Davis, N 
McGarrity, G Williams (eds), Surveillance, Counterterrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism (New 
York, Routledge, 2013) 
175 My critique of the liberal-utilitarianism of speech is still also at once a modest critique of the framing 
of privacy as a monolithic liberal-utilitarian right. Indeed, my critique of speech also unpacks some of the 
problematics of privacy that privilege a decontaminated or secure monolithic liberal-utilitarian imaginary 
that disavows relations of heterogeneity and plurivocality that as I show in Chapter one, speech and 
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11 right to freedom of association or assembly is also pertinent to this thesis, I do not attend 
to it because a comprehensive deconstructive engagement with it would go beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  
 
Finally, although reference is made to other EU jurisdictions especially in my discussion of 
rights under the Convention, the UK remains this thesis’ principal jurisdictional locus for 




This thesis proceeds as follows: 
 
Chapter one is concerned with exploring speech theoretically. It draws from speech act theory 
and deconstruction mainly from the work of Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: a politics of the 
performative and Jacques Derrida’s Dissemination and Of Grammatology in order to 
introduce, develop and connect many of the conceptual ideas around which this thesis is 
structured.  
 
In this regard, this chapter can be read as an attempt to theorise speech and the 
symbolic/phantasmic potency that it wields especially in the context of lawmaking and 
regulation. Hence, it constructs speech as an incalculable assemblage of overlapping, 
divergent disseminatory and iterable speech that always already subverts containment and 
constatives of performance. In doing so, it suggests that the disseminatory structure of 
speech presents problems for law, regulation and enforcement structures that are grounded 
on calculable constative boundaries of interpretation.176 Accordingly, this chapter suggests 
that the uncontainability and inescapable plurivocality177 of speech is what gives speech the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
indeed technology accelerate. My modest assertion here is that “privacy territorialises a spatial 
collective continuity (and creates a specular other) that reifies sovereignty. A critique of speech is 
therefore at once also a critique of the “topographical or liberal-utilitarian aesthetics of privacy that pull 
individuals together universally under a common spatial frame of the sovereign state (against collective 
individual autonomy) creating autochthonous zones of ‘presence- to-self’ that are circumscribed by the 
rubrics of public order, assimilation and hierarchy. My critique of the monolithic singularity of speech 
within law therefore corresponds conceptually to and reiterates a (would-be) corollary critique of privacy. 
It is also why I do not undertake a discussion of privacy under article Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in this thesis: See Joque, and Kalulé, Law & Critique: Technology 
elsewhere, (yet) phantasmically present. See also McKittrick, K. Demonic grounds: Black women and 
the cartographies of struggle. (U of Minnesota Press 2006); Browne, S. Race and 
surveillance. Handbook on Surveillance Studies (Routledge 2012); Browne, Dark matters; Weheliye, 
Habeas viscus  
176 I argue that speech is not “a transparent medium for the transportation of meaning”: De Ville, J. 
"Derrida, the conditional, and the unconditional" Stellenbosch Law Review, Stellenbosch 
Regstydskrif 18, no. 2 (2007): 255-287 
177 In this thesis “plurivocality” refers to the interlinked plurality or multiplicity of speech or voices. 
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power and ability to confound and destabilise legal enforcement and regulation. Further, 
drawing from Joque’s perspicacious scholarship on deconstruction and technology, a 
discussion of the textual nature of Internet178 communication technologies and their ecological 
fecundity for dissemination and uncontainability (an issue which recurs in chapter three) is 
initiated. In sum, this chapter makes the theoretical claim that regulatory regimes, which claim 
to be able to contain speech that incites terrorism, are inherently self-compromising owing to 
the fact that they seem to be haunted by a trace of lack, impotence or inability in their quest to 
contain the heterological phantoms of speech. The main point of this deconstruction is to 
show that liberal-utilitarian understandings of harm have an ineluctable tendency to over 
determine what constitutes harm. These are important preliminary theoretical observations 
that later inform my criminal law and human rights analyses of speech in chapters two and 
five respectively.   
 
Chapter two is a legal doctrinal chapter. The method of analysis in this chapter can be seen 
as being closer to a “traditional” black letter law approach in the sense that it demonstrates 
how existing incitement to terrorism laws are applied through a reading of case law decisions. 
In terms of scope, this chapter traces the genealogical links of incitement to terrorism, both as 
an inchoate offence and as a public order offence. In paying particular attention to the links 
between inchoate offences, public order offences, terrorism offences, and incitement to 
terrorism offences, this chapter highlights conceptually undecidable thresholds of the law in 
this area, and their implications. This is done through an analysis of concepts like “likelihood” 
and “recklessness” as well as “inchoate liability”179amongst others. The confusing and 
indistinguishable character of legal offences in this area suggests that despite its claims to 
certainty, there is always already an autoimmune logic inscribed and working within the text 
that leads to a self-inadequation in the law. This textual failure or inadequation leads to an 
corresponding feeling of precarity from the perspective of the sovereign that in turn makes it 
susceptible for incitement to terrorism laws to be applied arbitrarily, in a discriminatory 
manner. Moreover, this chapter suggests that because the law focuses on harm or disruption 
in utilitarian terms, it tends to disavow the heterogeneity of speech by failing to give credence 
to the iterable divergence of speech. Rather than try to analyse all manner of cases falling 
under the umbrella of terrorism in the post 9/11 continuum, my approach to the case law 
selection in this chapter was to search for terrorism related cases that demonstrated links to 
the protection and preservation of normative public order. I felt that analysing these cases, by 
looking at the ethical implications of their contradictions, was a more substantive endeavour 
than trying to come to a grand objective exhaustive analysis of all the cases related to 
incitement to terrorism.  
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Chapter three interrogates the legal enforcement and regulation180 of different incitement to 
terrorism provisions. In other words, it shows how the legal provisions in chapter two are 
transposed online in order to counter extremist speech. As such, it focuses on the techniques 
and methods of online regulation under the notice and takedown (NTD) model. It then looks 
at technological regulatory techniques such as filtering and blocking in order to examine their 
limitations. This chapter uses some of the empirical data from semi-structured interviews 
which were advisory and not representative to support the claim that the inadequacies and 
inconsistencies of the criminal law (discussed in chapter two) increasingly blur the thresholds 
between suspicion and actual crime hence engendering a degree of undecidability that 
reinforces (yet at the same time complicates and undermines) law enforcement. My decision 
to use interviews was driven by the need to explore some of the discrepancies between the 
law in practice and the law in the books especially with regard to operationalising and 
enforcing widely drawn incitement to terrorism statutes as no equivalent assessment of this 
nature has so far been conducted. Insights from interviewees are woven into my discussion in 
chapter three of this thesis. By carrying out a synthesised analysis that combines an 
evaluation of the data from these interviews, a critique of the law in chapter two, and of 
speech in chapter one, this chapter argues that online communication technologies and the 
tools that regulate them (i.e., automated filtering or algorithms and Artificial Intelligence ––
hereinafter AI) are self-undermining in the sense that they have the potential to subvert and 
resist pre-programming in their intention to detect and contain speech that incites terrorism. 
The discussion in this chapter reveals a crucial hauntological configuration i.e., that however 
much the law/regulation tries to contain these spectres, often these spectres, the “bearers of 
silence/absence”181 return, leaking through, so as to interrupt, complicate, and impede law’s 
hauntological logics of calculability, rationality, reason, and containability.182 
 
Chapter four is a doctrinal human rights chapter. Human rights are considered here because 
they perform a conceptual, aesthetic and subsidiary function with respect to the lawmaking 
and regulatory processes of incitement to terrorism. Thus, drawing from decisions in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), this chapter suggests that fair balancing 
principles i.e., the margin of appreciation, subsidiarity and proportionality which aim to protect 
the right to freedom of expression are aporetic and self-limiting and self-destabilising due to 
their grounding in theorems of liberal-utilitarianism. This chapter is for the most part 
subjunctive or hypothetical in the sense that it draws from freedom of expression decisions 
that are (not actually, but rather) loosely connected to the notion of incitement. My approach 
to the case law selection in this chapter was to search for incitement and public order related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180For this thesis, regulation, is defined as a “mechanism of social control or influence affecting all 
aspects of behaviour whether intentional or not” Black, J. Critical Reflections on Regulation London 
(LSE centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, 2002) available at: < 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35985/1/Disspaper4-1.pdf > accessed (08/16/2018) 
181 Ibid p.6 
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cases that demonstrate how the interpretive principles of the Convention are applied. I was 
interested particularly in decisions that underscored the aporias of singularity v. heterogeneity 
and subjectivity v. subjection under a liberal utilitarian framing. I wanted to probe the ethical 
implications of such calculated restrictions. At any rate, this chapter attempts to imagine how 
courts would conceptually interpret incitement to terrorism decisions. This is done for two 
reasons: 1) because the very concept of incitement to terrorism is drifting, elusive and 
contestable there are – and may be – wide variances with regard to what may be considered 
incitement to terrorism, and 2); because there is a dearth of case law under the ECtHR with 
regard to cases pertaining specifically to expressions that incite terrorism. Accordingly, the 
first half of the chapter, is concerned with an analysis of the application of fair balancing 
principles of human rights such as subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation, and 
proportionality. This is done so as to assess the vulnerabilities and blind spots of the liberal-
utilitarian framework that underpins human rights decisions. The second half of the chapter 
focuses on probing the liberal-utilitarian schema of rights as it applies to the balancing of the 
right to freedom of speech but in a much wider aesthetic way. That is, through an inter-woven 
double reading, this chapter navigates through cases that present two rights balancing 
scenarios, namely: 1) where the ECtHR declares that individual speech rights should be 
restricted in order to protect the overriding speech rights of the majority and 2); where the 
ECtHR declares that there has been an undue violation of individual and indeed minoritarian 
speech rights in favour of the majority. In reading these cases, I place an emphasis on the 
latter scenario which as I argue suggests that rights can be rerouted “otherwise”, in a 
transgressive183manner that goes past and beyond constrictive liberal-utilitarian rubrics in 
order to achieve a kind of impossible justice that exceeds the force and violence of law and is 
attuned to the heterogeneity and plurivocality of the other. In addition to looking at the 
protection and balancing of the right to freedom of speech under Article 10, this chapter also 
explores: 1) Article 7 which requires that criminal laws must be foreseeable by the citizen; 2) 
Article 14 which protects citizens from discrimination and 3); Article 9 which protects the 
freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs. My discussion of Article 14 and Article 9 follows 
a similar trajectory to that of Article 10 in the sense that it attempts to interrogate contrastive 
readings of the interpretive principles of human rights by the ECtHR. Moreover, my 
discussion of Articles 9 and 14 also traces how fair balancing affects the alterity of the other. 
The discussion of Article 7 in this chapter takes a slightly different direction in the sense that it 
re-examines the underlying issue of opacity and undecidability within the incitement to 
terrorism laws, an issue that previously runs through chapters two and three. I try wherever 
possible to show how these recurrent paradoxes within human rights law link back to my 
conceptual framework of hauntology by suffusing my case law discussions with 
deconstructive insights.    
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Chapter five reviews the previous chapters and pulls their arguments together. It reorients or 
links them back to the conceptual framework of hauntology. In doing so, it suggests that these 
recurring opacities within incitement to terrorism coupled with the incapacity of human rights 
with regard to how the fair balancing principles to extend or limit freedom of speech to the 
other could be a direct mark, or permeation of hauntological fear in the post 9/11-7/7 
continuum. It presents this as an irreconcilable, interpretational, neither-nor tension of 
undecidability. In this regard, this chapter is skeptical about advocating for “new” laws or 
forms of regulation concerned with utility, exemplarity, deterrence, and ends-oriented justice. 
This, it argues, is due to the fact that the force of law and the recurring undecidable problems 
inherent within law engender an aporetic non-closure. These legal-ethical interpretational 
problems (although amplified in incitement to terrorism laws) are present within all laws, that 
no law is perfect. Not wanting to leave this thesis on a note of irreparable “risk” or despair,184 
this chapter proposes an ethical intervention wherein it grapples with the incalculable 
possibility of unanticipatable justice. It thinks about how we could attempt to signal an 
elsewhere (i.e., an ethical bearing that animates law’s reserve for justice) in a manner that 
attends to the heterogeneity of the other. The “unanticipatable” directions provided here are 
initially formulated in chapters four and two where a discussion of cases that are receptive 
and responsive to the heterogeneity of the other is done. I chart and gather these directions 
under the notion of “the ghost dance”. 
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Chapter 1  
	  
Conceptualising speech: Of haunted terrorist speech and the limits of 
regulation 
 
“Every sign, if it is to be a sign must presuppose the possibility of repetition (iterability). Because of this possibility the 
present presentation of meaning by expression is haunted by its repetition.”185 –– Geoffrey Bennington 
 
What speech represents  
 
In Of Grammatology and in Signature event context, the philosopher Jacques Derrida looks at 
how speech and language form society. For Derrida, speech (and indeed language) is a form 
of enunciating or uttering existence and being. Speech thus forms, creates, and determines 
the historico-metaphysical predeterminations of modern society.  
 
Speech, if viewed from these terms, is very instrumental for administration and governance 
and for inaugurating as well as preserving the idea of sovereignty. Indeed, at the beginning of 
the very origins of European civilisation, speech and the writing of speech were a 
“transmitting medium” for communication, they were an originary locutionary act that was 
used to transmit and convey meaning and to create hierarchisation186 through its “living 
feeling” power. Such “meaning” as Derrida explains, is grounded in a presence/absence, 
cultural memory, imagination, morality a phantasmic materiality or (un)consciousness.187 
Speech can thus be configured as a writing pad, a sort of psychic signifying register that 
inscribes (and erases) signs, ideas and the circumstances that accompany them.188 
Language and speech (because speech is a component of language) are logos i.e., reason, 
coherence, logic, knowledge and the word of God. In this sense, speech provides and 
represents a fixed ideological grounding or corpus of knowledge.  
 
To speak, as Fanon notes, is to “assume a culture to support the weight of a civilisation”.189 
Indeed, for Vismann, the transmission of speech was a means of conveying tradition and for 
consolidating empire, thus, the ability of Imperial Rome to ritualise speech through signatures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Bennigton, G. Jacques Derrida (University of Chicago press, 1993) p.66 
186 Derrida, J. Signature event context 1972 (Glyph I, 1977) 
187 Derrida, Monolingualism of the other, p.29  
188 Ibid p.6 and Freud, S. et.al "Project for a scientific psychology"(1954) 
189 Fanon, F. Black Skin, White masks (New York 1952) pp.17-18 
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scrolls and translated media, invested Rome with a voice a legitimacy and memorialisation 
that led to the establishment and expansion of empire.190 Thus, much of western speech (and 
indeed western law as an official register of speech) sought to represent, transmit, impose 
(e.g. through the imposition of monolinguistic imperialistic languages and nationalistic 
identities or indigenousness on colonised peoples) and consolidate power, metaphysics, and 
a distinct imperial primacy and totality of authority.  
 
All this is to suggest that speech inscribes, structures, and relations of power. Undeniably, the 
scientific and cultural expansion of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth century would not 
have occurred without the intellectual sociological and scientific technologies of writing. The 
ways in which speech is circulated between parties predetermines roles. It becomes a vehicle 
for transmitting particular aims of social and political and social ordering governance and 
subordination. To belabour this point, one can consider the salient role that freedom of 
speech plays in establishing political legitimacy (or the ability to participate in a democracy) 
through understandings of political speech such as the vote.191 Heinze argues that the word 
vote has its semantic roots in the word “voice” and is attached to the idea of citizens formally 
offering and pledging their mandates and views to the sovereign.192 To this end, voting is a 
formalised form of speech; “to deny a citizen a vote is to deny a citizen a voice”. Thus 
construed, speech/language becomes a marker of belonging,193 of state formation and of a 
unanimous people assembled and united or assimilated by an attributable symbol such as a 
mother tongue (i.e., an ideology of “unisonance” –– the unity/unification of voice and 
consciousness) joining a fraternity (a fatherland/ Gemeinschaft) of individuals194 belonging to 
the same “bio-logic”195 family.    
 
To speak here of a “mother tongue” or language/speech would be to speak of a single 
community that as Nancy notes “loses the in of being-in-common”.196 Thus the idea of a 
mother tongue would draw links to an essence of birth as it relates to soil, blood, the bio-logic, 
as integrated under the notions of nationality citizenship and culture. This integration 
unification of speech/language into such an objective homogenous singularity of essence or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Vismann, C. Files Law and Media Technology (Stanford University Press, 2008) p.53 
191 Rancière following Aristotle notes that, those citizens with a civic life or in a polis have a voice, logos 
that is distinct from those outside the polis. Those outside the polis only speak with a voice phôné that 
serves animals in general to indicate or show sensations of pleasure or pain: Rancière, 
J. Disagreement: Politics and philosophy (University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pp.21- 22 
See also Aristotle, Politics (Cambridge, Mass: Leob Classical Library 1932)  
192 Heinze, E. Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (OUP, 2016) pp.46-47 
193 Derrida, Monolingualism of the other  
194 Bhabha, J. “Get back to where you once belonged: Identity, citizenship, and exclusion in 
Europe”. Hum. Rts. Q. 20 (1998): 592  
195 “Bio-logic” is a term coined by Oyěwùmí, to show that the cultural organisation of the western world 
and its social categories is derived from biological determinism Oyěwùmí, O. The invention of women: 
Making an African sense of western gender discourses (U of Minnesota Press, 1997) preface p.ix 
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corpus of knowledge – usually a Pan-European knowledge – however, is not without 
differences, splits, divergences, subtractions, contradictions, challenges and repeated on-
going translations.197 Intellectual property law (i.e., copyright law) and indeed privacy law (e.g. 
discussions around the right to be forgotten)198 suggest that speech in western liberal 
societies is essentially a property right (i.e., that speech invests individuals with a sense of 
logos and thus construes speech as an integrant of self-property/ownership) which means 
that subjects can and do exercise speech as self owning persons for the development of their 
agency and selfhood.199 Speech in this regard ceases to be a monolithic/ homogenous public 
totality that can be present, interpretable or controllable. Rather, It starts to become a unique 
differentiated right. As my discussion in this chapter will later show, the very differentiation of 
speech then begins to correspondingly fragment, split, subtract and challenge configurations 
of sovereign singularity.  
 
Such a differentiation of sovereignty is perhaps most visible online. That is to say in 
cyberspace, the tensions between the state and personhood take on even a bigger 
significance wherein individuals become somewhat devolved (or divisible) sovereigns in their 
own right and inhabit a power that allows them to dislodge the state’s homo-hegemony of its 
totalising effects. As such, the public-private dialectic takes on a whole new overlay of in-
between-ness wherein distinctions between the public and private become nebulous.  
 
This cybernetic struggle for speech ownership production and regulation happens on a wide 
scale and within a complex system of nondeterministic/unprogrammable relations and 
networks. It pushes the notions of state sovereignty to the limits and in so doing allows for the 
putting together of differentiated/divisible speech that is bound to rupture, displace and crack 
the state’s central/indivisible shell of speech authority and primacy by revealing the co-
existence of other contesting and contested forms of sovereignty beyond state sovereignty 
that each infer “an infinite number of performances”.200 This then fosters a complex structure 
of interrelations between the speakers, akin to what Deleuze and Guattari have called the 
“rhizome”,201 hence complicating regulation. I return to some of these regulatory difficulties 
later on in this chapter. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Butler, Excitable Speech  
198 Mayer-Schönberger, V. Delete: The virtue of forgetting in the digital age (Princeton University Press, 
2011) 
199 These Kantian style rights are also mirrored in the US first Amendment, “The First Amendment 
confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.” United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948)  
200 Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge (Pantheon Books, New York 1972) p.27 
201 The rhizome, an interconnection of networks, is founded on heterogeneity. It is impossible to trace 
the rhizome back to a principal locality or root.  A very similar notion to the rhizome is the assemblage, 
which emphasises fluidity, exchangeability, and multiple functionalities connectivity: Deleuze, G. & 
Guattari, F. A thousand plateaus, 1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987); Glissant, 
Poetics of Relation p.33  
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I have so far introduced the idea that speech is not singular, monolithic or univocal. In the 
next sections I take this idea further by looking more micrologically at the heterogeneity of 
speech and the tensions that are imbricated within it. 
 
Speech and différance   
 
According to Ferdinand de Saussure’s, Course of General linguistics, language/speech 
consists of a closed system of words. Within this system of semiotics, the signifier is the word 
or sound image and the signified is the concept or mental image conjured. For Saussure, 
there is no intrinsic link between the word and the image. Hence, the link between signifier 
and signified is arbitrary, differential, insubstantial, open and relational. In other words, there 
is no universal essence or fixed set of concepts that signifies. What speech signifies in one 
language will differ (sometimes radically) from what speech signifies in another language. 
Each language articulates and organises the world differently. Speech is thus a network of 
opened-out/infinite differences with no stable programmable/calculable elements.   
  
This emphasis of speech as a spatio-temporal-networked system of movable differences is 
important here. It suggests an inherent “destinerrance”202/ “undecidability”/ “blindness”203 
interchangeability and contingency within speech. Thus every sequence of “said speech” ––
whether it be written, spoken or recorded, generates multiple sequences of meanings, 
cognitions/re-cognitions i.e., a multitude of alternative perspectives, identities and 
subjectivities, some of which will be deferred or concealed on account of their inability to be 
grasped. This inability to grasp (which also involves the repression, deferral or erasure of 
oppositional meanings “the not said”)204 is based on particular cultural and historical 
hermeneutic determinations particular to the western world, which strive to create a 
homogenous meaning out of “the said”. But as we shall see, “the not said” meanings are not 
vanquishable. They are central to the very economy of “the said” and are in an ineluctable link 
or spectral tethering with(in) it.   
 
Indeed, Derrida has demonstrated that this deferred-difference (or différance)205 of speech 
brings otherness i.e., the representative subjectivities of the excluded outside into a 
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204 Ibid 
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or postponement. For Derrida différance is also about the interplay of tensions and oppositions like 




continuous relation with closed hierarchal structures. Thus, “othered speech” by virtue of its 
différance206 is compelled to and indeed interacts secretly and continuously in dissent with the 
very hierarchical speech structures that seek to erase, exclude mute or overcome them in the 
first place.  
 
If we take the example (in late-modern history) of marginalised voices, identities and 
relationships (e.g. the relationship between colonizers and the colonised), it becomes 
apparent that silenced colonised voices have always haunted the monolithic homo-hegemony 
i.e., the identity speech or fixity of the colonizer. That is to say, suppressed voices have 
always exerted an incalculable absence/presence, an (unheimlich) uncanniness that 
frustrates the familiar (or familial) present-whole that seeks to unisonantly inscribe, represent 
and put them in the out of memory.  
 
And so, in a kind of ineluctable catachresis, subaltern speech inevitably inhabits a dystopic 
space of power (already in the inside) and spectrally reconfigures it strategically by borrowing 
from its own history and heritage of oppression in order to transform its “logical 
systematicity”207 by “determining its conditions of existence, fixing at least its limits, 
establishing its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and showing 
what other forms of statement it excludes”.208 Consequently, they, i.e., the voices of absence, 
the voices on the outside of speech, of suspended or deferred-difference/ différance, re-
emerge spectrally unsounded from the cracks of univocality or unisonance bringing with them 
disparate articulations of truth, legitimacy, subjectivity, desire, history, memory and culture 
that challenge established notions of centre and periphery such as monolinguistic 
representations, laws and sovereignties of command.  
Speech in the break; turned into itself   
 
It is fair to say (as the above section shows) that speech, from the very beginning, by 
ascribing or inscribing différance, creates a reverse-play of power or counter-power 
situations. In other words, all processes of communication through speech mean that 
individuals in socially dominated circles (i.e., the ruled) can and will inevitably re-appropriate 
speech using it as means of irrupting power. This very process of re-appropriation forms part 
of their logos, their existence, their being. Such reversed speech acts and utterances are 
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206 This notion of différance does not only refer to deferral or as that which is adjourned in an economy 
of the same. Indeed, as Derrida notes in Rogues p.38, what is also stake and marked by différance is 
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performed in a haunt of irreducible guises that divert from pre-established and pre-determined 
linguistic speech norms.      
 
Such irreducible guises indeed are always already present in the originarity of locutionary 
violence, as Derrida would say: “there is nothing outside the text”; in other words, the outside 
of such speech is a priori in the inside of it. Speech thus “invaginates”209 itself in a 
“hermeneutic circle” structured by a double motion.210Accordingly, words when repeated can 
be appropriated by subjects to conjure up futural, historical and present meanings for which 
they were never intended. Embedded within speech is the possibility for it to break from prior 
contexts and acquire meanings and functions for which it was never intended.211 For the 
“subordinated speaker”, their ability to re-appropriate language can be read as a disruption, 
detouring and rerouting of a liberal-utilitarian/ homo-hegemonic linguistic imperial project. 
Hence, language (and indeed speech) becomes a tool for agency and sociality that is used to 
recreate subjectivities. It is this inherent illimitable power and inescapable reverse power play 
(combined with the heterogeneity of différance) within speech that perhaps makes it such an 
expansive, spectral, shiftable concept and makes its regulation especially online irrevocably 
difficult.  
 
Derrida suggests that “context” which is always determined by the presence of a receiver, is a 
notion based on a hermeneutic consensus. However, a hermeneutic consensus can never be 
absolutely determinable, simply because the (pre)determinability of meaning within speech is 
received is always already at once absent. In other words, although speech carries within it a 
meaningful presence of intention and inscription, (i.e., a presence of a writer to “say-what-
s/he-means”)212 this always happens according to a speaker’s particular cultural experience. 
Such a condition however is not present to the reader or listener and therefore one can never 
be sure of the destinations of speech. In this regard, the meaning of what a speaker or reader 
enunciates/says or (un)consciously intends to say can lose its original form and rhythm and 
become lost or unreadable. For example, words that are intended to offend or cause harm 
can miss their intended target and in an almost camouflaged or conjuring way, produce an 
unexpected and unintended effect on the reader or listener213 owing to the inescapable fact 
that context is always dislodged, drifting and ruptured. A “real” understanding of context 
would therefore be impossible to grasp. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Invagination is the inward refolding of form, “an inverted reapplication of the outer edge to the inside 
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when/where invagination happens, the limits of the border are limitless. Derrida, J., & Ronell, A, The law 
of genre. Critical inquiry (1980) 7(1) p.59 
210 Moten, F. In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (University of Minnesota Press, 
2003) p.6 
211 Butler, J. Excitable Speech A politics of the performative (Psychology Press, 1997) 
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Moreover, the notion of a hermeneutic consensus, which coincides, with leading 
conceptualisations of the public sphere in Habermasian terms (i.e., that “language games 
work because they presuppose idealisations that transcend any particular language 
game…these idealisations give rise to the perspective of an agreement that is open to 
criticism based on the basis of validity claims”)214 presupposes certain universalist 
assumptions and homo-hegemonic fictions. In the context of law, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, these assumptions or legal fictions may entail standards like the 
“reasonableness” of “a readership” and the margin of appreciation within human rights law. 
But a closer reading of a standard such as reasonableness in the context of terrorist speech 
for example in the substantive determination of what constitutes moral and ideological 
aggregates such as “terrorism” “radicalisation” or even hate speech shows that such 
aggregates are aporetic or fraught with impermanence and contestable subjectivities of 
différance (singularity v. incommensurability/ heterogeneity) based, on interpretation, 
perception, memory, imagination, and understanding amongst other factors. Hence, what 
some reasonable readers may subjectively perceive to be dangerous terrorist speech may be 
perceived by other reasonable readers (within the same space or locale) as legitimate 
political speech. Such an opposition is inescapable, for speech is intrinsically made up of 
valuable contestations of difference or “locations of culture”.215  
 
The problem then in setting out a hermeneutic consensus or aggregate on what constitutes 
harm in speech regulatory situations is that it is homo-hegemonic and one-sided (i.e., it 
misguidedly constructs a common evil against a universal “good”).216 Hence, it forecloses 
relationality (or the encounter and sociality) of différance by reiterating practices of exclusion 
and abjection. A claim, for example, that certain forms of ideological speech lead to the 
“radicalisation” of individuals would ignore the fact that such individuals have agency or the 
ability to define, interpret and appropriate such forms of speech in a number of different ways 
that can expand on or undo their original meaning and context. It would also ignore the 
various contestable historical, on-going and futural translations and navigations of speech.217 
 
Citational or iterant speech  
 
Within a shared generalised social experience, speech is always citational i.e., always tracing 
or referring to a generally experienced and repeated signification, ritual or convention. 
Quotability is the very precondition of speech. Indeed, some utterances cannot be 
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apprehended without their repeated referents and signs. However, it is from this repetition of 
referents that an in-finitude of meaning and difference, in different context begins. Therefore, 
the utterance of a statement such as the “blood is red” would immediately be understood by a 
particular set of listeners or readers, but such an utterance would not originally originate from 
the speaker, it would have been reproduced recirculated and cited from a particular 
historically transmitted convention or representation from which it is transposable into new 
boundless differing/changing conventions and contexts.  
 
The re-emergence of difference here suggests that all repetition or citation (when 
disseminated) involves an interplay of différance –“different/citation”218– and thus every virtual 
speech signature has an “other”, that is, a derivative non-identical supplementary form that 
proliferates and disperses metonymically [speech is “extra/ex/citational”].219 Speech thus 
iterates and intermingles embodying an intertextuality of finitely differing representations. It 
becomes “a complex system of roots”220 enveloped in coils of “borrowed pieces”221 crossing a 
multitude of singular scenes of utterance, and further scenes of utterance. With intertextuality 
the intelligible rules of sequence causality (and one could indeed add regulation) no longer 
hold, for different unforeseen, transformative temporalities always already emerge. As such, 
speech is a dynamic locus (loci) of changeable spiralling meanings. Kristeva, on discussing 
intertextuality suggests that it occurs when the “literary word”, becomes “an intersection of 
textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several 
writings”.222  
 
Thus, like with context, cited language and text systems are never self-contained they move 
unbounded blurring simplicity in a theatrical and parasitic manner, hauntologically, always 
hinting at the possibility of a return in a sort of graphametic drift. Even in this movement, there 
is always an absent “other” (i.e., an outside ––, for “iter” connotes alter/other) to the text that 
is not saturable. This “other” hovers ubiquitously about, manipulating all manner of inter-
medial linguistic tricks such as visuality, aurality, and temporality. With all written/recorded 
media, there is always an absence of the writer/speaker. The writer/speaker is not present to 
explain their meanings223 and as such written and spoken signs can be reused iterably 
anywhere by anyone irrespective of the author’s purposes. The structure of repetition 
(through citation) causes signs to differ, hence changing meanings. Meaning is substitutable 
and contaminated with destinerrance; it is never fully fixed and present. It never fully arrives.  
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There are always other words in a word, other texts or “grafts” of “polysemic”224(ad infinitum) 
possibilities, in a text –– “iterability alters”.225 
 
Consequently, if we recall our previous statement, “blood is red” a statement, which at first 
may appear simple, and fleeting it is highly likely that when disseminated and re-cited by 
various speakers online it can then infer, a different meaning (or meanings) than was 
originally intended by its (absent) speaker. Other speakers and audiences could then (re) cite 
it and through this, they could create a nondeterministic derivative re-punctuated vocabulary 
(with each single word, a pictograph, + [“emoji”]226 or even a Deepfake227 image) that contests 
and challenges normative understandings of fiction/reality, i.e. isness,228 “blood” and even the 
very colour “red”.  
 
Further, if we consider a phrase like the Islamic call to prayer: Allahu Akbar, such a phrase 
always already has an altered/ iterated/interrupted/multiplicity of meanings, significations or 
representations. Thus when uttered or re-cited, for non-muslim conservatives and anti-Muslim 
polemicists, it could read as an “Islamic battle cry” worthy of suspicion especially if read within 
the context of the aftermath of a terrorist attack. For others, as Harvard argues, particularly 
those belonging to an Arabic or Islamic cultural background it is re-cited: “at the sight of a 
beautiful sunset or a starry night, and roared during moments of chaos and strife. It is a 
reminder that no matter how invincible or vulnerable we feel, God is greater than all other 
powers”.229   
 
The rearticulating, re-citation, re-iteration, simulacra, and proliferation of cited speech (i.e., its 
destinerrance, which extends itself far beyond what, we colloquially understand as writing),230 
is perhaps nowhere most evident than on the Internet. Indeed, a number of Internet media 
communication signatures like memes, tweets  (including retweets, subtweets) and videos 
allow for the citing (re)linking, recoding, and reworking of content nondeterministically and 
multipliably. As such, almost every Internet user has the ability to cite, reframe and multi-
contextualise speech to invent, alter and modify presence/subjectivities. This is done using a 
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number of technological, linguistic (and rhetorical) devices like parody satire and political 
critique creating what Lessig has called “remix culture”.231 In attempting to clarify these rather 
abstract conceptual notions, it is important situate them within the textual aspects of 
technology. I do so in the following section.  
 
Technological regulation as a con-textual reading  
 
Generally, the regulation of speech can be thought of as an analytic process that cancels out 
or alters undesirable segments of textual information. As such, regulation involves processes 
of communication akin to reading, editing, analysing, identifying, interpreting and translating. 
Configuring technology as a text thus helps to show that perhaps technologies are not merely 
mathematical devices but that they are also linguistic tools that interpret and manipulate 
significations of language.  
 
If technologies are not merely mathematical but also linguistic notations of e.g., protocol and 
code, their application for calculable regulatory purposes (i.e., to analyse, detect, identify, 
translate, and apprehend content that incites terrorism) then becomes fraught with 
undecidability. Regulation (like law, and speech) thereby becomes iterable i.e., not as rigid, 
secure, fixed, and straightforward as imagined. To probe this assertion further, in the next 
section, I look at how computer code mirrors human language/speech. 
 
Code, programming and speech  
 
Computer programming languages have a great deal of similarity with natural human 
languages and all communication, “programs function as a type of writing”.232 Indeed, code 
like speech carries within it linguistic elements, which is to say, that code is essentially an 
archive of texts in a meta-system of communication addressed to machines as well as 
humans.233 Indeed, systems of code have meanings, instructions, references, citations, 
commands and “signifieds” that enable computer programmes to function. Code works in a 
recurrent manner of language inputs and outputs and seeks to communicate to multiple 
users. It is inherently porous and uncontainable. It is for this reason that code is susceptible to 
“bugs”, “viruses”, “glitches”, “crashes”, “overflows” and other unpredicted viral-contaminations, 
surprises and vulnerabilities of obsolescence, ephemerality and temporality.  
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Although scholars like Hayles and Galloway have argued that the “artificial” 
instantaneous/automatic language of code is distinct and not as ambiguous as 
(natural/human) language, their claims to this distinction of both languages (natural/human) 
are not so definitive.234 Notwithstanding their distinction(s), Hayles and Galloway still 
fundamentally conceptualise code and computers as mediums of communication or 
language. And yet, regardless of whether language is thought of as human or as 
code/technological, in the end, it still serves the same purpose –– iterable communication. 
Whichever way one may look at it, the bind/tether of language, as a means of relational-
transmissional communication (whether its between networks of computers, or between 
humans using computers, or between humans simply communicating amongst themselves) is 
inescapable.  
 
Moreover, code re-enacts some significant traits of human language. Code for example has 
elements of delay and deferral (différance) between the present instructive text/language and 
the absent/destinerrant action of reading or interpretation required. The same happens with 
human language or speech. Like with human speech it is impossible to predict what happens 
with code until the moment of performance. As such, the vulnerabilities of writing, speech and 
communication still haunt code acutely, in the same way that they haunt natural/human 
languages and speech. I show how these hauntings manifest themselves in a more practical 
way in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
Computers and writing  
 
Online communication technologies can be conceptualised as modern prosthetic extensions 
of writing ––“the page remains a screen”.235Derrida has suggested that online communication 
technologies in fact belong to a “digital history” of finger-operating devices and handheld 
devices,236 like “pen tools” that process words or print words with voices and with words.237 
Thus, online communication technologies are essentially “textual mediums”238 with elements 
of multiple addresses of code written in programming languages.239This is to say that they are 
always embedded within an iterable and disseminatory ecological process of writing and 
communication. They are ever in (and of) an iterable process of languaging –– i.e., of 
reproducing and being produced as copies and duplicates of texts interminably looped in a 
network. Accordingly, the recurring problems and vulnerabilities of communication that plague 
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all language(s) are inherited by code and all its computational processes hence creating 
unknowable/undecidable gaps in interpretation/communication.240 Arguably, these 
vulnerabilities are even more pervasive online because online communication involves the 
interplay of intensified language/speech with code and artificial intelligence in a very fast 
register that diverges from our human language. Further, due to the interfacing 
(human/machine) synchronic engagement intrinsic to online communications technologies, 
online communication technologies can be thought of as disseminatory organisms that 
produce a new kind of dual-authored writing, through a “duplicitous” double speech that 
“seems to originate not just with the persons who are individually identifiable in a genealogical 
sense, but also with a computer discourse that encircles (within itself) its own textual 
protocol”.241  
 
Because this writing occurs between human/machine or human/computer it readily re-enacts 
a spectral play of différance. Accordingly, for us “the humans”, it occurs with an invisible non-
presence, techno-hallucinatory-trickery or an automatic spontaneity, “an internal daemon” i.e., 
an other that/who can (or not) be withdrawn, in front of us; one that is faceless, from a 
different place, remote, behind the computer screen.242 This auto-spectral element of 
spontaneity and trickery is manifested in the manifold ways in which online communication 
technologies come up with new or unarticulated conjunctional combinations of solutions to 
divergent situations (and also “autoimmune” ruptures and slippages e.g. through “glitches”, 
“crashes” or “leaks” “DDOS attacks” etc.) that spectrally befuddle,243 surprise, “freeze!” and 
outwit not only us their users, but also their designers, regulators and programmers.  
 
It is also worth noting that the kind of writing produced by online communication technologies 
(i.e., the complex combination of networked computers with the code that operates them and 
the humans that sit at these computers) is more mobile, hyper-fluid and faster than the kind of 
writing produced by humans in the “real world”.244Thus, the speed and force of large numbers 
of (real and fake) people online creates very rapid cycles of interpretation and response 
hence giving online communication technologies a phantasmic appearance of an almost 
inhuman emergence. This othered phantasmic reading/writing then accelerates all the traces 
of heterogeneous speech and writing that occur in “the real world” hence blurring 
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communicative contexts duplicitously in an immediate, otherworldly out of time register. 
Technology then becomes an open haunted door that neither the doorkeepers, nor we the 
end-users245 can see through with clarity. I substantiate this relationship between opacity and 
regulation of online communication technologies in greater detail in chapter three. For now, 
we shall explore the indeterminate issues that come with having to regulate or contain iterant 
speech.  
 
Irreconcilable censorship: Regulating the indeterminate 
 
Under a liberal-utilitarian framework regulation through censorship of certain kinds of speech 
is important as it prevents the proliferation of hateful, offensive and criminally harmful speech. 
This is indeed the view taken by most European countries246 that in contrast to the US with its 
almost247 unfettered speech under the First Amendment have strict curbs on incitement to 
speech, racial hatred and other un-desirable motivations. These divergences in 
understanding speech regulation are perhaps a direct consequence of the long history of 
Anti-Semitism in Europe.248 Nonetheless, despite the differences in the aforementioned 
cultural and jurisdictional approaches to regulating speech, it can be submitted that the mere 
fact that legislation proscribing such speech acts exists does not prevent such speech from 
being uttered and disseminated iterably (and hence indeterminably) in the first place. The 
very iterable/indeterminable nature of speech confounds legal and regulatory limns. More 
specifically, although the process of regulating harmful speech aims to cancel-out, contain, or 
negate such speech, it ends up engendering undecidabilities because it designates open an 
unsolicited, unforeseen and unprogrammable word-game of différance within speech. Hence, 
(somewhat paradoxically), the fixed or enclosed structure of regulatory law deconstructs or 
compromises itself by inciting open an indeterminate reproduction of subversive, reverse, or 
counterpoint speech within the very prescription of limits, of “the unsayable” or what can not 
be said.  
  
Indeed, commentators like Levine have argued that writers or speakers can be spurred on by 
the impediments of censorship to innovate new styles of communication, which anticipate and 
bypass the limitations imposed by censorship.249 An example of such a phenomena would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See Vismann, Files, pp.13-21 
246 Public Order Act, 1986, Part III (U.K.) (proscribing racially inflammatory material as well as acts 
intended or likely to stir up racial hatred). In Germany, the “Auschwitzlolge” offense (literally, “lie of 
Auschwitz” offense) under sections 130 and 194 of the Criminal Code prohibits the approval, 
trivialisation, or denial of Nazi crimes or the crimes of other violent regimes. 
247 “Almost” here underscores the fact that there is a discussion in US scholarship about how in practice 
speech is more limited than it may first appear under First Amendment jurisprudence. 
248Boyle, K. "Hate speech--the United States versus the rest of the world." Me. L. Rev. 53 (2001): 487 
249 Levine, M.G. Writing Through Repression: Literature, Censorship, Psychoanalysis (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994) p.2. 
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the re-appropriation and re-contextualizing of ordinary and seemingly innocuous words such 
as “milk”250 by online right wing and neo-Nazi extremists to iconise and connote white 
supremacy.251 For the regulator(s), such a change in terminology would subvert traditional 
understandings of what constitutes hateful speech and would alter prevalent notions of 
certainty and clarity (through widening the derivative, the imitated, “the fake” and the 
differentiated) hence making the regulation of such speech intractable. In the context of so 
called terrorist speech, similar elastic word and text-image puzzles are encountered with 
words like Jihad and Allahu Akbar discussed above, which can and have been recoded to 
frame and create different representations (and indeed different “emotional effects”252 to 
different listeners), which may not be easy to spot and interpret for those who decide what 
constitutes the legitimate and illegitimate. The same could be said of the word “radical”, a 
word, which is synonymous with revolutionary, progressive reformist politics, yet at the same 
time connotes violence and extremism.   
 
One should also highlight here how the word “terrorism” itself has been dislodged and is still 
now, even in this very moment, being dislodged from its narrowly/exclusively defined cultural, 
religious and racial post 9/11-7/7 discursive singularities as “anti-state violence” to now 
embrace a whole host of shifting, heterogeneous unprogrammable meanings of “terrorism” 
such as state terrorism, “bio-terrorism”, “animal-rights terrorism”, “street-terrorism”, “bedroom 
terrorism”, “lone-wolf terrorism”, “intimate terrorism” and so forth. 
 
Further, that the authority to delineate and translate the unspeakable from the speakable has 
been transmitted to a variety of players extraterritorially across legal and socio-political 
cultures is testament to the intrinsic uncapturability of speech. It also means that the 
regulatory and interpretational process is fraught with complex conflicts of power, subjectivity, 
representation and legitimacy. To this effect, regulation is indeterminably haunted by a 
“monologic terror of indeterminacy”.253  
 
Derrida has suggested that “context”, which is always determined by the presence of a 
receiver, is a notion based on a hermeneutic consensus. However, a hermeneutic consensus 
can never be absolutely determinable because the predeterminability of meaning within which 
communication (i.e., texts or images, or speech) is received is always at once absent.254And 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Freeman, A. Milk a Symbol of neo-Nazi Hate, The conversation (31/08/ 2017) available at: < 
https://theconversation.com/milk-a-symbol-of-neo-nazi-hate-83292 > 
251 Iterations of this kind are also used in “draconian” jurisdictions like China where individuals use 
homophones to subvert censorship and regulation. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon 
see n.675 and n.676. 
252 Belavusau, U. Freedom of speech: Importing European and US constitutional models in transitional 
democracies (Routledge, 2013) p.110  
253 Holquist, M. Corrupt Originals: The Paradox of Censorship. Publications of the Modern Language 
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although speech carries within it a meaningful presence of intention and inscription i.e., a 
presence of a writer to “say-what-s/he-means”255 according to their experience, such a 
condition is not present to the reader or listener especially with regard to recorded or written 
speech. That is to say, the meaning of what a speaker or reader says or intends to say 
always loses its original form and rhythm and is susceptible to becoming lost or unreadable. 
This means for example, that words which are intended to offend or cause harm can miss 
their intended target and produce unexpected, unintended and unknown effects on the 
readers or listeners.256 Their context is always shifting, dislodged, drifting, always returning 
out again and again, churned in an uncontainable flux of rupture.  
 
The possibilities of this occurring are incalculable especially online, given the condensed 
cross-cultural landscape of the Internet. Certainly, the re-citation, re-iteration, and re-
contextualisation of speech/language is perhaps nowhere most evident than on the Internet 
where a number of Internet media signatures like memes, tweets  (including retweets, 
screenshots, subtweets, direct messages) and videos allow for the citing re-linking, recoding 
and reworking of content nondeterministically, multipliably and cross-jurisdictionally. This is 
done using a number of online communication technological tools257 in processes that involve 
the endless deferral, translation, invention, regeneration and repetition of texts –– engaged 
with other networks of texts –– in and at differing times.  
 
In sum, the argument I am trying to advance here (an argument that I will gradually unpack 
throughout this thesis) is that contemporary speech regulation and indeed online regulation is 
complicated by the fact that it is grounded on a monolinguistic liberal-utilitarian aesthetic 
schema that is susceptible to disavowing the endless iterability of heterogeneous texts. This 
is a recurring regulatory tension and a hauntological trace that ultimately tends to privilege 
and preserve a univocal majoritarian viewpoint over others. This consequently complicates 
human rights consideration particularly the right to freedom of expression. Hence, it is 
important that we interrogate some of the undecidable limitations of liberal-utilitarian speech 
theory, which are the basis of prevailing conceptualisations of the right to freedom of 
expression.  
 
On the limits of liberal-utilitarian speech theory 
 
In this section, my approach will be to locate Millian liberal thinking within a historical–social 
context in order to uncover some oft-disregarded forces that in my view still significantly haunt 
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a great deal of western liberal jurisprudential and legal thought, particularly in the area of 
speech theory. 
 
Generally, within the western liberal-utilitarian legal tradition the notion of harm is generally 
based on empiricist calibrations that help to determine whether (or not) particular acts are 
injurious to the safety of the state or its citizens. Such empiricism is consensus based in its 
construction of evil/ harm. Millian speech theory,258which underpins a lot of current 
jurisprudential ideals in the liberal-utilitarian tradition, for example functions within a fellow-
feeling of normative nationalistic homogeneity: “among a people without fellow feeling, 
especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to 
the working of representative government, cannot exist”.259  
 
Millian speech theory thus posits a singular liberal-humanist universal speech schema that 
subordinates and disavows categories of being, identity and knowledge through a play of 
différance. In this way, it creates and maintains “a global hegemonic ethno-class world 
citizenship of modern “Man”260 whose speech indispensably carries more legitimacy and 
validity than that of the rogue infrahuman other who remains condemned in the bottommost 
places of the social and communicative hierarchy of modern society. 
       
Indeed, Jahn, Ussyk and Baxi have shown that J.S. Mill’s liberal theorising is guided by 
colonial-cultural norms such as the belief that the world could be understood through a 
binarism of the civilised and the barbaric –– which meant that “large masses of colonised 
peoples were regarded as not fully human, or in need of tutelage”.261 The Millian liberal 
project is thus irrecuperably underpinned with the enlightenment’s mission to civilise or 
transform reform and initiate barbarous peoples into the echelons of higher civilisation. For 
Mill, backward populations had interests in assimilating with the British Empire, which was a 
unique privileged representative of universal causes. A demand for primacy interlaced with a 
colonial civilising mission of conquest that seeks utter perfectibility and exclusivity at the same 
time ––a disregard for the alterity of the other (I develop this thought later in this section). 
Millian liberal-utilitarian speech is therefore haunted by colonial dialectics that reinforce 
signalled differences in humanhood, identity status and belonging.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Perhaps the most cited text on freedom of expression in legal jurisprudence is Mill’s 1859 treatise On 
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notion of the  “harm principle” in On Liberty positions freedom of expression as a non-absolute right and 
thus as justifiably limitable by law from the outset: Mill, On Liberty, 1859  
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Similarly, for Rawls, his overriding aim is to describe a well-ordered society that is, a society 
in which “all members accept, and know that the others accept, the same principles (the 
same conception) of justice”.262For Rawls, people with different comprehensive conceptions 
of morality/depravity, justice or the good can and should reach an “overlapping consensus”.263 
Rawls’s thinking is thus results-driven consensus-driven and order-orientated. Arguably, his 
ultimate aim is to create an enlightened utopic utilitarian sphere, which rests on a 
reaffirmation of a distinctly universal (i.e., free and rational) sensus communis.    
 
Liberal-utilitarian consensus-based reasoning as articulated by Mill, Milton, Rawls and others 
like Dworkin264 and Hart265 emerges from a distinct liberal Protestant Reformation tradition, 
the scientific revolution, the enlightenment and post-enlightenment, and its emergent patterns 
of democratic governance that reinscribed the romantic and nostalgic ideal of Eurocentric 
convention, authenticity and normativity.266 It thus aimed at the realisation and preservation of 
a primacy of distinctive, interlocking ideals of individual character and public discourse — 
ideals that to a great extent emerged in the European enlightenment period as exemplified in 
the thought of Immanuel Kant267 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau268through their constraining 
processes of trampling on external individual experiences (e.g., such as their aporetic 
tensions between individual rights and general utility) that still persist today.   
 
Following this, it could then be argued that liberalism is fundamentally self-inadequating. 
Indeed, because liberalism programmes “an ascendant commonality of experience culture 
and political values”,269and equal positions of power as a precondition for speech,270 it fails to 
address the issue of différance i.e., the relational tether of othered/excluded/ differed speech. 
For instance, it fails to address the fact that speech does affect its listeners with differing 
“emotional responses”. Hence, it ignores the fact that a consensus (whether it is on harm or 
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do great damage to the person or property of others”: Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously (London 
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on morality/depravity) has varied (and equally mootable) tensions and contestations of 
différance. But in a diverse, online plurivocal world, a stable, monolithic homo-hegemonic 
collective identity based on the notion of consensus-based reasoning on issues like morality 
and justice is perilous and untenable.  
  
Moreover, the increasing apparent blurring (and inseparable reinforcement) of borders with 
modern technologies in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum suggests that contemporary 
communication has to grapple with negotiating speech (and différance) in its various cultural, 
philosophical and national subjectivities ––many of which are not necessarily reflected in the 
western liberal tradition. Indeed, for the most part, divergent claims always arise to challenge 
the very foundations of a statist, let alone a collective Euro-Atlantic normativity especially in 
contemporary times. And although such emerging divergent claims may (and are) easily be 
dismissed as irrational or against public reason, in dismissing them, the notion of justice to 
the other is disavowed pre-emptively. The result of this is (as is arguably happening today in 
public spaces both online and offline) a recalcitrant haunting of unresolved contested deferred 
socio-cultural in-equalities. In order to attempt to get to the roots of these irresolvable 
tensions, it is worth probing the relations between speech sovereignty and public order or 
regulation.  
 
Speech and the ghosts of sovereignty  
 
The arena of regulation and law traditionally lies within the remit of the state or the sovereign. 
Indeed, Schmittian analyses suggest that the sovereign has the ability to make laws and to 
determine a state of exception271 and indeed law making which is also regulation and public 
order making is conveyed as a locutionary enactment of sovereign power and authority. This 
can be expressed in prohibitory utterances and administratory utterances by the state or 
sovereign that are then transmitted onto individuals by convention, ritual and enforcement. 
Such utterances as Derrida suggests carry with them a formative power (but also a haunting 
originary lack, for “haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony”)272 that structures, 
demarcates and forms structures of social and political ordering and being that are a reaction 
to real or imagined fears and anxieties. Speech is thus crucial to the administration, 
organisation and functioning of space, and its territory and power. It is not then surprising that 
such fears and anxieties would be phantasmically intensified and multiplied in situations 
involving national security. 
 
In these situations, such utterances can bring about a sort of hauntological differentiation, 
classification, and naming by creating and inscribing what Said calls “poetic processes of 
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imaginative geographies and naming” that identify and distinguish e.g., citizen/barbarian.273 
Relatedly, in the interests of its own security or protection, the state can also hauntologically 
outline through legal prescriptions and policy declarations, which acts of speech may be 
unspeakable or illegitimate and which acts of speech, may be speakable or legitimate. These 
differentiations and demarcations of the different statuses of speech cannot happen without 
the foundational legal ratification and maintenance of the state and its enforcement 
institutions.274 What is important to note here is that the state (in its ratification, enforcement 
or regulation of speech) does not act as a lone entity. Which is to say, the “locutionary 
violence”, legitimatisation or enforcement of the sovereign with regard to speech is not 
singular or one-directional. It is as Bell suggests transmitted polycentrically. It “spectrally 
leaks” i.e., it is decentred, proliferative, transverse and transitive. Hence, its authority (and 
challenges to its authority) comes from multiple coexisting275 /overlapping non-statist 
sources276 of power some of which are undefined and undefinable.277 Perhaps, it is due to this 
very fact that “sovereignty” (especially online) is increasingly contested. 
 
To invoke Wendy Brown, in a somewhat Nietzschean sense, the state sovereign is dead.278 It 
has left us with “spectre[s] or, like Hamlet, with a dead father-[king] in a line of dead 
fathers”.279 Hence, divergent spectral ghosts of sovereignty and their totems/fears/anxieties 
have become unravelled, disjointed, –– “out of joint”. 
 
In any event, this perilous  “to be, or not to be” twilight, absence, loss and “eternal 
recurrence”280 of the sovereign’s spectres through the “democratisation” of speech (and 
indeed other areas of socio-political administration) can be read as an intensification of late-
modern phantoms of “globalisation”. It thus comes with a plethora of messy anxieties (i.e., 
existential fears, “terrors and horrors”)281 and implacable traces of différance that complicate 
contemporary and futural speech and regulatory practices. As this thesis will show, many of 
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these slippages return, through continuous Hobbesian collisions of sovereigns, to haunt 
lawmaking, enforcement and regulatory practices of speech in the post 9/11 -7/7 continuum. 
 
On censorship and différance 
	  
Given the aforementioned rupturous and irruptive quality of speech, one may think that it is 
counterintuitive for governments to keep censoring content. One then wonders why it is that 
practices of censorship are vigilant. Following my discussion of hauntology in the introduction, 
I want to suggest here that censorship is a hauntological device, which provides a semblance 
of authority and protection. Thus, despite the fact that censorship’s obsession with terror, 
anxiety and distress may at first glance appear to be a prohibitive structural weakness on the 
part of the government (in the sense that it reveals a degree of lack, powerlessness or 
inadequacy), it should also at the same time be viewed as an oblique productive 
demonstration and deployment of banoptic power insofar as it aims to proactively capture, 
neutralize, and pre-empt what unbearable/othered bodies (i.e., unheimlich /unbearable bodies 
that signify cultural anxiety/terror) say, speak or express in liberal-utilitarian public spaces. All 
this is to say that the very banoptic process of censorship i.e., of crossing out, deleting, 
blacklisting, annulling, taking-down or negative-writing,282 is what validates sovereign power, 
endowing law with its symbolic aura of suspension, retribution, banishment and execution.283 
Thus, censorship is implicated in and conjoined to power and logos, inseparably. There would 
be no writing or speech, or logos without censorship. 	  
	  
Indeed for Vismann, law and power cannot function without the process of censorship, 
because censorship allows for the naming, delegitimisation and annulment of other forms of 
knowledge and subjectivity.284 Similarly, Raz argues that “censorship expresses authoritative 
condemnation not merely of the views or opinions censored but of the whole style of life of 
which they are a part”.285 Robert Cover in, Violence and the Word, stretches this notion of 
condemnation even further out in describing the violence of legal interpretation as “the 
violence which judges deploy as prosecuting/punishing instruments of a modern nation-state” 
to render certain lives helpless.286 Seen in this light, one begins to construct censorship as a 
significant power-producing force that mirrors fear-transmission and repression.287 The 
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censorship of unlawful speech can therefore be construed as an integral hauntological 
instrument of psychic power in the sense that it is inseparable from the notions of fear-
transmission and repression.288  
 
In the context of “incitement to terrorism”, this is somewhat explicitly articulated in the ways in 
which terrorist speech is phrased or defined as a pathogenic element or virus that has the 
potential to disrupt/corrupt morality or undermine the very foundations (and continuity) of 
liberal-utilitarian normative social orders that privilege singular homogeneity over difference. 
This position, (which should also be thought of as a phantasmic remnant of liberal-utilitarian 
thought289) mirrors a “pro-civility” approach in the sense that it purports to “respect the 
sensibilities of others and, act in a fashion which preserves a measure of decorum in society 
as a whole”.290 But the preservation of decorum or propriety through a censorship or erasure 
of undesirable and harmful viewpoints is fraught with considerable practical difficulties 
because in reality, cancelled-out remarks are never actually deleted. The very fluidity or 
unprogrammability of speech means that it interpolates and returns rupturously to haunt 
generic and monolithic structures (of which it is an integral part) through their very barriers 
and limits of regulation. Like haunting blots or scars, these cancelled out, “not-said” views, 
opinions and expressions are never actually excised but rather, are brought to the fore 
phantasmically, indefinitely and they always return in a spectral fashion to haunt and threaten 
the normative centralities of meaning that seek to erase them ––“what one tries to keep 
outside always inhabits the inside”.291 Consequently, this oppositional-paradoxical mode of 
différance engenders an irreconcilable tension, a power/counter-power interplay/dynamic that 
haunts speech regulation and undermines its very coherence and efficacy interminably.292   
 
It is important to stress that such a regulatory slippage or failure does not only occur in a 
practical sense but it also affects the psyche, the unconscious. Which is to say, in a rather 
uncanny way, the authoritative regulator remains haunted by a neurotic panic of originary lack 
or inadequacy/helplessness (and is hence triggered into an unending paranoia and 
aggressivity) to censor. For our purposes, this means that the problems of containing speech 
that incites terrorism become especially non-reducible problems for law. Which is to say, law 
does not take away (but preserves) the attitudes, cultures, and hyper-visible memories of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Mignolo, W. D. Introduction: Coloniality of power and de-colonial thinking. Cultural studies 21, no. 2-3 
(2007): 155-167 
289 Losurdo, D. Liberalism: A counter-history. (Verso Books, 2014) pp. 273-274  
290 Geddis, A. Free Speech Martyrs or Unreasonable Threats to Social Peace? Insulting Expression and 
Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 Public law 4 (2004) p.869 
291 Bennington, G. Jacques Derrida (University of Chicago Press 1993) p.217 
292 For Derrida, “Writing/ speech is unthinkable without repression. The condition of writing is that there 
be neither a permanent contact nor an absolute break between the strata: this explains the vigilance 
and failure of censorship”: Derrida, J. Freud and the Scene of Writing, in Alan Bass, ed., Writing and 
Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) p.226  
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trauma that it seeks to contain. These remain spectrally present, escalated, always already 
present, (before/ after), and in the very moment of their exclusion, inscription or censorship.  
 
On censorship as a consensus of harm 
 
Intrinsic to the concept of justice within law is the idea that where the criminal justice system 
imposes a punishment, it should do so only in proportion to the crimes to which it seeks to 
respond. So far, my discussion has suggested that censorship may be misguided as it has 
the propensity to identify criminality and harm in the wrong places and with the wrong kinds of 
speech. In view of this predicament, a question then arises: how is proportionality construed?  
 
And so, in a brief attempt to shed some light on this question, it is worth considering the 
philosophical underpinnings of censorship.  
 
Generally, the determination of harm in western liberal states is governed by deontological 
and consequentialist empirical logics and ethics. Deontological ethics on the one hand are 
anchored in normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or 
permitted put succinctly, they are concerned with what is morally wrong or right. 293 
Consequentialism on the other hand is concerned with choices or intentions and their 
outcomes.294 The kind of consequentialism this thesis is concerned with is utilitarianism, a 
kind of consequentialism that is best expressed in assessments of moral actions and their 
corresponding outcomes or benefits. Of course, a thorough analysis of both consequentialism 
and deontological empiricist ethics is impossible here; hence, my discussion shall only focus 
on how they identify, predict or calculate harm.295  
 
To start with, I want to suggest briefly that the differentiation of deontological reasoning from 
utilitarian reasoning is misleading and that fundamentally they all achieve the same aim i.e., 
to arrive at a consensus of harm.296 Put differently, because assessments of terrorism are 
always at once sensus communis assessments of risk, both deontological and utilitarian 
ethics configure terrorism as a risk that should be contained in order to achieve security for 
the greater good of society. This is to say, incitement to terrorism tends to be viewed as 1) 
something morally reprehensible and 2); an action that infringes the liberty, rights and security 
of others, in a liberal-utilitarian sense, by causing them harm.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Heinze, E. Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2016) pp.32-33 
294 Ibid  
295 Ibid 
296 Because they are not mutually exclusive, I conflate deontological reasoning with consequentialism 
for ease of argument. 
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Crucially, with these philosophical determinations of harm, which form the backdrop of many, 
if not all incitement to terrorism laws, distinctions between terrorist acts of violence and 
speech that incites terrorism are never clearly made. This is because empirical or evidential 
assumptions are generally made to the effect that certain actions can be calculated as 
harmful or immoral before they occur. This as I have argued in the introduction is emblematic 
of the harm principle within which liberal-utilitarian determinations of harm are made.297 The 
key issue with this model is that unpopular kinds of speech (even those that are not 
substantially harmful in anyway) are susceptible to being reductively formulated in an anxiety-
inducing manner i.e., with monolithic claims about harm or danger or risks or from the 
outset.298 To probe this claim further, it is important for us to look at the kind of harm that 
deontological and utilitarian rubrics are interested in containing with regard to incitement to 
terrorism. For purposes of scope, in this chapter I only look briefly at a general legal and 
policy reasoning behind some the relevant legislation and regulatory policies. I carry out a 
discussion of the specifics of incitement to terrorism law in chapter two. 
 
The kind of harm at issue 
 
Generally, the harm caused by speech that incites terrorism is a “public harm” described in 
terms such as “grooming”, “radicalisation” and “indoctrination”. When assessing or describing 
the forms of speech that incite terrorism, the preponderance of opinion is that they provide 
“oxygen” or the mood music to ideas that lead to violent radicalisation. In this sense the 
speech or ideology is treated both as a trigger and an act of harm: 
 
We should not ignore the contributory role that radical texts and extremist pamphlets 
have in radicalisation. They serve to propagate and reinforce the extremist and 
damaging philosophies, which attempt to justify and explain motivations of terrorists. 
We should not undermine the role that such literature can have in radicalising 
vulnerable and susceptible young people particularly changing Muslims from law-
abiding members of the community to potential terrorists.299  
 
Implicit in the conceptual structure of incitement to terrorism offences is the presupposed 
notion that terrorist ideology is harmful or dangerous because it destroys the morale of a 
nation or class and undercuts its solidarity through the random murder of innocent people.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 For Zedner, “pre-crime” marks a conceptual shift in criminology that anticipate and forestall that 
which has not yet occurred and may never do so: Zedner, L. "Pre-crime and post-
criminology?." Theoretical criminology 11, no. 2 (2007) p.262 
298 Ahdash, F. "The interaction between family law and counter-terrorism: a critical examination of the 
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This is clear in the UK’s CONTEST strategy300 (from which the “Prevent” strategy is derived), 
which states: “the first propriety of any government is to ensure the security and safety of the 
nation and all the members of the public”. This general axiom of public order and safety is 
also reflected in criminal sanctions such as the Public Order Act 1986, the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 and the Communications Act 2003 to deal with speech that stirs 
up racial hatred, speech that is threatening, abusive insulting and causes alarm and distress. 
Whilst these offences may seem convenient in their quest to prevent the harms caused by 
speech, questions emerge with regard to the ways in which these offences are structured. 
These questions can be phrased under 3 interrelated points namely: 
 
1) That the offences disregard the iterable and indeterminable nature of speech 
2) That the offences inaugurate an indemonstrable causal link between speech and 
harm 
3) That the offences lead to broadly overreaching proscriptions of speech.  
 
An underlying assertion in this thesis is that points two and three directly follow from point 1. I 
have already discussed point one to a great extent in this chapter. I discuss point 3, the 
notion of broad criminalisation in greater detail in the following chapter. In the subsequent 
sections, I focus on the point 2, which relates to the difficulties in distinguishing between harm 
and causation.  
Speech and transferential or causal harm  
 
Thus far, I have attempted to show in this chapter that speech is not univocal301 i.e., that it is 
made up of a system of changeable and divergent referents and signifiers. It would therefore 
be absurd to assume that there is a uniform clarity of meaning or of cause and effect with 
regard to interpretation of what words mean. To this end, it is conceivably impossible in the 
sense that it is incalculable to measure or assess the harm, threat or risk that words carry. 
Indeed, what one may assess to be harmful in one situation could be read as something 
completely harmless in another situation. What is “harmful” lies in the eyes or ear of the 
beholder. But in speech situations, there is a divergent polyphony of “beholders” or “hearers”, 
each with different attitudes, cultures, memories and histories. This ultimately makes it difficult 
for us to predictably draw monolithic assumptions or consensus-based assessments with 
regard to what constitutes harm and what does not. Hence, the very liberal-utilitarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 CONTEST is the UK government’s overarching counterterrorism strategy. It is a multifaceted policy 
comprising of four components: 1) Prevention; 2) Pursuit; 3) Protection and 4) Preparedness that has 
the objective of containing activities that lead to ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism generally. See CONTEST: 
The United Kingdom’s strategy for Countering Terrorism: (HM Government June 2018) available at: 
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assertion that speech that incites terrorism is harmful or immoral becomes problematised. It 
becomes a point of endless iterable contestation between the regulator and the regulated, 
and in other cases a point of contestation of meaning morality and viewpoints between the 
reason of the majority and that of the minority.  
 
Of course, there are situations where meaning is declared final but because such 
declarations are often carried out through a liberal-utilitarian legal-juridical calculus, they are 
liable to silencing the heterogeneity of marginalised perspectives such as those of women, 
Muslims, people of colour and queer people. And even when they claim to protect 
marginalised individuals from harm, such claims to protections come with calculated/ pre-
determined/ paternalistic limits, demarcations and conditions such as the requirement to 
assimilate within normative liberal-utilitarian theorems of (un)freedom “on the grounds that the 
marginalised do not know what is good for them.”302 A circular irresolvable liberal programme 
of silencing, unhumaning and discrimination that as Butler notes creates “‘subjects’ who are 
not quite recognisable as subjects”303 then becomes reinscribed on end. Moreover, in 
situations where a demarcation of what is harmful or moral occurs, where the signature of law 
inscribes and enforces such a definition, such an enforcement or decision does not happen 
stricto sensu. All this is to say that law remains encumbered by its inability to define or identify 
threats accurately or perfectibly.304 Legal definitions abound and are always already 
contaminated in excess by other unanticipatable definitions.305 This is an incalculable and 
irreconcilable inadequation and paradox that is embedded within law’s very aesthetic 
structure.306  
 
Contestable harm  
 
If we maintain that there is a consensus over what incitement to terrorism constitutes in terms 
of morality or harm or violence, we face the risk of ignoring the fact that the very notion of 
incitement to terrorism such as glorification or encouragement can be contestable, which is to 
say, that what some audiences consider to be extremist terrorist-like or harmful may be 
compellingly considered by other audiences as liberating and freeing. Indeed, when all is said 
and done, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Thus, inasmuch as law 
seeks to identify and apprehend crime, there is an undecidable problem in apprehending 
speech crimes especially incitement to terrorism crimes due to their contestable nature and 
their heterogeneity. And even in situations where the law attempts to do this by foreclosing 
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303 Butler, Frames of War p. 4. 
304 Derrida, J., & Ronell, A. The law of genre) p.59; Davies, M. "Derrida and law: legitimate fictions." 
In Derrida and Law, pp. 71-95 (Routledge, 2017) 
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other interpretations of what terrorism are through universal or liberal-utilitarian interpretations 
of speech, law remains haunted by its inability to occlude or foreclose the other’s unsayable 
speech. In fact, in a paradoxical way, the person whose speech is censored may feel harmed 
by the fact that their speech or viewpoints are not being equally affirmed or validated within 
the public sphere.    
 
Moreover, it is incredibly difficult to show that violence or harm from speech is contingent. For 
instance, whilst one may advance historical claims to the end that racist speech and hate 
speech were instrumental in periods leading up to genocide (e.g., 1940’s Europe during 
Nazism or the Rwandan 1994 Genocide),307 such historicist claims as Baker notes are difficult 
to prove empirically308 because they tend to ignore the symptomatics of the speech at issue 
i.e., its deep underlying historical, socio-political and its material dimensions, conditions or 
forces.309 These symptomatics of speech are disavowed spectral forces that if unresolved 
always return to undermine the stability of monolithic speech. Moreover, in asking us to move 
beyond a “general spirit” of historicist claims, Ertür observes (through a reading of the 
Armenian genocide) that such historical claims are susceptible to becoming “unaddressable”, 
in the sense that they can inscribe a universalised truth about historical memory which is 
susceptible to cementing a “legal facticity”310 that is self undermining on the one hand as well 
as instilling a particular or absolute “European universalism that is exclusionary, 
interventionist and often experienced by Europe’s others as hypocritical”311on the other. At 
any rate, it appears that if we are to critique speech or harm that accrues from speech as this 
thesis attempts to do, we need one that critically goes beyond universal monoliths of pure 
presence and considers all of speech’s inherent structural contestations, divergences and 
entanglements.    
 
Speech trade-offs and human rights 
 
The ethical challenge of regulating harmful speech or reining speech within a normative 
liberal-utilitarian order is that it fails to account for iterability of speech and the speech of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 For Baker, countries that have experienced genocidal and racist violence have still had such speech 
proscriptions yet still failed to desirably contain racist attacks or genocides: Baker, C. E. Autonomy and 
hate speech in Hare and Weinstein, Extreme Speech and democracy (OUP 2009) pp.146-147    
308 The idea that we can empirically verify speech harms is conceptually misguided. It assumes that 
speech is a constative when indeed (as I suggest in chapter one) speech is iterable and indeterminable. 
Secondly it fails to give much attention to links between crime and unconscious desire/ or the 
psychoanalytic i.e., the fact that inasmuch as we criminalise what we regard as harmful speech the 
unconscious desire to make such speech manifest would still remain/return. If such a link were to be 
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hold. 
309 Ibid; n 270 
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other. Indeed, individuals from minoritarian cultural subjectivities (particularly Muslims) are 
susceptible to experiencing a degree of subordination or subjection when their speech does 
not fall within the spectrum of accepted speech in a statist sense. The reason for this (as I will 
show in chapter four)312 is due to the fact that human rights are structurally formulated in a 
manner that allows for a degree of freedom but with trade-offs or limitations. Put another way, 
speech rights provided for under art 10 of the ECHR are not absolute.313 Thus, when speech 
rights are at issue, the national courts and national authorities are likely to interpret human 
rights law in a manner commensurate with the nationalistic-whole i.e., based on their social 
experience, their cultural anxieties, and their civil sensitivities.   
 
In practice, this means that limitations on the right to freedom of speech are determined and 
justified by contextually contingent fair balancing or interpretive principles such as the margin 
of appreciation, proportionality and subsidiarity, which provide states with a wide discretion 
when assessing what can be seen as an interference with speech that is “necessary in a 
democratic society”. Crucially, these interpretive principles are inextricably linked to the 
notions of consensus-based reasoning and liberal-utilitarianism in the sense that they seek to 
disambiguate harm and to prevent threats, disruptions or injury to normative public orders. 
Because of this, non-normative forms of speech are susceptible to being seen as harmful 
from the outset. To this end, an inchoate pre-crime,314 and exclusionary logic towards the 
speech of the other is inaugurated, and this can have a spectral “chilling effect” on speech 
rights that occurs by way of a kind of spectral subjection/subjugation/unfreedom that is 
scaffolded/authorised by the force of law and is difficult and perhaps even impossible to 
challenge. At any rate, this banoptic /panoptic and disciplinary logic engenders a high degree 
of legal indeterminability hence underscoring questions of incompatibility with regard to art 7 
of the ECHR, which requires for the law to be specific or clearly defined. I analyse this point 




The discussion in this chapter, which acts as a theoretical backdrop for much of this thesis, 
has attempted to map the aesthetic contours of speech and how they are negotiated in the 
contexts of regulation. It has suggested that speech is inherently divergent iterable, and 
extra/citational. Put another way, speech has an inherent ability to destabilise meaning and 
containment whether through regulation or enforcement. The re-circulable meanings and 
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delay/relay of texts, images and spoken words with speech cannot completely arrive i.e., they 
cannot be mastered let alone located. They are destinerrant. Unsettling, phantasmically, like 
ghosts, these meanings elude law’s immuring and arbitrary order and structure. And even 
after processes of translation and regulation, they forever gesture towards an infinite de-
regulated presence of  “heterological openings”.315 Thus, while laws and regulations strive to 
apprehend speech in a calculable anticipatory manner, and to rein speech within singular 
nationalistic moral and cultural boundaries, they flounder irreparably owing to the fact that 
speech is inherently unprogrammable, inexhaustibly divergent and incalculable.316 I develop 
and link this claim to incitement to terrorism laws and practices as well as human rights 
issues in the subsequent chapter.
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316 This claim forms the very basis of my arguments in chapters two and four where I look at criminal law 
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Chapter 2  
An evaluation of incitement to terrorism legislation in the UK 
 
This chapter looks particularly at incitement offences as a facet of criminal law. In so doing, it 
critically examines the provisions under the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006 and their 
overlapping legal provisions (such as the Public Order Act 1986 and Offences against the 
Person Act 1861 and the Prevent strategy).  
 
What is incitement? 
 
The word “incitement” has no agreed legal definition. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
the word incite as to: “encourage or stir up (violent or unlawful behaviour)”.317 The definition 
this thesis will use is the same as that of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), which has interpreted incitement as the utterance of provocative speeches or the use 
of threats in public places or at public gatherings.318 For the ICTR, incitement also involves 
the “sale or dissemination, or offer for sale, or display of written material, or printed matter in 
public places or at public gatherings or through the public display of placards or posters, or 
through any other methods of audio-visual communication”.319  
 
This definition is important because it enumerates (a priori) the incommensurability or 
indeterminability of the crime. This extensiveness is evident in the divergent terms used to 
refer to various forms of incitement such as the dissemination of threats through written or 
printed material.  
 
What is clear from the very beginning is that in trying to proscribe certain forms of speech, 
incitement paradoxically opens itself up to various categories of speech crimes engendering 
problems of scope and definitional clarity. This in turn presents various consequential 
challenges particularly with regard to legal interpretation and clarity that this chapter will seek 
to unravel.  
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Speech that incites: Some general criminal principles 
 
In the majority of scenarios, criminal law has the aim of proscribing actions of persons that 
cause harm or carry the risk of causing harm.320 However, there are some exceptions321 
especially with regard to certain offences where the intention is to prevent crime at an earlier 
stage so as to prevent accruing harms.322 
 
These crimes are generally referred to as precursor crimes, pre-emptive crimes, preparatory 
crimes and inchoate or non-consummate crimes,323 which implies that these offences are 
incomplete or underdeveloped.324 Cahill defines inchoate crime, as “conduct that is not itself 
harmful or wrongful but seems somehow sufficiently close to a criminalisable harm or wrong 
as to be criminalisable also”.325  
 
For inchoate liability to occur, the defendant must have more than mens rea. That is to say, 
the defendant must be at a stage where their preparatory action or behaviour poses a risk for 
the safety of members of the public.326 A defendant cannot be punished just for having the 
mental element of an offence. Hence, “determining” to commit an offence or merely 
harbouring “evil thoughts” is not punishable,327 but intent or recklessness is punishable.  
 
This seems bewildering in the sense that “intent” arguably reverses the very purpose of 
“likelihood”. Which is to say, that with “intent”, the chances of carrying out the crimes in 
question are potentially widened; anything (even the remotest of intentions) is “suspect” and 
thus “likely”.     
 
Further, that intent is sufficient for inchoate criminality ignores the fact that external conditions 
or circumstances can possibly interrupt or alter the actor’s state of mind hence causing the 
actor to desist from engaging in the crime. Owing to this fact, there is arguably an oft-ignored 
element of reasonable doubt and subjectivism that haunts the very notion of inchoate crime. 
The implication of this is that inchoate liability seems to go against the criminal law maxim 
actus non-facit reum nisi mens sit rea, a maxim referring to the principle that criminal 
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Zedner, L. Preventive justice (OUP 2014) pp3-8 
327 Ibid 
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culpability requires proof of a guilty mind. In the UK courts, this maxim is illustrated in R v. 
Cunningham328 where a subjective test (which establishes that an individual should not be 
convicted of a serious criminal offence unless their state of mind is culpable and unless, they 
were foreseeably aware of the obvious risk of the prohibited consequences occurring) is 
applied to determine recklessness. This chapter is interested in making the argument that 
inchoate crimes are part of a liberal-utilitarian logic that seeks to achieve preventive justice 
through a calculation of deterrence and utility. It argues that this notion of “inchoate crime” 
affects the structure of the law and obfuscates its coherence undecidably. It also suggests 
that such undecidability is not necessarily a “shortcoming” of the law (for it also decides) but 
rather an enactment of utility/liberal utilitarianism i.e., an intentional deployment of the force of 
law that allows the sovereign to broaden its power substantially into unforeseeable contexts 
under the auspices of national security and public order. 
Inchoate speech crime and public order 
 
Beyond strict legality or criminality, inchoate liability plays a symbolic or public policy role i.e., 
in preventing future public harm and disruption. Indeed, according to Herring, inchoate liability 
intervenes at a stage where the crime in question is likely to threaten public order or disturb 
the Queen’s peace.329 This attribution of public order to inchoate liability is important because 
it constructs inchoate liability as a programmable legal apparatus that has the intention of 
identifying, designating, apprehending, and sanctioning) crimes before they materialise. 
Following Herring’s observation, it should be noted that the inference of public order and the 
Queen’s peace suggest that inchoate liability may not just be dealing with crimes as crimes in 
their technical sense but crimes as conceptualised by the sovereign and their particular 
social-cultural understanding of crime. In order to understand this we shall look briefly at the 
historical development of inchoate crime and public order in the UK. Thus, I start by looking 
back at them (i.e., historically) though the offences of blasphemy and seditious libel which are 
the fons et origo of inchoate speech crime in the UK.    
 
The first recorded blasphemous case is R v. Taylor330 where Taylor “a blasphemer of unusual 
thoroughness” was charged for openly proclaiming statements like: 
 
Christ is a whoremaster, and religion is a cheat, and profession a cloak, and all 
cheats, all are mine and I am a King's son and fear neither God, devil” and “I am 
Christ’s younger brother and that Christ is a bastard.331  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 R v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 See also R V.G [2004] 1 AC 1034  
329 Herring, J. Criminal law, p.343 
330 (1676) 3 Keb 607; 84 ER 906 
331 Cromartie, A. Sir Mathew Hale 1609-1676:Law, Religion and Natural Philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) pp.74-5 
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Taylor acknowledged speaking the words (except the word “bastard”) and he was found guilty 
of blasphemy.332 Consequently, Chief Justice Hale provided an opinion on the case, which 
explained the jurisdiction of the court over blasphemy:  
  
And Hale said, that such kind of wicked blasphemous words were not only an of-
fence to God and religion, but a crime against the laws, State and Government, and 
therefore punishable in this court. For, to say religion is a cheat is to dissolve all those 
obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of 
the laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in 
subversion of the law.333 
 
To understand the Court’s criminalisation of blasphemy, it is important to remember that at 
this time in history, the state and the church were close. Indeed, during the Reformation the 
state and the church were unified.334 Thus, to subvert the Church of England which then had 
(and still has) the sovereign, Rex as its head through criticism ridicule and contempt, was also 
to subvert the state and its sacred subjects, it was to “endanger the peace then and there to 
deprave public morality generally to shake the fabric of society and to be a cause of civil 
strife”.335 Further, by alluding God the divine, Rex, one also alluded to a divine universal 
political-religious336 ordering of society (i.e., order/ the Queens Peace) and a deep 
univocal/fraternal veneration of and for scripture, the word of God, logos through totemic 
rituals (or laws) like the use of divine oaths to enforce social contracts even outside the 
court.337This suggests the presence of a mystical force and application of the law that intends 
to punish those who go against the collective moral/religious/ritualistic impulse i.e., those 
“deviant”/unheimlich others who transgress sameness.338 It is thus fair to say that the 
criminalisation of blasphemous speech was a manifestation of a particular spectral or 
unheimlichkeit fear towards publications, speech and ideological viewpoints that had the 
potential to disrupt socio-political and moral political orders. 
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Alongside and in addition to blasphemy laws, the British state felt a need to contain other 
ideological forms of expression that caused moral or social-political outrage and disruption. 
But to understand the significance of this function and its on-going transposable effects, one 
needs to go before/prior the origins of these laws, to understand the socio-political conditions 
that necessitated the passing of these laws. A thorough examination of the genesis of 
blasphemy laws is beyond the scope of this thesis. Notwithstanding, it still merits a brief 
excavation here. 
 
Scholars of legal history have suggested that the offence of blasphemy was created in order 
to deal with political, religious and moral radicalism. In this respect, the state felt that the need 
to criminalise such “radicalism” in a way that would enable it to maintain a hold on normative 
order. Consequently, sedition laws and the offence of seditious libel were established in order 
to put a limit on the advocacy and dissemination of radical speech, propaganda, or ideology 
that sought to encourage “discontent or disaffection amongst his/her Majesty's subjects, or 
promoted feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of such subjects”.339  
 
In R v. Collins340 for example, the defendant was charged with sedition for publishing a letter 
in an unlawful assembly which read: “a wanton, flagrant, and unjust outrage has been made 
upon the people of Birmingham by a blood-thirsty and unconstitutional force from London, 
acting under the authority of men who…seek to keep the people in social slavery and political 
degradation”.341 The defendant in Collins342 was liable of seditious libel because his letter was 
deemed to have the ability to encourage people to take power into their own hands and to 
excite them to tumult and disorder.343 Related applications of sedition laws are apparent in 
decisions like R v. Burns,344 and R v. Aldred,345 which demonstrate the Courts’ use of 
seditious laws as public order laws to prevent anticipated346 violence or disruption to the 
peace of the sovereign. Whilst some may argue that seditious libel and blasphemy helped to 
maintain a semblance of peace and public order, it is worth emphasising that in maintaining 
peace and public order, such offences presented a number of operational and hermeneutic 
challenges that were engendered by the very breadth of the offences and the lack of 
definitional clarity about them.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Hansard HL Deb 9 July 2009, vol 712, col 848 
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341 Ibid Para 911  
342 Ibid 
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Notwithstanding, at the same time, it should be stressed that this lack of definitional clarity 
was purposeful in the sense that it presented the government with a wide discretion to 
suppress a wide array of speech offences in the interests of protecting society and preserving 
public peace and order. The problem however with its wide discretion is that it left wide open 
the possibility for innocuous or inscrutable forms of speech to be suppressed arbitrarily and in 
discriminatory fashion.  
 
This is evinced for instance, in the offences of blasphemy and sedition that led to the 
suppression of arguably harmless kinds of speech that criticised the British state’s imperial 
and government policy. Moreover, these offences led to criminal prosecutions involving 
various literary works like Thomas’ Paine’s The Age Of Reason and Shelley’s Queen Mob or 
even a poem, The Love That Dares to Speak Its Name by James Kirkup, which graphically 
sexualized Jesus Christ.347 It is therefore not surprising that these offences have undergone 
severe criticism from a number of commenters. Indeed for Roger Douglas and Nadine El-
Nany,348 the offence of sedition, which in some jurisdictions is coupled or replaced with 
treason,349 is essentially a “political crime” that was/is used to “punish people for what they 
think (or what they are thought to think) rather than on the basis of the degree to which their 
activities actually posed a threat to social order (however defined)” and to “instill fear and 
scuttle dissent”.350 Furthermore, as I have highlighted above the lack of definitional clarity 
within these offences could simultaneously be viewed as a productive demonstration and 
deployment of banoptic and biopolitical power in the sense that it sought to proactively 
capture and repress forms of expression that were perceived as unbearable, threatening, 
disruptive and distressing in liberal public spaces. 
 
The construction of blasphemy and seditious libel as public order offences therefore suggests 
that they are primarily intended to contain “outrageous” speech however so defined. Which is 
to say, it can be argued that these offences were never intended to protect the interests of 
“persecuted believers” but to suppress speech that expressed non-majoritarian viewpoints or 
(more specifically put) speech that reflected legacies of protest, resistance, opposition and 
dissent.351  Eventually, based on their conceptual vagueness and their susceptibility to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 Green, J. & Karolides, N.J. The Encyclopedia of Censorship (Facts On File Inc, 2005) pp. 56-57 
348 El-Enany, N. “Innocence Charged with Guilt: The Criminalisation of Protest from Peterloo to 
Millbank”. In Riot, Unrest and Protest on the Global Stage, pp. 72-97 (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 
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suppress unorthodox speech for no justifiable reason, the offences of blasphemy and sedition 
fell out of fashion and they were abolished by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.  
 
Nevertheless, as things currently stand, it can be said that contemporary inchoate speech 
offences from which incitement to terrorism offences spring still repeat the conceptual errors 
of blasphemous libel and sedition. That is to say, inchoate speech crimes (or ideologically 
motivated crimes) still follow a particular univocal352 logic that already assumes/ presumes/ 
predicts a transferential effect of meaning or interpretation with regard to speech offences 
even when these offences (e.g., “racial hatred”) are spectrally oblique or obfuscated in the 
sense that they are mootable, subjective and “not amenable to precise empirical 
observation”353and analysis.  
 
The danger then of inchoate speech offences is that individuals could be punished simply, 
tout court, for what they say or think even when it has the remotest link to actual violent acts 
owing to the fact that the contours of liability become incalculable.354 In so doing, inchoate 
speech offences capitalise on a hypothetical notion of criminal intent. In other words, they 
place an emphasis on hypothetical/ conjectural causation in their configuration of speech 
crimes. Whilst such an inchoate speech framework is thought to be convenient in protecting 
national security especially in times of terror, its tendency to anticipate355 or apprehend crimes 
before they are completed still presents two key problems, namely: 1) scope, i.e., it is not 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to foresee the consequences which a 
given course of conduct might entail and 2); its pre-calculations of utility and deterrence under 
a liberal-utilitarian schema are susceptible to foreclosing the alterity of the other.  
 
These two claims warrant further analysis. I touch on some of them in this chapter but they 
also form the basis of my analysis of human rights in this chapter four. 
 
Mapping the contours of incitement: The example of incitement to racial 
hatred  
 
To illustrate these aforementioned concerns, it is first worth exploring the contours of 
incitement generally through the lens of incitement to racial hatred. A discussion of incitement 
to racial hatred will then develop the links between incitement and inchoate crime and thus 
inform our wider discussion on “inchoate liability” and  “incitement” in the context of terrorism.  
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353 Heinze, E. Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual Orientation and Analogies to 
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The offence of incitement to racial hatred is a speech-related offence laid out under Part III of 
the Public Order Act 1986. Racial hatred is defined under section 17 of the Act as: “hatred 
against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including 
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins”. It is worth noting that the incitement to racial hatred 
offence has several elements beyond the scope of this chapter and so, I cannot claim to offer 
an exhaustive treatment of all its elements. Hence, here, I only focus on section 18 which 
proscribes the use of “threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behaviour or displaying 
written material intending to, or which is likely to, stir up racial hatred”.356 
 
For an offence to materialise under section 18, it has to be: 1) “threatening, abusive or 
insulting”, and; 2) it has to be intended to or likely in all the circumstances to stir up racial 
hatred. 
 
A significant interpretational test accruing to incitement to racial hatred and indeed to all 
inchoate crime is the subjective recklessness test (as discussed in R v. Cunningham above). 
The rationale for punishing defendants for planning activity, which generally is not sufficient to 
constitute a completed crime, is its increased possibility or likelihood of success. Thus, the 
prosecution must prove that hatred was intended or likely –perchance/ perhaps– to be stirred 
up. “Likelihood” does not connote that racial hatred was simply possible. Likelihood or 
probability is a test of “reasonable probability” and not of near certainty or clear and present 
danger.  
 
Although “likely” means that the context of any publication or behaviour has to be considered 
very carefully (factors like the prevailing public mood, the characteristics of the target 
audience are taken into consideration)357 it is entangled with the requirement for the 
perpetrators mens rea i.e., the perpetrators’ intent or state of mind, which may in this case 
include features like a deliberate dissemination to a wide audience.358 This inextricable 
entanglement with mens rea problematises “inchoate liability” as it presents unforeseeable 
ambiguities with regard to determining and identifying the crime. At the same time, the 
subjectivism of the offence and the perpetrators’ mens rea then become engulfed in an 
incommensurable economy of différance haunted by an unforeseeable iterability of speech 
which the thresholds of the law/offence cannot contain. The concept of “likelihood” then 
becomes undecidable or indeterminable hence potentially problematising law enforcement 
and interpretation. 
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Underlying the logic of incitement offences is a rationalised logocentric assumption that 
incitement crimes carry with them a transferential or direct link to crime. Indeed, as Horder 
notes, the purpose of inchoate speech crimes like incitement to racial hatred is that it helps 
with futural crime prevention: “the concern [in criminal liability] is not merely with the 
occurrence of harm but also with its prevention” in the future.359 Although this ability to 
prevent harm in the future stands out as convenient, it can also be counterproductive and 
self-undermining of the law itself in the sense that it spectrally saturates speech offences with 
pre-calculated conjectural criminal logics i.e., the logics of suspicion and pre-crime. These 
logics in turn sustain, and extend the banoptic and disciplinary power of the state i.e., the 
force of law, and its propensity to punish innocent individuals. 
 
The vagueness of incitement to terrorism offences is further complicated by the fact that they 
mark and inaugurate speech (an iterable disseminatory medium) as crime. This, I maintain, is 
an interminable conceptual blind spot because it ignores the fact that the singular fixed 
structure of law has to contend with the very disseminatory, heterological and iterable form of 
speech. In this way, legal-juridico decisions that aim to determine and distinguish legitimate 
speech from harmful speech become fraught with a textual-hermeneutic haunting. 
 
Relatedly, it becomes difficult to clearly identify terrorist speech or speech that incites 
terrorism in divergent contexts. This is as I have argued partly due to the fact that it is not 
easy to demonstrate empirically and with calculable consistent evidence that incitement to 
terrorist speech causes terrorist violence. This dilemma occurs because we cannot clearly 
predict or determine the outcomes of speech transparently, as they are.360  In this sense, the 
law displays within its structure an irretrievable aporia of singularity v. incommensurability, an 
aporia that in an auto-immunary logic self-inadequates and undermines the stability and 
determinability of speech offences hence rendering them interminably undecidable.361  
 
And even if it were argued as proponents of regulation suggest that speech offences are not 
undecidable that they are intended to capture “obvious dangers”362 e.g., offences that drum 
up enthusiastic support or create the “mood music” for terror and hatred one could still equally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Horder, J. Ashworth's Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) p.470 
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argue following Heinze that such an argument is not empirically provable. Such an argument 
is also circular because it returns us to a position where we would still have to determine what 
such terrorist speech and hate speech would entail despite their conceptual and definitional 
uncertainty. And so, even if such an argument (i.e., that hate speech presents obvious 
dangers) became a reason for regulating hate speech, it would still be reductive of speech in 
the sense that would ignore the inherent iterability of speech that I have underscored in 
Chapter one. Furthermore it would, as Heinze and Barendt have highlighted, privilege the 
conceptual misapprehension of speech as a distinguishable ideological act when it is indeed 
performative and distinguishable from constative acts.363 
 
Moreover, as scholars like Nusbaum have demonstrated, the criminalisation of speech in 
jurisdictions like France and Germany, which have strong legal-regulatory structures that 
criminalise and seek to deter neo-nazi hate speech can have the adverse effect of not only 
causing hate speech such as racist speech to go underground, but also of morphing it into an 
unanticipated insidious or re-coded form of speech that iterably escapes readers, regulators, 
or listeners. Nusbaum makes this observation as if to suggest that, all forms of speech 
criminalisation are still encumbered by the very circulation and iterability of speech, which is 
in essence non-transparent and resistant to capture.364 A singular homo-hegemonic 
enforcement of counter speech laws (and their corresponding authority and field-force of 
power normalization)365 therefore remains unable to reduce and preempt some, “if not all” 
harmful forms of speech.366 Perhaps, the reason for such a structural ethico-regulatory 
undecidability or failure as I have shown in chapter one, is down to the very fact that speech 
is inherently disseminatory/iterable and as such ruptures all singular structures of 
determinability, interpretation and containment. 
 
R v. Mizanur Rahman,367 a decision concerned with incitement to racial hatred demonstrates 
how this undecidability bears out in more practical terms. In Rahman, the appellant was tried 
at the Central Criminal Court before the Common Sergeant on offences alleged to have been 
committed during a demonstration in London in February 2006 against cartoons of the 
Prophet Mohammed that been published some months earlier in a Danish paper. During this 
protest, Rahman held a placard demanding the deaths of British troops in Iraq and 
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“beheading of those who insult Islam”.368 After the protest, Rahman made a speech that 
referred to western military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan where he said, among other things: 
 
We want to see them coming home in body bags. We want to see their blood running 
in the streets of Baghdad. We want to see their blood running in Fallujah. We want to 
see the Mujahedeen shoot down their planes the way we shoot down the birds. He 
then prayed to Allah, Don't leave any of them alive in Iraq. Don't leave any of them 
alive in Afghanistan.369 
 
The prosecution's case was that what he did in marching with the banners and what he said 
in his speech amounted not merely to behaviour, which contravened the Incitement to racial 
hatred under section 18, the Public Order Act but amounted to incitement to murder. 
Consequently, Rahman was convicted for using threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour with intent to stir up racial hatred or in circumstances where racial hatred was likely 
to be stirred up contrary to section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 and also for inciting 
murder. For his defence, Rahman argued that he was carried away in the moment and that 
he did not intend his words to be taken literally and not as inflammatory provocations. 
Nonetheless, the judges felt that there was a need to pre-emptively subdue Rahman’s 
speech, as there was a likelihood that his would lead, others to commit acts of racial violence. 
This view was based on the words that were uttered (i.e., “running blood” and “body bags”) 
and the apparent symbolic power of those words.  
 
I am not necessarily concerned about whether Rahman was wrongly decided or not. Rather, I 
am more concerned about probing the conceptual framing of the offence with regard to its 
scope i.e., how the offence is determined or distinguished from other offences and its 
subsequent implications. This decision suggests that from the outset the prosecution and the 
jury are not so certain of how to identify or categorise Rahman’s overdetermined speech. It is 
not clear whether it should fall under (or leak into) the category of incitement to racial hatred 
or incitement to murder. This determination is even made more confusing if we consider the 
fact that incitement to racial hatred and incitement to murder are two broad separable criminal 
categories. At any rate, because the speech offences are so widely and incrementally drawn, 
the entire legal structure that supports them collapses within and upon itself. It then becomes 
difficult for the prosecution or even the jury to draw or identify distinctions of “harm” and to 
apply the very text of the law.  
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The decision in Abdul v. Director of Public Prosecutions 370 underscores some of these issues 
and is worth probing. Here five appellants in a small group of thirteen Muslim protesters were 
protesting the UK’s involvement in the Afghanistan and Iraq war were convicted of using 
threatening, abusive or insulting words (within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be 
caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby) contrary to s 5 of the Public order Act 1986.  
Section 5 provides:  
 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if he— 
(a) uses threatening [or abusive] words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or 
(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening  [ or 
abusive],within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm 
or distress thereby.  
(2) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, 
except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the 
writing, a person inside a dwelling displays sign or other visible representation, and 
the other person is also inside that or another dwelling. 
(3) It is a defence for the accused to prove— 
(a) that he had no reason to believe that there was any person within hearing or sight 
who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress, or 
(b) that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or 
behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation displayed, would 
be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling, or 
(c) that his conduct was reasonable. 
 
During the protest, the appellants shouted slogans such as: “British soldiers murderers; Baby 
killers, Rapists all of you; British soldiers go to hell; Shame on you; Go to hell; Murderers; 
Baby killers”.371From the evidence presented to the court, the appellants were compliant 
throughout the protest to directions from the police; there was no evidence (of any warnings 
given to the appellants to desist from their behaviour), or of any efforts made to confiscate 
their placards or PA system. In fact, a letter was received on behalf of the Regiment saying 
(commendably) that they had not been bothered “one jot” by the demonstration. This letter 
describing the reasonably peaceful atmosphere of the protest suggests that there was no 
imminent link to harm that legitimized this prosecution. Based on the combination of these 
facts, one could argue that the actions of the protestors did not have a causal link to violence 
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or an (impending) inclination towards violence. Indeed, owing to the configuration of the crime 
at issue as an inchoate or precursory crime, it could be argued that the threat caused by the 
appellants’ speech in the demonstration was merely conjectural and presupposed.  
 
To illustrate this claim, the statements or speech made by Abdul also warrant a discussion 
here. To suggest that soldiers are murderers may be outrageous for some but it is not for 
others. Such an inference then creates a tenuous link between speech and harm or violence. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that many of the statements in Abdul e.g., “soldiers are 
murderers” are similar to the kinds of statements that could made by pacifist protestors to 
suggest that war and militarism are destructive, violent and unnecessary. The statement 
“soldiers are rapists, murderers and baby killers” although arguably incendiary could also be 
read as a fair statement of fact in light of sexual assaults372 and war crimes committed by the 
United States Army such as the gruesome Mahmudiyah rape killings in 2006.373 
 
Accordingly, one could argue that Abdul’s speech is a form of perfectly legitimate political 
speech that does not cause violence or threats of violence. It is simply a statement of political 
protest and resistance by Muslims against the war on terror and its brutal unhumaning effects 
such as the indiscriminate killing of civilians as well as the deployment of technologies and 
weapons of war like unmanned aerial vehicles.374 Hence, the court’s proscription of the 
protestor’s speech in Abdul conceptually oversimplifies (and yet doubly blurs) hermeneutic 
interpretations of speech in the sense that it substantially essentialises perceptions and 
determinations of what is “safe” or “harmful” according to the audience or a hypothetical 
public to whom speech is addressed. As I have demonstrated in chapter one, the implication 
of this is that it instills a monopoly or recursive cultural self-referentiality with regard to what 
“truth”, “terror”,“harm” and “ideology” are, hence sustaining a différantial exclusion of 
minoritarian speech and viewpoints. But in doing so, the very monolithic structures of 
containment and self-referentiality remain compromised by their inability to grasp the iterable, 
performative, and incalculable nature of concepts like truth, harm, and terror.375 This is an 
inescapable tension. 
 
To illustrate this tension further, it is worth turning to the case of Chambers v. 
DPP.376Although not an “incitement to violence” case per se, Chambers is significant because 
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it illustrates how innocuous speech could be wrongly criminalised. In Chambers, the 
defendant was convicted for posting a series of tweets commenting on the closure of an 
airport from which he was due to travel. He posted several “tweets” including: “Crap! Robin 
Hood Airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I am 
blowing the airport sky high!” None of the defendant's “followers” who read the tweets were 
frightened or shocked by them. A few days later however, the duty manager responsible for 
security at the airport found the tweets during an Internet search for tweets relating to the 
airport. Consequently, even though not constitutive of a credible threat, the matter was 
reported to the police. The defendant was charged with sending by a public electronic 
communications network a message of a menacing character, contrary to section 127(1) a of 
the communications Act 2003.377 He was convicted in a magistrates’ court. The Crown Court 
upheld the conviction, being satisfied that the message was “menacing per se” and that the 
defendant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character. The 
Court later allowed the appeal, on the grounds that the defendant did not have the intention to 
send a message of menacing character:  
 
 [T]he mental element of the offence is directed exclusively to the state of mind of the 
offender, and that if he may have intended the message as a joke, even if a poor joke 
in bad taste, it is unlikely that the mens rea required before conviction for the offence 
of sending a message of a menacing character will be established…. this ‘tweet’ did 
not constitute or include a message of a menacing character.378  
 
Crucially, for our purposes, the mere fact that such a decision concerning commentary written 
in jest (or bad taste) had initially been interpreted as menacing and had led to a prosecution 
goes to show the difficulties that those who enforce or interpret the law in speech situations 
may encounter. Chambers suggests that what a speaker or reader says or (un)consciously 
intends to say can lose its original form and rhythm and become lost, unreadable. Chambers’ 
harmless “joke tweet” was clearly lost uncannily, in context. Chambers thus suggests that 
context with regard to speech is always plural, in rupture, dislodged, suspended, drifting, –– 
destinerrant. A “real” understanding of context and the different nuances of context is 
therefore intolerably difficult to grasp. Hence, it becomes difficult from the outset to enforce 
laws that regulate speech, as these laws have to grapple with the contextual heterogeneity, 
incommensurability, and indeterminacy of speech, or even possibly whatever they construct 
as “ideology”.  
 
What these decisions (especially Abdul) suggest is that laws that seek to contain speech 
have a recurring conceptual difficulty of thresholds. In other words in their quest to regulate 
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indeterminate speech laws such laws are susceptible to being undecidably self-defeating in 
the sense that they may not be able to delineate precise and clear definitional thresholds with 
respect to different criminal categories of speech. They may for instance be incapable of 
differentiating between speech that merely threatens and speech that incites racism or even 
speech that incites murder. Furthermore, these decisions underscore another conceptual 
difficulty of inchoate speech crimes i.e., their incalculable inability to accurately establish a 
perpetrator’s mens rea with regard to inchoate speech offences. 
 
Another point that merits a brief discussion here is the susceptibility of inchoate speech 
offences to foreclose the alterity and speech of the other. In its justification of suppressing the 
speech of the protestors in Abdul, the court held that “when determining whether speech is 
“threatening, abusive or insulting, the focus on minority rights should not result in overlooking 
the rights of the majority”.379 The notion that the rights of the majority should not be 
overlooked if speech is threatening is concerning, because it ignores the fact that minoritarian 
individuals speak from a different/iterable structural position in western liberal societies and 
are thus always already likely to be subject to a censorial regime of delegitimation from the 
outset. This reenacts the aporia of subjectivity v. subjection that is present within all liberal-
utilitarian legal calculations of deterrence, prevention and utility as means-oriented justice. 
The criminalisation of the offence under a liberal-utilitarian calculus that privileges the rights 
of the majority should not be overlooked. It is significant because it legitimises, and 
inscribes a homo-hegemonic “pro-civility” of speech norms that renders certain viewpoints 
more conventionally acceptable than others. In this sense, it infers that the minoritarian 
speech of the other always already has a premeditated or pre-determined phantasmic 
potential to disrupt the normative liberal idea of a univocal or unanimous white, secular, or 
Christian, liberal-British people. 
 
It is therefore not surprising that in Abdul, British white people (who are a 
structurally/materially privileged racial majority) are psychically centred as the victims of 
racial hatred. Considering that racial hatred is for the most part concerned with the 
protection of racialised and racial minorities like Muslims in the post 9/11 continuum, this 
particular juridico-legal interpretation of what racism entails paradoxically replicates the 
structural /institutionalised production and effects of racism380 in the sense that it disavows 
the alterity of the other through its negation or delegitimisation of the speech/logos of the 
most marginalised in society. 
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Crucially, my reading of “racial hatred” in Abdul touches a very sensitive nerve in the 
collective cultural memory of the majority of citizens in the UK who are white, non-religious 
and liberal British. Which is to say, that Abdul’s speech taps into western society’s general 
unconscious (i.e., its cultural anxiety of Islam specially in the content of its involvement in Iraq 
and Afghanistan) revealing the unsayable psycho-existential wound or trauma of what Derrida 
might call “the unconscious scar of the to come”.381 This uncanny or Unheimlichkeit 
investment or need to safeguard liberal orders against the terrible unknown in Abdul can be 
read as being suggestive of a calculated sovereign psychoanalytic desire to suppress or 
censor the “unsayable” or difficult to bear.382And so, by creating Abdul’s speech as a potential 
cause and “transmitter” of racial hatred, such criminalisation can be read as a kind of 
repression that fails to reckon with the “ghosts” (i.e., the materially disavowed and 
underrepresented contours of Abdul’s speech).  
 
The effect of all this is as Choudhury and Fenwick 383 have observed is the execution of a 
structural and epistemic limit that can contribute to a wider sense of injustice and aggravation 
among minority groups especially Muslims who may feel that they are a scape-goated 
“suspect community”384targeted for their speech. This in turn engenders (and sustains) a 
highly racialised hauntological climate or system of collectively repressed fear,385anxiety and 
racialised suspicion that haunts not only Muslims but also non-Muslim communities through 
irreconcilable tensions or polarisations of différance (such as the idea of the West v. Islam) 
that also accelerate, multiply, and sustain the additional aporetic problematics of subjectivity 
v. subjection and singularity v. incommensurability/heterogeneity. To this end, the law’s 
intentions to create a more secure and ordered society through extensive criminal measures 
are undermined for the reason that a phantasmic impression of a society under siege is 
created without closure. 
 
Of course, it is fair to say that the inherent flexibility is convenient because it is instrumental in 
quashing racial hatred before it occurs, especially in unforeseeable speech situations. 
Flexibility can be seen as convenient due to its ability to prevent, identify and anticipate futural 
crimes especially in the context of speech. I am somewhat sympathetic to this line of 
reasoning because law is always left wanting especially if it is “strictly applied” or narrowly 
interpreted.386 However, as I have already suggested, in the context of inchoate speech 
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crimes, flexibility tends to be so widely inscribed and construed conceptually within the very 
text of the law that it ends up producing and inaugurating conjectural notions like “likelihood” 
and “reasonableness” that complicate speech regulatory situations. Put another way, such 
flexibility conflates understandings of harm and paradoxically inaugurates a slippery slope 
within the very structure and text of the law that makes practices of regulation and 
containment intractable.  
 
The implication of such overcompensatory/overdetermined flexibility, especially in the context 
of inchoate speech crimes, is that it can be used as a justification to extend the singular 
application of the law and its thresholds into unknown contexts. Whilst this may be necessary 
for law enforcement, it presents three irreconcilable mooring problems related to the 
thresholds (i.e., the textual boundaries, gaps, disavowals, and limits) of the law namely:  
 
1) In its desire to enduringly predict or calculate, flexibility’s lack of precision and 
wide scope complicates and stretches the very text of the law (intertextually) into 
unforeseeable contexts or situations (flexibility engenders the aporia of 
singularity v. heterogeneity) making laws’ very enforcement and interpretation 
intractable. Hence, the inscribed speech harms (or ideologically motivated 
crimes) that the law seeks to contain in the first place become unidentifiable, 
blurry and indistinguishable making the law self-undermining and self-
inadequating. 
2) This aporia of singularity v. heterogeneity (which also operates concomitantly 
within an aporetic episteme of subjectivity v. subjugation), leads to a prioritization 
of the needs of the singular over the heterogeneous and in turn makes the law 
more susceptible to being applied in discriminatory and arbitrary ways. 
3) This consequently conflicts with the right of freedom to expression provided for 
under art 10 ECHR and related rights such as the right from discrimination. As 
will become evident in this thesis, these violations occur partly because of the 
“vagueness”387 of the law, which “impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to 
policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis 
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application”.388 
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In this chapter I focus on the first two gaps. I pay more attention to the third conflict with 
human rights particularly art 10 of the ECHR in chapter four. 
Incitement to terrorism in the UK 
 
Because incitement to terrorism is conceptualised as a convergence of incitement on the one 
hand and terrorism on the other hand, it is important, for the purposes of this thesis, to briefly 
consider the definitions of incitement and of terrorism in their particularities as this can aid our 
understanding of the notion of incitement to terrorism better.  
   
Incitement  
 
I have already outlined the contours of incitement as a crime that instigates, prompts or 
“goads (someone) to take some action or course of action”389to some degree in the previous 
sections. For the purposes of this thesis, incitement will be conceptualised as a generic 
concept that gathers together various inchoate speech offences such as glorification and 
encouragement as brought about by the 2006 Terrorism Act in relation to extremist speech.390 
What this chapter will be interested in is tracing the overall structure of incitement and probing 
how it brings two key trends into play 1) precursor/inchoate crimes and 2) crimes that seek to 
regulate and pre-empt the dissemination of speech or ideologically motivated crimes. I return 
to this discussion later in this chapter. But first, for now, I turn my attention to the component 
of terrorism within incitement to terrorism.   
 
Defining terrorism  
 
The definition of terrorism is found under s.1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides: 
 
           (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where – 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and 
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(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious[, racial] 
or ideological cause.391 
 
Right away, in looking at the definition of terrorism, a reader faces many definitional and 
interpretational difficulties that demonstrate the broad range of activities covered. These are 
aesthetic and conceptual difficulties of scope (e.g., from “serious property damage”, to 
endangerment of another person’s life to creating a serious public health or safety risk to 
serious interferences or disruptions of electronic systems) that extend even to activities 
carried outside the UK.392  
 
Indeed, if this definition under the 2000 Act is contrasted with the previous definition of 
terrorism provided under section 20 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 (“the use of 
violence for political ends including any use of violence for the purposes of putting the public, 
or any section of the public in fear”),393 drastic extensions definition-wise and scope-wise 
arise.   
 
Section 1(c) for example lumps together different criminal offences and concepts (such as 
“political, religious, racial or ideological”) and conflates them. Significantly, by obfuscating the 
boundaries between racial, ideological and political motivations (or put differently, by merging 
all these divergent concepts under the singular notion of terrorism definition) section 1 
engenders a further interplay of indistinguishable offences. Moreover, contestable terms like 
“religious” and “ideological” are then inscribed within the very undecidable opacity of  
“terrorism”, enkindling opacities within opacities. Hence, from the outset, an inevitable and 
undecidable entanglement of differences that play upon each other is inhabited and initiated 
from within section 1’s text. This spectral play of différance/differences is perhaps most 
evident in the inclusion of the notion of “racial ideology” –– an amendment to the 2000 Act 
that was made in 2008. The introduction of  “racial” ideology into section 1’s text inscribes or 
marks the speech of the racialised other (in particular the Muslim other), as a potentially 
transferential cause and referent of terror. In doing so, the provision psychically asserts an 
expansive homo-hegemonic episteme, that widens the scope of terrorism potentially creating, 
consolidating and enforcing a racialised interpretation of terrorism (the West vs. Islam) that at 
the same time, inherently defers and disavows the alterity of the other.394 Yet, inasmuch as 
this widening of the Act increases the sovereign’s power to police terrorism, it also 
paradoxically opens the definition of terrorism further out, into other phantasmic dimensions 
and extremities by elevating “the wrong things into sensational focus [and] hiding and 
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mystifying the[ir] deeper causes”.395 This inexorably blurs and compromises the intended 
stability, coherence and enforceability of section 1.  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in R v. Gul396 underscores some of the interpretational 
difficulties and challenges brought about by the broad definition of terrorism as provided for 
under section 1. In Gul, the defendant had uploaded and disseminated videos which showed 
attacks by insurgents on coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and excerpts from 
martyrdom videos accompanied by commentaries praising the attackers’ bravery and 
encouraging others to emulate them. He was tried and charged and convicted under s 2 of 
the Terrorism Act 2006. Similar to the decisions discussed earlier in Abdul and Rahman, one 
of the key issues of concern in Gul was the potential for the definition of terrorism under s1 of 
the 2000 Act to be used arbitrarily owing to its imprecise wording. In fact, this was the basis of 
Gul’s appeal.  
 
Gul believed that his actions did not amount to terrorism because the “concept of terrorism”397 
in international law (unlike the UK’s definition of terrorism) excluded those engaged in an 
armed struggle against a government who attacked its armed forces in the context of a non-
international conflict. Although his appeal was dismissed, the court acknowledged the 
potential over-reaching nature with regard to the way in which terrorism was defined. The 
Court’s obiter dictum observed that 
 
the fact that the powers are so unrestricted and the definition of 'terrorism' is so wide 
means that such powers are probably of even more concern than the prosecutorial 
powers to which the Acts give rise …[emphasis added].398 
 
Like with the offence of incitement to racial hatred (discussed above), the justification given 
for preserving the incitement to terrorism offences in their current state is the same given for 
other inchoate crimes i.e., they are instrumental in quashing terrorism before it occurs. In this 
way, they also serve a public order purpose, a banoptic pre-control or “governmentality” 
function399(rather than a strict criminalising purpose), which is the preservation of the 
sovereign’s peace, order or security. 
 
Although this thesis focuses solely on the United Kingdom, it is worth noting that the 
European Union has taken a related stance with regard to offences that incite terrorism or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Hall, S. et al. Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press 
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397 Ibid at Para 25 
398 Ibid Para 63 
399 Choudhury, T. “The Terrorism Act 2006: Discouraging terrorism” in Extreme Speech and 
Democracy (OUP 2009) p.465 
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(according to its terms) offences that provoke terrorism. Looking briefly at the EU’s 2017 
Directive on combating terrorism is important because it provides some comparative insight 
into the essence of the offence and its aims.  
 
The EU Directive 2017/541 provides that: 
 
The offence of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence act comprises, inter 
alia, the glorification and justification of terrorism or the dissemination of messages or 
images online and offline, including those related to the victims of terrorism as a way 
to gather support for terrorist causes or to seriously intimidate the population. Such 
conduct should be punishable when it causes a danger that terrorist acts may be 
committed. In each concrete case, when considering whether such a danger is 
caused, the specific circumstances of the case should be taken into account, such as 
the author and the addressee of the message, as well as the context in which the act 
is committed. The significance and the credible nature of the danger should be also 
considered [...].400  
 
At the time of writing, it is evident that the Directive, like the incitement to terrorism offences, 
is broadly constructed so as to stop the dissemination of harmful speech transnationally.401 
The danger however in this Directive is that: 
 
 1) It creates a reductive pre-programmed and calculable understanding of speech 
harms or ideologically motivated crimes that eschews the fact that speech is iterable, 
divergent, and multi-contextual and 
 2); It drafts incitement to terrorism laws as firm inchoate offences that seek to pre-
determine the outcomes of speech/ ideologically motivated crimes in differentiated 
contexts paradoxically undermines (yet also exaggerates) the limits and definitions of 
such laws by widening their reach indeterminably. This I argue fundamentally and 
inexorably blurs and compromises the intended clarity and coherence of inchoate 
speech crimes.  
 
Having discussed the nature of incitement, and pointed out its vulnerability to indefiniteness 
or opacity, it is now important that we trace its configuration in contemporary UK legal 
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401 See de Londras, F, and Doody, J. eds. The impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-
Terrorism (Routledge, 2015);	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provisions in order to understand how it is defined and interpreted. My starting point for 
discussion is the 2006 Terrorism Act. 
 
The 2006 Terrorism Act: A background 
 
Legislation targeting incitement or speech of a terrorist nature in the UK was first proscribed 
under Schedule 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Temporary Provisions Act 1989. However, 
over time, this Act was deemed to be necessarily ineffective because it could not counter the 
threat from extremist international terrorism in the post-9/11-7/7 era, as practiced by global 
terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and ISIS, amongst others.  
 
Accordingly, in an attempt to supplement this inadequacy within law, an interrelated 
smorgasbord of legislation has replaced the 1989 Act, namely: the Terrorism Act 2000, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This 
chapter limits its focus on the Terrorism act 2006 and section 57 and section 58 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 for the reason that these provisions best exemplify the notion of 
incitement to terrorism. 
 
The Terrorism Act 2006402 was brought into effect as a direct result of the London bombings 
of July 2005. During parliamentary debates before the Act was passed into law, the then 
Home Secretary Charles Clarke MP stated: 
 
The July events indicate that there are people in this country who are susceptible to 
the preaching […] of an argument or a message that terrorism is a worthy thing, a 
thing to be admired, a thing to be celebrated and then act on the basis of that…. 
What this Bill is about is trying to make that more difficult, that transition from people 
encouraging, glorifying to then an act being undertaken.403    
 
The foundations of this law suggest that it was formulated for prophylactic purposes. The 
Preamble of the 2006 Act describes it as: “an Act to make provision for and about offences 
relating to conduct carried out, or capable of being carried out, for purposes connected with 
terrorism”.404 Thus, in the process of passing the 2006 Act a great deal of attention was paid 
towards the concept of ideological speech as a cause of violent radicalisation and terrorism. 
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This, from the point of view of the government, was a justifiable stance because ideology can 
have great implications for the process of radicalisation:405  
 
We should not ignore the contributory role that radical texts and extremist pamphlets 
have in radicalisation. They serve to propagate and reinforce the extremist and 
damaging philosophies, which attempt to justify and explain the motivations of 
terrorists. We should not underestimate the role that such literature can have in 
radicalising vulnerable and susceptible young people particularly changing Muslims 
from law abiding members of the community to potential terrorists.406  
  
Consequently, the 2006 Act purposively sought to contain speech in the form of religious 
ideology (particularly Islamic related speech)407 as it was conceptualised a key contributor of 
terrorism. Thus, the 2006 Act constructed religious, political and ideological forms of speech 
as inchoate offences, with the intention of curbing the proliferation and publishing of such 
forms of speech that would glorify, encourage, induce and provoke acts of terrorism. These 
offences in principle were to cut back on the capabilities of those who contribute to a climate 
in which “impressionable people” might believe that terrorism is acceptable. It was thought 
that limiting access to ideological speech would prevent terrorism.  
 
I want to position this discussion differently. I want to suggest, following my discussion of 
inchoate speech crimes, that the passing of the Act should be read as a configuration of 
sovereign power to control speech or discourse/ideology by preserving normative liberal 
orders. To understand this, one must briefly retrace the genealogical roots of inchoate crime. 
In addition to situations (involving unlawful assembly, blasphemy and particularly sedition as 
discussed above) inchoate speech offences were instrumental in the British empire’s 
attempts to police tendencies that sought “to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite 
disaffection against the person of, Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, or the 
government”408 in the colonies especially in places like Ireland, Palestine, Kenya and Cyprus 
where it routinely experienced anticolonial dissent.409 Many of these uprisings e.g., the Mau-
Mau independence movement in Kenya employed covert unpredictable and subversive 
tactics that left the British colonialists with hardly any choice but to employ proactive as well 
as pre-emptive military/policing strategies and tactics.410 Many of these tactics, were driven by 
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407 Barendt, E. Threats to Freedom of Speech in the United Kingdom UNSWLJ 28 (2005): 895; Duffy 
and Pitcher, Indirectly Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of Law  
408 See Stephen, J.F. Digest of the Criminal Law, 9th ed., Art. 114 
409 Similar structures of speech regulation have also been used to suppress communist speech. 
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Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, no. 5 (2011): 731-748; Anderson, D. Histories of the 
hanged: The dirty war in Kenya and the end of empire (WW Norton & Company, 2005); wa Thiong'o, 
	  
                                                                         	  
93	  
an uncanny fear of colonial self-preservation, a “fear felt by the white community and the 
need to preserve its privileges”.411  
 
Owing to this phantasmic fear, they followed a spectral extralegal logic akin to Agamben’s 
critical postulation of “the state of exception”. That is to say, the tactics blurred legal norms 
and went beyond conventional legal means and employed brutal proactive and pre-emptive 
methods of torture and degradation such as unlawful imprisonment, hanging, castration and 
screened interrogations, all in the name of preempting unpopular speech ideas.412 Years 
later, some of these strategies were transposed and implemented into UK national law and 
counter terrorism policy especially during the Irish troubles in Northern Ireland.413 
 
No doubt, the situations encountered by the British government on foreign soil are different 
from the situations of terrorism encountered on British soil today. But it is still within this 
broader historical context that the Terrorism Act 2000 should be read, for the UK’s legislative 
past still haunts the present. Which is to say, its terminologies of anxiety and panic belong to 
this same psychic/mystic colonial-liberal-utilitarian register. Indeed, the 2000 Act performs a 
similar “reincarnative” colonial-liberal-utilitarian function of proactive and pre-emptive policing 
and risk management. In fact, what stands out initially from the language used in these 
terrorism provisions is that they are conceptually drafted as inchoate speech offences so as 
enable the authorities to police and arrest the indeterminate and unpredictable elements of 
post-9/11-7/7 terrorism414 through notions like pre-crime. As such, they infer a systematic 
operation of a kind of governmentality or calculability that attempts to determine and calculate 
the outcomes of speech as behaviour beforehand, (even) in differentiated contexts.  
 
Whilst this can be convenient from the point of view of national security, it yet again, in an 
ironic vein, it re-inscribes the two aforementioned challenges highlighted in my discussion of 
inchoate speech crimes, namely: 
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1) A pre-programmed or pre-calculated understanding of speech and indeed speech 
harms that do not consider the fact that speech and speech harms (or “ideologically 
motivated crimes”) are iterable, divergent and contextual. This ultimately fosters a 
homo-hegemonic consensus on speech and harm based on western liberal-utilitarian 
viewpoints that deters, delegitimizes and forecloses the speech of the other; and  
 2) A paradoxical widening of the law and its definitions in an attempt to contain the 
indeterminate. This stretching out into the indeterminate fundamentally blurs and 
compromises the intended stability, coherence and enforceability of inchoate speech 
offences. 
 
In the next sections, I explore these claims further by looking at the notions of encouragement 
and glorification as forms of incitement to terrorism legislation in the UK. Throughout my 
discussion, I probe the inchoate nature of the offences and the particular ethical predicaments 
this may have in regard to legal opacity, interpretation and accessibility of law.   
 
Encouragement and glorification of terrorism under the 2006 Act  
Encouragement 
 
The offence of Encouragement to commit a terrorist act is laid out under section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006. Section 1(2) A of the 2006 Act states that a person commits an offence if: 
 
(a) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to 
publish such a statement; and  
(b) at the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he; 
(i) intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise 
induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or 
Convention offences; or  
(ii) is reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly 
encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate 
such acts or offences.  
 
Like with many of the other generic concepts of incitement to terrorism, “encouragement” is 
broad in scope. For example, it includes the notions of publication of statements causing to 
publish statements and preparing or instigating the publication of such statements.   
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The statement in question can be visual or auditory or could even be done electronically 
through a service like the Internet.415 The publication of the statement would thus constitute 
the actus reus of the offence. The statute also requires the prosecution to show that the 
instigator intended members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or induced by 
the statement, this would constitute the mens rea. 
It is worth noting that the consideration of the composition of the readership of a publication is 
different from, and should not be confused with, the consideration of evidence of people who 
have read a publication in the past and have been encouraged to commit terrorist offences. 
This is demonstrated in R v. Faraz416 where the appellant, a manager of an Islamic bookshop 
appealed a conviction for selling publications of books, articles, videos and DVDs that 
allegedly encouraged militant Islam.417 In Faraz, the prosecution had submitted that the 
publications were terrorist publications by virtue of the fact that they were found in the 
possession of terrorists. At first instance, the judge accepted that the evidence provided by 
the prosecution was important explanatory evidence of the case as a whole, particularly in 
determining whether or not the publication concerned was a “terrorist publication”.418 
However, on appeal, the court was of the view that the judge at first instance had erred in his 
reasoning and it quashed the convictions. The court held that inferences of encouragement to 
terrorism drawn from mere possession of publications were not admissible for the reason that 
they would be “speculative, unfair and prejudicial”.419  
 
Although this distinction of substantial probability as established in Faraz, in the context of 
terrorist crimes is important, it is not the only determinant of mens rea. In reality, the 
requirement for such a probability also pays attention to contextual factors. Indeed, the court 
attempts to make distinctions based on the facts of each case to determine whether or not the 
context in which speech is disseminated impacts on the defendant’s ability to encourage 
terrorism. This approach is expressed in R v. Ali (Humza).420 Here, the defendant, who was a 
supporter of the proscribed organisation Islamic State, sent three Islamic State propaganda 
videos to two other men with whom he was in contact via a chat group. The first two videos 
showed prisoners confessing “sins” against the organisation and being executed, while the 
third was a recruitment video. The defendant was charged with three counts of disseminating 
a terrorist publication, contrary to section 2 of the Terrorism Act.  
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In Humza, the court was of the view that the case should be distinguished from 
Faraz because “the context was different and the dissemination was different and it involved 
different dissemination, different material and a different potential readership”.421 Humza 
unlike Faraz had clear connections with terrorism activities in the sense that he had taken 
positive steps such as the dissemination of videos that encouraged and supported IS’s 
activities and thus suggested a deep commitment to terrorism activities.422 Humza like Faraz 
can thus be read as a properly considered decision in the sense that it provides an important 
setting of interpretational thresholds that appreciate the “difference” or heterogeneity and 
iterability of speech.  
 
To determine the mens rea of encouragement, further guidance is provided for under section 
1(4) of the 2006 Act, which requires consideration to be taken for the publications as a whole. 
Accordingly, the context of the document or publication in question is crucial. Thus, how a 
statement is likely to be understood and what members of the public could reasonably be 
expected to infer from it must be determined having regard to both: (a) the contents of the 
statement as a whole; and (b) the circumstances and manner of its publication. 
 
Notwithstanding, in day-to-day enforcement situations, using contextual interpretations to 
determine mens rea can be difficult, owing to the inchoate and intertextual/iterable nature of 
the offence. Furthermore, the fact that the offence relies on reasonableness and likelihood 
complicates things. Reasonableness is a very subjective term (that in a play of 
difference/différance articulated in the previous chapter) somewhat presupposes an other’s 
unreasonableness. Thus, how “some readers” understand and interpret text and speech is 
subjective and problematic from the outset. The possibility of a publication being unfairly 
misread or misinterpreted by a given readership (especially where the addressee/addressees 
are not physically present) is thus infinitely high. Determining the circumstances and manner 
of a publication and the publisher’s intent thus becomes intractable.  
 
A demonstration of this instance occurs in R v. Brown (Terence Roy)423 where Brown was 
convicted of seven counts of collecting or making a record of information including a 
publication of the “Anarchist Cookbook” a 1971 pamphlet that and a limited CD edition, which 
comprised thousands of files already available on the internet. The court was of the view that 
such information was likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of 
terrorism. No doubt, the context played a role here in the courts determination. It appears that 
the court was fixated on the fact that these publications were disseminated in the aftermath of 
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the London bombings. Perhaps for this reason, the courts were palpably haunted by the 
spectre of terrorism. Perhaps also, the court’s interpretation of harm or risk in Brown emerges 
from this spectral socio-political reality. 
 
I raise this as a point of contention because unlike Humza, one could argue (as in Brown) that 
he had no intent to cause or encourage terrorist acts through his dissemination of the 
publications. He had no deep commitments to IS or any other proscribed terrorist group and 
did not want to cause serious violence to public. Moreover, the publications were publicly 
available online and could have been accessed by anyone. Brown thus contrastingly goes in 
a very different direction from Faraz. It reads as a decision that seeks to establish an element 
of far reaching risk/harm prevention. But in doing so it undermines consistency within the law. 
Furthermore, the decision in Brown ignores the fact that speech can affect different readers 
differently and that speech dynamics are incalculably diverse, iterable, heterological.  
 
1) The Encouragement Defence  
To establish a defence to the offence of encouragement to terrorism, the defendant will have 
to show that:  
(a) The statement neither expressed his views nor had his endorsement (whether by 
virtue of section 3 or otherwise); and (b) that it was clear, in all the circumstances 
[emphasis added] of the statement’s publication, that it did not express his views.424 
 
Yet again, the requirement to show that it was “clear in all circumstances” i.e., that a 
statement did not endorse terrorism is not so easy to identify because speech is inherently 
elusive, unprogrammable and obscure. Indeed, as I have suggested in chapter one, whatever 
one says or endorses, is iterable, not constative. Words do not correspond to certain fixed 
mono-subjective system of signs (or in a straightforward cause-effect-trajectory/“criminal 
interaction order”)425 and for this reason, they can never be “clear in all circumstances”. Put 
another way, for a statement to be clear or for it to be interpreted as such means that it would 
have to undergo a publicly biased/subjective/presumptuous liberal consensus-based 
determination. This in turn makes it almost impossible from the outset for anyone to argue 
that a statement they have published or uttered is not connected to terrorism if the majority of 
the public to whom such a statement is communicated directly or indirectly believe and 
generally agree that it is.  
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The offence of glorification to terrorism is proscribed under section 3 of the 2006 Act. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the statements that are likely to be understood by 
members of the public as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of acts of 
terrorism or Convention offences include every statement which:  
(a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or 
generally) of such acts or offences; and  
(b) is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be 
expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should 
be emulated by them in existing circumstances. 
 
Although similar to “encouragement”, glorification appears to stretch the definition(s) of 
incitement, at least conceptually. As per section 20 (2) of the 2006 Act, glorification brings to 
mind the notions of “praise”, “eulogising”, and “celebration”. Or as Home Office Minister 
Baroness Scotland has put it, “to glorify is to describe or represent as admirable, especially 
unjustifiably or undeservedly”.426 The offence covers statements published which glorify 
terrorism “in the past, in the future or generally”427 and hence arguably goes further than 
encouragement.  
 
The purpose for the indication if “glorification” in law is tied to an official response of palpable 
panic after the 7/7 attacks in the UK as reflected in the statements of then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair who said: “Let no one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are changing”.428 
Such panic led to a restructuring of the UK’s legal anti-terrorism measures through the 
introduction of new anti-terror legislation such as the offence of glorifying terrorism. Amidst all 
the post-7/7 socio-political legal upheavals and uncertainty, it was felt that the offence could 
pre-emptively control ideologically motivated crimes. When the Act was still a Bill, the then 
home office secretary stated that the purpose of the law was to make it more difficult for 
people to transition from encouraging, glorifying to then committing acts of terrorism.429 
Further, in later comments about the law the home office secretary also seemed to 
emphasise that there was a link between speech or “ideas”430 that glorify terrorism and acts of 
terrorism themselves:   
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430 Ibid: The government in its desire to prevent terrorism seems to have placed a lot on emphasis on 
the fact that speech is a direct cause and driver of terrorism. The problem in such a reading is that yet 
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 It is perfectly clear that people who seek to recruit terrorists do so not just by directly 
encouraging terrorism or by provoking people to commit violent acts but by glorifying 
terrorism and terrorists. They may emphasise that terrorists are heroes whose 
actions should be copied; that terrorists go straight to paradise when they die; that 
terrorist undertake glorious acts that deserve to be emulated; or that terrorists are 
simply better humans than those of us who are not terrorists. The single word that 
best captures that is ‘glorification’. […] It does not as I have explained cover all forms 
of indirect encouragement, but it does cover those forms. It is that clarity of meaning 
that makes the word glorification so important […] those who seek to recruit terrorists 
know what it means [emphasis mine].431  
 
The law would thus act as a kind of security/protective cushion. Indeed as Eric Barendt432 has 
observed, the purpose of the legislation from the point of view of the government was to 
“signal” that speech glorifying terrorism was unacceptable. It is of course understandable to a 
degree that the government needed a wider legal strategy to deal with the then threatening 
characteristics of post-9/11-7/7 terrorism. For the government, the communication of ideology 
from both the perspectives of the publishers and the readership/listeners (or members of the 
public) were an urgent and important factor in the equation.  
 
Under section 4(b), the offence of glorification requires that those who hear a statement 
praising or celebrating terrorism must reasonably be able to infer that what is praised is being 
praised as something that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances. This 
requirement for a readership to reasonably infer meaning from what is praised in the existing 
circumstances however presents difficulties it would be necessary for us to interrogate. For 
example, there can be an enormous scope for disagreement between its readership (the 
fictional members of the public as to whom it is published)433 as to whether a particular 
comment is merely an explanation or an expression (such as humour, satire, a double-edged 
pun, or irony or a word placed within a tendentious cluster of words goes further) and 
amounts to encouragement, praise or glorification”.434 In this regard, the offence relies on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
again it glosses over the divergence and iterability of speech and it disavows other symptomatic/deep 
underlying causes of terrorism. Furthermore, the legal proscription of terrorist speech offences does not 
necessarily bring an end to the dissemination of terrorist content, which is subversive by its very nature. 
431 Hansard HC Vol. 442 Col. 1437  
432 Barendt, E. Incitement to, and glorification of, terrorism in Extreme speech and democracy (OUP 
2009) p.469 
433 According to s 2 of the 2006 Act, the impact of the publication is measured by it’s understanding by 
all or some of the members to whom it is or may become available. 
434 Hunt, A. Criminal prohibitions on direct and indirect encouragement of terrorism Criminal Law Review 
(2007) 
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drawing of inferences (or hauntological projection)435 therefore generating a degree of 
uncertainty and unpredictability or inaccessibility of the law.  
  
Moreover, one could argue, as I have done in the previous chapter, that the offence of 
glorification especially in a liberal-utilitarian society like the UK doubly functions as a tool of 
censorship in the sense that it inscribes and pre-determines how certain socio-political 
references, vocabularies and histories are to be invoked, enunciated or expressed. In doing 
so, it in an a priori fashion subjugates minoritarian viewpoints that cannot yield or assimilate 
to the norm. It condemns them to “silence or to shocking non-civil outspokenness”436 in order 
to preserve a normative univocal/fraternal British logos or way of life.437 This is a 
monopolisation of violence through law, a kind of monopolization that dispossesses non-
minoritarian people of their ability to speak in certain ways by its inscription of a banoptic and 
disciplinary logic that disavows the alterity of the other.  
 
Part of the difficulty in determining glorification stems from its grounding in terrorism which (as 
discussed earlier) is in itself nebulous and has an expansive interpretation within UK 
legislation. This is problematic considering the fact that the ECtHR has held in Sunday Times 
v. United Kingdom,438 that “the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to 
have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case”.439 In interpreting glorification, it is conceivable that an enormous scope of 
disagreement can arise between reasonable people as to whether a particular comment is 
merely an explanation or an expression of a previous terror incident or whether it amounts to 
praise or glorification. This is further complicated by the representational dynamics of speech 
as a form of locutionary power and sovereign exclusivity.440 One who defines the world 
controls it and circumscribes a particular division and consensus of it.441 A dominant universal 
meta-narrative can lead to misrepresentations of less popular speech, even by a reasonable 
composition of a readership, and this could incalculably label speech as “glorification” even 
when it is not. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 For Freud, projection is a self-preservative mechanism in which the ego defends itself against 
unconscious impulses or qualities by repressing or disavowing their existence and attributing them to 
others. See: Freud, S. Case Histories II (Penguin Freud Library Vol. 9, 1988) p.132 
436 Bourdieu, P. Language and symbolic power (Polity Press, 2016) p.139 
437 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p.26 
438 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245 
439 Ibid at Para 49: a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. 
440 Dawes, J.R, Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities: 
Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 1(1999) 
441 Foucault M, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (Colin Gordon, 
1980) p.93 
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Furthermore, the requirement of “reckless” rather than “intentional encouragement” is also 
problematic. Traditionally, the test of recklessness is based upon the subjective recklessness 
test in R v. Cunningham,442 which establishes that recklessness occurs when: a person acts 
recklessly with respect to a circumstance when he is (a) aware of a risk that exists or will 
exist; and (b) being aware of that risk, it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable 
to take the risk.443 Glorification however, under the 2006 Act, creates a drastic shift in the 
reading of recklessness that postulates foresight of consequence. That is to say, 
“recklessness” under the 2006 Act does not depend on the publisher, rather, it is an “objective 
recklessness”, determined by the readership of the publication i.e., members of the public 
“who could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified as conduct that should 
be emulated by them in existing circumstances”.444  
 
This supposition of “objective” within recklessness also needs some closer examination. 
Being “objective” infers being impartial, equitable and unbiased and is a matter of 
unacknowledged truth making. It is defined by the inclinations of how certain social agents (in 
this case the readership) view and experience the world. Thus, no matter how carefully 
framed and expressed “objectivity” is, as a mode of inquiry, it inevitably “harbours 
preconceptions and pre-understandings that direct and regulate it”.445All this is to say; it is 
quite likely that in trying to be objective, the readership would be exclusive, essentialist and 
reductionist. Put differently, because the make up of the readership would coincide generally 
with a particular regional/geographical cultural position, they would be inclined to recognise 
and identify what “glorification” is basing it on a particular regional, historical and cultural 
narrative and its complex set of assumptions and presuppositions. Naturally speaking, their 
regional historico-cultural narrative would be the norm; it would be the proper or “rational” way 
of doing things and all other ways of doing things would be constitutively non-objective, 
irrational. In this sense, it would carry with it dominant univocal and homogenous mono-
subjective discourses that dictate day-to-day cultural attitudes and experiences.446 Thus, 
given this fact, it is improbable that such a univocal readership would identify positively with 
non-normative speech that challenges or re-interprets the readership’s very historical-cultural 
position (i.e., their moral, ontological and epistemological attitudes, sensibilities and 
experiences).  
 
Objective recklessness then becomes delimiting (paradoxically) because it conserves and 
gives a greater role to the readership’s collective sensibilities and presuppositions. Indeed, as 
chapter one of this thesis has suggested, drawing clear, objective and unbiased meanings or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 [1957] 2 QB 396 see also R v. G [2003] UKHL 50 
443 Ibid Para 41 
444 Section 3(b) Terrorism Act 2006  
445 Gunkel, D.J. Hacking Cyberspace (Westview Press, 2001) p.1 
446 Heinze, E. Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual Orientation and Analogies to 
Disability, Age, and Obesity. Extreme speech and democracy (2009) p.267 
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a hermeneutic consensus from speech in highly charged socio-political contexts is impossibly 
difficult. The contexts themselves are always drifting and the speech itself is always iterable. 
Indeed as the decision in Abdul above has shown, reasonable beliefs (like with “objectivity” 
discussed above) ignore the hierarchisation of positions of utterance, they infer a 
commonality of experience with regard to culture, memory, re-cognition and interpretation and 
are susceptible to excluding minoritarian opinions and viewpoints as well as the different 
nuances within the significations and gradients of speech such as the ability to read or 
distinguish between statements and gestures of irony, socio-political critique, or even a joke 
made out of mere frustration as was the case in DPP v. Chambers. 
 
That glorification also turns back the clock, by its proscription of statements that occurred in 
the past is confusing. It is not clear, for example, whether or not the now (ex post justifiable) 
actions and statements of people like Nelson Mandela fighting against repression such as the 
ANC of 80’s South Africa or even if say Dedan Kimathi of the Mau Mau independence 
movement would encompass “glorification”.447 Arguably, such meanings remain elusive since 
they can only be ascertained after the event, and not by psychically “scrying” into the future.  
 
Reasonableness, with regard to interpretation or meaning, is further problematised when we 
think of speech dynamics within the medium of cyberspace ––a medium of metadata, which 
continuously transmogrifies448 digital speech449 and obscurely multiplies words, contexts, and 
subjectivities. This ecological and informational ambiguity engenders an interpretational void, 
which can be confusing when trying to establish the publisher’s mens rea and ultimately in 
trying to establish when an individual is “glorifying” terrorism or not. Such a determination is 
hard to make because speech is inherently divergent. It iterates into different modes and 
functions that evade translation, calculation, and apprehension. 
 
Awan for instance suggests that such speech through debates or poems online can in certain 
instances have a cathartic function that enables users to express their despair or concerns of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Stone, R. Civil Liberties and Human Rights (OUP 2008) p.244; Macdonald, S. "Prosecuting 
suspected terrorists: precursor crimes, intercept evidence and the priority of security." In Critical 
Perspectives on Counter-terrorism (Routledge, 2014) pp.146-165  
448 My use of the word transmogrify here refers to the inherent ability of digital speech to transform or 
alter meaning in a surprising manner. 
449 Murray, D. Freedom of Expression, Counter-Terrorism and the Internet in Light of the UK Terrorist 
Act 2006 and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Neth. Q. Hum. Rts 27 (2009): 
p. 331. See also:  Pickerill, J. Radical Politics on the Net, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2006): p. 
273; Miró-Llinares, F. Moneva, A, and Miriam, E. "Hate is in the air! But where? Introducing an algorithm 
to detect hate speech in digital microenvironments." Crime Science 7, no. 1 (2018):15 Pontzer, L. "If 
words could kill: can the government regulate any online speech." Pitt. J. Envtl. Pub. Health L. 5 (2011): 
153; Marwick, AE. and boyd, d. "I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, 
and the imagined audience." New media & society 13, no. 1 (2011): 114-133; Kalulé, On the 
Undecidability of Legal and Technological Regulation 
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frustration or empathy with others without necessarily resorting to violence.450 Awan cites a 
poem written buy one blogger, which in some situations could be, misread as inciting or 
glorifying terrorism.451 A section of it reads thus: “I can no longer see my family being 
slaughtered and do nothing/ What would I tell Allah on the Day of Judgment /That I couldn’t 
help them or that I couldn’t save them/ I will not have their blood on their hands”.452   
 
While this poem does not necessarily draw explicit links between its speaker and a terrorist 
organisation, it could still be read as some as making this connection. At the same time, it 
could be read as others as not making this connection. Such connections are contestable and 
not easy to draw. Audiences can (and do) misunderstand a speaker’s intentions. 
Furthermore, there is also always the possibility that an audience could disengage, or 
read/listen passively (i.e., without responding or being affected transferentially) to the speaker 
or publisher. Speech circulates in various uncontainable ways. This is an inescapable 
outcome and effect of all speech and communication. Given this fact, we are then presented 
with a quandary: how is a readership reasonably expected to infer, or discern, that what is 
being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated considering that speech 
that glorifies may be infinitely and inherently divergent, and perhaps more importantly not 
necessarily of a violent nature?  
 
But who is “a readership” or and how are they to “reasonably” be determined? Is “a 
readership” monolithic or is a “readership” a particular section of the public?  
 
The provisions under the 2006 Act do not provide much guidance concerning these 
questions. They also do not provide much guidance on interpretation and foreseeability. And 
even if they did, hypothetically, they would still struggle to rein in, grasp or fathom speech’s 
inherent heterological fugitivity, given speech’s ability to shift meanings in different, applied 
contexts as shown in my discussion of Chambers above. 
 
At any rate, there always remains an interminable absence of clarity or undecidability 
concerning how glorification is to be understood. This undecidability seems to go against the 
requirement of the law as expressed in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex 
parte Simms453 that restrictions must be the clearly expressed intention of the legislature, 
using specific and unambiguous words. This however in the context of terrorism and national 
security is impossible. The concern then in using an ambiguous word like “glorification” is that 
it self-compromises by stretching the criminalisation and prosecution of speech into areas that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Awan, A.N. Virtual jihadist media: Function, legitimacy and radicalizing efficacy." European Journal of 
Cultural Studies 10, no. 3 (2007): 389-408 
451 Ibid p. 397 
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453 [2000] 2 AC 115 
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Parliament had never intended. This of course is understandable considering the fact that 
terrorism always comes unexpectedly, as a surprise, but it creates an irresolvable incongruity 
with regard to the clarity and predictability of the law.  
 
Although not a glorification case, but an offence dealing with proscribed organisations, R v. 
Choudary (Anjem) and R v. Rahman (Mohammed Mizanur)454gives us some insight into how 
the interpretational undecidability of glorification could be handled by the courts. In this case, 
the appellants were charged with offences of inviting support for a proscribed organisation. 
They were said to have given talks and made an oath of allegiance to the organisation and its 
leader and posted them on the Internet. The appellants denied that the talks were invitations 
to support the organisation or that they intended them to be so. This case is significant here 
because it was concerned with clarifying the notion of inviting support. Thus, the judge 
decided that the words “inviting support” were to be given their normal and ordinary meaning, 
and that the “support” required for the purposes of the actus reus of the offence was not 
restricted to practical or tangible support. Giving the word “support” its ordinary meaning, the 
court held that “the actus reus of the offence could encompass support going beyond that 
which could be characterised as practical or tangible; however, that did not mean that the 
section was ambiguous or impermissibly vague”.455 
 
What is striking about this case is not the conviction but the conceptual significance of the 
court’s extensive interpretation of “inviting support”. The courts phrasing of “beyond that 
which could be characterised as practical or tangible” is problematic because it suggests that 
the courts could also possibly interpret glorification as a broad offence without material 
causation or indeed as an offence pivoted on “likelihood” and “recklessness”. Whilst this 
conceptually allows the state’s prosecutorial apparatus a broad discretion with regard to 
whom it goes after, it also equally risks undermining the coherence of the law. This intrinsic 
potentiality for incoherence différance then challenges the implicit assumption that speech 
that glorifies terrorism is identifiable. It is perhaps because of this reason that there is a dearth 
of case law under the specific notion of glorification of terrorism.  
 
That being said, the rarity of cases under “glorification” does not take away its symbolic 
prominence. Which is to say, despite its grey areas, and despite the fact that statements that 
glorify terrorism can be successfully prosecuted under other, more narrowly drafted statutes, 
the offence of glorification still remains on the statute books and it plays a fundamental-
functional role in the day to day enforcement and regulation of speech both offline and online. 
In fact, if looked at from a more international perspective, it appears that the criminalisation of 
glorification as a mode of counter-terrorism is here to stay. The current legal-political structure 
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demands it. For example, it is explicitly proscribed by the Directive 2017/541 on combating 
terrorism of the European Union.  
 
And whilst it could be argued on the one hand that laws of a symbolic function are convenient 
because they prohibit (perceived) harm or violence, we should also attend to the fact that 
offences like glorification overdetermine, that they are susceptible to prohibiting speech and 
harms that are conjectural and not demonstrable.456 This in my view is a conceptual step too 
far (in terms of calculation/determination), for the reason that it takes away from the reality 
that speech is iterable and divergent and that its causes or effects cannot be rationally 
presumed, pre-calculated, delimited or pre-determined with clarity.457 Glorification thus 
becomes phantasmic or hauntological in the sense that it remains haunted by its inadequacy 
to accurately identify, contain, and distinguish speech that “glorifies” terrorism from speech 
that does not. The inability to distinguish clearly what harm constitutes engenders a spectral 
extensiveness that widens the discretion of law enforcement which can in turn lead to a 
discriminatory and arbitrary application of the law in a manner that elevates the “wrong things 
into sensational focus [by] hiding and mystifying the[ir] deeper causes”.458  
 
In any event, an analysis of the offence of glorification does not take us very far given the lack 
of case law. We therefore have to look at other/ ancillary incitement to terrorism provisions or 
statutes that “cross–refer” to encouragement and glorification as proscribed under the 2006 
Act. Perhaps the most important ones are the possession offences under section 57 and 
section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which are pre-cursors to encouragement and 
glorification.   
 
The Possession Offences  
 
Section 57 provides: 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if he possesses an article in circumstances, which 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected 
with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 As demonstrated in Chapter one, historicist arguments to the end that (e.g., Nazi speech) is harmful 
are reductive in the sense that they place a lot of emphasis on speech as a direct cause or effect of 
violence but fail to account for the underlying, unresolved symptomatic or material/structural causes and 
factors that cause and accompany such harmful speech in the first place.  
457 See my discussion of iterable speech in chapter one. Any such claims to empirical coherence, 
stability or calculability would be indeterminate and thus conceptually contradictory. 
458 Hall, S., et.al Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982) 
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(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove 
that his possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the 
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. 
 
And section 58: 
(1) A person commits an offence if — 
(a) s/he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or 
(b) s/he possesses a document or record containing information of that kind. 
             (2) In this section ‘record’ includes a photographic or electronic record. 
(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove 
that he had a reasonable excuse for his action or possession”. 
 
The central purpose of section 57 was to criminalise the possession of ordinary items,459 
which could be used in the commission, preparation and instigation of terrorism. An “article” is 
defined in section 121 of the 2000 Act to include a “substance and any other thing”, and has 
been used to charge those found in possession of everyday items like fertilizer460 and 
petrol.461 More relevantly, an “article” can also include a publication or documents and has 
been used to prosecute individuals with computer hard drives containing instructions on the 
manufacture of bomb-making equipment.462 
 
Under section 57, the phrase “connected with…an act of terrorism” is somewhat contentious. 
It is not clear and can cause interpretational problems. Consider again, the notion of 
“terrorism”(which I defined earlier in this chapter). Is “terrorism” here to be interpreted in the 
same manner as “an act of terrorism”?  Perhaps, but perhaps not. This is not clearly 
articulated within the statute.  
 
Additionally, the words “activities connected with” broaden the scope of activities that may be 
caught under this provision ––I discuss this issue later. It is also worth pointing out that under 
section 57 (2) the defendant has some room to rebut this presumption of guilt by proving that 
an article was not in the defendant’s possession for a terrorist related purpose. This however 
is a reverse onus of proof broadened by the notion of “reasonable suspicion”.  
 
Unlike section 57, there is no requirement in section 58 (1) for the prosecution to prove that 
the defendant possessed the information for a terrorist purpose. All that the prosecution has 
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460 R v. Khyam (Omar) [2008] EWCA Crim 1612 
461 R v. Lusha (Krenar) [2010] EWCA Crim 1761 
462 See R v. Sultan Mohammed and R v. G; R v. J below 
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to show under section 58 is that the material in question is of practical use to a terrorist. In 
other words, the material must go beyond encouraging terrorism. It must be material of a 
practical kind that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion in the commission or preparation of 
terrorism. Thus, section 58 makes it an offence to collect, make or have in one’s possession, 
without a reasonable excuse, any record of information (written, photographic, or electronic) 
“likely to be of use” to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism or to have 
possession of any document or record containing such information. Section 58 has been 
applied cases like in R v. G; R v. J,463 where the court has held that possession of a 
document or record is a crime only if it is of “practical use” and was possessed by a person 
without a reasonable excuse.  
 
R v. Sultan Mohammed 464 demonstrates that an article of practical use should “speak for 
itself” and not be of the sort in general circulation. In this case, the appellant had written a 
document outlining ideas on how to conceal information and avoid being arrested on 
suspicion of involvement in terrorist offences. The information in this document called “draft 
ideas” included a wide array of practical instructions and suggestions such as avoiding using 
code words in emails, and avoiding using words like jihad over the telephone amongst 
others.465 The document also contained a list of suggested readings.  
 
The question for the courts in this case was whether or not the information in this document 
fell under the meaning of “information” as provided for under section 58. The court was of the 
view that a document entitled Draft Ideas spoke for itself and could not reasonably be viewed 
as information for every day use by ordinary members of the public. Put differently, Draft 
Ideas were very peculiar to this case and were so different from other everyday items like 
published timetables and maps.  
 
The document “speaking for itself” also connotes that a reasonable jury should be able to 
conclude that the document contains information of a kind likely to be useful to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism. This is to be assessed objectively in the light of all 
the circumstances. My point however, is that in times of palpable fear, such as the post-9/11-
7/7 continuum, the determination of what such a document is can become inflected 
broadening its reaches into unforeseen contexts. Which is to say, the document could then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463[2009] UKHL 13 
464 [2010] EWCA Crim 227 
465 More of the notes in draft ideas included suggestions such as:  
“Try avoiding using Islamic words on the phone e.g. jihad, insha'allaah, irhabi etc one of the 
reasons is the phone systems have or are going to have tunnel systems were certain words go 
back to the operator… more details follow. 
E-mail: […] Utilize non-home i.e. private flat connection or secure proxy in the least)[…].The 
email account used should be changed every so often and promptly in emergency and specific 
words and plans avoided.” 
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most likely become anything because, hypothetically, any document of ordinary or everyday 
use to ordinary members of a population (such as the yellow pages) could be of use to 
terrorists.  
 
This inescapable blurring and irresolvable lack of reasonable thresholds within section 57 
reveals the fact that the nature of law in this area is always already indeterminably construed 
(beyond pragmatic usefulness) hence problematising its day-to-day enforcement. Moreover, it 
remains unclear as to how far law enforcement would have to go to ascertain crimes caught 
under section 57 this presents a question of ethical fraught pertaining to the 
indistinguishability of risk that arguably affect minoritarian viewpoints, in the sense that the 
state could have a carte blanche to construct othered heterogeneous forms of speech as 
legally relevant grounds for justifying extensive discrimination. Ultimately, this occurs because 
the vagueness of the law allows for it to be manipulated by the sovereign in a suppressive 
fashion466for its own preservation, safety and liberal-utilitarian ends. 
 
On the convergence of section 57 with section 58 
 
Despite the differences in categorisations between section 57 and section 58, it should be 
noted that these two different sections are conceptually similar and that they overlap in reality. 
The court has admitted and demonstrated this in R v Rowe.467 In Rowe, the appellant was 
charged with two counts of possessing articles for terrorist purposes, contrary to section 57 
and section 58. Rowe had been arrested at Coquelles in France in October 2003 as he tried 
to enter the UK on a coach bound for Victoria Station, London. The articles in question were: 
a) notebook which contained mortar instructions and b) a substitution code which listed 
components of explosives and places of a type susceptible to terrorist bombing e.g., “airport” 
and “military bases” in his handwriting. It was the prosecution case that the appellant was 
shortly to embark on a terrorist venture and that both the notebook and the substitution code 
were held for terrorist purposes. Rowe’s reason for possessing these items (only advanced at 
trial) was that the notebook contained information to help Muslims defend themselves against 
the Serbs in 1995, and the substitution code was part of a humanitarian plan to courier items 
needed by Muslims attacked or persecuted in Chechnya. The prosecution response to this 
was that, while he might have been engaged on expeditions abroad, these were not for the 
humanitarian purpose described.  
 
The point of relevance here, which also formed the substance of Rowe’s first ground of 
appeal, was whether or not documents could be an article under section 57, or if the appellant 
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should instead have been charged under section 58, which specifically refers to documents. 
Concerning this point, the court was of the view that the documents could be articles:  
 
There are a number of other instances of prosecutions being brought under section 
57 in relation to documents or records…. There is undoubtedly an overlap between 
section 57 and 58, but it is not correct to suggest that if documents and records 
constitute articles for the purpose of section 57, section 58 is almost superfluous 
[emphasis mine].468 
 
This statement in Rowe is significant because it confirms that section 57 and section 58 
converge. But whilst this convergence of section 57 and section 58 is useful from the vantage 
point of the state and the prosecution, it can lead to undue enforcement overreaches and a 
high degree of interpretational inconsistency and uncertainty. 
 
In the following sections, I look at some case law decisions in order to explore the possession 
offences in more detail. The issues of particular interest here are: 1) the opacity and 
stickiness of the law in this area brought about by the broad drafting of the legislation, and 2); 
the overlaps the possession offences under the 2000 Act have with the encouragement and 
glorification offences under the 2006 Act. 
 
In R v. Samina Hussain Malik,469 Samina Malik, (who also dubbed herself ‘the lyrical 
terrorist’)470 was prosecuted under section 57 and section 58. Malik argued that the 
documents in question (various publications relating to violent Jihad and terrorism found on 
her computer, and poems written by her) were not for a purpose connected with terrorism. 
Rather, she claimed that they were for writing poetry and were in her possession only for 
curiosity. The Court of Appeal found that only some of the documents fell under section 58 
and quashed the conviction because the jury had not been properly instructed on the practical 
assistance requirement it held that there was scope for confusion on the part of the Jury as 
they had been misdirected on the ingredients of the offence of possession of terrorist 
information under section 58 and the defence of  “reasonable excuse”.  
 
That some of Malik’s poems would potentially fall under section 57 rather than section 58 is 
quite telling; it affirms that these offences overlap and that they can be used in a catchall 
manner. It also shows that section 57 and section 58 have the potential to chill speech by 
causing individuals with minoritarian views to hold back from publishing downloading and 
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469 [2008] EWCA Crim 
470 Gardham, D. ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ Samina Malik cleared on appeal (The Telegraph, 17/06/2008) 
available at < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2145506/Lyrical-Terrorist-Samina-Malik-
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sharing information online. More importantly perhaps, Malik highlights the irresolvable 
hermeneutic opacity of section 57 and section 58 i.e., the definitional, differentiating and 
contextual issues it is likely to engender when the Courts and law enforcement are dealing 
with material that causes and incites terrorism. A question thus remains, how are the courts to 
determine what is likely to be useful in the dissemination of harm or indeed terrorist related 
crime?  
 
It appears to me that such an assessment would yet again be determined under a liberal-
utilitarian calculus that aims toward deterrence and utility. The problem however, is that such 
a mode which is subtended by an exclusive moral/socio-cultural consensus or reason of the 
majority), is likely to disavow minoritarian views or even frame them as the very cause of 
harm, disruption or risk. To illustrate this problematic, we turn to the decision in R v. K.471 
Here, the defendant was charged under section 58 (1) of the Terrorism Act for being in 
possession of material of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act 
of terrorism. With regard to the material in question, the counts related to a copy of the Al 
Qaeda training manual, and texts concerned with the organisation of Jihad movements. 
Another count concerned a text advocating for Muslims to work for the establishment of an 
Islamic state. The defendant submitted that the documents in question were merely 
theological or propagandist. The defendant argued that because section 58 was insufficiently 
certain; it lacked clarity to comply with the common law doctrine of legality or Article 7 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The judge 
rejected that submission and dismissed his appeal.  
 
Concerning the nature of the material, the judge was of the view that it was up to a jury to 
determine whether or not the material in question was material likely to be useful to a terrorist 
and was possessed by the defendant without reasonable excuse. He further rejected the 
defendant’s submission stating that depending on the context and circumstances of the case, 
theological and propagandist material may indeed fall within the scope of section 58.472 
Consequently, R v. K reveals some unresolved tensions and undecidabilities within the law. It 
shows that section 58 catches not only documents falling within the practical assistance remit 
but also materials hitherto excluded such as propaganda and theological documents hence 
potentially going contrary to the decision in Samina Malik.  
 
In R v. Zafar and others,473 the defendants, four university students and a schoolboy, were 
charged with possessing articles for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation 
or instigation of an act of terrorism, contrary to section 57 of the 2000 Act. The articles in 
question were documents, computer disks and hard drive with political and religious material 
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of an extreme nature.474 Communications between the defendants and others showed a 
settled plan under which they would travel to Pakistan to receive training and thereafter 
commit terrorist acts in Afghanistan. The point of contention in Zafar was the notion of 
certainty under section 57 of the Act. Despite the fact that there was evidence that supported 
the existence of a plan to travel as alleged, it was held that there was nothing expressly 
showing the use, or intention to use, extremist literature to incite terrorism. The material in 
question was merely akin “to literature stored in a book on a bookshelf, or on a computer 
drive, without any intention on the part of the possessor to make any future use of it at all”.475 
 
Based on the very nature of the information and its inchoateness i.e., its remoteness from 
actual terrorist violence, it was also doubtful to show if section 57 was infringed. This was a 
matter for the Jury to decide. But in coming up with their decision, the jury had to be satisfied 
that the planners intended to use the extremist material to sustain their enthusiasm and 
resolve—to “hype each other up” in order to carry out the act(s) of terrorism. The court held 
allowing the appeal that the phrase “for a purpose connected with” was so imprecise as to 
give rise to uncertainty unless it was construed to require a direct connection between the 
article possessed and the act of terrorism. Indeed, the words “connected with” enlarged the 
ambit of section 57 by rolling up three distinct stages of the plan:476 1) travelling; 2) training 
and; 3) fighting against the government as constituting incremental acts of terrorism. 
 
Crucially, Zafar highlights a situation where the court has interpreted speech crimes 
connected to terrorism more sensibly. That is to say, that although Zafar still demonstrates 
the incredibly broad scope and opacity of section 57 (owing to its conceptual grounding in the 
tenuous and opaque notion of terrorism) the court in Zafar is able to distinguish mere 
possession from acts that instigate terrorism. Indeed, by emphasising that there should be a 
“direct connection” between the materials in question and terrorism, Zafar limits the potential 
overreaches of section 57. In this way the court shows that a degree of certainty can be 
ascertained in the face of legal undecidability by placing a restricted meaning on section 7. In 
this sense, Zafar holds out for an achievable potential or promise that suggests that section 
57 can be interpreted beyond preventive means-oriented frames of deterrence and utility so 
as to make it more responsive to the heterogeneity and speech of the other. 
 
A decision worth considering together with Zafar is Siddique (Mohammed Atif) v. HM 
Advocate.477 Here, the appellant was charged with various offences under the Terrorism Act 
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2000 and a breach of the peace in terms of material found on his various computers and 
other electronic equipment and magazines found upon a search of his home. The key 
question here was whether or not the appellant who possessed documents and information 
had articles likely to aid terrorism purposes. The appellant himself did not deny possession of 
the relevant material; he however sought to argue that the trial judge had misdirected the jury. 
For his defence, it was submitted, inter alia, that the judge had misdirected the jury in 
assessing whether Siddique's possession of the articles was for a purpose connected with the 
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. The appellant argued that some 
of the material (which enjoined the slaying of the “infidels”) should not be given undue weight 
and scrutiny as it included material from the Koran, which was merely a personal 
historiography of Islamic culture, it offered no practical utility to anyone It therefore did not 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion under section 57, for a purpose connected with the 
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. This recognition that the material 
in Siddique was merely of an iteration of difference and not “anticipatorily harmful” is crucial. 
Through its anticipation of the promise of justice to the heterogeneous other, it breaches 
normative frames of preventive justice that are grounded in deterrence and utility.478  
 
Although the appeal in Siddique479 was allowed, the decision highlights the difficulty in scope 
i.e., the opacity remoteness and unpredictable nature of the offence in question in relation. It 
shows that the statutory defence provided for in section 57 (2) could only properly operate on 
the strict application of the statutory language used in section 57 (1). Thus, there remains a 
serious likelihood of confusion; section 57 could be interpreted widely in situations where 
accurate directions are not given to the jury.  
 
Put differently, given the broad scope of the section 57 offence, and indeed the section 58 
offence, there always remains the inescapable possibility for section 57 to be applied 
exceedingly, in a manner disproportionate to the (perceived) recognition of the threat at hand. 
Thence, there remains an incalculable and unpredictable element of interpretational and 
contextual doubt and confusion that would still impact on day-to-day enforcement of the 
possession offences. That “at least 80%”480 of the material that can be of use for terrorist 
purposes can be accessed from everyday sources like internet searches, books magazines 
and television broadcasts, maps, public data on state capabilities etc., without resorting to 
illegal methods,481 underlines the incalculable and indeterminate scope that section 57 and 
section 58 have to grapple with. At the same time, it emphasises the extensive potentiality of 
incalculable public anxiety or the spectral nature of the terrorist threat at hand. 
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No doubt, from the perspective of law enforcement and the sovereign, there is a practical 
incentive for the possession offences to remain opaque and flexible so as to deal with these 
wide speech and terrorism outcomes especially in times of palpable insecurity. But 
nevertheless, in their desire to achieve flexibility in order to contain and overcome the 
indeterminate outcomes of speech and terrorism, section 57 and section 58 still remain 
undecidably and inescapably compromised or haunted by their very own inability to identify 
and distinguish legitimate possession from criminal possession. This is an irreconcilable 
tension.  
 
Although section 57 and section 58 claim to hold a promise of containability and thus 
certainty, the mere fact that they are inextricably linked to other provisions outside the 
possession offences gives rise to uncertainty. This works in two ways. Firstly, it can lead to 
arbitrary and discriminatory applications of the law as it extends the powers of prevention 
available to law enforcement. Secondly, it can lead to a penumbra of legal uncertainty in the 
sense that individuals are unlikely to foreseeably know with sufficient precision how, or even 
whether or not their actions are proscribed by law.  
 
Auxiliary legal provisions 
 
The problem of opacity (with regard to incitement to terrorism offences) is further 
compounded by the auxiliary nature of the law in this area. This problem arises due to the fact 
that terrorism offences are conceptually tied to a number of pre-existing legal provisions 
ranging from: religiously aggravated abuse, to soliciting murder, to Malicious Communications 
to incitement to crime, incitement to racial hatred.482   
 
Arguably, the auxiliary configuration of the law in this area (i.e., its susceptibility to 
accumulate offences that overlap, leak into, or bleed into each other) is in part driven by the 
fact that the threat presented by terrorism in the post-9/11 continuum is far too great 
(especially considering the high threat post-9/11-7/7 continuum and the scale and frequency 
of contemporary terrorist attacks, in the western world and in the UK).483  
 
Although these auxiliary laws may be convenient from a securitisation and enforcement point 
of view, their very overcompensatory discretion and  “intertextual” framework betrays them in 
the sense that it aesthetically extends them to an inaccessible play of opacities within 
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opacities, which incrementally makes processes of interpretation slippery, muddled, 
inconsistent and undecidable. In this sense, the very inter-textual structure of the law in this 
area begins to deconstruct itself in an autoimmune logic.484 Which is to say, the very structure 
and letter of the law starts to hide within it what Derrida calls a “nonunifiable multiplicity of 
concepts”.485 As such, it becomes indeterminably extensive rendering it otiose, undecidable, 
and thus difficult to enforce consistently in practice.  
 
To illustrate this conceptual and textual problematic, in the following section I trace how the 
offences of glorification and encouragement always already overlap with the offence of 
soliciting to murder.486  
Incitement to terrorism and its overlaps with soliciting to murder 
 
In R v. El Faisal,487a Jamaican national known as “Sheik Faisal” who had become an Islamic 
theologian and was living in the United Kingdom was convicted for creating a number of 
audiocassette recordings of an inflammatory nature that urged Muslims to wage war against 
and kill Jews, Christians, Americans, Hindus and other “non-believers”. His recordings also 
condoned suicide bombings and the use of chemical weapons. El Faisal was thereby 
convicted under two pre-2006 statutory provisions i.e., of using threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour with intent to stir up racial hatred contrary to section 18(1) of the 
1986 Act and soliciting to murder, contrary to section 4 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861.     
 
In R v. Abu Hamza,488 the appellant, who was previously an Imam at a mosque, had been 
convicted and charged for possessing threatening, abusive or insulting sound recordings with 
intent to stir up racial hatred, and possessing a document or record containing information of 
a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing to commit an act of terrorism 
under section 58 of the Terrorism Act. In addition to this, he had also been convicted for 
soliciting to murder contrary to section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.  
 
The facts in both El Fasial and Abu Hamza are similar, indeed, in both cases the offences 
arose out of speeches made by the appellants inciting their audiences to engage in Jihad and 
to kill those not of the Islamic faith. The following is an excerpt from one of El Faisal’s 
statements:  
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The way forward can never be the ballot. The way forward is the bullet; we spread 
Islam by the Sword and so what, and today we are going to spread by the 
Kalashnikov and there is nothing you can do about it. Is there any peace treaty 
between us and Hindus and Indians? No, so you can go to India and if you see a 
Hindu walking down the road you are allowed to kill him and take his money.489 
 
Arguably, the statements in El Faisal and Abu Hamza show that the appellants’ offences 
could have conveniently fallen within the ambit of “glorification” or “encouragement” to 
terrorism under the 2006 Act or the possession offences under the 2000 Act. However, 
because the law on both glorification and encouragement wasn’t clear, they were prosecuted 
under yet another auxiliary provision: soliciting to murder.  
 
Even more strikingly, if we recall the decision in R v. Umran Javed and others490, discussed 
above, it becomes evident that the offence of soliciting to murder and another public offence 
i.e., in this case, stirring racial hatred can be prosecuted concurrently. This yet again widens 
the potential ambit of the law and reintroduces gradients of inconsistency with respect to 
incitement to terrorism speech offences.  
  
To emphasise the patchwork nature and the excessive, gratuitous, supplementary/ 
complementary of the offences in this area, it is important to briefly probe the offence of 
soliciting to murder under section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Section 4 of 
the 1861 Act provides:  
 
Whosoever shall solicit, encourage, persuade, or endeavour to persuade, or shall 
propose to any person, to murder any other person, whether he be a subject of Her 
Majesty or not, and whether he be within the Queen's dominions or not, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ...  to imprisonment 
for life.491   
 
A leading case in interpreting section 4 is the 1861 case of R v. Most492 where Most who had 
published and circulated a publication of an article, written in German in a newspaper 
published in London, exulted the murder of the Emperor of Russia and commended it as an 
example to revolutionists throughout the world. The Court held that the publication and 
circulation of a newspaper article might be encouragement, or might endeavour to persuade 
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murder, within section 4 although it was not addressed to any person in particular. 
Huddleston B laid out the scope of the offence as follows:  
 
The largest words possible have been used—‘solicit’—that is defined to be, to 
importune, to entreat, to implore, to ask, to attempt to try to obtain; ‘encourage’, which 
is to intimate, to incite to anything, to give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to raise 
confidence, to make confident; ‘persuade’, which is to bring to any particular opinion, 
to influence by argument or expostulation, to inculcate by argument; ‘endeavour’, and 
then, as if there might be some class of cases that would not come within those 
words, the remarkable words are used, ‘or shall propose to’, that is to say, make 
merely a bare proposition, an offer for consideration It is to be a misdemeanour of a 
highly criminal character to solicit, to encourage, to persuade, or even to propose to 
any person to kill any other person, whether one of her Majesty's subjects or 
not….What was the intention of this Act? The intention was to declare the law and to 
protect people abroad from the attempts of regicides of this description, and therefore 
the largest possible words are used.493 
 
The definition of the offence of “soliciting” in Most is thus suggestive of the fact that the 
offence of soliciting to murder overlaps with all other incitement to terrorism offences. Indeed, 
as Huddleston’s words above show, soliciting to murder carries with it the criminal concepts 
of inchoate crime and the notions of ideological encouragement or glorification soliciting to 
murder. In other words, these offences all involve the urging or persuasion with words of 
one’s audience to attack an individual or individuals before such an attack is done.  
Yet again, rather than clarifying the meanings of incitement to terrorism, these offences use 
words that are inscrutable hence making incitement to terrorism fuzzy and self-inadequating 
and hence difficult to enforce consistently in practice.494 To this end, “glorification” and 
“encouragement” exhibit an overarching monologic desire to contain the incalculable, which is 
also an aporetic formulation of the tension between singularity and incommensurability/ 
heterogeneity. However, this very “overdetermined” desire to contain the incalculable, which 
is also a desire of “self-presencing” that enacts the sovereign violence and monopoly of the 
force of law, is what stretches the text of these offences making them paradoxically incapable 
of effectively identifying, distinguishing, and apprehending the very crimes that they seek to 
contain.  
 
In any event, ancillary incitement to terrorism provisions such as “glorification” and 
“encouragement” under the 2006 Act are arguably unnecessary. They only seem to exist to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Ibid Para 258 
494 In such instances, the meaning of the law becomes enigmatic, neither present nor absent. See 
Goodrich, P. Legal Enigmas—Antonio de Nebrija, The Da Vinci Code and the Emendation of 
Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30, no. 1 (2010): 71-99 
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serve the sovereign with a mystical and symbolic reassurance of incalculable force against 
unanticipatable threats in our precarious historical present.495 In fact, far from offering any 
functional use, the provisions under the 2006 Act are mirrored under an older body of criminal 
provisions ranging from public order offences, to the Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
And so, the offences of glorification and encouragement only compound the problem of legal 
interpretation by further confusing an already existing legal muddle or exception of inchoate 
crimes. Practically, this means that, in the moment of having to make a decision, those who 
interpret the law, or who enforce it would be confused as to which laws or which combinations 
of laws to apply and how they are supposed to interpret them.496 In addition to the 
problematics of legal interpretation and enforcement, the undecidability of incitement to 
terrorism provisions also gives rise to underlying human rights concerns such as legal clarity 
and accessibility under article 7 of the Convention, concerns that I address more substantially 
in chapter four. 
 
The section 58 defence under the 2000 Terrorism Act  
 
Although the extensiveness of the offences under the 2000 Terrorism Act seem to be tipped 
largely in favour of the prosecution and law enforcement, it is worth noting that the Act has a 
defence that seeks to allow for a degree of individual rights protections and is worth touching 
on briefly. Section 58 provides a defence of reasonable excuse, which states that: “It is a 
defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had a 
reasonable excuse for his action or possession”. 
 
This defence would suffice where a person felt that they had a valid reason for possessing 
such content. Such a defence would presumably be invoked when an individual is being 
investigated or questioned on matters surrounding terrorism.497 Although the burden on the 
defence is evidential and has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt as was the case in R v. 
G and R v J,498 (where it was held that it was necessary for the Crown to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the possession of information was for a terrorist purpose a defendant 
claimed that he had a reasonable excuse for possessing the relevant). Accordingly, one could 
argue that this defence is inherently fragile, owing to the fact that the prosecution needs to do 
no more than prove that the reasonable excuse put forward is untrue. Therefore, there is no 
need to go further and prove that the defendant’s possession of the article was for a purpose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Derrida, Force of law  
496 I show how this plays out in the context of Internet regulation in the next chapter.	  
497 Sabir, R. UK's misguided terror laws: Criminalising the innocent: Increasing jail sentences for viewing 
terror content does not counter terrorism; it terrorises the innocent (Aljazeera.com 08/10/2017) available 
at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/uk-misguided-terror-laws-criminalising-innocent-
171007103005102.html> 
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connected with terrorism.499 If a defendant suggests that his reasonable excuse for 
possession of say, an article on the internet as per academic research, the prosecution must 
only show that the defendants defence is untrue although in actual sense such articles in 
possession could serve more than one purpose.500   
 
To illustrate this point, I turn to the decision in R v. Amjad.501 Here, the defendant was found 
in possession of a number of anti-western publications and a notebook containing a 
handwritten list of fitness exercises for a Mujahidin fighter. Police internet searches revealed 
a similar list in a document on two websites attributed to a person believed to be a terrorist 
engaged in Jihad. The defendant was charged with possession of a record containing 
information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. At issue 
was whether documents were part of a normal fitness regime or if they were part of a fitness 
regime to further acts of terrorism, either by the defendant himself or someone else. The 
Crown, in this case did not have to furnish evidence to establish the origins of authorship of 
this document in order to show whether or not they were of a “terrorist” use. The court was of 
the view that the possession was identical to that attributed to terrorists. The defendant was 
convicted without proof and even without a statement from an expert witness. He 
consequently appealed on the basis that the internet material was “anonymous hearsay” 
without a statutory basis. 
 
I am not concerned in this particular instance about whether or not the documents in Amjad 
were likely to cause terrorism or not. Rather, I am more concerned about the lowering of the 
burden of proof under section 58. The burden of proof here is low and it seems to go against 
the stricter requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt under conventional criminal law 
standards. In such a case, it can simply be achieved by calling evidence to show that the 
article in question was not reasonably for academic purposes. Thence, section 58 potentially 
leaves room for pre-conceptions and presuppositions meaning that there would be no need to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the real reason for possessing the article in question was 
for a purpose connected with an act of terrorism.  
 
Conclusion  
   
This chapter started by looking at the wide scope of offences that proscribe incitement to 
terrorism. It suggested that the notion of “incitement” and indeed “incitement to terrorism” and 
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500 See e.g. R v. Omar Altimini [2008] EWCA Crim 2829 where the Court of Appeal held that materials 
held on a hard drive by a terrorist “sleeper” (i.e. a suspected individual not actively engaged in terrorist 
activities) contravened s.57, notwithstanding that his immediate purpose was storing them. 
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is grounded in inchoate crimes that seek to prevent crimes before they occur. It then looked 
more closely at the notions of glorification and encouragement under the 2006 Act and found 
that these offences were also widely conceptually drawn. It further showed that these 
offences overlapped with other auxiliary offences e.g., the pre-existing public order offences 
of soliciting to murder and stirring racial hatred. Understandably, from the point of view of the 
sovereign, this flexibility is convenient because it provides the state a wide scope to 
proactively and preemptively combat terrorist crimes. In other words, this substantially broad 
formulation of speech crimes is important for the state because it acts as a necessary security 
cushion especially in the face of incalculable terrorism in the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. The 
issue with this however, is that the incitement to terrorism offences themselves self- 
deconstruct. They function on “a scale without scales”502 through ambiguous and vague 
terms, hiding a “nonunifiable multiplicity of concepts”503 contradictions and questions. Through 
interminable aporetic formulations their singular structure of containment fails to limit speech 
crime pertaining to terrorism and instead in a paradoxical movement becomes supplanted by 
the very unidentifiable, incalculable and indistinguishable logics of the speech and harms it 
seeks to contain. Inasmuch as this problem of the undecidability of incitement to terrorism 
offences is a structural/ aporetic problem of interpretation, it is also, as my discussion in this 
chapter unravelled, an exposition of important ethical concerns with regard to how the 
undecidable criminal provisions engender an element of unforeseeability within incitement to 
terrorism laws. Put differently, the undecidability of the law in this area does not only lead to a 
self-inadequation of law but it also simultaneously504 consolidates the force of law by 
broadening the scope of terrorist related crimes spectrally, “further up the field”505 into 
unforeseeable contexts. As cases like Siddique, Zafar, Samina Hussain Malik, and Chambers 
have demonstrated, such an over-determined calculated, preventive notion of harm that 
prioritizes utility and deterrence under preventive justice and draws us into “pre-inchoate 
territory”506 that sets dangerous precedents wherein individuals are punished for what they 
think even when it is not tangential to violence or harm. This in turn is likely to criminalise 
reasonably remote iterations of speech such as jokes in bad taste507 or critical political 
commentary on social media that is far removed from any measure of harm.   
 
At any rate, what the overall legal-regulatory overcompensation of incitement to terrorism 
offences suggests in this chapter is that the iterability and heterogeneity of speech haunts the 
monologic text and conceptual structure of incitement to terrorism laws, inescapably. This 
draws us to the fact that perhaps, the only way that law can deal with such heterogeneous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Derrida, The Death Penalty, p.119 
503 n.485 
504 All these textual and conceptual tensions happen in different directions and at the same time.  
505 Anderson, D. "Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law 
’(2013)." EHRLR 3: 233-246 
506 Ashworth, A, and Zedner, L "Prevention and criminalization: justifications and limits." New Criminal 
Law Review: In International and Interdisciplinary Journal 15, no. 4 (2012): 542-571 
507 Duffy, and Pitcher, Inciting Terrorism? p.343 
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speech is only through over-determined liberal utilitarian calculations (expressed through 
ethically fraught and conjectural terms like “glorification”, “encouragement” and “likelihood”) of 
what such speech constitutes. The observations in this chapter are not a tout court rejection 
of law. Rather, they highlight the fact that an irresolvable ethical impossibility operates within 
the very structure of law. A way out then may be a kind of statutory interpretation that betrays 
current frames of “preventive justice” within criminal law that are geared towards deterrence 
and utility and instead works towards a kind of incalculable/unanticipatable justice that 
embraces the alterity and heterogeneity of the other. I show how such a kind of justice could 
be achieved using the notion of the ghost dance in chapter five.  
 
 




Of enforcement and regulation: some inescapable conundrums  
Introduction 
 
In talking about technology, this chapter focuses on what I call online communication 
technologies, in particular the Internet and its different private and public gatekeepers or 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) such as social networking platforms and law enforcement 
bodies. More specifically in this chapter, I probe how the domestic and international legal 
framework of incitement to terrorism are transposed onto contemporary enforcement and 
regulatory practices (such as filtering and blocking) in order to address hauntological tensions 
like undecidability therein. 
 
Technological regulatory frameworks 
Internet gatekeepers 
 
I use the term gatekeepers drawing from Barzilai-Nahon’s Network Gatekeeper Theory 
(NGT).508 Under NGT, gatekeeping is a binary process involving the gatekeeper and gated, it 
is concerned with the movement of information through gates, and the use of a gatekeeping 
process and mechanisms. Generally gatekeepers do one or more of the following: selecting, 
channelling, shaping, manipulating and deleting information.509 
  
Kraakman defines gatekeepers as: 1) those who control access to information by limiting 
access to or restricting the scope of information; and 2) opinion leaders, those who facilitate 
“innovate, change communication channels, carry out or broker intermediary functions”.510 
Internet gatekeepers therefore include as Laidlaw511 has suggested, search engines, ISP’s, 
high traffic social networking sites user-generated uploading-content sites and portal 
providers,512 ––all these “gatekeepers”/ “doorkeepers” protect the endpoints of the network 
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509 Ibid 
510 Kraakman, R.H. Gatekeepers: the anatomy of a third-party enforcement strategy." Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 2, no. 1 (1986): 53-104 
511 Laidlaw, E. A Framework for Identifying Internet Information Gatekeepers, International Review of 
Law, Computers & Technology, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2010 
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and constitute what Zittrain calls “points of control” of content in cyberspace.513 For the 
purposes of this discussion the notions of “gatekeeping”, or “regulatory duties and roles” will 
involve the managing and taking down of terrorist related content and its filtering/moderation 




Self-regulation can be defined as the process by which private gatekeepers collectively 
administer solutions to address citizens, consumer issues, or other regulatory objectives, 
without formal oversight from government or regulator.514 It involves the decentering of 
regulation from the public sphere to the private sphere.515 Generally, the UK has run on a self-
regulatory system of the Internet, but state regulation is increasingly encroaching on this 
system of self-regulation hence forming a system of co-regulation.516 This in simplified terms 
means that the economic /market liberalism of gatekeepers makes them reluctant to 
cooperate with state or public regulators especially in scenarios where the gatekeepers have 
objectives and concerns that differ from those of the state. Many of these objectives 
/concerns are business orientated (such as protecting the data privacy of Internet end-users) 
others are jurisdictional and practical.517 These self-regulatory interests are to a great extent 
facilitated by the European Union Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce, which exempts 
gatekeepers from certain monitoring liabilities and obligations, discussed later. Nonetheless, 
some commentators are of the view that on the great scale of things, a pure self-regulation” 
does not exist anymore (and has perhaps never truly existed), self-regulation only exists 
when viewed from the prism of internal self-regulation which includes management of 
platforms and the taking down of viruses and spam. Thus private gatekeepers always already 
manage/self regulate their own platforms in a strictly “devolved”518/ “unilateral” manner.   
 
That being said, it is should be emphasised that gatekeepers still receive a high level of 
external influence from the government and public authorities and at least cooperate with 
them to a certain degree.  For instance, art 16 of Directive 2000/31 and the EU action plan for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 Zittrain, J. Internet points of control BCL Rev. 44 (2002): 653 
514 Ofcom, Statement: Identifying appropriate regulatory solutions: principles for analysing self- and co-
regulation (10/12/2008) pg. 2 available at: 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/46144/statement.pdf> 
515 Black, J. Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
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516 Marsden, C, T. "Internet co-regulation and constitutionalism: Towards European judicial 
review." International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 26, no. 2-3 (2012): 211-228  
517 Because “terrorism” is culturally and contextually fluid gatekeepers face a regulatory and in some 
cases a diplomatic conundrum when regulating it. 
518 European Digital Rights Initiative The Slide from ‘Self-Regulation’ to ‘Corporate Censorship’ (2011) 
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safer Internet use emphasise the need for co-ordination and co-operation across Member 
States between public law enforcement agencies and the private internet industry519 and the 
need for some form of “cooperation” between Internet intermediaries and governments for 
public policy objectives and interests. As Kreimer puts it, “the Internet is not dyadic it is linked 
by a complex chain of connections”.520 We are therefore at the tipping point of self-regulation, 
waiting at that blurry converging aperture where self-regulation and co- regulation are 
inseparable and indistinguishable.521   
 
The invisible handshake: Self-regulation as co-regulation   
  
It is incorrect to think that private gatekeepers do not have securitisation monitoring and 
regulation obligations. As the 2013 Snowden Revelations show, there is indeed an extra-
legal522 “shadow of control”523 from the government and law enforcement (who can be thought 
of as public gatekeepers) that looms, compelling private Internet gatekeepers to monitor 
activity and to take down/filter illegal content/ disclose information about their users 
/subscribers. This shadow of control involves the government and law enforcement providing 
ISPs with a blacklist of illegal content. Thus, a governmental/public gatekeeper like the 
Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit524 provides private gatekeepers and intermediaries 
with a blacklist of extremist content to be filtered or blocked from the Internet. At the same 
time, gatekeepers, who may in certain situations not qualify as intermediaries, can (under 
their own self-regulatory remit)525 proscribe content that they deem to be extremist. Thus, 
regulatory roles from both a self-regulatory and co-regulatory point of view are not clearly 
defined but are freely shifting. What is clear nonetheless, is that both forms of regulation and 
gatekeeping have a unified intention of censoring and blocking content that incites terrorism 
however undecidable this may be. This in turn creates a considerable variance of filtering and 
blocking procedures practices and processes across gatekeeping in general. This fragmented 
heterogeneity in regulation standards across different private/public gatekeepers526 and 
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520 Kreimer, S.F. Censorship by proxy: the first amendment, Internet intermediaries, and the problem of 
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523 Edwards, A. The moderator as an emerging democratic intermediary: The role of the moderator in 
Internet discussions about public issues, Information (Polity 2002) 7:1, 3–20 
524 I discuss the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit in greater detail later in this chapter  
525 This is done usually by way of platform based community standards or terms of use. 
526 There is no one single gatekeeper but a complex architecture of gatekeepers from online 
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indeed jurisdictions527 (engenders regulatory variances, divergences or opacities) and has 
implications for human rights safeguards such as accountability, accessibility, transparency 
and proportionality.528    
 
What is more, the lack of clarity in how to classify ISPs (i.e., in regard to whether they play a 
private or pubic gatekeeping role) means that there is a potential limit with respect to their 
responsibility insofar as human rights are concerned.529 In the UK, the HRA restricts liability of 
Human rights violations on the actions of  “public authorities”.  
 
Section 6 of the Human Rights Acts states that: “[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way which is incompatible with a Convention right”. According to section 6(3)(b) a “public 
authority” is any person whose functions are of a public nature, and section (6)(5) notes that, 
“in relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue of only section 3(b) if 
the nature of the act is private”.  
 
Taken together, these two subsections provide that any person (or body) whose functions are 
of a public nature will be a public authority, other than in relation to those particular acts, 
which are of a private nature. These provisions allow for the requirements of the HRA to be 
enforced against private bodies in cases where they are performing “functions of a public 
nature”. The activities of ISPs to filter or block content in order to protect national security 
could be read as actions of a public nature. Indeed, one could argue that the convergence of 
take down requirements with intelligence gathering and surveillance cements the status of 
ISPs as bodies serving a public function.   
  
This concurrent private-public fusion of personality, what Birnhack and Elkin-Koren call the 
“invisible handshake”530 between public and private gatekeepers complicates the 
classification of ISPs and has further repercussions for human rights compliance and 
accountability. Thus, an Internet intermediary could flexibly engage its private status to 
exempt itself from onerous human rights obligations. This private status is useful in a co-
regulatory context because it can be used as a loophole or by public authorities such as 
governments to bypass human rights compliance and accountability such as adequate 
judicial oversight and the justification of censorship according to human rights standards in a 
court of law. At any rate, by giving private companies an accompanying public role in the 
normal business operations the statute obfuscates the private status of such companies and 
creates barriers with regard to administrative law, human rights compliance and liability.  
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The rationale of such co-regulatory arrangements is understandable. Indeed, given the 
transnational character of the Internet and the divergence in different regulatory models 
globally it would be irrational to grant sole responsibility for internet governance to the public 
bodies or governments as they would not be competent enough to solve internet related 
crime in real time. Outsourcing and sharing this responsibility through co-regulation with 
private ISPs is therefore considered to be reasonably pragmatic. Co-regulation nevertheless 
has several drawbacks in so far as legal accountability and human rights compliance are 
concerned –– the most clearest one being that it tends to privilege efficiency over due 
process. Some of these drawbacks are unavoidable due to the manifestation of divergences 
in legal-jurisdictional and criminal standards online.  
 
Furthermore, inescapable divergences in cross-jurisdictional definitional interpretations in the 
context of terrorism and extremism recur making legal accountability and human rights and 
legal compliance intractable. Yet again, the blame or liability is usually placed on private 
bodies but their standing as private bodies absolves them from human rights culpability.531 
This leaves us at a crossroads. Either way, human rights obligations are likely to be violated. 
Accountability and redress are also likely to be less than ideal. At any rate, “private power can 
jeopardise the exercise and the very core of individuals’ prerogatives as much as public 
power”.532 
 
Of course, in relation to investigatory powers, one must note that it is still the state which is 
responsible for human rights obligations. But, when the state outsources intelligence 
gathering and moderation to private companies, things become more problematic in that 
there are no oversight or accountability safeguards as these are only based on the (usually 
ambigious) standards of the outsourced private ISP’s in question. 
 
 As things stand, whether ISPs are classified as public or private entities doesn’t seem to 
change the fact that they play a central gatekeeping role in the execution of Notice and Take 
down procedures. The more pressing issue here is not the nature or meta-structure of 
regulation but how regulation amongst the different gatekeepers is achieved. Accordingly, it is 
essential for us to further probe the ways in which NTD procedures are carried out. In the 
subsequent sections I examine filtering and blocking in particular to illustrate how even more 
perplexing, indeterminable and hauntological the regulation and enforcement of incitement to 
terrorism online is.  
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How online regulation works: Filtering and blocking   
 
The terms “filtering” and “blocking” are interchangeable. The major difference between 
filtering and blocking is their “scale and perspective”.533Filtering on the one hand is commonly 
associated with the use of technology that block pages by reference to certain characteristics, 
such as traffic patterns, protocols or keywords, images on the basis of their perceived 
connection to illegal content, it is micro.534 Blocking on the other hand can be thought of in 
macro terms as it refers to preventing access to specific websites, domains, IP addresses, 
protocols or services included on a blacklist. There are a number of different techniques that 
ISPs adopt to block a target website or online location.535 The more commonly used blocking 
techniques have been highlighted in Cartier International AG v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, 
a decision which was concerned with the appeals by five UK ISPs (Sky, BT, EE, TalkTalk and 
Virgin) collectively against orders which required them to block or attempt to block access by 
their customers to certain websites which were advertising and selling counterfeit goods.536 I 
call them macro-blocking techniques. Generally, they include the following:537 DNS name 
blocking; IP address blocking using routers; DPI-based URL blocking; and Two-stage 
systems.538 
 
Although all the aforementioned macro systems of blocking are relevant, for purposes of 
scope, this chapter shall focus on micro-filtering technologies. The two micro-filtering 
technologies I explore are: 1) keyword filtering through natural language processing 
techniques and 2) the blacklisting of an exploration of how these algorithmic tools and 
technologies work. In looking at these tools, I emphasise that they are used for textual 
analytic functions i.e., they reroute, edit and censor or cancel out harmful speech. Thus, my 
discussion of them always points back to the uncanny complications of speech i.e., 
dissemination, iterability, and destinerrance that I have discussed in chapter one of this 
thesis. 
  
1) Textual filtering: Natural Language Processing (NLP) technologies  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 Barnes, R. et al. "Technical Considerations for Internet Service Blocking and Filtering." (Internet 




536 [2014] EWHC 3354 
537  Ibid  
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Natural language Processing (NLP) techniques work by scrutinising the meanings of words 
online. They scrutinise euphemisms, references, code words and colloquialisms online to 
predict their proximity to crime and its commission. NLP techniques associate and identify 
extracted words and sentiments to specific topics using statistical extraction and retrieval 
algorithms. By looking at documents as a bag of words, each word in each document is 
assigned a score reflecting the word’s importance in this document.539 The document is then 
represented by a vector whose coordinates correspond to the words it contains with each 
coordinate having the word’s score as its value. A similarity of vectors denotes a similarity of 
documents. After the data are identified, a method of elimination known as hashing is applied. 
Hashing is a mathematical operation that takes chains of data of arbitrary length, like a video 
clip or string of DNA, and assigns it a specific value of a fixed length, known as a hash. The 
same files or DNA strings will be given the same hash, allowing computers to sequentially 
search, segment and classify duplicates.540 In this process of sequential searching and 
classification, if blacklisted keywords are detected, RST injection packets541 are used to 
disrupt or disconnect on-going communications and sometimes also temporarily block the IP 
address from connecting. 542 At this point, access to the documents in question is prevented. 
 
An example of where NLP techniques have been used is Impero Education Pro.543 Impero is 
in an internet monitoring software used in over 40% of secondary schools in the UK and 
developed in response to the Prevent strategy and the duty of care placed on schools under s 
26 of the 2015 Counterterrorism and Security Act which requires “specified authorities” to 
ensure that children are “safe from terrorist and extremist material when accessing the 
Internet in school, including by establishing appropriate levels of filtering”. 
 
Working within an analytic and calculative logic that aims to detect, identify and apprehend 
extremists and potentially extremist students before they are drawn into terrorism, Impero 
comes with a radicalisation library analogous to a search index of keyword maps that sifts 
through documents, sentences or phrases that contain those keywords. This library or 
glossary contains a list of over 1000 phrases words or wordings that filter the Internet to 
indicate whether a student is proactively seeking extremist content.544  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539 Jain, A., et al. Data clustering: a review. ACM computing surveys (CSUR) 31, no. 3 (1999): 264-323 
540 Ibid 
541 Packet injection, generally, refers to an interference technique that spoofs or disrupts an established 
traffic stream. Packets are normally used to let one side of Transmission Control Protocol (or network 
connection) know that the other side has stopped sending information, and thus the receiver should 
close the connection.  
542 Ibid 
543 Impero’s anti-terrorism, extremism and radicalisation keyword library, as part of Impero Education 
Pro see <https://www.imperosoftware.com/zh-tw/resources/videos/imperos-anti-terrorism-extremism-
and-radicalisation-keyword-libraries-explained/> accessed (05/06/19) 
544 Ibid 
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The list includes acronyms and neologisms such as: YODO i.e. (You only Die Once) words 
which also feature noticeably in different contexts such as Dying Awareness Week. Thus, 
there are credible fears that Impero can unwittingly catch some students out and proscribe 
innocuous content.545 And although Impero has emphasised that: 1) its software is not about 
catching students out but about safeguarding, not criminalising or punishing and 2); and that 
its software enables school staff to make a human judgement call –– by capturing the content 
in question as a time stamped screenshot or video recording logged against the students 
identity ––546 there are some seemingly undecidable tensions concerning the proportionality 
of the software.  
 
Firstly, perhaps most importantly, there is a lack of clarity on the meanings of words, word 
combinations and terms in Impero’s radicalisation library or glossary. This inescapable lack of 
clarity creates ambiguity that ultimately prevents Internet users from knowing what content is 
illegal or not so that they can regulate their conduct appropriately. The guidance policy of the 
Prevent strategy provides some hints (but no clarifications) on the type of words or word 
combinations that the software may entail: 
 
The authorities specified …are subject to the duty to have due regard to the need to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Being drawn into terrorism includes 
not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism,547 which can create an 
atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists 
exploit.548 
 
However, the Prevent Duty guidance comes with definitional difficulties, which are then 
transposed into Impero, creating problems with regard to scope and certainty. The term “non-
violent extremism” for example presents blind spots that deserve closer inspection. “Non-
violent extremism” is an amalgam of two notions: nonviolence and extremism (with extremism 
being defined as: “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs)”.549 Non-violence, which refers to ideological beliefs that are conducive to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 Ibid See also Richardson, H. Software to spot extremism among pupils BBC (04/06/2015) available 
at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-32996327 > and Impero, countering radicalisation in schools 
(22/06/2015) available at: < https://www.imperosoftware.co.uk/countering-radicalisation-in-schools/> 
546 Ibid 
547 Prevent duty guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn 
into terrorism. Available at: < 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf > 
The initial Prevent strategy dealt with violent extremism but it was explicitly changed in 2011 to 
encompass ‘non-violent extremism’, 
548 Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
549 Prevent duty guidance, p.107  
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terrorism yet without terrorism, is a very vague concept not only by virtue of it simply being a 
legal-juridical concept susceptible to iterable non-closure, but also vague but because it is 
also aligned to the already indeterminable concepts of terrorism and violence. The marriage 
of both terms into the notion of “non-violent extremism” therefore creates an expansive 
definitional scope that is not only conceptually contestable but also open to an iterable 
interaction with heterogeneous speech that cannot be contained. 
 
This question becomes predictably more complicated if we consider the fact that the software 
just like the humans who design it is bound to have subjective and alternating viewpoints 
about notions like “British values”, “extremism”, “terrorism”, and “radicalisation”. And even if 
we trusted software and algorithms to be objective or even more objective than humans, the 
reality is that humans craft these algorithms and software and they “embed in them all sorts of 
biases and perspectives”550 that are read usually “from the perspective of those [i.e., the 
monolithic whole] who stand to lose the most.”551 
  
2) Blacklisting of audio-visual images: Digital fingerprinting techniques 
 
In addition to language processing techniques, it is important to examine the workings of 
digital fingerprinting in regulating speech. In practice, digital fingerprinting works in a manner 
similar to NLP techniques. It enables Internet platforms, search engines and networking sites 
to scan online content, classify it in categories and compile it in a database of unique files i.e., 
a hash that allows for sequential searches and matches. And although the practice of digital 
fingerprinting within the context of terrorism is known to be prevalent (e.g., it has been 
reported that Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube have collaborative digital 
fingerprinting databases for identifying the most extreme and egregious terrorist images),552 
precise details concerning how digital fingerprinting is done in the context of terrorism still 
remain unclear. What is known is to us is that the government works with the filtering industry 
in an on-going process that involves a bio-diverse spectrum of private gatekeepers (e.g., 
social networking platforms who then communicate with the Home Office and law 
enforcement) so as to identify unlawful material that incites terrorism under the Terrorism Act 
2006 and also under Prevent.553  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Dormehl, L. From Algorithms Are Great and All, But They Can Also Ruin Lives, Wired (19/11/2014) 
available at: <https://www.wired.com/2014/11/algorithms-great-can-also-ruin-lives/> accessed 
20/02/2017 
551 Beatty, D. The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.160 
552 Perez, S. Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube collaborate to remove terrorist content from 
their services (12/05/2016) Available at: < https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/05/facebook-microsoft-twitter-
and-youtube-collaborate-to-remove-terrorist-content-from-their-services/?guccounter=1> 
553 The Prevent strategy is used to combat content that causes radicalisation and extremism  
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For a more “forensic” analysis of digital fingerprinting, it is worth exploring digital fingerprinting 
in the context of illegal child sexual imagery. Briefly, in my discussion of digital fingerprinting 
in the next few paragraphs I should reiterate (following my theoretical discussion of speech in 
chapter one) that digital images online are signifiers of text and speech and of language on 
the whole. Thus, filtering deals not only with written or spoken texts as “speech” but also with 
images as “speech”.   
 
In the UK, the “Internet Watch Foundation”, an independent non-for profit organisation, 
principally regulates sexual imagery. The IWF (and online social platform Twitter),554 which 
uses Microsoft’s PhotoDNA technology to regulate illegal “child abuse” images. PhotoDNA 
scans content, uploads it onto the cloud then tags it with a “hash” that is then connected to 
other digital databases held by Interpol, and other law enforcement agencies around the 
world,555 so that the system flags duplicate copies of the images found elsewhere in 
cyberspace to make proactive monitoring of content possible.556 The monitoring is then let to 
the IWF in conjunction with other Internet intermediaries and law enforcement that then work 
towards the blacklisting and blocking of the content in question.557 There are of course 
concerns with regard to the IWF blacklisting model. That said, with the IWF, these concerns 
are mitigated to a degree because the IWF uses specially trained moderators who follow UK 
criminal court sentencing guidelines on “child sexual abuse”, ––an arguably more clearly 
definable category of speech. Moreover, the IWF has other processes for intervention like 
monitoring and transparency reports that are reviewed by the police, the public and other 
stake holders on their website.  
 
Contrastingly, the situation is evidently less transparent and clear in the context of terrorist 
blacklisting because the guidelines on blacklisting terrorism are secretive. Questions arise 
thus: 1) who makes the decision on the types of material that should be blacklisted, is it the 
police, an intelligence agency, a judge, the content moderators, or the Internet 
intermediaries? 2) On what criteria or guidelines are such blacklists made considering the 
very definitional and cross jurisdictional instabilities of terms like “terrorism”, “violence”, 
“nonviolence”, “radicalisation” and “extremism”?  and 3); What happens with terrorist content 
that is blacklisted, is it just taken-down or are there prosecutions?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Arthur, C. Twitter to introduce Photo DNA system to block child abuse images, The Guardian 
(22/07/2013) available at: < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/22/twitter-photodna-child-
abuse> 
555 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be interesting to explore what it means for the 
police to reproduce and store hashes of traumatic content on the cloud. Arguably, the very process of 
storing these hashes replicates a haunted archive wherein regulators reproduce and disseminate the 
very thing they attempt to exclude. 
556 See: IWF, image Hash List available at: <https://www.iwf.org.uk/our-services/hash-list> accessed 
05/06/18 
557 One should distinguish the censorship process of the IWF from that of the CTIRU. For the IWF, the 
process is monitored and transparent and not just carried out by law enforcement in secret. 
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Furthermore, the most significant concern about digital fingerprinting is its inherent fallibility.  
Although many cryptographic hash functions tend to guarantee that two distinct inputs (i.e., 
files) will not produce the same hash value, they also have many functional shortcomings.558 
As discussed earlier, altering the original file, for example through shortening or excerpting it, 
re-encoding it, and so forth, invariably alters the hash value. This means that modified i.e. re-
encoded, retitled shortened files may avoid being recognised for the reason that they contain 
a different hash value from the original hash value, in the database of hashes, which identifies 
them. A search for the hash will not always match with them, hence problematising their 
detection. Additionally, it is worth pointing out that with fingerprinting, the bits inside the media 
file (which can also change with alteration and editing) are never properly scrutinised. DNA 
technology only looks at the components of the media in question itself rather than the bits 
encoded in the entire file itself.559 Therefore, a lot of content can go undetected undermining 
the very process of identification and detection.560 Ultimately, because Microsoft’s Photo DNA 
technology (like all filtering technologies) relies on prior examining, analysing and identifying 
aspects of matched target files against hash values its efficiency and accuracy can be 
compromised through subsequent manipulation of files and their duplicates to alter hashes 
through a series of steps like re-encoding, shortening, re-editing and re-titling.561 
It is also worth noting that technological tools like encryption stymie sophisticated 
fingerprinting technology. When a file is encrypted, the entire content of the message is 
concealed making it impossible for the regulators to gain access to information stored 
electronically in order to analyse the content of the file for specific patterns. And although it is 
possible to encrypt a file’s content without encrypting the metadata, such a method would be 
subject to the limitations of metadata such as incorrect matches.   
This scenario has been played out more markedly in the aftermath of the 2015 ISIS-inspired 
terror attack in San Bernardino, California. Following this attack, the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) attempted to retrieve some information from a smartphone used by one of 
the alleged terrorists.562 The phone, an iPhone, was cryptographically protected by encryption 
security measures pre-installed by Apple. The problem here from a point of view of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Engstrom, E. & Feamster, N. The Limits of Filtering: A Look at the Functionality and Shortcomings of 






562 Order Compelling Apple Inc to assist agents in search: In re The matter of the search of an Apple 
iPhone seized during the execution of a search warrant on a black Lexus IS300, California license plate 
35KGD203 No. ED 15-0451M (C.D. Cal.16, 02, 2016) available at: 
<https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714005/SB-Shooter-Order-Compelling-Apple-Asst-
iPhone.pdf accessed 19/05/2018 
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regulation/enforcement was that the FBI was unable to break through Apple’s security 
barriers, as these consisted of a two-step verification/public-key encryption system. The 
iPhone needed to be unlocked with a personal code only known by the user, and if the FBI 
attempted a “brute force” attack (i.e., where software is used to randomly enter numbers until 
a right combination of digits is found) Apple’s inbuilt security software would self-destruct 
deleting all the contents of the phone after 10 failed attempts.563Apple declined to aid the FBI 
in breaking the encryption code. Consequently, the FBI issued Apple with a court order in 
order to force Apple to comply.564 By associating code with expression and speech in an 
American jurisprudential sense, Apple argued that it was unconstitutional for the FBI to 
compel them to unlock the phone as the First Amendment protects speech.  Further, Apple 
claimed that they could not themselves break into iPhones without changing their entire 
approach to encryption and that doing so would potentially compromise the personal data of 
their customers.565  
Although eventually the FBI found a third-party provider that was able to hack into the iPhone 
in question, the trajectory of this case suggests that encryption generally complicates and 
encumbers enforcement and regulation processes of speech. The problem of encryption or 
“the going dark problem”566 is a huge issue for law enforcement, or is claimed by them to be a 
huge issue anyway. It is not just limited to the well-publicised Apple FBI iPhone case but it 
something that they probably encounter on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, today, platforms that 
use end-to-end encryption are the legion and they provide terrorist groups with a wealth of 
communication options that are usually free and accessible to use and download.567 Hence, 
the options to disseminate extremist content cryptographically without it being intercepted 
become divergent, incalculable, and uncontainable especially if we start to consider smaller 
less popular social networking platforms beyond the major ones like Facebook, Twitter, 
WhatsApp, Google and YouTube. All this auto-proliferation of content arguably makes the 
regulation of online communication technologies undecidable. 
In fact, in order for the predictive algorithms to be more accurate (although I doubt that this is 
possible) they need masses of data of alternating variables to be fed/input into their main 
database systems. In determining what terrorist or extremist imagery looks like (a very 
complex hyper-subjective determination that needs an intricate situational reading of socio-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Zetter, K. Magistrate orders Apple to help FBI hack San Bernardino shooter’s phone  
564 Ibid 
565 Cook, T.A. Message to Our Customers, APPLE (16/ 02/2016) available at: <http://www.apple.com/ 
customer-letter/ > (accessed 18/05/18)  
566 Traylor, J. M. Shedding Light on the Going Dark Problem and the Encryption Debate. U. Mich. JL 
Reform 50 (2016): p.489 
567 Consider the example of Telegram, a free encrypted messaging social networking application, which 
was popular with Daesh. Smith, L. Messaging app Telegram Centrepiece of IS Social Media Strategy 
(BBC News, 05/06/17) available at: < https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-39743252> accessed 
02/05/19  
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political settings) the database will need to have a substantial cache or profile of terrorist 
speech and in contrast a substantial cache of non-terrorist speech. In most situations 
however, the databases have missing and incomplete data (because of the very 
unpredictable, interminable and ungraspable nature of terrorism itself) or they will have data 
mostly corresponding to one variable hence widening the probability for inaccuracy.568 
Further, a conceptual-regulatory paradox (différance) can be highlighted here in the sense 
that these database systems require a substantial cache of least terrorist speech to function. 
Thus not only does the exclusion not succeed but it also demands and requires that which it 
excludes (in an autoimmunary fashion) in order to function. 
Because automated filtering technologies depend on having a reference database for 
extremist content (such as matching fingerprints or hashes), such a database is only 
practicable if accurate fingerprints/hashes of content are compiled within the database in the 
first place.  
Yet again, the hyper-subjective determination of what terrorist/extremist speech entails 
returns us to the complicated notion of hauntology and its susceptibility to blur realities or 
mislead. This consequently raises questions as to whether the databases on which filtering 
tools function are suffused with false and misleading identifications where the reference hash 
or fingerprint does not in reality correspond to the content it purportedly identifies. Moreover, 
due to the impossibility of adequate human-juridical-ethical intervention, filtering tools are 
likely to wrongly classify and distinguish content leading to an influx of misleading data and a 
widening of the margins of error.  
Inasmuch as some advocates of AI and cybersecurity believe that these false positives can 
be disambiguated or reduced drastically (almost to the point of greater accuracy,569 or even 
perfection), I doubt that such processes can or could ever possibly be perfected accurately or 
even be “well accounted” for considering their sheer quantity. Realistically, in my opinion we 
cannot correct the uncanny. Which is to say, false positives in these circumstances are an 
inescapable by-product or consequence of the different on-going relational negotiations, and 
the rupture and tensions in, with, beside and between language writing and speech.  
 
It is perhaps for this reason that examples of “false positives” i.e., situations where seemingly 
harmless content is wrongly censored, where content wrongly stays up when it should be 
taken down and, where technological tools and software virally mutate and “auto-destruct” our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 Prabhakar, M. Garcia-­‐‑Sanchez, R. & Casimir, D. “Development and Optimization of Machine 
Learning Algorithms and Models of Relevance to START Databases,” Report to the Office of University 
Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, 
MD: START, 2016. See also Duarte et al Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media 
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impulses of aggressivity to censor and over-regulate in today’s age of technological 
dominance and (techno- militaristic conquest in the interests of finitude)570are recurrently 
endemic. Automatic false-positives and false negatives are in reality never avoidable.  
 
Perhaps then we should not blame these “tools” (i.e., technologies and software) because, as 
Heidegger suggests, they are only “revealing” the inevitable realities (i.e., the limitations, 
tensions, iteration, absence, destinerrance, and the inherent openness to pathogenic 
contamination571 etc.,) of communication in nature, in the real world.572 Perhaps these 
technologies and software are simply deconstructing code, communication and linguistics in 
an “other” incalculable uncanny register, in a language unfamiliar to us, in a spectral play 
upon play of différance, in a “speech coming from the other, a speech [or call] of the 
unconscious as well”. 573  
 
As Derrida elaborates: 
 
I don’t know ––how the internal demon of the apparatus operates. What rules it 
obeys. This secret with no mystery frequently marks our dependence in relation to 
many instruments of modern technology. We know how to use them and what they 
are for, without knowing what goes on with them, in them on their side and this may 
give us plenty to think about with regard to our relationship with technology today ––
to the historical newness of this experience.574 
 
Notice and Take down  
 
Notice and take down (NTD) is a process operated by Internet intermediaries in response to 
government court orders or (police, hotlines, citizens and “other bodies duly authorised”)575 
that content is illegal. With NTDs the Internet intermediary following a notice or complaint 
remove or take down content. There are two common forms of NTD procedures. The first is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Ronell, A. Finitude's Score: Essays for the End of the Millennium (University of Nebraska Press, 
1994) p.44-47 
571 Metaphors of disease, infectivity and pathogenic contamination e.g. “virality” are often used to 
describe the challenges of dissemination online. 
572 Heidegger, M. The question concerning technology (New York: Harper & Row, 1977);“no matter how 
‘digital’ we become, the continuing problem of social inequality along racial lines persists”: Nakamura, L. 
and Chow-White, P. (eds) Race after the Internet. (Routledge, 2013) p.1 
573 Derrida, Paper Machine, p.23 I am speculating here, following Derrida that “the machine” itself could 
have unconscious desires that cannot be determined by logo-centric human interpretations. 
574 Ibid 
575 European Digital Rights, Joint Comments to the Dialogue on Notice and Take Down of illegal content 
July 2010 available at <https://edri.org/files/090710_dialogue_NTD_illegal_content_EuroISPA-
EDRI.pdf> 
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the issuing of explicit “Takedown Orders”, and the second, the far more common approach, is 
the use of a “voluntary” NTD regime.   
NTD has widely been applied in relation to copyright infringement but it also applies to libel, 
defamation and other illegal content such as images of child abuse and terrorist, extremist or 
radicalising content. It should be stressed here that the use of the word “voluntary” i.e., done 
out of free will, is in actual sense a misnomer. There remains a great deal of regulatory 
pressures responsibilities and coercions going on even within voluntary NTD regimes.  
Within the context of terrorism or content that incites terrorism, the approach has been 
“voluntary,” similar to that of child images and extreme pornography. Thus, the government, 
through bodies like CTIRU, has encouraged the use of a STOP or REPORT button (akin to 
the IWF’s Hotline) to take down extremist content propaganda or content that amounts to 
“glorification” and direct /indirect “encouragement” of terrorism. And whilst this STOP button 
approach is flexible and less burdensome than statutory regulation, it obfuscates processes 
of due process, adequate judicial oversight and parliamentary scrutiny.576  
 
Furthermore, that such a NTD approach is founded on an amorphous concept like terrorism 
widens the scope of proscription and creates a definitional, jurisdictional and interpretational 
inconsistency or ambiguity for Internet Service Providers (ISPs)577 with regard to liability––
what Stalla-Bourdillon has called “riding too many horses at the same time without having 
identified in the first place the precise direction to follow”.578 For purposes of practicality, (i.e., 
consistency) or because of fear of liability and having a bad moral reputation, ISPs are likely 
to engage a broad-brush system that infringes on the rights to freedom of expression of end- 
users. Ian Brown suggests that only a few NTD regimes include any substantive protection for 
individuals’ rights to freedom of expression, association or privacy.579 They are often 
introduced under the threat of legislation or litigation, agreed and operated behind closed 
doors “in the shadow of the law” with little participation by or consideration for citizens.580  
E-Commerce Directive  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 I am aware of the fact that judico-legal “oversight” is a regulatory/banoptic logic. But for purposes of 
scope a critical discussion of due process and oversight is not addressed in this thesis. That being said, 
I probe some of their interactions human rights considerations in chapter four of this thesis. 
577 How ‘Liberty’ Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-
Regulation Ahlert, C et al., How ‘liberty’ disappeared from cyberspace: the mystery shopper tests 
Internet content self-regulation." ( RootSecure. com  2004)., www. Rootsecure available at: < 
net/content/downloads/pdf/liberty_ disappeared_from_cyberspace. Pdf> 
578 Stalla-Bourdillon, S. Sometimes One Is Not Enough-Securing Freedom of Expression, Encouraging 
Private Regulation, or Subsidizing Internet Intermediaries or All Three at the Same Time: The Dilemma 
of Internet Intermediaries’ Liability. J. Int'l Com. L. & Tech. 7 (2012): 154. One could complicate this 
statement further by arguing that a “precise direction” to be followed doesn’t exist and that it is has not 
yet been agreed on. 
579 Brown, I. Beware self-regulation. Index on Censorship 39, no. 1 (2010): 98-106 
580 Ibid 
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The Directive 2000/31/EC (hereinafter Directive) gives general guidance on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market. First and foremost, the Directive defines what ISPs are: “natural or legal persons 
providing information society service.”581 Information Security Services are defined as 
services normally provided for remuneration at a distance by means of electronic equipment 
for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual 
request of a recipient of a service”.582 The services encapsulated by the definition of ISS 
include ISPs and search engines as well as section 18 of Directive 2000/31/EC.583 
  
Art 14 provides that member states shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the 
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the 
provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information (such as defamatory 
content, content which breaches intellectual property laws, obscene content, terrorism-related 
content, and content which stirs up religious or racial hatred) and, as regards claims for 
damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information 
is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. It is worth emphasising that 
this article does not hinder the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance 
with member states’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent 
content that constitutes an illegal infringement nor does it affect the possibility for member 
states of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. 
 
Art 15 provides obligations on how monitoring is to be done. Art 15(1) stipulates that Member 
states shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services to 
monitor the information, which they transmit, or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek 
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Additionally, Art 15 (2) grants Member states 
authority to establish requirements for information society service providers promptly to inform 
the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided 
by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at 
their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom 
they have storage agreements. 
 
The reasoning behind the Directive is to ensure legal certainty and consumer and investment 
security through the coordination and harmonisation of national laws in the internal market. 
This provides a favourable environment for the free flow and movement of information 
services. It is a harmonisation of the existing fragmented approach and multiplicity of laws 
and a move to encourage e-commerce and free flow of information in the common market by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Article 2(b) Directive 2000/31/EC 
582 Ibid s (17)  
583 Section 18 Directive 2000/31/EC 
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limiting Intellectual property infringements online.584 This move to enhance efficiency of e-
commerce, however, potentially creates “over compliance” on the part of ISPs (who are 
exempt from liability using the host defence under Article 14 of the Directive) hence creating 
tensions with the right to freedom of expression by virtue of the fact that “hosts” and Member 
states can broadly censor content whilst circumventing standard requirements for due 
process, human rights safeguards and accountability.585 
 
Whilst a general monitoring obligation cannot be imposed on ISPs, Member States still have 
a prerogative to implement blocking orders, which they can apply in scenarios where they feel 
a need to censor illegal content. This prerogative however can be used to the extreme. 
Between 2002 and 2004 for example, the Düsseldorf District administration issued 90 
injunctive orders against ISPs in North Rhine Westphalia requiring them to block access to 
online platforms with right wing content.586 Although this blocking/censorship can be a 
necessary move for the purposes of national security and public order amongst others, the 
methods of blocking can operate in a dragnet, covert and disproportionate manner (as I 
elaborate later in this chapter) and can truncate the right to freedom of expression of end- 
users. In light of the recent terrorist incidents and attacks in Europe, there have been 
proposals to curb online content that incites terrorism.587 
 
However, this is not an easy task to accomplish. The EU legislation will need to establish 
common rules on the definition of terrorist offences, or offences related to a terrorist group or 
terrorist activities and penalties in this area. And even when EU legislation attempts to come 
up with common rules as evinced in the 2017 Directive on Combating Terrorism,588 the very 
hauntological opacity of terrorism returns to undermine the regulatory process. Indeed as this 
thesis has shown so far terrorism is a highly subjective, contextual and ever-evolving term (as 
the old adage goes, one man’s terrorist is another mans freedom fighter). It therefore remains 
to be seen whether such proposals and agreements can ensure harmonisation and certainty 
across borders when regulating terrorist content.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) available at: < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2003/0
702/COM_COM(2003)0702_EN.pdf > p.12-14 
585 Internet censorship: US legislates as Britain volunteers, Library Association Record 100(9) (1998) 
457  
586 Akdeniz, Y. Internet child pornography and the law: national and international responses (Routledge, 
2016) p. 236 
587 AVMS: Definitions, hate speech and terrorism, accessibility and protection of minors - Presidency 
compromise proposals available at:<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/apr/eu-council-AVMS-
terrorism-hate-speech-6597-17.pdf> 
588 See Directive (EU) 2017/541 Para 7 
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EU Commission recommendations on tackling illegal content online 
 
In addition to the AVMS Directive,589 the European Commission has issued a series of  “non-
binding” recommendations on tackling illegal content online590 that enlist procedures to be 
taken by online platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Google amongst others and 
member states to flag and remove such content that covers things such as terrorist content, 
incitement to violence, counterfeit products, and copyright infringement.591 
 
The procedures within this recommendation are aimed at ensuring proactive detection of 
content whilst still ensuring that fundamental rights such as freedom of expression are 
retained. The new operational measures introduced in March 2018 are particularly focused on 
online terrorist content and its proliferation, which according to the Commission poses a 
particularly grave risk to “the security of Europeans, and as such has to be treated with the 
utmost urgency”.592  
 
Moreover, the recommendation suggests that online platforms should deploy more automated 
detection tools, to apprehend identify and keep down such content.593 It also advises the 
platforms to regularly report to the authorities on what steps they are taking to curb such 
content. Once more as if to really drive the severity of the point home (like with the AVMS 
Directive and the Ecommerce Directive) the recommendations also put the ISPs and 
intermediaries in a very uncomfortable place where they have to expeditiously act upon 
indications of illegality within an hour or have no excuse when dealing with the threat of 
liability from states and law enforcement agencies and/or a negative appraisal from the 
Commission in regard to their “societal responsibility”.594 Inasmuch as the Commission 
stresses that the recommendations do not contain legally binding rules, the commission does 
not also hide the fact that it “urges” (i.e., persistently persuades) online platforms to step up 
and speed up their efforts to prevent, detect and remove illegal online content, in particular 
terrorist related, as quickly as possible. This places ISPs in an inescapable power/liability 
tether, bind, or a phantasmic shadow of control. They become hauntological, bound in fear, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 2016/0151 (COD): DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
amending Directive 2010/13/EU: The most recent revision of the AVMS directive was adapted on 6 
November 2018 
590 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social committee and the committee of the regions: Tackling 
Illegal Content Online Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms available at: < 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-555-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF > 
591 European Commission, Press Release A Europe that Protects: Commission reinforces EU response 
to illegal content online (03/2018) available at:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1169_en.htm 
592 Ibid: The operational measures include e.g., a one-hour rule that requires companies to remove 
content within one hour from its referral. . 
593 Ibid 
594 Article 15(2) of the E-Commerce Directive  
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waiting interminably, Kafkaesque, in the sense that they are always under the guardianship of 
a more powerful gatekeeper.595 Moreover, if they don’t comply with these “nudges” then they 
face the challenge of having to comply EU enacting binding law (combined with the risks from 
reputational damage), which forces them to do these actions. 
 
To this end, blocking and filtering becomes an incentive to arbitrary censorship that can lead 
to a preventive over-blocking of harmless content on the part of the ISPs. The Commission 
itself says that companies now remove on average 70% of illegal hate speech notified to 
them and in more than 80% of these cases, the removals took place within 24 hours but even 
with at impressive rate of takedowns and removals there is still a residual recurring feeling of 
impotence with regard to informational control on the part of the Commission.596  
 
Yet again, what these recommendations disregard are the contextual and disseminatory 
challenges such as indeterminability of content inherent within the very speech and content 
they seek to contain. Rather than providing the clarity they seek to hold onto, these 
recommendations replicate hauntology. Like with the AVMS directive discussed previously, 
they reinscribe the (pre)calculated hauntological impulses of proactive filtering and blocking597 
which only engender processes of regulatory self inadequation.  
 
Notice and Takedown for Incitement to Terrorism Content 
The CTIRU 
 
The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, (CTIRU) is a law enforcement body that is 
responsible for making requests to gatekeepers to block content. The CTIRU was launched in 
February 2010 and was created to respond to the increasing use of the Internet by terrorists, 
specifically for radicalisation and propaganda purposes. It is one of the regulatory bodies 
within the complex web of Internet regulation online. It was set up by the Home Office and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers and it works closely with the CPS and the National 
Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). The CTIRU derives its legitimacy from S3 of 
the 2006 Terrorism Act, which gives the police power to demand the removal from public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595 See Derrida, J. "Before the law." In Acts of literature, pp.181-220  (Routledge, 2017) Vismann, C. 
Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford University Press 2008) pp.13-29; see also DiMaggio, P. & 
Powell, W. The iron cage revisited: Collective rationality and institutional isomorphism in organizational 
fields. American sociological review 48, no. 2 (1983): 147-160 
596 Kuczerawy, A. Intermediary liability & freedom of expression: Recent developments in the EU notice 
& action initiative. Computer Law & Security Review 31, no. 1 (2015): 46-56. 
597 Frosio, G, and Mendis. S "Monitoring and Filtering: European Reform or Global Trend?." The Oxford 
Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability (Oxford University 2019) 
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availability, within two working days, of content on the Internet deemed to be encouraging or 
inciting terrorists.598  
 
The CTIRU makes reference to 2006 Act when it “flags” a website to a hosting company. 
Presumably, the content flagged would be terrorism related and would fall under s 3(7) and s 
3(8) of the 2006 Act. These I have discussed extensively in a previous chapter but briefly, 
they would include articles or records and therefore publications that are likely to be 
understood as direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism and publications that are likely to glorify 
terrorism and information that is likely to be useful to any one or more of those persons in the 
commission or preparation of such acts.599 
 
A thorough evaluation of the CTIRU’s activities i.e., the nature of the content they are 
concerned with and the scope of their influence with regard to takedowns is almost 
impossible; they are very secretive and as such, there is a high degree of uncertainty with 
regard to the volume of content they takedown. Be that as it may, a reading of the 
government’s latest Contest strategy document provides some insightful figures. In terms of 
takedown numbers and rates it was reported that the CTRIU had secured the removal of over 
300,000 pieces of terrorist content between 2010 and 2018.600 It has also been noted that the 
CTIRU has developed relationships with over 300 online platforms, and that they have 
a trusted flagger status with many of the major platforms like YouTube, meaning that they 
have “prioritised flag reviews for increased takedown actionability.”601  
 
The CTIRU points out that these removals have been a direct consequence of the formal use 
of existing terrorism legislation (i.e. the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Act 2000) that 
encourages, promotes or glorifies terrorist acts or which otherwise incites or assists others to 
participate in such acts. But even though it is stated that the types of content most often 
removed usually breach Sections 57 or 58 Terrorism Act 2000 or sections 1 or 2 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006,602 the lack of transparency combined with the vagueness of the way in 
which takedowns are described (e.g. the expression “most often removed usually”) leaves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 See Metropolitan Police, Report extremist and terrorist material online 4/15/2016 available at: 
<http://news.met.police.uk/news/report-extremist-and-terrorist-material-online-160089 >accessed 
24/05/2018 
599 See: section 3 (7) and section 3 (8) Terrorism Act 2006  
600 HM Government, Contest: The united Kingdom’s strategy for Countering Terrorism (June 2018) 
available at: < 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169
07/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf> 
601 See e.g., the YouTube flagger programme, available at: < 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7554338?hl=en-GB> 
602 See e.g., CTIRU Takedown Demand, available at: <https://lumendatabase.org/notices/11757313#  > 
accessed 17/03/2019 
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room to suggest otherwise. That is to say, it is fair to assume that some of the removals 
overseen by the CTIRU also stem from interpretations of the Prevent strategy and its need to 
combat the amorphously defined online radicalisation and extremism.603  
 
It is worth also mentioning that other auxiliary legal provisions such as the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988, the Terrorism Act 2000 (the possession offences) and the Public 
Order Act and many other patchwork laws could possibly play a role in the regulatory or 
enforcement operations of the CTIRU.604 Significantly, many of the removals are conducted in 
a co-regulatory role with the ISPs,605 or web administrators, and they do not exactly follow the 
procedure outlined in section 3 of the 2006 Act. Concerningly, many of these flaggings are by 
the CTIRU’s “ACT” and/or “STOP” Terrorists’ and Extremists Online Presence campaign (a 
hotline), which encourages members of the public to flag extremist content. This is normally 
done by way of clicking on an ACT Terrorism report button606 which on clicking, quickly 
directs the public/web user(s) to an anonymous form607 that asks them to enter the address of 
the webpage where they saw the terrorist related content. The form categorises the following 
as terrorist related content:  
 
1) articles, images, speeches, videos that promote terrorism or encourage violence 
2) content encouraging people to commit acts of terrorism 
3) websites made by terrorist or extremist organisations 
4) videos of terrorist attacks 608  
 
That the hotline campaign invites the general public to monitor the Internet and report what 
they consider to be extremist is problematic. Which is to say, the hotline stretches the reach 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 HM Government CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for countering terrorism p. 37 available 
at  <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-
contest.pdf > accessed 24/07/16 In addition to the Prevent strategy one should also consider see also 
Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA 
604 See my discussion of patchwork and overlapping laws in Chapter two. 
605 Fidler, D, P., Countering Islamic State exploitation of the Internet Digital and Cyberspace Policy 
Program  (2015) Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2609 available at: 
<https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2609/ > 
606 See e.g. NPCC, Counter Terrorism Policing urging public to ACT against online extremism, available 
at: < https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/counter-terrorism-police-urge-public-to-act-against-online-
extremism>  
607 Home Office, Report Online material promoting extremism or terrorism, available at: 
< www.gov.uk/report-terrorism> 
 608 The counter Terrorism internet referral unit lists the following as extremist or terrorist material: a) 
videos of violence with messages of ‘glorification’ or praise for terrorists; b) Postings inciting people to 
commit acts of terrorism or violent extremism; c) Messages intended to stir up hatred against any 
religious or ethnic group; Bomb-making instructions. Available 
at:<http://www.npcc.police.uk/NPCCBusinessAreas/PREVENT/TheCounterTerrorismInternetReferralUni
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of counter-extremism vigilance but in doing so, it invites an indeterminate and pre-emptive 
range of ethical-legal determinations that potentially suspend the law and the all-important 
scrupulous juridical determinations of what is wrong from right. In this sense, the CTIRU’s 
hotline mechanism is susceptible to collecting inaccurate and potentially illegal complaints.609 
 
In addition to takedowns, the CTIRU also compiles a blacklist of URLs for material hosted 
outside of the UK, which would give rise to criminal liability under the provisions of the 
Terrorism Act 2006. This list is secret; it is not clear whether or not it goes beyond the remit of 
the Terrorism Act 2006. These blacklisted sites are then blocked on networks of the public 
estate, such as government buildings, schools and libraries. In November 2014, it was 
announced that all major UK ISPs would be incorporating the blacklist into their adult content 
filters, preventing access to such websites where subscribers do not specifically opt out of 
such filtering. There is no known formal appeal or review process for the CTIRU’s blacklist 
and no accountability of transparency from them whatsoever. Moreover, the fact that law 
enforcement practitioners and the police predominantly oversee the blocking and filtering 
process negates the notion of independence, accountability and impartial oversight because 
in practice, no one but the police can review the decisions in question.  
 
In the process of my research for this thesis, I tried to contact the CTIRU for interviews. My 
requests for interviews were ignored. Be that as it may, I managed to carry out an 
anonymised interview with a police officer from a country in the European Union (hereinafter 
ACEU)610 who provided some insight on how police cybercrime units like the CTIRU 
function.611 
 
Like the CTIRU, the ACEU cybercrime body is a unit, a “sub-sub-sub department” of the 
ACEU police of about maybe 20 or so police officers who are just given the task of 
determining what content deserves being taken down.612 In his view, this police unit (given 
their close relationship to the executive) absolved themselves of some of the responsibilities 
of having to determine what constituted terrorism by placing this responsibility on ISPs and 
social network providers.613 It is also easier for the government and the CTIRU perhaps for 
reasons of resource management and political pressure and (im)practicality “to pile pressure 
on company bosses for not doing enough”.614   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 Although it is impossible to cite statistics from the CTIRU, one can compare its operations to the IWF 
(on which the CTIRU is modelled) whose 2016 NTD report reveals that only 28% of the complaints 
reported were correctly identified child sexual abuse images IWF Annual Report 2016 available at: 
<https://annualreport.iwf.org.uk/2016/ > accessed (15/05/2018) 
610 The country has been anonymised on the request of the interviewee. 
611 See Appendix, Interview transcript B: with M an ACEU police official in Cybercrime  
612 Ibid p.256 
613 Ibid 
614 The House of Commons Home Affairs Select committee, Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism 
online, Fourteenth Report of Session 2016–17 Para 25 (25/04/2017) 
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Yet still, a crucial question remains how is “enough” (an indeterminable concept on its own) to 
be measured?615 It seems that the very vagueness of “enough” is instrumental here in the 
sense that its ambiguity gives the executive and the police an excuse or justification to avoid 
accountability when dealing with inscrutable issues such as the undecidabilities of criminality, 
policing and terrorism as they occur in the context of the Internet: 
 
[…]. So, we (as the police) don’t decide anything, we point it out to the company and 
then they place the responsibility for this judgment as a matter completely in the 
hands of that company.616  
 
Moreover, there are ethical concerns around the fact that police officers in cybercrime units 
can stretch their determinations of “illegal content” to include what is objectionable and not 
necessarily illegal or criminal. Perhaps this is not their fault. Which is to say, it is the 
consequence of a much bigger societal problem, a systematic problem of interpretation that 
carries within it a particular post-9/11-7/7 outlook that blurs objectivity with regard to how we 
define, predict, interpret, pre-calculate or identify terrorism.617 This blurring of objectivity arises 
out of the counter terrorism apparatus’s spectral entanglement with probability neglect with 
regard to determining what constitutes “terrorism”618 or “incitement to terrorism”. In other 
words, from the point of view of the police a determination or interpretation of what constitutes 
terrorism is inescapably tied to a hyper-subjective banoptic system of cultural, emotional, 
linguistic and moral norms or pre-programmed biases that impedes an ethical responsibility of 
proportionality, objectivity and reasonableness: 
 
And so even if it is true (which it is) it should never be a reason for singling out these 
groups. You should always check against other factors objectively to determine 
whether or not this ‘hunch’ is right and based on facts. Especially where terrorism is 
involved, you see that many people in the ACEU public and also the ACEU police 
and ACEU prosecution (hesitates) seem to be a little less strict about how much of 
that objectivity they need to do. […] There are issues with the whole societal zeitgeist 
[…]. It is a system bias and system biases are always bad. They may feel less a bias 
as they become part of systems and habits and procedures etc., – so there’s no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 As the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation Max Hill QC has asked: “How do we 
measure ‘enough’? What is the appropriate sanction?” See: Grierson, J. Watchdog likens May's internet 
fines threat to Chinese censorship (03/07/17 The Guardian) available at: < 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/03/watchdog-likens-mays-internet-fines-threat-to-chinese-
censorship > accessed 25/05/2018 
616 Interview transcript B, p.277  
617 Zedner, "Pre-crime and post-criminology?”; Sunstein, "Terrorism and probability neglect” 
618 See n.576 p.275: “the spectre of terrorism is a problem in the ACEU. The definition of what terrorism 
actually is as its being used in society right now has nothing to do with the definition of terrorism as 
proscribed in the law or even ten years ago”.  
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“actual decision” about a single thing anymore. A personal bias can be solved by 
having another person look at it, but a system bias is much harder to solve.619   
 
The intrinsic textual problematics of determination, interpretation and enforcement of 
incitement to terrorism seem to be compounded by the fact that the judiciary does not 
oversee the regulatory practices of the police officers in the ACEU. The issue concerning who 
oversees their regulatory practices remains unclear. Moreover, the police officers role in the 
equation appears to be a mere extension of state’s “force of law” and disciplinary power in the 
sense that it has a legitimatised coercive influence or hold on lower-level doorkeepers like 
ISPs. This ambiguous or opaque lack of scrutiny thus potentially allows the ACEU to 
proactively stretch criminality and (indeed pre-crime) to legal-juridico areas that are not 
conventionally brought before the law. In other words, because the ACEU are stewards of the 
sovereign’s force of law, they are obliquely shielded from accountability and from the burden 
of being legally challenged by individuals whose speech they censor. 
 
The ACEU police can inform the company that something is amiss and in accordance 
with this user policy the company can take it down. The thing is, the ACEU police are 
not just any citizen, they are an official/officials of the state and they are prompting 
this removal. Now there are people saying (just to emphasise: not necessarily my 
position – just opposing voices) that they should not leave this decision (of removal) 
to private companies who are not usually even based in the ACEU, as they would not 
be able to rightly assess the kinds of content aimed at harming ACEU society.  
 
Moreover, these companies are a non-body a non-judge but they are now judge, jury 
and executioners of the content. Well, one could say that it is fair for any one 
including the ACEU police to point out that this content is a violation and the rest is up 
to the company; they are simply prompting them. If the content is truly and fully more 
than objectionable thus criminal and not taken down because of the user licence the 
ACEU police may get the foreign authorities to execute an order. Obviously, most 
companies for what you might call good reasons will say this is ‘apparently’ illegal 
and will proceed to remove without any orders or warrants. This will reduce 
paperwork and the ACEU police rejoices.620 
  
No doubt, there are legal and jurisdictional disparities between the ACEU model and the UK 
model. But there are also stark similarities between both models in the sense that they share 
the same goals of detecting, identifying, removing and taking down extremist content or 
content that incites terrorism. Similarities also exist structurally. Most of the takedowns under 
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620 Ibid p.274 
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the ACEU model (like with the CTRIU) work informally /non-bindingly in a soft-solution,621 co-
regulatory manner without judicial scrutiny. The ACEU police and the CTIRU also have 
structural similarities in that they are both doorkeepers of the state and executive they are 
thus willing to take a more hard-line approach.  
 
This hard-line approach to counter terrorism and regulation is arguably driven by a collective 
feeling of insecurity in the post-9/11-7/7 continuum which prompts the need for wide 
legislation and enforcement through supplementary policies or strategies like Prevent in an 
attempt to counter terrorism’s indeterminate threat. However, the indeterminability of law, 
technology and enforcement practices crystallise repeatedly into and with tensions of 
containability hence sustaining interplays of différance between gatekeepers, the law and the 
technology. As such, there is always an element of inadequacy and deferral, an unfathomable 
informational void that causes law and regulation to move at an interminably slower pace than 
the technologies and speech they seek to regulate. My interviewee elaborates thus:   
 
The problem is; law is slow. It is a condensation of the societal average and some 
problems are not at the centre of society they are at the edge currently. I think, for 
this particular issue, law is too slow. One big legal issue remains obviously, the 
transnational differences. And so, what we in the ACEU might deem objectionable or 
illegal and what the Germans deem objectionable and what the Hungarians deem 
objectionable are different. It gets even weirder if you go beyond Europe, say China 
and South America, or even average officially Islamic countries, which may be less 
inclined to address or co-operate on certain issues, because their societal issues are 
different and because they may have differences on how they view extremism. I do 




It is worth probing the issue of transnational differences and the problems it may present for 
regulation. Indeed, ISPs may face more than one notice from a different number of countries 
(all with differing criminal interpretations of incitement to terrorism) altogether putting ISPs 
under immense pressure and cost and creating a litigation nightmare. To illustrate this, it is 
worth considering the Licra vs. Yahoo litigation.623 Here, a Paris court held that the display of 
Nazi memorabilia624 and propaganda on an auction site625 by Yahoo! in France infringed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 Mörth, U. Soft law in governance and regulation: an interdisciplinary analysis. (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2004) 
622 Interview transcript B, p.280 
623 La Ligue contre le racism et l’antisemitism v. Yahoo! Inc, Order of TGI Paris of 20 Nov. 2000 
624 Cohen-Almagor, R. Freedom of expression, Internet responsibility, and business ethics: The Yahoo! 
saga and its implications. Journal of business ethics 106, no. 3 (2012): 353-365  
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French Penal Code. The Paris court denied the argument by Yahoo!, which claimed that 
Yahoo!’s services were primarily directed to end-users in the US and that French courts had 
no jurisdictional competence on the issue. It held that the content on the Yahoo! servers 
impacted on French users, further that Yahoo! had knowledge that this content was being 
disseminated in France created something similar to the equitable protective duty (discussed 
in Cartier above) and meant that Yahoo! had to take necessary steps to take down the 
content. Consequently, the court ordered Yahoo! to impede access to the site to French users 
and required them to embed a warning of prosecution on the Yahoo! French website that 
would detract users from seeking out the content in question. Although Yahoo! argued that it 
would be technically impossible for Yahoo! to block all access to its sites from France, the 
court consulted experts who found that 70% of French end-users could be identified as 
French through their ISPs and that it was possible to impede these users by filtering/blocking 
their IP addresses. Inasmuch as Yahoo! eventually complied with the French authorities and 
took down some of the illegal material on its auction sites, my understanding of the outcome 
of that case is that Yahoo! decided itself to remove Nazi memorabilia from sale 
internationally, in a “public relations” move to protect its reputation. 
  
When read in conjunction with Godfrey v. Demon and Totalise plc v. Motley Fool Ltd. 
(discussed above), what the Yahoo! Litigation demonstrates is the latitude of coercive control 
or power that states have over ISPs. It demonstrates that ISPs unavoidably comply with 
national regulations (in this case regulations such as glorification, direct and indirect 
encouragement, the dissemination of propaganda) and speech restrictive orders of a public 
and social order (in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public safety for the 
protection of health and morals)626 in order to avoid hefty legal costs and potential 
reputational damage (as Yahoo! demonstrates) in particular jurisdictions.   
 
In addition to government pressure, some have argued that ISPs also have a societal/moral/ 
ethical duty or a corporate social responsibility to ensure that offensive illegal and hateful 
content on their servers is not accessible.627 The appeal of corporate social responsibility 
solutions in regulating difficult social problems such as the radicalisation of terrorists is 
understandable. On the one hand governments can be seen to be “doing something” that in 
the short-term may appear reasonably effective, while reducing enforcement costs and 
scrutiny from courts and legislatures and ISPs on the other hand are applauded for their 
“social responsibility” whilst potentially avoiding more “burdensome” regulatory 
responsibilities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 Ibid 
626 Article 10(2) ECHR 
627 Laidlaw, E. Internet gatekeepers, human rights and corporate social responsibilities PhD thesis (The 
London School of Economics and Political Science 2012);Cohen-Almagor, R. Freedom of expression, 
Internet responsibility, and business ethics 
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Nonetheless, the corporate social responsibility frame, (which is in fact a concessionary 
extension of the co-regulatory public-private cooperative frame) presents some difficulties 
when it comes to freedom of expression concerns, particularly with regard to blanket or 
broad-brush censorship. This broad-brush which mirrors what Marsden calls “a shoot first ask 
questions later approach”628 has implications for freedom of expression that can be 
summarized in two points: 1) it favours a monolithic presumptuous viewpoint over others that 
is also liable to removing harmless non-majoritarian content and 2); it occurs within an 
environment of little or no adequate due process and judicial review. 
 
Although the previous discussion on the liability of ISPs throws some light on the process of 
NTD generally, it still fails to throw light on the interpretational, contextual and jurisdictional 
challenges that are experienced when taking down terrorist/ extremist content i.e., which 
incites, glorifies or encourages terrorism, or is of an extremist nature. To examine the extent 
and nature of these challenges it is worth considering from a more practical point of view how 
Facebook negotiates some of these challenges using examples from my interviews. 
 
Case study: Facebook and how it takes down content  
 
To substantiate some of the observations highlighted in the previous sections. It is worth 
turning to empirical research I carried out with Facebook and its representatives in the UK. 
This research takes the form of semi-structured qualitative interviews. Generally, my 
interviews revealed that the problem of enforcing, filtering, blocking and moderating content 
was not only down to the way in which the legal provisions were drawn. They suggested that 
a massive part of the problem was structural i.e., caused by the homogenous analytic model 
of regulation. In other words, the key problems were triggered by the singularity of the 
analytical logic to identify, apprehend and sanction, an approach, which always missed the 
mark in its attempts to contain the heterogeneity of speech, writing and communication 
online. That is to say, the encumbrances Facebook faced when regulating content that incites 
terrorism were essentially emblematic of the undecidable problems of translation, editing and 
reading, –– problems that (as suggested in chapter one of this thesis) are inherent to all forms 
of speech, textuality and writing.  
My interviews seem to suggest that Facebook and other companies do try their best as far as 
is humanly or rather linguistically possible to pay attention to intercept takedown and filter the 
content in question. However, it needs to be acknowledged that they are dealing with 
indeterminate heterogeneous speech (in huge amounts) that ruptures stability and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 Marsden, C.T. Internet co-regulation: European law, regulatory governance and legitimacy in 
cyberspace (Cambridge University Press, 2011) p.164 
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containability. Therefore, to blame Facebook and other Internet companies “for not doing 
enough” 629 is merely an easy escape that phantasmically overshadows –– and even 
disappears or excludes –– critical analyses concerned with the symptomatic causes and the 
heterogeneous complexities of such speech. It also enables governments to evade their 
responsibilities and human rights obligations through by shifting them over to private Internet 
companies.   
Analysing Facebook’s community standards guidelines and policies 
 
In a 2018 news blog by Facebook, they have outlined the fact that they define terrorism as 
“any non-governmental organization that engages in premeditated acts of violence against 
persons or property to intimidate a civilian population, government, or international 
organization in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim”.630   
 
Facebook emphasises that its policy and guidelines are agnostic to the ideology or political 
goals of a group (or what Facebook calls a hate organisation),631 which means that they 
include everything from religious extremists and violent separatists to white supremacists and 
militant environmental groups.632 The key point they focus on is whether or not such groups 
“glorify”, “encourage” or “celebrate” the use “violence” to pursue those goals.633  
 
Facebook’s community standards seem to place an emphasis on the notion of violence. But if 
one assesses what violence actually is from a critical historical perspective (a subject that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis), violence turns out to be a hyper-subjective and contentious 
notion. Such contestability arguably extra-escalates undecidability particularly in a diverse 
cross-cultural space like the Internet. Which is to say, the determination of what content is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629 Hope, C. & McCann, K. Google, Facebook and Twitter told to take down terror content within two 
hours or face fines. The Telegraph (19/09/19) available at: 
< https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/19/google-facebook-twitter-told-take-terror-content-within-
two/> 
630 Bickert, M. & Fishman, B. Hard questions: How we counter terrorism, Facebook Newsroom 
(06/15/17) available at: < https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/> accessed 
21/05/2018 
631 According to Facebook’s policy standards a hate organisation is: “Any association of three or more 
people that is organised under a name, sign or symbol and that has an ideology, statements or physical 
actions that attack individuals based on characteristics, including race, religious affiliation, nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, sex, sexual orientation, serious disease or disability” available at: 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/dangerous_individuals_organizations > 
632 Letter from Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to Facebook’s Content Policy, Product 
Policy, and External Relations Teams,  
(08/06/18) Available at: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4910674/Letter-From-LCCRUL-
to-Facebook.pdf>  
633 See Facebook Community standards part iii (13) on Violence and graphic content, available at: < 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/graphic_violence> 
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“violent” will always remains suspended open, a matter for debate. In this regard, the 
guidelines are paradoxically more textually complex and confusing than they intend to be.   
 
Understandably, the aim of the community standards is to make speech offences easily 
identifiable and apprehendable in an almost calculable manner. However, the Facebook 
community standards (just like any text) are not fixed and stable in their meanings. Moreover 
because they seek to contain or regulate a dynamic, global cyber-community, the iterable and 
disseminatory interpretations that accrue from are susceptible to drifting heterologically,634 
hence making their very operationalisation and enforcement intractable. Thus, the community 
standards inherently obfuscate and contaminate analytic singularity, stability and 
containability. They thereby begin to question the widely held assumption that speech can be 
contained, understood and grasped homogenously. For in reality, legal constatives such as 
“terrorism”, “radicalisation”, “pornography”, “fake news”, “hate speech”, “propaganda”, 
“obscenity”, “violence and graphic content”635 or even “cruel and insensitive content”636 are 
fraught with impermanence and contestable interpretations understandings and so forth.637     
To complicate this even further, it is worth mentioning that it is not only Facebook that flags 
content. The whole process of regulation has a multiplicity of analytical players or “editors” 
(from individuals to NGO partners, akin to “trusted flaggers”)638 who determine what content is 
flaggable/proscribable. And even though the introduction of these other editors is done on 
good grounds such as trying to limit bias, and human subjectivity. In a somewhat paradoxical 
move this only complicates regulation from the outset as it initiates and proliferates divergent 
tensions and plays upon plays of (différance) contested meanings. These offences then 
become mootable, impartial and inter-subjective. Their meanings evolve and mutate, 
contesting from inside out i.e., within and without. Thus, the various meanings, readings and 
interpretations of law compromise their closed structure by “inciting” open a shifting reverse or 
counterpoint dialogue within the very prescription of limits with regard to what is sayable and 
unsayable.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 The heterological shifts in meaning with regard to the community standards are arguably down to the 
fact that a community is heterogeneous and never a homogenous essence: Derrida, J. Declarations of 
independence, New Political Science 7, no. 1 (1986): 7-15 
635 See Facebook Community standards Part iii: Objectionable Content  
636 Ibid  
637 […] Everyday, new challenges, new scenarios come up and maybe something that has never 
happened before will come up and in these situations there is no policy about it”: Appendix, Interview 
transcript A: with a former Facebook content moderator, p.263 
638 Ibid: “[…] So we work with NGO partners in countries around the world who have more expertise in 
these areas than we do. We have a kind of symbiotic relationship with them to help with correcting and 
interpreting our policies. For example, we have a process whereby we can ask our NGO partners to 
become, ‘trusted flaggers’ but not like the Google model”. Interview transcript C, p.286  
                                                                         	  
150	  
In sum, Facebook has published and implemented guidelines and policies to guide its 
decisions to block content. But these guidelines are not consistent; they are ambiguous and 
often fluctuate.639 This fluctuation is inevitable. It is a direct inescapable effect of attempts by 
Facebook to try and deal with the heterogeneity and plurivocality of online speech. And even 
though Facebook has review teams and moderators working at all hours of the day around 
the globe, to ensure that their policies and guidelines are complied with, the policies can auto-
undermine themselves (e.g. through false positives, and cross-content issues with third-party 
Facebook apps) in their endeavour to cope with the multiplicity of speech and its contestable 
meanings.640 Operationalising and enforcing these contextually contested meanings 
especially for issues like terrorism hence becomes a complex indeterminable ordeal.641  
Facebook’s use of Artificial Intelligence 
We are not necessarily familiar with the sort of AI that Facebook uses to moderate content 
online.  Nonetheless, Facebook has disclosed in a number of public statements that they use 
AI tools when filtering terrorism content online.      
We want to find terrorist content immediately, before people in our community have 
seen it. Already, the majority of accounts we remove for terrorism we find ourselves. 
But we know we can do better at using technology — and specifically artificial 
intelligence — to stop the spread of terrorist content on Facebook. Although our use 
of AI against terrorism is fairly recent, it’s already changing the ways we keep 
potential terrorist propaganda and accounts off Facebook. We are currently focusing 
our most cutting edge techniques to combat terrorist content about ISIS, Al Qaeda 
and their affiliates, and we expect to expand to other terrorist organizations in due 
course. We are constantly updating our technical solutions, but here are some of our 
current efforts.642 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 I substantiate this claim in the following section.  
640 Facebook, Commonly submitted false Positives 24/11/2013 available at: < 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-bug-bounty/commonly-submitted-false-
positives/744066222274273/ > 
641 Interview transcript C: “… so this is really hard to operationalise and to draw up rules that can apply 
fairly”. p.289 
642 Bickert, M. & Fishman, B. Hard questions: How we counter terrorism, Facebook Newsroom 
(06/15/17) available at:< https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/> accessed 
21/05/2018 see also Cruickshank, P. A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Brian Fishman, 
Counterterrorism Policy Manager, Facebook (Combating Terrorism Centre 09/17 Vol 10 issue 8) 
available at : < <https://ctc.usma.edu/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-an-interview-with-brian-fishman-
counterterrorism-policy-manager-facebook/> 
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These public statements were confirmed in my interview with the Facebook Policy manager643 
who stated that Facebook uses tools such as image matching, language understanding and 
cross platform collaboration. For purposes of scope, I limit my discussion to AI or algorithms 
that are concerned with language processing.    
As discussed earlier, the functional logic of NLP programmes (like those employed by 
Facebook) is to forestall “harmful” and “violent” expression by detecting and identifying 
“harmful” and violent cited keywords. My interview with the UK’s Facebook Policy manager 
revealed that Facebook relied on and built a bank or library of known terrorist propaganda 
that goes into what is known as a “hash-sharing” database of images and words that is then 
blocked from being uploaded.644 He also stated that the algorithmic tools were effective 
(although he also made later statements contradicting this which I will return to later) because 
they were intelligence led, identified propaganda quickly and prevented it from spreading fast 
and far.  
  
Moreover, the notion that AI is “accurate” and “effective” was, contradicted by the Facebook 
Policy manager himself.  The policy manager acknowledged the fact that AI was also error 
prone ––I analyse this issue in more depth later in this chapter. He also expressed significant 
doubts about the predictive abilities and potential of AI by pointing me to an interview where 
Facebook have stated: 
AI can’t catch everything. Figuring out what supports terrorism and what does not 
isn’t always straightforward, and algorithms are not yet as good as people when it 
comes to understanding this kind of context. A photo of an armed man waving an 
ISIS flag might be propaganda or recruiting material, but could be an image in a news 
story. Some of the most effective criticisms of brutal groups like ISIS utilise the 
group’s own propaganda against it. To understand more nuanced cases, we need 
human expertise.645 
Arguably, Facebook’s reservations about the efficacy of AI, (i.e., about AI’s limits or inability to 
catch anything and its inability to interpret context clearly) fit within my description above of 
code and online communications, as disseminatory texts that rupture normative fixity and 
gesture towards the indeterminate and incalculable. Thus, because language based AI tools 
are always already embedded within an iterable and disseminatory ecological process of 
writing and communication, they are ever in a drifting process of languaging (i.e., of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 The Facebook Public Policy manager (Mr. Karim Palant) serves as a key point of contact concerning 
Facebook’s policies as well as the Legislative issues that are central to Facebook’s mission.  
644 See Interview transcript C 
645 Bickert, M. & Fishman, B. Hard questions: How we counter terrorism 
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reproducing and being produced as copies and duplicates of texts interminably looped in a 
network). The key point here is that even if extremist content (e.g. an extremist image) is first 
wrongly identified then corrected and filtered out, the fluidity and openness of both speech 
and AI itself means that this same image could be re-contextualised unforeseeably. All this is 
to say that the recurring problems and vulnerabilities of communication that plague languages 
are inherited by code and all its computational processes, hence creating 
unknowable/undecidable gaps in its translation/interpretation.  
 
In fact, a recent project has shown that AI technologies and software programs can have 
encumbrances by virtue of the fact that they are engineered or designed based on subjective 
linguistic biases. As such, the more software and AI technologies develop human-defined 
abilities like “logic” and “common sense”, the more they commensurably develop unintended 
ingrained human stereotypes and dislikes like ageism, ableism, racism and sexism646 ––“the 
monster bears the traits of its maker”647–– and when little or no individuating data are 
available, stereotypes are highly likely to dominate the evaluation of the stereotyped target.648 
In this regard, they can become tools of further hauntological otherisation.  
 
Thus, filtering tools and programmes have an encoded capacity to marginalise the non-
normative (even when harmless) hence potentially distorting public opinion and infringing on 
the right to impart and receive information. In light of this, Facebook tries to inject more clarity 
into the regulatory and enforcement process by supplementing AI with human moderation. I 
explore how human moderators work in the next section.  
 
Human moderation  
 
Generally, the responsibility of content moderators is to assess whether or not the content in 
question goes against the company’s community standards, if it does, the content comes 
down. Facebook employs teams of between 4500-7500 human reviewers around the world, 
who speak many languages.649 As soon as these moderators are recruited, they undergo 
training on how to remove content. This training strictly follows the policies and community 
standards of Facebook and they apply the company’s global policy.650 It also involves 
identifying how certain words fall under certain proscribed categories for certain reasons. 
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Evidently, because of the differences and conflicts in jurisdictions, a lot of the training and 
indeed the moderation is done on a country-to-country basis.651 Precisely, because of this 
reason, content moderators in their training and in their process of enforcement/moderation 
have to adhere not only to national counterterrorism legislation but also to country-specific 
counterterrorism strategies such as Prevent and its inauguration of contestable and confusing 
meanings of terms like “British values”, “extremism” and “radicalisation”. This very fact means 
that the moderators start to grapple with a regulatory structure that is conceptually anchored 
onto indeterminate meanings that have no fixity, meanings that are open, and indeterminate 
(i.e., fragmented, interdependent,	  contiguous, and diffused) with no clear boundaries.652  
  
In our interview, the Facebook Policy manager also revealed that Facebook hires human 
moderators to limit the degree of contextual error that algorithms are susceptible of 
replicating.653 According to him, Facebook’s human moderators help to mitigate the extent of 
these false positives and provide extra safeguards by carrying out a rigorous interpretation 
and translation of the content against Facebook’s community standards and the context in 
which they occur.  
  
However, in probing this revelation further, the picture turned out to be more complicated than 
was initially communicated. He revealed that this is more complicated than first thought 
especially in regard to determining the political, cultural and moral nuances of incitement to 
terrorism. He intimated that being impartial and objective whilst determining these issues was 
impossible654partly because the law itself does not “clearly say this-is-what-terrorism content 
is”.655   
  
Nonetheless, he referred to the fact that Facebook engaged with “a number of NGO partners 
in countries around the world who have more expertise in these areas than we do in order to 
mitigate the implications of impartiality and bias”.656 
  
And further on:  
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We are really conscious that it is far from perfect but it is an attempt to try and deal 
with the issue we are talking about which is this ability to define what is acceptable 
and what is not. The truth is the users of our platform are very vocal… and so where 
there are really controversial issues about what is and isn’t truth what is and isn’t 
extremism in parts of the world where there is a real tension around that like parts of 
the middle east ––where you can have two very sharp and divergent views on these 
things, we have to tread that line of trying to accommodate, of trying to find a 
balance…. so it’s one of those things that is hard … it is hard to say that this group, ‘X 
group’, is highlighting something that is important or unheard and at that same point it 
is hard to determine whether ‘X group’ is fanning the flames of a dispute that 
internationally everyone is condemning. These are really hard judgments to make.657 
 
To illustrate how moderation is affected by an inescapable impartiality and bias function in 
practice, it is worth considering some examples:  
 
i) In September 2016 Shaun King – a writer for the New York Daily News, who frequently 
writes stories about police brutality and runs a community page with over 800,000 people– 
posted on his Facebook page a screenshot of an email that twice called him the N-word, 
saying: “FUCK YOU N*****!” 658 Within a matter of a few hours, the Facebook filters banned 
him claiming that he had violated its “community standards”.   
  
The decision to filter King’s post is questionable as King was not inciting violence or 
expressing hatred towards Black people. His posting of the offensive email was an attempt to 
raise awareness it was “a name and shame act” to expose the sender of the email and their 
racism. Nonetheless, Facebook’s moderation policy self-inadequated, which is to say, 
Facebook’s automated filtering systems “lapsed” and it was unable to read nuance and to 
judge context rightly in this situation. In this sense, Facebook’s error (which is also the result 
of a kind of temporal-textual deferral or a human/machine or human/AI disjunction) displays a 
particular spectral unreadability of a kind of dual-authored writing or reading that is created by 
the interface of (human/machine) synchronic engagement. 
 
To illustrate the capricious difficulties inherent to moderation and with regard to King’s 
censorship incident, the Facebook manager stated:  
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But some of this language stuff is a challenge. I do not know so much about, it would 
be wrong of me to speculate, because I do not have the details. I know that whenever 
there is a tension like that of the Black Lives Matter, a sort of tension that deals with a 
massive issue like racial tensions in the US, this presents real challenges that always 
blow back on us. We are always a bit of a battlefield in these situations. Now, I also 
know that we took down a lot of the Charlottesville white extremist content, we took a 
lot of that down, which was again controversial the other way and there was also a lot 
of debate as to whether that was terrorist content or not … I wouldn’t want to be too 
definitive because I don’t know too much about this.659  
 
ii) In addition to King’s Censorship incident, another incident that shows how deeply 
challenging and “unshakeable” this notion of contextual interpretation is, was the censorship 
of news concerning the Rohingya massacre in Myanmar. On this the Facebook Policy 
manager commented:  
 
I can see that there are challenges if there is a minority group involved. Somebody 
pointed it out to me the other day. Generally, we can be attacked for removing a 
piece of content and silencing a particular group, at the same time as being attacked 
for leaving up the same content because it is upsetting or graphic. Sometimes the 
same publication or group will do both at different times because these are hard 
judgments, and people can hold two contradictory views about what the right thing to 
do is.660  
 
These aforementioned scenarios (and indeed many others)661 disclose the actual contextual 
and interpretational/ linguistic difficulties of speech moderation generally. In fact, in a 2017 
paper the Centre for Democracy and Technology highlighted that English-language 
processing tools may have disparate accuracy levels for minority populations.662 The paper 
found that NLP tools often struggle with variations in dialect and language use across 
different demographic and cultural groups of English speakers and as such, popular NLP 
tools tend to misidentify English dialects such as African American Vernacular English as 
non-English.663 The problem with technological regulation is essentially one of textual 
interpretation and translation. Understandably, the decision to have human moderators as a 
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matter of ensuring more accuracy is a good step. However, it does help to solve some 
interpretational challenges Facebook and other online platforms face. This is to say, it is 
questionable whether having human moderators can or will ever solve all these problems of 
mistranslation considering the fact that the very processes of translation (whether human or 
techno-automated) remains a language that is always-already fraught with the contextual 
complexities of language and writing such as destinerrance.  
  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that regulation should be stopped; this would be absurd. 
Rather, I am presenting regulation and enforcement as a structural dilemma that puts 
different gatekeepers as regulators/enforcers in an irreconcilable position. Which is to say, 
human moderators and AI tools are all haunted by the same textual-structural conundrum. 
They cannot have a conclusive grasp of the targeted content in question. They cannot 
analyse, detect or apprehend extremism, radicalisation and incitement to terrorism with clarity 
and certitude.664 This is essentially an enactment of immanent hauntological logics, an 
automated depiction of the inescapable uncanny traces of writing still always return to haunt 
meaning.  
 
Recurring Con-textual/analytic complications      
  
Furthermore, the filtering of speech raises questions about the “criminal interaction order” 
(i.e., the commitment of individuals to commit crime when they interact with potentially 
criminal content online).665 Hence, criminal identities online are not essentially stable; they are 
in a state of digital drift, which makes them unpredictable to regulate, monitor and police. 
Filtering even becomes more fraught with complications when it has to deal with detecting 
foundational concepts like “non-violent extremism”, which by their undecidable/inscrutable 
meaning(s) makes it impossible for the authorities and regulators to assess, measure and 
detect the content in question empirically.666 Moreover, because radicalisation is a process, 
individuals can easily dis-embed or withdraw themselves from it. In any event, not everyone 
who reads extremist content becomes a terrorist or becomes radicalised. This accordingly 
complicates traditional causation and crime paradigms.667  
 
With inchoate crimes like incitement to terrorism, the causal link between reading and/or 
publishing terrorist material online and committing the crime of terrorism is absent. Even if 
there was a link, I doubt that such a link could be demonstrably/empirically measured. 
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Terrorism is a multi-dimensional dynamic668 that is not primarily driven by online “ideological”/ 
“speech” radicalisation. A blanket filtering of the content therefore seems unreasonable, it 
punishes individuals without having a causation/proximity element i.e., the requisite mens rea 
and actus reus for what they read (not necessarily what they think). Moreover, it perpetuates 
a culture of fear speculation and suspicion through “Pre-crime” thus engendering more pre-
programmed false positives (even from the point of view of human reviewers/moderators) and 
going against the requirement for reasonable grounds for suspicion under the UK’s Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.669 
 
It is also worth mentioning that blocking and filtering technologies also paradoxically yield 
symbiotic possibilities of invention, improvisation (for improvisation always occurs within limits 
and frameworks)670 and subversion. This view is reflected in the scholarship of commentators 
like Levine who has argued that writers or speakers can be “spurred on” by the impediments 
of censorship to innovate new styles of communication, which anticipate and bypass the 
calculable limits imposed by censorship.671 This suggests that there is a recurring tension or 
play of différance (through delays, deferrals and exclusions) that signals a shutting off of 
access to the law interminably. This means that regulation itself can be undermined and can 
undermine itself both from within and without for there is a play of différance between those in 
the know and those in the dark. Eva Horn observes that the power/control/regulatory dynamic 
of inclusion/exclusion generates a “secrecy effect” that prevents silence.672 This secrecy 
effect in turn triggers a public ad infinitum discussion, suspicion and speculation on whatever 
information is withheld hence initiating a counterproductive over-abundance of 
communication.673 Like with Foucault’s Freudian observation that in modern society, 
repressed sexuality is discussed endlessly, the repressed secrets of censorship becomes 
endlessly talked about undermining the very notion of fixity, stability and control on the part of 
the regulator, –– “revenants pass through walls”.674 
 
Indeed, even in the most repressive regulatory regimes, with the most technologically 
advanced filtering system in the world, “closed off words” still give rise to a regeneration, a 
bypassing and an invention of infinite textual possibilities based off of those very closed off 
words. Hiruncharoenvate for instance, has shown how digital activists employ non-
deterministic homophones of censored keywords to avoid detection by keyword matching 
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algorithms on Chinese social media/online communication websites.675 Meg Jing Zeng 
underscores a relevant practical example of such non-deterministic circumvention wherein 
Chinese women and feminist activists on social networking websites like Weibo use the 
hashtag #RiceBunny as a substitute to the  #MeToo campaign.676 With #RiceBunny, users 
manipulate emojis (+ pictographs and homophones) of rice bowls (which sound “Mi”) in 
addition to emojis of bunny heads (which sound “Tu”) hence creating (Mi +Tu = #MiTu / 
#MeToo) in order to avoid censorship and detection by the software and the authorities.677 
 
Because homophones like #RiceBunny are or were not pre-determined by the software (and 
its designers) they create new unprogrammable situations for censors. These new 
unforeseen homophones can stay up on the Internet undetected three times longer than their 
censored counterparts. Consequently, in a play upon play of meaning, the cancelled-out or 
excluded other returns to the fore. It subverts the “logical systematicity”678 of that which seeks 
to censor it in a timely fashion by “determining its conditions of existence, fixing at least its 
limits, establishing its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and 
showing what other forms of statement it excludes”.679 In this regard, online censorship (as a 
form of negative-writing or cancelled out writing) from the very beginning (by ascribing or 
inscribing différance) creates the possibilities for a reverse-play of power or counter-power 
situations. As I have already noted in chapter one, such reversed speech acts and utterances 
are performed in irreducible guises that divert from pre-established and pre-determined 
linguistic speech norms.680 These irreducible heterogeneous guises are always already 
present from the outset “invaginating”681 texts/code as well as speech in a hermeneutic circle 
inseparably structured by a double contrary motion.682 Thus, in such a movement, words 
(even closed-off, cancelled-out words) are appropriated by subjects to conjure up historical, 
present and futural meanings and uses –– even those for which they were never intended. 
These methods of anticipating and bypassing the calculable limits imposed by filtering and 
blocking have become more widely disseminated and are now easier to use meaning that the 
futural possibilities for intertextual plays on meaning are incalculable. 
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What this means from the point of view of regulation is that the Internet creates an 
incalculable absence/presence, an unheimlichkeit uncanniness or impression that frustrates 
the regulatory and repressive structure of the singular archive, or the familiar/familial/filial 
whole that seeks to impose order by deleting it. Therefore, in a kind of ineluctable 
catachresis, excluded or closed off words inevitably inhabit an encrypted dystopic space of 
power, a space of incomplete powerlessness (encoded secretly already on the inside) that 
always already returns to haunt the very processes of predetermined meaning, closure, 
spatiality and regulation. 
 
Moreover, these very social networking websites sometimes undermine their own censorship 
efforts by providing inbuilt privacy-enhancing features such as closed groups that 
paradoxically engender the proliferation of extremist content and allow readers and 
consumers of extremist content to associate with each other clandestinely. This can be done 
even with simple inbuilt technological tools measures (such as secret groups, pseudonyms, 
passwords, encryption tools as well as a automatic sharing-systems of sentiment analysis)683 
that enable users to bypass or circumvent and undermine calculable filtering and blocking 
procedures. In this sense, programmed online communication technologies corrupt, co-
implicate, compromise, overwhelm, and circumvent their own systems of regulation and 
censorship in an incalculable textual movement of “unprogrammable play” ––reinscribing yet 
again a bind or tether of différance.   
 
It cannot be stressed enough that this “unprogrammable play” is spectral that it is almost 
automatically uncontrollable. This is to say, “unprogrammable play” it imbues online texts and 
speech with the uncanny capability to gravitate underground, to the dark web where it then 
becomes uncontainable. On this very point the Facebook policy manger states thus:    
 
Online generally? […]. There is clearly going to be somewhere else online for 
terrorists to take advantage of, like the dark web etc. It is going to be like a game of 
cat and mouse trying to stop these people. But can we continue to improve and 
reduce the amount of terrorist content online on major platforms that the vast majority 
of Internet users spend their time on? I think we can, we can get better and better 
and better at that. Can we completely eliminate it? –– you know?684 
 
In light of this, it is clear that the circumventing of blocking/filtering leaves a considerable 
undecidable/unknowable reopening for content that incites terrorism. This is an intractable 
dilemma. Filtering does not and cannot completely pre-empt the information disseminated by 
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terrorists or extremists let alone address the material causes and triggers of 
radicalisation/extremism/terrorism.  
 
Freedom of expression, discrimination and otherisation  
 
To show how the emancipatory capabilities of the right to freedom of expression are 
diminished by blocking and filtering, I turn to the work of communications and public opinion 
scholars who show that “when individuals believe their views differ from the majority” they 
become less willing to disclose their political views.685 This argument is based on the premise 
that illegalised/criminalised content is usually non-majoritarian and it challenges 
normative/monolithic political structurings. Accordingly, if individuals at a political or religious 
discussion in the real world or online are aware of the fact that they are being monitored that 
their interactions and speech is being observed for particular radical or extremist trigger 
words such as “jihadi” they withdraw, disengage. In this act of coerced subjection and self-
disengagement, individuals sacrifice their rights and opinions in fear of being suspicious, in 
fear of being profiled as dangerous “extremist” others. Stoycheff substantiates this view in a 
2016 study on the chilling of speech,686 where she shows that filtering and blocking practices 
lead to a significant chilling effect on speech because they trigger conformist or normative 
behaviour.687  
 
Additionally, that speech published online leaves traceable digital footprints indexed to other 
rights like digital and informational privacy (unlike real world speech) suggests that individuals 
will even be more paranoid and hesitant to speak online. This in essence forecloses the 
validation of their right to freedom of expression hence limiting their individual 
agency.688Arguably, these individuals will be more paranoid simply because their views are 
not given room for the articulation further more information about how and why such speech 
is taken down or filtered remains opaque to online users.689  
 
In this regard, the inevitable discussions and disagreements about what is offensive, 
extremist or acceptable in a democratic society and within public debate are disappeared and 
disavowed.690 Whilst, the censorship of speech may have valid national security aims, one 
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could equally argue that it is also detrimental to freedom of expression individual autonomy 
and pluralism or plurivocality of a democratic society. This is because through its exclusion of 
what it determines to be dangerous for national security (e.g., through notions like “British 
values”) state censorship is likely to espouse an overrepresentation of an 
insular/exclusive/monolithic liberal-utilitarian691 culture that is lacking in its ability to 
accommodate difference or “a critical openness” 692 to the speech of the other. 
 
Filtering and hauntology   
 
Broadly speaking, filtering does the work of shutting off in order to ensure propriety, 
conformity and homogeneity. The very mechanism of filtering rests on its ability to “name”, 
“classify” and categorise certain forms of speech (e.g., as “unequal”, “irrational” or 
“extremist”) so as to shut them off. In this prior system of naming and classifying, as Derrida 
has shown, there is an originary or prior violence that comes suspended before the law.693 
This pre-eminent exclusion in many cases does not seek to understand the nuanced 
complexities and entanglements of situations. It cauterizes, it labels, and it blacklists and in 
doing so, it reinforces hierarchies/territories ––it shuts off. This pre-eminent violence in 
naming means that content is excluded for its difference and its “otherness”. However, in a 
play upon play of différance, the cancelled out other always returns to the fore to 
subvert/haunt the “logical systematicity”694 of systems that seek to censor it, by “determining 
its conditions of existence, fixing at least its limits, establishing its correlations with other 
statements that may be connected with it, and showing what other forms of statement it 
excludes”.695 Thus, online censorship (as a form of negative-writing or cancelled out writing) 
from the very beginning (by ascribing or inscribing différance) creates the possibilities for a 
reverse-play of power or counter-power situations. Such reversed speech acts and utterances 
are performed in irreducible guises that divert from pre-established and pre-determined 
linguistic speech norms.696   
  
In a frustrated effort to deal with this subversiveness as well as the inadequacy caused by the 
fugitivity of speech and its heterogeneity, filtering and counter-terrorism mechanisms tend to 
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fall back into the spectral logics of the banopticon in a vicious cycle that exacerbates fear 
aggressivity and hostility.697In this banoptic mode, which is a pre-shutting off of positions, 
even human rights positions, become more entrenched rather than flexible and reflective,698 
their structure becomes more suited to postponing the justice indefinitely, exceptionally.699As 
scholars like Hall700 and Said701 have argued, this “naming”/“otherisation” and the fear and 
anxiety of speech that we can not bear (within which it functions) is reinforced endemically 
(consciously and unconsciously) through pre-history, historical conjectures, the practices and 
sentiments of the media, politicians, law enforcement, institutions and the public in a complex 
feedback loop of rationalised pre-command and pre-control  – through the “banopticon”,702 for 
purposes of security and public order. This banopticon is autoimmune in the sense that in as 
much as it depends on the authority and power of the sovereign and the authority of law, it 
also works against these very structures and inadequates or undermines them interminably. 
Thus, a blurry zone or an auto-compulsive negative feedback loop703 of precarity is 
endangered where (in the interests of a pre-calculated liberal-utilitarian means-oriented 
justice) the rights and selfhood of certain individuals are subordinated or truncated as they 
are seen as impending threats to the sovereign. Within the context of post-9/11-7/7 online 
speech regulatory paradigms, this blurry zone inflects a predefined racialised 
assemblage704 which disproportionately restricts the speech of Muslims both online and 
offline.   
 
To illustrate this briefly, it worth considering the case of Mohammed Umar Farooq, a 
postgraduate student in “Terrorism, Crime and Global Security”, who was wrongly classified 
as a radical terrorist following from the Prevent Duty. Although the Mohammed Umar Farooq 
incident occurred offline, it could have easily occurred online through filtering under the 
Prevent statutory duty, which requires “relevant higher education bodies” to monitor IT 
equipment so as to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.705 In fact, in early 2017, 
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King’s College London introduced a notification on its email login page for students and staff 
members informing them that they were consenting to having their emails being “monitored 
(possibly filtered) and recorded”.706 Consequently, Mohammed Umar Farooq’s incident helps 
to illustrate the possible implications of censorship and filtering on freedom of expression and 
minority groups both online and offline. On 23 March 2015, Mohammed Umar Farooq (MF), 
was approached by two members of staff whilst in the library at Staffordshire University. The 
three had a brief discussion initiated by one of the female staff members touching on 
(polarising and subjective) issues such as Islam, homosexuality, the Islamic State, Sharia, 
British values and democracy.707 After the conversation, one staff member noticed that the 
conversation raised too many red flags and decided to report the student to a security guard. 
The staff told the security guard: “There is a man, who is Asian and with a beard, who is not a 
student and is reading book on terrorism”. The member of staff also went further to 
say, “check him out”, as she suspected he is a “radical terrorist”.708 A short while later, a 
security guard approached MF claiming that he had received a complaint from staff members. 
MF was deeply offended and filed an internal complaint. In MF’s internal complaint, he asked 
the staff members why they had questioned him. The staff members refused to answer any of 
the questions.709 MF’s case highlights how individuals from minority groups are censored and 
monitored wrongly (even by humans) based on their difference or alterity. 
 
Due to the recurring climate of fear that already exists with extremism in the post-9/1-7/7 
continuum, it is concerning that Prevent, in a manner similar to section 57 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000,710 obfuscates the distinctions between fear, Islamophobia, extremism and 
radicalisation. This in the long run is susceptible to creating a liberal-utlitarian attitude of 
calculation and suspicion in which individuals are pre-cauterised (and red-flagged based on 
the difference of their speech) regardless of whether or not they commit or are capable of 
committing terrorist-related offences711 hence contributing to a systematic culture of 
stigmatisation, marginalisation, and exclusion of “othered” forms of expression. It is no 
wonder thus, that it has been recommended in a recent court of appeal decision ––R (on the 
application of Salman Butt) v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department 712 –– that 
section 26 of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 be expressed in less trenchant 
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terms so as to ensure that decision makers make better balanced, accurate, and less 
“presumptive” decisions when assessing whether or not speech is of an extremist nature.713 
 
Moreover, these foregoing problems of interpretation and enforcement are exacerbated and 
haunted by structural and material inequalities from the real world. MacKinnon observes that 
moderators (and algorithmic designers) “who play the roles of lawmakers, judge, jury, and 
police all at the same time of such content”714 have a distinct culture (predominantly 
middleclass, male, western and white) that is not reflective of the broader diversity, plurivocal 
and subtle complexities of subjective experiences (race, sex, gender, class, literacy as well as 
language, amongst others) that form the views of the average “global” internet user in the 




The enforcement and interpretation of incitement to terrorism offences follows a particular 
regulatory logic that already assumes a univocal clarity or determinability of meaning and 
interpretation as to what speech offences mean. Understandably, the aim of this is to make 
offences easily identifiable and apprehendable in an almost calculable manner. But when we 
probe the nature of these online speech offences (e.g., “terrorism” and one could also include 
the concepts of “obscenity” as well as “hatred”) and indeed the nature of the technologies that 
are used to identify apprehend and impede these offences it becomes clear that we 
encounter an inescapable and indeterminable obfuscation an autoimmune motion within their 
very structure that undoes their stability. We are thus faced with a dilemma, an 
insurmountable challenge, wherein regulation is indispensible yet also counterproductive from 
both an enforcement/technological and legal/human rights perspective. This is an 
irreconcilable conundrum.715 
 
At any rate, the aspects of regulating online communications technology in the context of 
incitement to terrorism are inextricably linked to an infinity of memories and cultures i.e., the 
religious, philosophical, juridical, and so forth”.716 As such they cannot simply be expressed 
with clarity, accuracy, stability and perfectibility. Indeed online communication technologies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 Ibid, Para 172-177; See also: HM Government, Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and 
Wales: Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism, available at: < 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4459
77/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf > p.4 
714 Mackinnon, R. Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom (Basic 
books, 2012) p. 154 
715 See Transcript C  
716 Derrida, Force of law p. 947 
                                                                         	  
165	  
are essentially “textual mediums” always embedded within an iterable and disseminatory 
ecological process of writing and communication. They are ever in an iterable process of 
speech making. Which is to say, they are contaminated with all the recurring problems and 
vulnerabilities of communication hence creating unknowable or undecidable gaps in 
hermeneutic interpretation/translation/containability and regulation. All these gaps of 
autoimmunary backfire if taken together, reveal a phantasmic “nonhorizon of knowledge”,717 
an unintelligible “other” meaning i.e., (a “powerlessness to comprehend recognise, identify, 
name, describe, foresee”)718 that interminably haunts speech regulation online.  
 
With respect to regulatory ethics, this interminable haunting or undecidability is not completely 
meaningless in a nihilistic sense. Rather, its very impossibility infers that there is always-
already a reversible possibility, an “imperceptible “contact, juxtaposition, porosity, osmosis, 
friction, attraction and repulsion,”719(i.e., an inevitable intractability to every decision of 
regulation that requires an impossible kind of faith, a transgressive responsiveness),720as well 
as a relationality to the other that can only be measured in our “inability to read” 721 and attune 
to the unforeseeable plurivocality of their call in order to “negotiate the dangers and pleasures 
of the worlds they encapsulate and explode”.722 I attempt to elaborate how this re-negotiation 
of relationality or transgressive responsiveness could be done using the notion of “the ghost 
dance” in chapter five.  
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Chapter 4  




The human rights issues this chapter is concerned with are those provided under the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which has been incorporated in UK law under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The rights under focus in this chapter are those that are engaged by 
the incitement to terrorism provisions discussed previously in chapters two and three.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter is broadly interested in probing two interrelated questions, namely: 
 
1) What ethical723 and human rights issues arise when trying to identify, apprehend and 
contain speech that incites terrorism? 
2) How does and how could human rights law sustain the ethical-theoretical tension of 
having to ensure a justifiable balance between countering speech that incites 
terrorism on the one hand and the right to freedom of speech and its related rights on 
the other considering that human rights law operates within an irreconcilable aporia of 
subjectivity vs. subjection?     
  
This chapter is for the most part subjunctive or perhaps hypothetical in the sense that it draws 
from freedom of expression decisions that are (not actually, but rather) loosely connected to 
the notion of incitement. Thus, it attempts to imagine how courts would conceptually interpret 
incitement to terrorism decisions. This is done for two reasons: 1) because the very concept 
of incitement to terrorism is drifting, elusive and contestable there are – and may be – wide 
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variances with regard to what may be considered incitement to terrorism, and 2); because 
there is a dearth of case law under the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with regard 
to cases pertaining especially to speech that incites terrorism.724 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In part I of this chapter, I look at the interpretation of fair 
balancing principles under the Convention (i.e., the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality 
and the margin of appreciation) and how they apply generally to the right to freedom of 
expression. In part II, I look more specifically at the right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the Convention. Part III looks into how other related rights to freedom of speech 
under the Convention  (i.e., Article 7, Article 9, and Article 14) are correspondingly shaped by 
restrictions on art 10. Part IV gathers together the foregoing analyses from parts I, II, and III to 
assess how they affect human rights considerations more generally.  
 
Part I: Interpretive principles under the Convention  
 
Alongside the guidance provided by the wording of particular provisions in the Convention, 
the process of interpretation is governed by a number of interpretive principles. Some of 
these principles are sharply distinct from each other, while others interlink. Generally, 
however, these interpretive principles appear to converge into an interpretative framework 
that focuses on a fair balance of competing rights i.e., where private rights are calibrated 
against public rights. Although these principles provide interpretive clarity and flexibility to a 
certain degree, they also paradoxically engender complex interpretational entanglements that 
place limits on individual rights especially in scenarios where individual rights are balanced 
against competing public interests. In this sense, they form a kind of overlapping/conjugated 
proscribing alliance with the incitement to terrorism criminal law provisions discussed 
previously in chapter two. Ultimately, this presents difficult questions with regard to their role 
in proportionately balancing the right to freedom of expression. 
 
In light of this, it is important to address some of the fair balancing principles that underpin the 
balancing approach. The next sections therefore look at different Convention mechanisms or 
principles within human rights that are invoked under the calculus of fair balancing to limit 
human rights. Consequently, in the next sections I look at the principles of subsidiarity, 
proportionality, the margin of appreciation and the notion of derogation. 
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Subsidiarity can be defined as a principle that requires each social and political group to help 
smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends without, however, arrogating 
those tasks to itself.725 In the context of this discussion subsidiarity plays out when 
transnational courts defer to national courts in order to avoid having an overbearing juridical 
influence on them and to allow for a more informed kind of decision-making. Indeed, 
provisions in the Convention suggest that the role of the Court in Strasbourg is only 
subsidiary to that of member states. Article 13, of the Convention, which embodies the 
principle of subsidiarity provides: 
 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
In addition to Article 13, Article 1 provides: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in s I of this Convention”.726 
This also confirms that the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the 
guaranteed rights and freedoms is with the national authorities. 
 
Further, under Article 35, applicants are required to consult with and exhaust all domestic 
enforcement procedures before petitioning the Court. At any rate, subsidiarity means that 
domestic institutions are under an obligation to try to remedy alleged human rights violations, 
but in resolving such disputes states and domestic institutions are advised to follow their own 
local arrangements. 
 
It should be noted that the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality is also related to the 
Court’s margin of appreciation doctrine. All these principles favour governance and 
jurisdiction at national level rather than transnational level.727 In the following paragraphs, I 
show how the subsidiarity principle operates and how it has been applied in practice. As 
mentioned earlier, because precise formulations of subsidiarity are hard to predict (owing to 
the inescapable vagueness of incitement to terrorism and the wide variety of expressions it 
already inscribes) this section presents a general exploration of the subsidiarity principle in 
relation to the right to freedom of expression and its interplay with public order offences.  
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When the subsidiarity and indeed proportionality principles are applied in the context of the 
right to freedom of expression, it becomes apparent that the state will enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation that can be justified on the grounds of preserving and protecting public interests 
such as the rights of others in a democratic society. To demonstrate this, I turn to Hogefeld v. 
Germany.728 This decision concerned the restriction of speech of a former member of the Red 
Army Faction (RAF), a left-wing “terrorist” movement that was responsible for numerous 
attacks on personalities in the 1970s. The applicant had been approached for a number of 
interviews but the Frankfurt Court of Appeal barred her from being interviewed by press and 
radio journalists. She consequently argued that her right to freedom of expression within the 
meaning of Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. The question for the ECtHR in this 
case was whether or not the German domestic authorities had pursued a legitimate aim in 
limiting the applicant’s speech.   
 
The ECtHR noted that terrorism by the RAF had been a major threat to national security and 
public safety in Germany for more than 20 years and that fighting terrorism, which included 
taking preventive measures against the recruitment of members and supporters for terrorist 
organisations, was a legitimate democratic interest of every State. The fact that the applicant 
had been a former member of the RAF and one of its main representatives therefore, meant 
that the restrictions imposed on the applicant's right to freedom of expression was 
proportionate and pursued a legitimate aim in accordance with Article 10(2) of the 
Convention.  
 
Although not necessarily an incitement to terrorism case, the very blurry, ambiguous or 
indeterminable nature of “incitement to terrorism” demands that we briefly touch on the 
decision in S.A.S v. France.729 This case concerned a French national, born in Pakistan who 
wished, of her own volition, to wear a burqa (full-body covering with a mesh over the face) 
and niqab (a full-face veil with just an opening for the eyes) in public. In October 2010, the 
French Parliament passed a law that made it a criminal offence for persons to wear clothing 
that veiled their faces in public places. The law was introduced because the government 
considered that facial concealment in public places was contrary to the French Republican 
value of fraternity and because it undermined a degree of “civility that was necessary for 
social interaction”.730  
 
Consequently, the applicant submitted that the law violated her right to respect for her private 
life (regarding her desired appearance) under Article 8 and her freedom to manifest her 
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religious beliefs guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. On assessing whether the law 
was necessary in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber stated: 
 
 […]. As regards Article 9 of the Convention, the State should thus, in principle, be 
afforded a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extent a 
limitation of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs is ‘necessary’.731 
 
Acknowledging the role of the principle of subsidiarity, the Court held that there was no 
breach of the applicant’s rights as France could justify the restrictions legitimately as they 
protected the rights of others by preserving the French social value and significant public 
interest concern of “living together”.732 In other words, “living together” was a crucial public 
interest concern that allowed for and justified a truncation of individual rights in this situation. 
Hence, it gave the state a varyingly amenable, wide and exceptional degree of discretion in 
certain matters (especially in “matters of public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a 
democratic society, particularly between opposing groups”)733 a degree of wide exceptional 
powers susceptible to rendering specific minority viewpoints and forms of expression of 
individual rights discardable and persuasively so.  
 
SAS is significant because inasmuch as it shows that subsidiarity allows national authorities 
to exercise judicial caution and circumspection when balancing rights, it also reveals an 
underlying tension and susceptibility of balancing to lead to an irresolvable situation where 
individual rights are at the discretion of national authorities. Thus from the outset, the 
“national aspect or “constitutional order” – [remains] privileged, prominently in the 
foreground.734 This potentially presents an irresolvable structural and epistemic tension 
particularly between the national understanding of rights and a universal understanding of 
rights.735 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that commentators like Carozza have suggested that subsidiarity 
calls into question rights considered “fundamental”, “universal”, and “human”,736 as it 
ultimately gives states the final say in how to assess rights limitations based on their 
particular socio-political concerns. Granted, rights remain protected by the sovereign state, 
this is important. But the very fact that they could at the same time be indeterminably limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Ibid Para 129 
732 Ibid Para 17 
733 Lautsi & others v. Italy [2011] ECHR 2412 Para 60  
734 Sauvé J.M, Subsidiarity: a two-sided coin? Seminar organised by the European Court of Human 
Rights (30/01/2015) p.11 available at: < 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_Seminar_JMSauv%C3%A9_ENG.pdf > 
735 See Trotter, S. ‘Living Together’, ‘Learning Together’, and ‘Swimming Together’: Osmanoğlu and 
Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017) and the Construction of Collective Life, Human Rights Law Review, 
Volume 18, no 1 (2018): 157–169 
736 Carozza, Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international human rights law 
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or “overstretched” by the state on its own terms as, “it sees fit” contradicts the very values of 




Generally, proportionality involves an inquiry into the balance between the benefit gained by a 
restrictive measure and the loss suffered by an impact on the right in question.737 The overall 
aim of proportionality is to protect certain individual, fundamental interests – not only from 
arbitrary state power, but also from collective interests.   
 
Proportionality is most relied upon in situations where the Convention expressly allows for 
restrictions of rights. Thus, for qualified rights i.e., rights stipulated under Articles 8-11 of the 
Convention, there are exceptions such as “is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others”.738   
 
In these instances, proportionality has to do the difficult double aporetic work of ensuring that 
state/public interests are secure without violating individual rights. This is to say, 
proportionality denotes the need (by the state) to contain and it thereby functions as an 
internal limitation. To do this, proportionality employs calculi such as “the legitimate aim” of a 
given restriction, together with its interrelated concepts or calibrations of legality, necessity, 
and foreseeability.739   
 
These calculi of proportionality have been applied in decisions like Okçuoğlu v. Turkey740 to 
protect individual rights from interference by the state. In Okçuoğlu, Mr. Okçuoğlu participated 
in a round table discussion. His comments were later published in an article entitled the past 
and present of the Kurdish problem. He was imprisoned for these comments and later 
required to pay a fine, under a law protecting national security and preventing public disorder. 
Okçuoğlu argued that his right to freedom of expression had been infringed upon. He also 
argued that the wording section 8 of the 1991 Act (which proscribes dissemination of 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the State) was vague and allowed for disproportionate 
interferences with his individual right to freedom of expression.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Barak, A. Proportionality: constitutional rights and their limitations (Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Barak, A. "Proportionality and principled balancing." Law & Ethics of Human Rights 4, no. 1 
(2010): 1-16; Lazarus,L, McCrudden, C, &  Bowles, N. "Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial 
Engagement." (Hart 2014) pp31-113 
738Articles 8-11 of the Convention  
739 n.734 
740App No 23536/94, [1999] ECHR 42 
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In arriving at its decision, the Court applied a proportionality test wherein it looked at the 
interference in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the impugned 
statements and the context in which they were made. Determining whether the restriction was 
“proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the 
national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”,741 the Court found that the 
interference by a public authority with the applicant's right to freedom of expression was 
proportionate because it was prescribed by law and pursued a necessary legitimate aim, 
namely the protection of the national security and territorial integrity of the State, and the 
prevention of words that have the potential to exacerbate national security situations. In citing 
Okçuoğlu, I am not interested in showing whether or not a limiting of Okçuoğlu’s rights was 
justified in this case but rather, I am interested in showing the implications such a decision 
has for proportionality. This is to say, that when limiting speech (as in Okçuoğlu), 
proportionality intends to contain the expected harms that accrue from such the harmful 
speech at issue. However, the mere fact that speech harms are not necessarily clear, 
because they are empirically indeterminable or non-identifiable (owing to the very iterable 
nature of speech and of terrorism and of incitement) suggests that harms attributed to speech 
can correspondingly be drawn changeably.742 The threat becomes non-identifiable and so 
does the very concept of proportionality. In this regard, a “vague suspicion” that an individual 
could have crossed the line from legitimate expression to glorifying, or “inciting terrorism”  
(even when that individuals speech is peaceful) 743 could be drawn (as a proportionate action) 
especially in a time when the threat from terrorism is palpable yet spectrally 
incalculable/interminable as is the case with the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. 
 
The implications of such a reading of proportionality is that it ultimately operates within a 
liberal-utilitarian calculable logic that seeks to make separate distinctions between what is 
harmful and what is not harmful for the liberal utilitarian purposes of utility, deterrence and 
means-oriented justice. But in times of palpable fear and precarity proportionality undergoes 
an autoimmunary invasion wherein schematic legal distinction becomes a biopolitical 
operative mechanism (galvanised by the force of law) that calculates a means oriented justice 
of deterrence and yet fails to distinguish peaceful political speech or dissenting political 
speech from actual terrorist violence. And so under the arithmetic of proportionality an ethical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Ibid Para 61 
742 Endicott, T. Proportionality and Incommensurability in Huscroft G, Miller BW and Webber, G 
eds. Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 
2014);Tsakyrakis, S. "Proportionality: An assault on human rights?" International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 7, no. 3 (2009): 468-493; Urbina, F. J. "A critique of proportionality." Am. J. Juris. 57 
(2012): 49 
743 Webber, F. Apologists for terrorism: dissent and the limits of free expression Institute of Race 
Relations (29/01/2015) available at: < http://www.irr.org.uk/news/apologists-for-terrorism-dissent-and-
the-limits-of-free-expression/ >  
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and conceptual slippage of “non-harm” as harm occurs aboundingly.744 An example of this, as 
Webber notes, is where expressing support for Palestine becomes equated (over- 
determinedly) with a support for terrorism,745 or even where support for other human rights 
concerns like anti-deportation or unlawful imprisonment or socialism or animal rights become 
equated with terrorism as has happened in the UK at times.746  
 
Because at its core proportionality engages public/private trade offs, and because it requires 
an assessment of whether or not the limitation of a right impairs the right, it is worth noting 
that it is applied contextually and thus inconsistently. In trying to preserve the interests of 
freedom and security of the public majority, the rights and freedoms of those individuals with 
minority viewpoints (even when these viewpoints are harmless) can be truncated in a manner 
that goes beyond the aims being pursued.747 This occurs inevitably because proportionality 
confers states with a wide margin of appreciation in reacting to speech and public order 
situations.    
 
Moreover, the very inconsistent and indeterminable nature of terrorism means that the kinds 
of speech the state may consider harmful, threatening or violent are never absolutely clear. A 
body of human rights law and public order cases suggests that minoritarian forms of 
expression748 always-already run a high risk of being curtailed because they tend to be 
presupposedly marked as harmful or disruptive to the normative status quo or the established 
liberal-utilitarian order. In this regard, liberal-utilitarian speech restrictions remain 
irreconcilably haunted by or exposed to the self–inadequation of an impossible yet 
presupposed capture or closure. This is the working of an autoimmunary “force of law” that 
uses the language of freedom, rights, security, necessity, and balancing to justify subjection 
and curtailment by the state sovereign.   
 
I make this point not to condemn speech restrictions tout court but to further problematise 
them by stressing that they are anchored to a large extent on a calculated conceptual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 I want to suggest that such a slippage is autoimmunary, and is an inescapable mark of hauntology, 
of haunted speech and of its spectral hermeneutics: n.37 
745 n.740 
746 Consider for example the case of the Stansted 15 immigration protestors who blocked the runway of 
a Boeing 767 secretly chartered by the Home Office and were consequently convicted of terrorism 
offences at Chelmsford crown court: Iqbal, N. Stansted 15: ‘We are not terrorists, no lives were at risk. 
We have no regrets’, The Guardian (16/12/2018) available at: < 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/16/migrants-deportation-stansted-actvists> 
747 Carne, G. Brigitte and the French Connection: Security Carte Blanche or A La Carte’9 (2) Deakin 
Law Review 573, 613-14(2004) 
748 Many forms of expression (see my discussion of seditious libel and blasphemy in chapter two) have 
been deemed to be harmful even when they do not present an actual verifiable risk, threat or harm.  
Read together, these cases (e.g., Gough v. United Kingdom (2015) 61 E.H.R.R. 8) suggest that 
proportionality can side with sovereignist inclinations and ossify entrenched positions of public order that 
are determined by national narratives of morality and normative speech.  
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undecidability, which is the very force and condition of law. Understanding this presents us 
with an aporia stemming from the fact that speech restrictions under proportionality are 
inchoate and presuppositional, in the sense that they purport to contain in-calculable harms 
accruing from speech acts that are “yet to come”.749  
 
All this being said, the very indeterminable nature of speech restrictions under proportionality 
does not render the law helpless or illegitimate. In fact, this indeterminability is the very 
condition of the law, which is to say that all law needs a degree of undecidability in order to 
deal with future anticipated events.750 It is therefore not surprising that there is also a degree 
of variance with regard to readings of proportionality. And so, inasmuch as there are 
instances where the state’s (or majority) stance on what is harmful is sustained under 
proportionality and rightly so (as in Soulas & others v. France),751 there are also more delicate 
scenarios, where what the state may deem to be harmful may not in reality be harmful and 
thus proportionality is used as an intervention in order to protect the interests of socio-political 
minoritarian speech.752 
 
To briefly illustrate this latter “otherwise” approach, I turn to Sürek v. Turkey (No 4).753  Here, 
the applicants (the major shareholder and editor of a weekly Turkish political review were 
convicted by a security court of disseminating propaganda against the indivisibility of the 
state, following publication of an interview with a PKK leader and a joint declaration issued by 
four left wing groups. As such, both the applicants were found guilty, sentenced to six months’ 
imprisonment and fined.  
 
Their appeals to the Turkish court of cassation were dismissed and their sentences 
confirmed. They then applied to the Commission, complaining that their convictions 
constituted an infringement of their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Commission held, granting the applications, that while the convictions and 
sentences were accepted to be violations of the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 10, the infringements were prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of 
protecting national security, territorial integrity and the prevention of crime. However, the 
convictions and sentences were disproportionate to those aims in that they exceeded what 
was necessary in a democratic society. For the Commission, proportionality had to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 See also Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC] (1999) Application nos. 25088/94 & 28331/95 
750 I elaborate more on this tension of undecidability or indeterminability in chapter five  
751 Application no 15948/03 (2008) 
752 Malik argues that even in scenarios where proportionality protects human rights, proportionality is 
first and foremost concerned with managing/policing public order rather than in ensuring the rights and 
protection of minorities. In this sense even though it protects minorities it first and foremost prioritises 
the legitimacy of the state: Malik, M. Extreme speech and liberalism In Hare, I and Weinstein, J. (eds) 
Extreme speech and democracy (OUP 2009) pp.96-120 
753 [1999] 7 WLUK 160; 7 B.H.R.C. 339 
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considered against the background of the case as a whole, particularly in view of the role of 
the press in a political democracy and its role in disseminating information and ideas. Thus, in 
the instant case, the PKK leader's interview did not, taken as a whole, reveal an incitement to 
violence or hatred. In imposing the convictions and the sentences the security court had had 
insufficient regard to the public's right to know the views expressed by the PKK leader. Thus, 
there had been a violation of Article 10.  
 
A similar interpretation to Sürek (No.4) has been taken in Ceylan v. Turkey, where an article 
written by a trade-union leader described the Turkish military operations in the South East as 
“state terrorism”, “genocide” and “bloody massacres” and called for a reaction from the 
democratic forces of the nation. Here, the Court, pointing out the importance of political 
speech, found that “the article in question, despite its virulence, did not encourage the use of 
violence or armed resistance or insurrection” and accordingly registered a violation of Article 
10. It is fair to say that Sürek (No.4) and Ceylan are similar to Hogefeld in the sense that they 
all concern the containment of speech that could have incited terrorism. However, the 
outcome of the decisions against the respondent states (i.e., Turkey and Germany) is 
markedly different, which suggests that the court’s position with regard to the respondent 
states shifts and is not always consistent.754 This conflicting approach in interpretation is 
complex and difficult to grasp and a thorough analysis of it is not possible here. Such an 
analysis has already been done by scholars like Londras who claim that the ECtHR’s 
conflicting approach –– regarding the different states (i.e., Turkey and Germany) –– is due to 
the fact that Germany qualifies as a “high-compliance state” and Turkey does not.755 In this 
regard, the ECtHR has “a lot to lose if states begin to question its legitimacy.”756 Hence, it 
prefers to appease and defer to states with its decisions particularly those concerning 
contentious questions like terrorism. In this sense, the principle of proportionality leaks into, 
and remains inseparable from the principles of subsidiarity and of the margin of 
appreciation.757   
 
Notwithstanding, what remains clear is that determinations and interpretations of 
proportionality are variable and inconsistent. Owing to this inconsistency, we are then pushed 
to consider the question of whether restrictions of rights freedom of expression under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
754 E.g., the Court’s decision in Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) significantly departs from Surek no 4. In Sürek 
(No.1) the applicant was prosecuted for the publication of two readers’ letters harshly criticising the 
Turkish military operations in the South East. The ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 10, as: “the 
impugned letters amount to an appeal to bloody revenge by stirring up base emotions and hardening 
already embedded prejudices which have manifested themselves in deadly violence.  
755 Heinze, Hate Speech and democratic citizenship, pp.70-78 
756 de Londras & Dzehtsiarou, Managing judicial innovation in the European Court of Human Rights, p.7  
757  See Bank Mellat v. HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39 para 70-71: [T]he Strasbourg court recognises 
that it may be less well placed than a national court to decide whether an appropriate balance has been 
struck in the particular national context. For that reason, in the Convention case law the principle of 
proportionality is indissolubly linked to the concept of the margin of appreciation.  
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proportionality are compliant with the principle of legality. In determining legality the court will 
also examine the necessity of the restrictions and the gravity of the relevant restrictions or 
their legitimate aims. Furthermore, the Court also places emphasis on the fact that restrictions 
must be narrowly interpreted, as necessary. This reasoning has been established in Observer 
v. United Kingdom758 where publishers, editors and reporters of the Guardian and the Sunday 
Times complained that the granting of interlocutory injunctions restraining them from 
publishing extracts from Peter Wright's book Spycatcher (a memoir containing confidential 
information about the national security services, MI5, that would likely comprise national 
security) contravened the freedom of expression provisions contained in Article 10 of the 
Convention. The key point of interest in this case (particularly in relation to proportionality/the 
severity of the restrictions at issue) is that the interlocutory injunctions were deemed to be 
disproportionate and unnecessary after 29th April 1987. Indeed, it was found that the 
injunctions were intended to be temporary measures and because they had been in force for 
a longer time period, the particular risks to national security had changed and the injunctions 
thus ceased to be necessary. Observer stipulates that legal measures should not be severe 
i.e., that they should not foreseeably exceed (both in terms of duration and gravity of 
enforcement) the risks they seek to contain. Thus, restrictions should, for example, not 
prohibit discussion or dissemination of the information received pertaining to political 
discussion even if there are serious doubts about its veracity and reliability.759   
  
What is significant about Observer is that it focused on the requirement that restrictions 
should be proportionate i.e., “necessary in a democratic society” and it did so within the 
context of national security considerations. The court was of the view that the circumstances 
in which the information was published (i.e., whether or not the publication presented a 
foreseeable risk to national security) should be taken into consideration to ensure 
proportionality. And although a proper balance of proportionality is hard to achieve in the 
context of national security and terrorism owing to the very unforeseeability760  (i.e. 
extensiveness, and overdetermined scope) of these concepts and owing to the fact that the 
circumstances in which terrorism occurs or is likely to occur are also unpredictable, one could 
still argue that the notion of reasonableness as emphasised in the House of Lords decision in 
R (Laporte) v. Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary761 provides some hypothetical 
guidance with regard to how such unforeseeability could be navigated.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 [1992] 14 E.H.R.R. 153 
759 See also Salov v. Ukraine (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 51, Application No.65518/01  
760 Current incitement to terrorism offences are so conceptually overdetermined that they potentially 
catch forms of speech that do not necessarily incite violence but are merely contestable. It is also worth 
mentioning that Duffy and Pitcher draw our attention to the fact that the lack of definition of national 
security is noted in the Observer case. Duffy, and Pitcher, "Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression 
and the Limits of the Law p.369 
761 [2006] UKHL 55 
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Although not an incitement to terrorism case per se, R (Laporte) points to a scenario 
concerned with a speech/public order offence (an offence that could also be drawn under the 
overarching notion of incitement to terrorism) and is thus relevant to this discussion. In R 
(Laporte), the House of Lords allowed an appeal concerning the right to freedom of 
expression of an anti-war protestor who had been prevented by the police from attending an 
anti-Iraqi war protest at an RAF airbase. The Lords were of the view that such prevention was 
unlawful and an unreasonable interference with the exercise of her rights of freedom of 
expression and assembly protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. Crucially, in R 
(Laporte) a link was made between the speech in question and its proximity to harm or 
imminence. Because no harm had yet occurred mere anticipation of a real possibility was not 
enough based on the evidence of the case. In this regard, there was no reasonable 
apprehension of an imminent breach of public order and thus it was held that the restriction 
on Laporte’s rights was disproportionate.  
 
R (Laporte) is a significant case for our discussion. Its requirement for “imminence” as a form 
of “reasonableness” infers a potentiality for the correction of the deficit of clarity and 
foreseeability in the law. It also provides crucial guidance on how proportionality can be read 
in public order situations as it potentially narrows the scope and severity of the speech 
restrictions at hand. R (Laporte) shows that in as much as there is an element of 
undecidability in this area of the law owing to the extensiveness of it, there is still an 
improbable potentiality for elsewhere interpretations that allow for the possibility of 
interpretations that are more open to the unanticipatable heterogeneity of the other. I come to 
this later. In any event, the notions of necessity and legitimate aims undergird all calculated 
evaluations of proportionality but these evaluations are hard to predict foreseeably because 
they in effect seek to contain the incommensurable. Thus, we cannot predict readings of 
proportionality with certainty. 
 
Margin of appreciation 
 
Like with proportionality, the doctrine of a margin of appreciation plays a salient role in fair 
balancing under the Convention. Fundamentally, the margin of appreciation functions on a 
liberal–utilitarian calculus that seeks to accord states with a nation-specific latitude or 
discretion when restricting rights and carrying out their functional duties.762 The term “margin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 For a more comprehensive analysis of the margin of appreciation, consider Yourow, H. C, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Kluwer Law 
1996); Legg, A. The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and 
Proportionality (OUP 2012) 
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of appreciation” first appeared in 1958 in the Commission’s report in the case brought by 
Greece against the United Kingdom over alleged human rights violations in Cyprus.763  
 
In the context of speech that incites terrorism, the margin of appreciation becomes relevant 
because it plays a crucial role in an assessment of how the right to freedom of expression is 
limited, in the sense that it allows states to provide reasons that justify speech restrictions. 
Here, I look at some speech specific instances that illustrate this operation. My starting point 
is Handyside v. UK.764 In Handyside, a publisher purchased British rights to The Little Red 
Schoolbook; a Danish book aimed at a readership of children and adolescents aged 12-18 
written by Søren Hansen and Jesper Jensen in 1969 that discussed sexuality. In the UK, the 
book became subject of extensive press comment, with mixed reactions with regard to its 
liberal attitudes towards sex. Summonses were issued against Handyside for having in his 
possession obscene books for publication for gain. Handyside ceased distribution and 
advised bookshops accordingly. At trial, Handyside was found guilty of possessing obscene 
publications for gain and ordered to pay costs. His appeal was dismissed. For the ECtHR the 
issue in Handyside concerned whether or not Handyside’s conviction under the Obscene 
Publications Act was justifiable under Article 10(2) as a constraint on the right to freedom of 
expression on the grounds of the protection of morals. The ECtHR held that there was no 
violation of the applicants’ Article 10 rights. Invoking the doctrine of a margin of appreciation, 
the court stated that: “By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of 
their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge 
to give an opinion on the exact content of those moral requirements as well as on the 
necessity of a restriction or penalty intended to meet them”.765    
 
What is significant in Handyside is that the Court does not get into a particular determination 
of the merits and disadvantages of censoring the speech in relation to rights protections 
under Article 10. Such a determination is left to the states (under the margin of appreciation) 
as they are in the best situation to calculate and determine what is necessary, or harmful, and 
what is not. The issue here however is that such a flexible position766 exposes the aporia of 
singularity v. incommensurability and exaggerates (through a hyperbolic appropriation of the 
force of law)767human rights law’s inability to limit the harms it seeks to contain on a much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
763 The Cyprus Case (Greece v. the United Kingdom) (1958-59) 2 Yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 172-197 
764 Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom (1976) Application No. 5493/72  
765 Ibid Para 48 
766 Flexibility is double-edged and obfuscating. It can be used to limit rights but it can also be used to 
protect rights. Yet again, this tension exposes us to the aporia of subjectivity vs. subjection that is 
inescapably inherent within all human rights law. My discussion in this section privileges subjection over 
subjectivity.  
767 Derrida, Death Penalty p.72 
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wider scale.768 This in turn makes human rights restrictions more susceptible to being applied 
in a homohegemonic and discriminatory fashion by the sovereign and other relevant public 
authorities.769 Indeed, such an aporia is apparent in the ways in which the margin of 
appreciation permits wide discretions (e.g., with regard to the “protection of morals”, or 
“tolerance”) and does not challenge the law at issue, even when the law is arguably 
misconceived in the sense that it is inchoate and intends to calculate harm before it occurs. In 
this sense the limits imposed by the margin of appreciation become a sovereignist calculation 
justified by a kind of utility of securitisation or deterrence that achieves an ends-oriented 
justice that always already eschews an unanticipatable and unprogrammable justice770 that is 
attuned to the heterogeneity of the other. 
 
Moreover, in some instances as evinced in Greece v. UK,771 the margin of appreciation is 
applied somewhat generously i.e., in a manner that sidesteps the doctrine of proportionality.  
It appears that with the margin of appreciation, the Court gives credence to the fact that “… 
the Government concerned retains, within certain limits, its discretion in appreciation of the 
threat to the life of the nation”. Thus, by potentially equipping states with a carte blanche to 
extend the application of the law and its thresholds into unknown contexts, without an 
application of the limits imposed by proportionality, the margin of appreciation allows for a 
drawing and reinforcing of homo-hegemonic boundaries of moral normativity and propriety. In 
this sense, the margin of appreciation starts to embodies the monopolistic qualities of the 
force of law that lead to an incalculable censoring of heterogeneous forms of expression like 
jokes,772 or cartoons,773 or statements of political dissent774 that may in no verifiable way 
undermine democracy, public safety, order, or morals.   
  
An example of such censorship occurs in Chorherr v. Austria.775 Here, Chorherr 
demonstrated peacefully during a military ceremony to commemorate the 30th anniversary of 
Austrian neutrality and the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II. During the ceremony 
the applicant together with a friend distributed leaflets calling for a referendum on the 
purchase of fighter aircraft by the Austrian armed forces. The leaflets in question carried the 
slogan “Austria does not need any interceptor fighter planes”. During the distribution of these 
leaflets, there was a commotion amongst the spectators whose view was blocked. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 Webber, Grégoire C The negotiable constitution: On the limitation of rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) pp. 90-100 
769 Even if human rights restrictions were to be applied under strict notions of legality, like the rule of 
law, such a notion of legality would still be recursive, self-affirming and tied to a particular liberal-
utilitarian monolithic geographical conceptualisation of law and the sovereign.  
770 For Justice exceeds law and all pre-calculation, and not by simply opposing law. 
771 Cyprus case (Greece v. The United Kingdom 1958-1959) 
772 See my discussion of Chambers above 
773 See my discussion of Leroy below 
774 See my discussion of Abdul above & Chorherr below 
775 (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 358, Application No. 13308/87 
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applicant was thus arrested for breach of the peace. Chorherr’s appeal was dismissed by the 
Austrian Constitutional Court on the basis that his arrest was aimed at putting an end to his 
breach of the peace. Chorherr consequently submitted an application complaining that his 
arrest and detention violated his right to liberty contrary to Article 5 of the Convention and that 
his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 was unjustly interfered with. In 
determining whether there was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court applied 
the margin of appreciation and in doing so it considered whether the interference complained 
of could be regarded as “necessary” in a democratic society. It was held that that inasmuch 
as public order offences have to be relatively broadly defined there must be an objective. The 
objective in this case was to ensure that reasonable and appropriate means could be used by 
the public authorities to ensure that lawful gatherings could take place as peacefully and as 
necessary. Because the applicant’s behaviour was beginning to engender a commotion 
among the spectators who wished to attend the parade peaceably and was likely to escalate 
his arrest and detention was necessary. Thus, for the court, the restriction was not excessive 
and had not overstepped the margin of appreciation. Like with Handyside, the decision in 
Chorherr suggests that in every freedom of expression rights balancing scenario, states had a 
licence to limit the right justifiably based on their peculiar contextual needs. In this sense, the 
margin of appreciation mirrors and amplifies the subsidiarity role of the Convention, which 
grants states a sole self-defined discretion as necessary with regard to the protection of 
human rights.   
 
I want to stress that the state having a sole-defined discretion does not always mean that a 
state will abuse its margin of appreciation. Indeed, the ECtHR will sometimes require under a 
quality of law test that a national law provide safeguards against arbitrary 
application.776Moreover, the European Commission for Democracy through Law argues that 
unrestricted state power runs contrary to the rule of law and that laws must indicate the scope 
of the discretion that they afford to the state to protect against arbitrary application. And so, in 
certain situations, such a sole-discretion will require and for the state to adequately and 
appropriately protect the rights of others in a society as demonstrated in decisions like Jean-
Marie Le Pen v. France Application. Which is to say, the margin of appreciation can indeed 
have convenient motivations such as the protection of the rights of others in a society as 
demonstrated in decisions like Jean-Marie Le Pen v. France Application777 and Féret v. 
Belgium.778 I outline the facts in Le Pen and Féret briefly below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 Consider e.g., Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom Application no. 4158/05 where the court held 
that the law must provide safeguards against arbitrary application so as to meet the quality of law 
requirement. 
777 (2010) Application No. 18788/09  
778 (2009) Application No 15615/07  
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In Le Pen,779 the applicant who was president of the French “National Front” party was 
convicted for incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence towards a group of people on 
account of statements he had made about Muslims in France in an interview with Le Monde 
where he stated among other things, that “the day there are no longer 5 million but 25 million 
Muslims in France, they will be in charge”. The applicant argued that the conviction breached 
his right to freedom of expression. The Court was of the view that, the applicant’s comments 
had certainly presented the Muslim community as a whole in a disturbing light and that they 
were likely to give rise to feelings of rejection and hostility. For the Court, the reasons given 
by the domestic courts for convicting the applicant had thus been relevant and sufficient. The 
Court found that the interference with the applicant’s enjoyment of his right to freedom of 
expression had been necessary in a democratic society. 
 
In Féret,780 the applicant, a Belgian member of Parliament and chairman of the political party 
Front National/Nationaal Front in Belgium was convicted of incitement to racial discrimination 
for disseminating leaflets that had slogans like “Stand up against the Islamification of 
Belgium”, “Stop the sham integration policy” and “Send non-European job-seekers home”. 
Here, the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention because 
the applicant’s comments had intended to arouse feelings of distrust, rejection or even hatred 
towards foreigners, especially among less knowledgeable members of the public. His 
message, conveyed in an electoral context, had carried heightened resonance and clearly 
amounted to incitement to racial hatred. The applicant’s conviction had been justified in the 
interests of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others, namely members of the 
immigrant community. A restriction of such speech was thus of the utmost necessity.   
 
Evidently, Le Pen and Féret show that limitations on speech can be convenient in the sense 
that they can suppress speech that seeks to disrupt the security and welfare of others 
especially those from marginalised groups. But such determinations of speech do not always 
come to a reasonable decision insofar as marginalised groups are concerned. Indeed, as I 
have argued throughout this thesis the very liberal-utilitarian nature of law can also lead to a 
pre-determined foreclosure of minoritarian forms of speech even when they are harmful. We 
therefore have a conceptual aporia or penumbra (i.e., of subjectivity vs. subjection) wherein 
the margin of appreciation can be used to “protect” minoritarian individuals  – albeit in a 
somewhat paternalistic mode – yet at the same time it can be used compulsively to 
symbolically mark the limits to which minoritarian viewpoints can be expressed or tolerated 
in public discourse.781  
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780(2009) Application No 15615/07  
781 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting the contested uses of Islam within public 
discourse in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. Islam can be used to potentialise liberal-utilitarian norms. On 
the one hand it can be used to criminalise certain expressions of Islamophobia. On the other, it can be 
used to punish certain gestures that are read as Islamic/radical/terrorist. All these parameters are 
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Such a reading in my view suggests that the margin of appreciation is ultimately anchored to 
a liberal-utilitarian calculus or system of calibration that seeks to preserve “poetic processes” 
of pre-calculating “imaginative geographies”782 in a way that disavows, assimilates and 
subsumes the unbearable and differentiated alterity of the other through an interminable bind 
of différance. Indeed, a fair assessment of legality might be impossible. But (regardless of 
whether an assessment of legality is fair or not),783in the context of terrorism related crimes, 
such an assessment will always already function within an economy/transaction/social 
contract of means-oriented liberal utilitarian imperatives justice based on utility and security of 
the sovereign. Put simply, as Benvenisti observes, national courts as always already remain 
the best judges of their particular situations and hence the final authority on their assigned 
margin of appreciation.784 To this end, the Court can abstain from evaluating the decisions 
made by national authorities as to whether there has been a violation of the individuals’ rights 
seeing as arguments in favour of human rights protection advanced by transnational 
International human rights organisations to correct some of the states’ inadequate rights 
assessments785 would be given little credence. 
 
Furthermore, from a practical/ law enforcement point of view, the wide margin of appreciation 
accorded to states could create a crisis of undecidability and indeterminability by widening the 
reach of speech offences connected to incitement to terrorism. This could potentially 
undermine the intended efficacy of law enforcement, as it will have placed way too much 
power in one direction, through an interpretive broadening of the scope of a state’s margin of 
appreciation, almost by default, even without the need for a declaration of a state of 
emergency under Article 15.786   
 
Although my discussion here has observed that the margin of appreciation tends to favour the 
sovereign’s sole-defined (“almost by default”) position of what constitutes necessity or 
pressing need, it is instructive to note that there are still situations where the Court can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
calculated by the state in a compulsively repetitive hauntological modality. Thus, the state's idea of 
Islam itself can be read as a discursive object that is deployed to differentiated (but self-
same/monologic) calculated ends e.g., the schema of subjectivity v. subjection that is used to 
distinguish, contest, and adjudicate the citizenships and rights of others. See e.g., Razack, S. 
"Geopolitics, culture clash, and gender after September 11." Social Justice 32, no. 4 (2005): 11 
782 Said, Orientalism  
783 Such an assessment of fairness would still be aporetic and self-inadequating because it would still 
irretrievably function within the logics of subjectivity v. subjection.  
784 Benvenisti, E. Margin of appreciation, consensus, and universal standards. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 31 
(1998): 844 
785 The ECtHR is limited in how far it can be innovative owing to a number of factors like: the status of 
the state in question and the political significance of the rights at issue. See de Londras, F. & 
Dzehtsiarou, K. "Managing Judicial Innovation in the European Court of Human Rights." Human Rights 
Law Review 15, no. 3 (2015): 523-54; Dothan, S. "Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human 
Rights." Chi. J. Int'l L. 12 (2011): 115 
786 Ibid: de Londras and Dzehtsiarou, see also Agamben, State of Exception 
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challenge a state’s margin of appreciation. These situations arise when the ECtHR decides 
that national authorities have not remained within their limits. The dissenting opinion of judge 
Mosler in Handyside intimates this. It emphasises that restrictions should only be applicable if 
they are necessary and proportionate. Judge Mosler stresses that because Article 10 is so 
valuable for every democratic society, its limitations “must be examined from every aspect 
suggested by the circumstances”.787  
 
Thus, in a decision like Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs und Gubi v. 
Austria788 which concerns the determination of whether the restrictions on the distribution of a 
critical magazine, Igel to soldiers violates Article 10 rights, the Court decided that such a 
restriction exceeds the margin of appreciation. This for the Court was inter alia down to the 
fact that the contents of the articles were not constitutive of a serious threat that undermined 
military discipline as they were not hostile but of a “critical approach” and “satirical nature”.789 
What is conceptually significant in Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs 
und Gubi is that the Court abjures law’s liberal-utilitarian calculus of means-oriented justice 
and security and instead attunes itself to justice and the iterable and heterological nuances of 
speech such as its inherent ability to have divergent/plurivocal meanings like satire and 
critique. In this sense the Court problematises the state’s homohegemonic and liberal-
utilitarian calculations of harmful speech.  
 
All in all, despite the fact that ambiguities and structural limits are inscribed, encoded and 
inaugurated within the margin of appreciation, it is still important to stress that there is always-
already a radical potentiality for an “otherwise” incalculable reading of the margin of 
appreciation that goes beyond the state’s homogenous conceptualisations of speech and 
monolithic sensitivities even within overdetermined limits. This potentiality immediately 
indicates that human rights determinations are already incomplete, that they also call for the 
need for a shift toward an improbable “elsewhere” or “otherwise” that could hold out for the 
promise of an unanticipatable justice of the other beyond liberal-utilitarian scales of utility and 
deterrence as means-oriented justice. I explore the horizons of this “otherwise” register briefly 
in my reading of some of the cases in this chapter but I discuss them in greater detail in 
chapter five through the notion of the ghost dance. 
 
Part II: Article 10 and related rights under the Convention  
 
Having discussed the core principles applied when carrying out fair balancing, it is worth 
looking more closely at the rights engaged by incitement to terrorism by drawing from case 
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788 (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 56, Application No. 15153/89 
789 Ibid Para 79 
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law examples in order to see how the fair balancing principles are articulated i.e., how the 
courts execute interferences with rights. In the following section I look at Article 10 of the 
Convention, the primary right engaged by speech that incites terrorism. In addition, I also 
consider Article 7, Article 9 and Article 14 of the Convention as potential supplementary and 
interrelated rights at issue. 
  
1) Article 10 
 
Art 10 of the Convention provides: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
The tensions between terrorist speech and freedom of expression are complex. This is 
because the right to freedom of speech provided under Article 10 is not an absolute right but 
rather a qualified right. Hence, it has restrictions prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democracy that are tethered to it under Article 10(2). National security is one of these 
restrictions and it encompasses terrorism. Thus, if limitations on the right to freedom of 
expression are proportionate and legitimate they can be used to interfere with the right to 
freedom of expression. It must be shown that the interference in question was necessary in a 
democratic society for one or more of these exceptions. The problem however, is that the 
very nature of the justifications for the restrictions at play (e.g., national security) are 
indeterminable. This as we shall see has the potential to inscribe unpredictable and 
inconsistent readings with regard to the proportionality and legitimacy of the restrictions at 
issue. In the following paragraphs I analyse a number of case law decisions so as to 
enumerate this textual and conceptual problematic.  
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In Zana v. Turkey790 the applicant Mehdi Zana, a Turkish citizen and former mayor of 
Diyarbakir was charged for making the following remark: “I support the PKK national liberation 
movement; on the other hand, I am not in favour of massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, 
and the PKK kill women and children by mistake”.791 On 30 August 1987 the “press 
offences” department of the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office began a preliminary 
investigation in respect of the applicant, among others, on the ground that he had “defended 
an act punishable by law as a serious crime”. Accordingly, the applicant was charged with 
supporting the activities of an armed organisation, the PKK, an “armed organisation” under 
Article 168 of the Criminal Code. Following the applicant's conviction and sentence by the 
Turkish courts, he argued amongst other things that the conviction was an “interference” with 
his exercise of his freedom of expression. This point was not contested. The question for the 
court was whether or not the applicant's conviction amounted to an interference with Article 
10(1). 
 
In answering this question, it was held that there was no breach of the applicant’s Article10 
rights. The court was of the view that the applicant’s statements had been made at a time 
when serious disturbances were raging. That the applicant’s statement was published in a 
major national daily newspaper meant, from the point of view of the court, that it was likely to 
“exacerbate an already explosive situation”. Consequently, it was justifiable for the national 
authorities to take the measures they took as part of the fight against terrorism and 
maintaining public safety and order. The interference therefore pursued a legitimate aim.  
Further, the court held that it was within a state’s margin of appreciation to ascertain whether 
a fair balance has been struck between the individual’s fundamental right to freedom of 
expression and a democratic society's legitimate right to protect itself against the activities of 
terrorist organisations. 
 
In Leroy v. France792 the applicant Denis Leroy, a French a cartoonist, working for various 
local publications, including the Basque weekly newspaper Ekaitza, was convicted for inciting 
terrorism (l'apologie du terrorisme) following the publication of a drawing which concerned the 
attacks of 11 September 2001. On 11 September 2001, the applicant submitted to Ekaitza’s 
editorial team a drawing depicting the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre – 
its four skyscrapers collapsing in a cloud of dust having been struck by two aeroplanes – with 
a caption parodying the advertising slogan of a famous brand (“Sony did it”). The caption 
went thus: “We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it”. The drawing was published in the 
newspaper on 13 September 2001. In its next issue, the newspaper published extracts from 
letters and emails received in reaction to the drawing. The public prosecutor brought 
proceedings against the applicant and the newspaper’s publishing director on charges of 
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791 Ibid 
792 Application No. 36109/03 
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complicity in condoning terrorism. In January 2002, the court convicted them of these charges 
and ordered them to pay a fine of EUR 1,500 each, to publish the judgment at their own 
expense in Ekaitza and two other newspapers and to pay costs. In September 2002, the Pau 
Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. In particular, it held that: 
 
[…] by making a direct allusion to the massive attacks on Manhattan, by attributing 
these attacks to a well-known terrorist organisation and by idealising this lethal 
project through the use of the verb ‘to dream’, [thus] unequivocally praising an act of 
death, the cartoonist justifies the use of terrorism, identifies himself through his use of 
the first person plural (‘We’) with this method of destruction, which is presented as the 
culmination of a dream and, finally, indirectly encourages the potential reader to 
evaluate positively the successful commission of a criminal act.793 
 
The French court of cassation dismissed the main part of an appeal on points of law lodged 
by the applicant. Leroy consequently lodged an application with the ECtHR on 12 November 
2003. According to the Court, the interference with the applicant’s right was prescribed by 
French law and pursued legitimate aims, like the maintenance of public safely and the 
prevention of disorder in the aftermath of a highly significant terrorist attack. Having regard to 
the modest nature of the fine imposed and perhaps, more importantly the context in which the 
impugned drawing had been published, the Court found that the measure imposed on the 
applicant had not been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, it was 
held that there was no violation of Article 10.  
 
What is striking in Leroy is the fact the courts all had a unanimous opinion regarding the 
impact of the applicant’s cartoons. From the point of view of the government, the cartoons 
imposed a predominantly univocal impression on society and thus warranted an outright ban. 
Arguably, this reading is spectrally influenced by the sociogeny,794 or socio-cultural 
sensibilities of the French public and their phantasmic “affective sensorial” attachments to 
fear of death and destruction in the face of 9/11.This is evident in the fact that the court failed 
to appreciate the applicant’s own indicated intentions (i.e., his satirical Anti-American stance) 
and instead focuses on the impression made by the cartoon in “its dream of the demise of US 
imperialism”795 as a kind of expression of encouragement and support for terrorism.  
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http://cyberlaw.org.uk/2008/12/13/leroy-v-france-application-no-3610903-chamber-judgment-of-
02102008/> 
794 Wynter, S. "Towards the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, of 
“Identity” and what it’s like to be “Black”. National Identities and Sociopolitical Changes in Latin 
America (1999): 30-66. 
795 Leroy argued that his aim in drawing the cartoon was to critique US imperialism. He also highlighted 
that cartoonists illustrating actual events do not have much time for distanced reflection. 
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If we reconstruct the chain of events leading to this rather sensational decision (i.e., the fact 
that it occurred in the aftermath of 9/11 and it alluded to it) it appears that the Court was 
preoccupied with the transferential effects of speech and its “projected” links to terrorism 
based on its interpretation of the phrase “we have all dreamt of it”. These were links that were 
insinuated without a sufficient proof of liability in terms of harm. In this sense, the notion of the 
dream, which can be read as a psychic dream of interminable trauma in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks signifies a kind of palpable collective anxiety or terror from the viewpoint of the 
French public, a terror that is reminiscent of the public order offences of treason and sedition 
–– crimes that involve imagining the death of the sovereign as well betraying the (western) 
collective values and terms of “order” and “belonging”. In this regard, Leroy’s rights are 
intentionally limited in a desperate attempt to confront or counter such phantasmic/psychic 
reverberations of his speech. Thus, in a Hobbesian hauntological movement, harm to the 
collective/corporeal body or the sovereign (and its death or destruction) became the origin of 
the law.796 
 
Leroy should be read in contrast to Hashman v. United Kingdom.797 In Hashman the 
applicants blew a hunting horn and engaged in hallooing with the intention of disrupting the 
activities of the Portman foxhunt, which was a legal activity and thus interfering with the rights 
of others. A complaint was made on the grounds that the applicants’ actions disturbed the 
peace. The key question that was relevant for the court and for our discussion here was 
whether the applicant’s speech actions and their contra bonos mores 798 behaviour justified a 
restriction of their rights under Article 10. The Court held that there had been an unjust 
interference with the applicants’ Article 10 rights, as their behaviour did not amount to a 
breach of the peace. Crucial to the Court’s reasoning was the requirement of a degree of 
foreseeability. The Court was of the view that the applicants could not anticipate a risk of a 
breach of the peace based on their behaviour. Thus Hashman held that behaviour that 
is contra bonos mores was not enough for a restriction under Article 10.  
 
In addition to Hashman, another decision in contrast to Leroy worth touching on is Incal v. 
Turkey.799 Here, the applicant was a member of the executive committee of the Izmir section 
of the People's Labour Party, which requested permission to distribute a leaflet that criticized 
measures taken by the local authority and highlighted the existence of a “Kurdish” problem. 
By virtue of his participation in the decision to distribute the leaflet, Incal was convicted of 
disseminating separatist propaganda capable of inciting people to resist the government and 
commit terrorist offences. Relying, inter alia on Article 10 of the Convention, Incal complained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796 Derrida, J .The beast and the sovereign, Vol I (University of Chicago Press 2009); Hobbes, T, 
Leviathan.1651. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1968) 
797 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 241 
798 Contra bonos mores refers to “conduct which has the property of being wrong rather than right in the 
judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow citizens”: Ibid Para 13 
799 (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 449, Application No. 22678/93 
                                                                         	  
188	  
that he had not had a fair trial before the National Security Court and that his conviction 
infringed his right to freedom of expression. Consequently, the ECtHR held that unanimously 
that there had been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention and that the speech at issue if 
read in context, could not be taken as an incitement to the use of violence, hostility or hatred 
between citizens.800 The Court emphasised that in the interests of speech in a democracy the 
actions or omissions of the government had to be subject to close scrutiny and criticism even 
by public opinion. Thus, although the government had to keep hold of a dominant position 
that limited criticism it nevertheless had to make sure that its restrictions were not excessive 
and that a degree of pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness with regard to political and 
social speech was provided for,801 this was an essential factor to be taken into consideration 
by the Court. 
 
Both Hashman and Incal depart from Leroy in the sense that they infer that restrictions on 
speech ought to be not contingent on assessments of harm that are mono-logically projected, 
insinuated or conjecturally pre-calculated by the sovereign on the grounds of utility or 
deterrence –– for such determinations are hard to make owing to the very iterability of speech 
–– but that they should be assessed from a broader vantage point that undoes the logics of 
calculability, i.e., in a modality that is concerned with the heterogeneity and plurivocality of 
speech in a democratic society.802  
 
Accordingly, if read in the context of incitement to terrorism offences, Hashman and Incal 
would suggest interpretations on speech could be anchored on a more careful or considered 
scrutiny of the intentions, demands and contours of the speech of the other (i.e., on the 
heterogeneous contingent ethical, cultural, and political significations of such speech) rather 
than on conjectural hauntological projections that are hinged on what the majority of the 
population pre-calculates as what is wrong or harmful or politically acceptable.  
 
Significantly, as discussed earlier in this thesis, by requiring a more cautious requirement of 
foreseeability, the decisions in Hashman and Incal complicate univocal understandings of 
speech. Which is to say they problematise the view that speech is merely causal and 
determinable by intricately embedding speech within an on-going historical, socio-political and 
material backdrop. In this sense, they thus point us in a different interpretational direction that 
ensures that differences in viewpoints under Article 10 and indeed under all forms of 
expression are accommodated and not pre-constrained. 
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A right to receive information  
 
An oft-neglected component of the right to freedom of expression that requires our 
examination here concerns the fact that the right to freedom of expression provides for a right 
not only to impart information but also the right to receive information. Arguably, if this 
component were given more significance, limitations such as those seen to be justifiable in 
Leroy would have a lesser weight under the proportionality calculus for the reason that 
freedom of speech would cease to be a private right and would be interpreted more 
relationally i.e., as a complex process of intra and inter-communication between people. This 
argument, which seems to me to be convincing is articulated in the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Pettit and Judge Pinheiro Farinha in the Observer case:  
 
In this respect, there was a violation of the right to receive information, which is the 
second component of Article 10. To deprive the public of information on the 
functioning of State organs is to violate a fundamental democratic right. 
 
However, the majority of the Court concerned itself with the first aspect rather than 
the second. If the state believes that a publication puts at risk state secrets or 
national security, there are other procedural means at its disposal. If the state 
contests a failure to comply with the duty of discretion on the part of a retired civil 
servant, appropriate procedures are available. In the present case the state did not 
prosecute Mr. Wright. However, the United Kingdom should, by virtue of the positive 
obligation imposed by the European Convention, have secured the public’s right to be 
informed.803 
 
This dissenting opinion makes an interesting observation in as far as the regulation of the 
right to freedom of expression is concerned. Perhaps, if we viewed the right to freedom of 
expression on its public merits as a right to receive information, the liberal-utilitarian rubrics of 
the balancing calculus would change.  
 
That being said, both the information in question and the circumstances in which it is 
published are of crucial importance. As such, the balancing calculus would be applied in a 
highly malleable fashion in order to meet the exigencies and needs of the situation as 
provided for by law. But even within this space of flexibility, malleability, following R (Laporte) 
and Hashman it would still be imperative for laws that restrict speech to be applied in a 
reasonable and proportionate manner that is: 1) reflective of the immediate likelihood or 
imminence of the risk at hand and 2) demanding of the most careful scrutiny as established in 
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Sunday Times v. United Kingdom.804 The recurring conceptual problematic with such a 
formulation of balancing is that it is still grounded in liberal-utilitarian scales of utility, “scales 
without scales” of deterrence and well being like “necessity” that first conceptually 
prioritise/hierarchise the monolithic interests of the sovereign and function within an aporetic 
frame (of subjection v. subjectivity) that ultimately disavows the alterity of the other.805 
Furthermore, wide human rights interpretive principles and their restrictions potentially 
compound the practical challenges of speech regulation and enforcement in the sense that 
their widening of thresholds leads to a psychic lack and a corresponding increase in demand 
for enforcement and regulatory resources. This, as I have shown in chapter three, does not 
necessarily stop the dissemination of heterogeneous speech. Rather, it sustains and 
accelerates undecidability within the law, in the sense that it exposes laws and enforcement 
to an interminable instability that remains haunted by the very heterological difference and 
unprogrammability of speech. 
 
b) Freedom of expression online  
 
As much of my discussion so far has centred on the limits of speech in the real world, it is 
now important for us to consider freedom of expression online or digitally and how it is 
regulated in the context of incitement to terrorism. For this, I turn to Yildirim in order to 
unearth some of the implications of wide indeterminable speech restrictions.    
 
In Yildirim, the applicant, a Turkish national, operated a blogging website hosted by the 
Google Sites service, on which he published academic work and his opinions on various 
matters. On 23 June 2009 the Denizli Criminal Court of First Instance ordered the blocking of 
an Internet site whose owner had been accused of insulting the memory of Atatürk.806 The 
order was issued as a preventive measure in the context of criminal proceedings against the 
site’s owner. Although neither Google Sites nor Yildirim’s own site were the cause of these 
proceedings, the Turkish Telecommunications and Electronic Data Authority (TİB) 
responsible for implementing the order had needed to block sites.google.com entirely in order 
to block the offending site in particular because of technical issues. Accordingly, the criminal 
court granted that request. Yildirim complained that it was impossible for him to have access 
to his Internet site on account of a measure ordered as part of a criminal case that had no 
connection with his website. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, he claimed that this 
measure breached his right to freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 (1991) 14 EHRR 229 
805 Even when such a formulation protects the rights of the other, such a protection is always precarious 
for it is always already subject to being withdrawn in a paternalistic or brutal fashion. Hartman, Scenes 
of Subjection 
806 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey and was its first president. 
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Consequently, the ECtHR held that there had been a violation of the applicant’s freedom of 
expression enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention on the grounds that the Turkish 
government had not satisfied the burden of showing that the imposition of such a restraint 
was justified. The ECtHR emphasised that there must be a strict legal framework to ensure 
that the restriction of content online was not done ultra-vires. The Court was also of the view 
that the claimants must have access to judicial review procedure.807 
 
The decision in Yildirim is an emphasis and a re-articulation of the fair balancing principles of 
proportionality discussed above that yet again denotes similar standards of legitimacy to 
those defined above, namely:  
 
1) that interferences and collections of data in cyberspace should not be 
indiscriminate; 
 2) that they should have proper oversight and procedural safeguards and 
 3); justified within a democratic society i.e., any national legislation to that effect must 
be clear and precise and must provide sufficient guarantees of the protection of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of expression. 
 
Accordingly, filtering or censorship of content must be strictly limited in scope in line with the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. Lists of blocked websites together with full 
details regarding the necessity and justification for blocking each proscribed website should 
be published; –– an explanation as to why a page has been blocked should also be provided 
on a page that is substituted for the affected websites. It is worth noting that these standards 
have also been re-echoed by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression.808   
 
Invoking the judgment in Handyside, the UN Special Rapporteur stresses that the right to 
freedom of expression includes “views and opinions that offend, shock or disturb”.809 He 
indicates that restrictions on freedom of expression should not be applied to activities 
involving political debate; elections; human rights; government activities; corruption in 
government; peaceful demonstrations/political activities, including for peace or democracy; 
and expression of opinion, dissent, religion or belief, including by minorities/vulnerable 
groups). The Rapporteur also emphasises the need for clear and unambiguous laws as a 
basis for any censorship/filtering, to prevent arbitrariness. Additionally, the Rapporteur 
confirms that: (i) search engines and other intermediaries should not be required to monitor 
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their networks pro/actively in order to detect possible illegal content,810 and (ii); that it should 
be possible to challenge blocking and filtering orders before an independent and impartial 
tribunal and seek clarification and remedies.811      
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that there are limits to these prerequisites. For instance, 
these limits will not be applicable in situations where an individual’s online activities fall within 
the ambit of crime, as they will then have been already criminally “prescribed by law”. Thus, in 
situations where one posts illegal or unconstitutional content even if one does not intend to 
do, as was the case in Nix v. Germany812 where the applicant used the picture of the former 
SS chief Heinrich Himmler with the swastika (a Nazi totalitarian symbol) as an “eye-catching” 
device to protest against the practices of the local employment office, one still remains not 
exempt from criminal liability as such a restriction of free speech remains within the state’s 
margin of appreciation.813 Crucially, it should be emphasised that this is strictly a margin of 
appreciation issue that, as Vajnai v. Hungary 814 indicates, depends on the relevant state’s 
socio-political history. Therefore, such a restriction will rely on whether or not the state thinks 
that there is a clear pressing social need (or cultural memory) that justifies the limitation in 
question and whether or not the need is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   
 
Noteworthy perhaps, in the eyes of the ECtHR, is the fact that a legitimate aim pursued 
underpins the need to protect the rights of others. To this end, a legitimate aim pursued may 
take the use of national security regimes even without resorting to Article 15 as the decision 
in Hogefeld discussed above intimates. The state authorities would then have a legitimate 
democratic right as well as an incalculable discretion to protect the state against the activities 
of whom it defines as a terrorist. This is most likely to trump all other considerations in the 
interests of keeping the “peace”. But inasmuch as such a position may provide the state’s 
enforcement apparatus a broad discretion with regard to whom it goes after, it (rather 
counterproductively, in an autoimmunary logic) inscribes a layer of textual incoherence within 
the human rights interpretive principles, hence revealing how ambiguity becomes the very 
force of the law, but also the promise of an incalculable and unanticipatable justice that 
embraces the heterogeneity of the other as I show later in this chapter. 
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The right to freedom of expression online: Some online peculiarities  
 
Perhaps, the most problematic aspect of human rights insofar as Internet regulation is 
concerned is liability or human rights compliance of private Internet companies. This is an 
issue that is complicated by the status of ISPs and other Internet gatekeepers as private 
bodies (i.e., self-regulatory companies operating independently from the state) and not public 
bodies. It therefore becomes impossible for individuals to know whether or not they can make 
claims when their rights are infringed by ISPs and other internet gatekeepers because section 
6 of the HRA Act is only binding on “public authorities” i.e., persons “of whose functions are 
functions of a public nature”.   
  
Moreover, as I have suggested previously, ISPs are also potentially criminally liable under the 
incitement to terrorism provisions. They are obliged to assist the government in preventing 
crime and disorder or else face large fines and reputational ruin. Rather than make 
themselves appear as if they are endorsing extremist content, ISPs tend to co-operate more 
willingly with security services and the police (out of necessity) in the prevention and 
enforcement of terrorist-speech related crimes. It is this somewhat fuzzy process of 
extrajudicial co-operation between law enforcement (such as the CTIRU and online ISPs and 
content providers) that poses difficult questions with regard to transparency and adequate 
freedom of expression safeguards online. 
 
Because the process of speech regulation is rooted in a proscription of offences (such as 
glorification, encouragement, extremism) that are indeterminable, wide and finitely differing in 
jurisdictional representations and scenes of utterance, the offline regulatory challenges of 
undecidability are also transposed online through filtering, surveillance and blocking 
practices. Indeed, as I have indicated above, many of these practices are non-transparent, 
complicated by diverse cross-jurisdictional legal complexities, the destinerrant heterogeneity 
of speech (i.e., its potentiality to always return, spectrally, sometimes in an even more 
concealed way), as well as the lack of processes of judicial review and redress. This means 
(practically speaking), that the protective human rights standards articulated in Yildirim could 
still remain inaccessible, unpredictable and perhaps impossible to implement and enforce 
effectively in the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. And yet, as the Court stipulates under Article 7, the 
law must give the public the capacity to “foresee” the circumstances in which their right to 
speech might be lawfully infringed upon.815 Notwithstanding, in stark contrast to Yildirim, the 
decision in Delfi AS v. Estonia816 suggests that the filtering and NTD removal of third party 
user generated comments posted by readers that are perceived as offensive on an Internet 
news portal does not amount to a violation of the Internet users’ Article 10 rights. Crucially, as 
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a point of emphasis, in Delfi it was determined that the restrictions on the Article 10 rights 
were permissible because 1) they pursued the legitimate aim of “protecting the reputation and 
rights of others” especially considering that information posted on the Internet could 
potentially remain there indefinitely and cause much greater harm and 2); under a fair 
balancing test such restrictions were necessary in a democratic society.  
 
Delfi is a defamation case. But if we place Delfi within the context of incitement to terrorism, 
what it suggests is that ultimately a determination of whether or not restrictions concerning an 
offence (in this case incitement to terrorism) infringes on Article 10 is dependent on whether 
these rights protect the rights of others and on whether such restrictions are proportionate 
and necessary. Consequently, the benefits of the Internet –– especially its capability to 
expand the freedoms of speech and expression817 –– had to be balanced against “liabilities”, 
such as the uncontrollable spread of harmful speech.818 Delfi therefore suggests that Article 
10 rights restrictions by ISPs could be justified on determinations for the greater welfare of 
democratic society i.e., in favour of lesser harms to the general public in a democratic society. 
How such determinations are made however is hard to foresee given the cross-jurisdictional 
nature of the Internet and the ambiguous and divergent meanings of incitement as well as 
terrorism. 
 
In any event, what the decisions in Yildirim and Delfi suggest is that these decisions ultimately 
hinge on the interpretation of the Court (something again that this thesis cannot predict with 
clarity). There is thus a possibility for the Courts to rule such a decision conservatively, in 
favour of the protection of the rights and safety of others as in Delfi and to place extensive 
restrictions on certain forms of speech but crucially, at the same time, there is always a 
possibility for the Courts to rule such a decision more broadmindedly in favour of online 
individual speech rights as in Yildirim. To be clear, I raise this point not to conclusively say 
tout court that the law is unfair or misconceived, but rather to provide a deeper aesthetic 
critique of the very aporetic, textual and conceptual problematic (of reading or interpretation) 
that is immanent –– in a sort of double bind or “dialectical seesaw”819 –– within the law. I 
analyse this problematic as well as the significance and implications of its aporetic double 
movement later on in this chapter. 
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III: An analysis of Article 10 related rights  
	  
1) Article 9: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
 
Closely linked to the notion of freedom of expression (and indeed the right to freedom from 
discrimination) is Article 9. It thus merits an examination here. In this section, I approach 
Article 9 mainly from the stance that wide unclear laws can impose inadvertent legal limits or 
boundaries that can censor or prevent religious and political minorities from expressing 
themselves freely. My discussion here does not assume that Article 9 will always apply to 
incitement to terrorism. It merely extrapolates, which is to say that the very ambiguous nature 
of the incitement to terrorism offences suggests that Article 9 rights could still be at play in 
situations where incitement to terrorism is concerned.  
 
Article 9 of the Convention provides:  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.   
 
Like other rights discussed in this thesis, when there is a conflict between Article 9 and other 
competing rights interferences can be made for the purposes of tolerance and for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 9 thus is strongly rooted in the fair 
balancing principles. 
 
The key case in relation to Article 9 is Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria.820 This decision was 
concerned with the censorship of a film Das Liebeskonzil in the applicant association's 
cinema in Innsbruck on the ground that showing it would constitute the criminal offence of 
blasphemy because the film ridiculed God, Christ and Mary, central figures of the Catholic 
Church. The applicant association complained that these measures violated its right of 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The question for the 
Court was whether or not such a restriction was legitimate. In its decision, the Commission 
maintained that it was up to the domestic courts to interpret and apply the domestic law as 
they saw fit and that the private interferences by the state were justified on the general overall 
public grounds of coexistence and tolerance. The Court ruled that there was a “pressing 
social need for the preservation of religious peace” and that it was “necessary to protect 
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public order against the film,”821 since the film disparaged Roman Catholicism. The 
Commission following the margin of appreciation and the principle of subsidiarity was of the 
view that the state had absolute authority to apply the law as it saw fit it. In my view, this is a 
self-inadequating and misconceived approach because it perceives non-majoritarian opinions 
as potentially harmful. In its intent to contain harm, this liberal-utilitarian approach also in an 
autoimmune motion opens itself out to a heterogeneity (or excess) of incommensurable 
harms that it cannot contain. All this overdetermines the boundaries of harm and legality 
further hence making legal interpretation and enforcement self-inadequating and intractable.  
 
It is fair to say, and indeed important to note, that the facts in Otto Preminger are quite 
removed from cases that could be considered incitement to terrorism. Notwithstanding, the 
very ambiguity of the offence of incitement to terrorism and its indistinguishable criminal 
categories gives us the liberty to read Otto Preminger on comparable taxonomical grounds. 
Thus, if Otto Preminger is read in the context of incitement to terrorism, from the point of view 
of fair balancing it becomes clear that such a position can lead to a blanket censorship (and 
self-censorship) of varied forms of expression (such as harmless religious dress, humour, 
satire and ridicule, as in Leroy) from the outset, –– all in the aims of preventing the 
dissemination of harmful speech. This occurs because such forms of expression can pliably 
be reconstructed as constituting a “pressing social need” however vaguely defined. In this 
regard, non-majoritarian viewpoints or forms of expression become phantasmically 
formulated (i.e., based merely on conjecture or presupposition) in the sense that they project 
certain forms of speech as harmful even when such projections are spectral legal fictions that 
are uncountable, incalculable i.e., not empirically provable. Thus, with evaluations of harmful 
speech this empirical tension always remains.  
 
Another decision worth considering is R (on the application of Begum) v. Denbigh High 
School Governors.822 Here, the appellant a school appealed against the decision where the 
respondent a Muslim student had been unlawfully excluded from school for failure to comply 
with her school's dress code. Begum had wished to wear a jilbab to school, rather than a 
shalwar kameez as required by the school’s dress code. The school denied Begum from 
attending school in a jilbab. Begum maintained that the shalwar kameez did not comply with 
the requirements of her religion even if it was accepted by mainstream Muslims. The school’s 
complaints committee decided that the uniform policy satisfied the requirements of the Islamic 
dress code. There were three other schools in Begum’s catchment area where jilbab was 
permitted but Begum’s application to one of those schools was unsuccessful. The respondent 
argued that the other two schools were more distant. Thus, the respondent lost nearly two 
years of school before a different school accepted her. The House of Lords held that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 Ibid Para 52 
822 [2006] UKHL 15 
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school's refusal to allow Begum to wear a jilbab at school did not interfere with her right under 
the HRA 1998 and Article 9 of the Convention: “the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion” (which also corresponds to the right of freedom of expression) to manifest her 
religion and, even if it did, the school's decision was objectively justified given the 
circumstances under Article 9(2). The key issue of relevance for this discussion was whether 
or not the respondent’s freedom to manifest her religious belief by way of dress was justified. 
Like in Otto Preminger, it was held that Article 9 was not absolute and could be interfered with 
if there was a justification; as such Begum’s right to wear the jilbab was rejected. Begum, like 
Otto Preminger, displays a haunting fear or (in)sensitivity on the part of the Court with regard 
to its calculable predictions of “adverse repercussions” that such a uniform would have 
caused. Whilst this seems like a reasonable way of preserving a semblance of normative 
order and safety in its preservation of a harmonious coexistence it, in a rather aporetic vein, 
disavows Begum’s alterity in the sense that it cauterizes Begum as an impending “risk”, 
“threat”, or “disruption”, rather than an individual whose personhood and autonomy deserves 
an encounter of relationality on equal terms.823 
  
Like with Otto Preminger, in Begum, the Court misses an ethical opportunity to re-enchant 
human rights in a manner that moves beyond a provincialized restrictive liberal-utilitarian 
register and allows for a relationality to non–majoritarian viewpoints or forms of expression, 
something which could be argued, is better in the long run for the purposes of democracy and 
“living together”. This failure to read interpretive principles in a more relational mode comes at 
a potentially heavy cost. In the long run, it leads to a silencing of othered voices that are 
arguably necessary in contemporary plurivocal/cross-cultural societies. This silencing occurs 
within a mode that engenders a singular meta-narrative (based on the exclusive moral/socio-
cultural consensus or reason of the majority), a mode that tends to view the alterity or 
difference of the other as something anticipatorily disruptive, harmful or risky that needs to be 
surmounted or quelled.824 Whilst this may be an effective means of ensuring public order in 
the short run, in the long run, it most likely leads to an epistemic alienation, 
marginalisation825or racialisation of minoritarian viewpoints through undue suspicion or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 I explore how such an encounter of relationality could be imagined in the next chapter  
824 Benvenisti, E. “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and International Standards”, (New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1999) p. 851 
825 Although some western feminists may argue that the veil as form of expression is dehumaning and 
not a free choice, equally, non-western feminists like Sherene Razack and Arundhati Roy argue that the 
key problem here is one of coercion and spectral repugnance or desire/fear, “coercing a woman out of 
her burka is as bad as coercing her into one”. Thus the nature of the responses to Muslim women 
wearing the niqab ignores complex social-poliinterplayical issues (i.e., issues at the nexus of race, 
gender and geopolitics) in favor of lumping veiled Muslim women together, as a presupposed 
“threat” or “disruption”. Hence, it coerces them to yield (subjectivity v. subjection) to a western cultural 
imperialist gaze. See: Razack, A Site/Sight We Cannot Bear; Roy, A. Capitalism: A ghost story 
(Haymarket Books, 2014) pp.67-68; Furthermore, Fanon in “Algeria unveiled” uncovers the veil as a 
symbol of anti-colonial resistance that strikes fear in the mind of the coloniser. Fanon, F. “Algeria 
unveiled” In Decolonization, Routledge, 2004) pp.60-73 
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presumptions of guilt based on notions like “Muslims are risks and are at risk”,826 and is 
engendered when people are punished for what they think /believe even when their 
viewpoints pose no actual threat to a political-social order. Such a position overrepresents 
and oversimplifies a liberal-utilitarian meta-calculus of risk that tends to ignore the fact that 
speech is an on-going process of iterable discourse and dialogue between individuals.827 It 
eschews the fact that speech is a contested process without singular control, anticipation, 
exclusivity and purity,828 that demands for a scope of relationality (with the alterity of the 
other) so as to allow for an on-going mutual deliberation and mediation of relationality, 
heterogeneity, and difference.      
 
Notwithstanding, despite the fact that the aforementioned decisions tend to be reluctant to 
provide a space for relationality in their desire to preserve a normative status quo, it is worth 
noting that Article 9 also provides us with an “otherwise” reading that evolutively strays from 
the normative status quo and is more attuned to the alterity of the other. To illustrate this, I 
turn to the decision in Ivanova v. Bulgaria,829 where the applicant complained that she had 
been unfairly dismissed from her job because of her affiliation with a Protestant religious 
group called “word of life”. Here, the Court found that Government’s restriction of the 
applicant’s Article 9 rights was contradictory and ambiguous and that it constituted a flagrant 
violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of religion. Of significance in Ivanova, is the fact 
that the Court seemed to be attuned to the applicant’s relational particularity in relation to the 
exclusory violence (of subjection, subordination, assimilation and disavowal) embedded in the 
liberal-utilitarian logics of rights restrictions. Indeed, by focusing on the applicant’s non-
majoritarian religious particularity, and on the fact that the applicant had been “alienated”830 
by the school (through its coercive demands on her to renounce her religious beliefs in order 
to keep her job), the Court in a movement of justice rightly read upheld the applicant’s 
personhood and selfhood stating that the applicant had undergone “significant public 
prejudice” and experienced “feelings of distress helplessness, and emotional suffering” as a 
result of her Article 9 rights violations.831 This decision is important because it moves away 
from calculations of harm and in an “otherwise” interpretation of justice attends 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 Heath–Kelly, C. ‘Counter-­‐‑terrorism and the counter-­‐‑factual: producing the ‘radicalisation’ discourse 
and the UK Prevent strategy’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2013) 15:3, 394-­‐‑
415; Harcourt, B. E. Muslim Profiles Post-9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counter-Terrorist 
Measure and Does It Violate the Right to be Free from Discrimination? (Law & Economics Working 
Papers, University of Chicago 2006) available at: 
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/329/> 
827  Murray, A.D. Internet Regulation in Handbook on the Politics of Regulation Levi-Faur, David 
(ed) (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) p.277 
828 Ramshaw, Justice as improvisation, p.53 citing Landgraf, E. Improvisation as Art: Conceptual 
Challenges, Historical Perspectives (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011) 
829 Application No. 52435/99 
830 Ibid at Paras 31 and 81 
831 Ibid Para 95: A similar ethical reading to Ivanova happens in Eweida v. UK where the Court pays 
attention to the applicant’s selfhood.  
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unconditionally to Ivanova’s alterity. Perhaps then, if we were more receptive to such an 
attentiveness of the relationality of the other in the context of incitement to terrorism, 
individuals with minoritarian viewpoints would not feel so alienated and so disenfranchised. 
More crucially, if we were attuned/responsive to the unheimlich speech of the other not as a 
potential threat to our normative liberal orders but as a communication of “life being lived 
relationally”,832 then perhaps, we would not be so keen to restrict the other’s rights as we 
would view them as an ongoing manifestation of illimitable heterogeneous speech in a 
plurivocal world.  
  
2) Article 14: Discrimination  
 
A number of other rights can be engaged conjunctively when restricting speech including the 
right to a fair trial, the right to freedom of assembly and association, the right to liberty and the 
right from discrimination. I focus on the right to discrimination (albeit briefly, for purposes of 
scope) because it is central to my theorization of speech833 as a calculated monolithic rubric 
that is in direct opposition (différance) to heterogeneity. I also touch on discrimination 
because as I have implied so far, the very exclusionary logic of censorship or regulation is 
contiguous to “othering”/discrimination. 
 
As this section will unravel, the criteria for the applicability of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 10 remain unclear. Perhaps for this reason that discriminatory practices concerning the 
restriction of speech are often taken for granted, and yet discriminatory practices still 
spectrally haunt law in this area. It is therefore worth our while to explore discrimination in 
relation to speech restrictions generally. 
 
Article 14 of the Convention provides: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this European Convention on 
Human Rights shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
Under Article 14, a state can argue that censorship or restriction of certain forms of speech 
even when discriminatory are reasonable and the result of objective factors and thus 
permissible. As such, the government can always draw a distinction between permissible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
832 Gilroy, P. Lecture I. Suffering and Infrahumanity Lecture II. Humanities and a New Humanism 
(Tanner Lectures 2014) 
833 I have suggested in chapter two that the very notion of censorship entails a kind of exclusion and is 
thus linked to the notion of discrimination.  
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differentiation and unlawful discrimination. In this manner, Article 14 significantly concedes to 
the principles of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation. In the Belgian Linguistic case,834 the 
Court held: 
 
The principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no reasonable 
and objective justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in 
relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had 
to the principles, which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of 
treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must only pursue a 
legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is 
no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realised.835  
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has stated in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece 836 that under Article 
14,“ the Contracting State enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what 
extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment”.837 
 
In some cases, the Court chooses to return to the principle of margin of appreciation when 
interpreting discrimination. One such case is Eweida and others v. United Kingdom.838 Here, 
the applicants complained that domestic law failed to protect their right to manifest their 
religion. Ms Eweida and Ms Chaplin complained specifically about restrictions placed by their 
employers on their wearing of a cross visibly around their necks to express their religion. The 
applicants invoked Article 9 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14. 
Although the Court recognised that the employment decisions constituted discrimination 
based on religion, it did not apply a very weighty reasons test. Rather, it applied a wide 
margin of appreciation to the State, and allowed for a restriction of the applicants’ expressive 
rights because “regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck 
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole”.839 
 
Indeed, if the logic of cases like Eweida is applied to incitement to terrorism provisions and 
policies generally, i.e., if we considered that individuals were to make complaints of 
discriminatory practices that incitement to terrorism laws and policies generate, it is very likely 
that the state would counter these complaints indefinitely by using the dominant consensual 
position of presenting “reasonable grounds”, under the pretext of national security or public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
834 Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium or 
Belgian Linguistic case (No. 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252 
835 Ibid Para.10 
836 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (Application Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09) Para .76  
837 Ibid Para 76 
838 Case of Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37 
839 Ibid Para 84 
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emergency or public order, as a convincing (yet undecidable) argument to justify its actions. A 
balance that ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and/or their 
forms of expression and avoids any abuse of a dominant position, would thus be almost 
unattainable since such fair balancing at its core always already seeks to calculably preserve 
or normalise the status quo and its “norms of propriety”840 through the suppression, 
compulsion, subjection of minority viewpoints, under what Simmons calls “the pretences of 
equality”.841  
 
Inasmuch as the aforementioned interpretations of Article 9 rights can be read as restrictive, it 
is worth noting that there still remains a significant potentiality for Article 9 protections if Article 
9 is read in an incalculable register that moves beyond liberal-utilitarian rubrics that permits 
for interpretations of relationality. Such a potentiality can be gleaned from the case of D.H. 
and Others v. the Czech Republic.842 Here, the applicants, Roma people, who had been 
placed in special schools under a policy established by the education system, argued that 
they were the victims of discrimination in the Czech Republic. In their submission, the 
applicants averred that the school policy instituted racial segregation and discrimination that 
were reflected in the existence of two separately organised educational systems for members 
of different racial groups. Consequently, the Court held that the difference in treatment 
between Roma children and non-Roma children was not objectively and reasonably justified, 
and there was not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means used and 
the aim pursued.  
 
DH is relevant to this discussion because if transposed to the context of freedom of 
expression, it points us to an alternative reading of discrimination. In other words, in DH, the 
Court interprets the relationality in a mode that goes beyond the liberal-utilitarian norms of 
propriety and is more attuned to the alterity of the other. In this sense, DH provides some 
ethical intimations for the ways in which the haunted speech of the other can be interpreted. It 
is significant for example that the Court in DH departed from the calculable liberal-utilitarian 
logics of reconciling competing interests (in order to ensure normativity and general welfare 
for the majority) and placed greater emphasis on the particularity as well as the singularity of 
the applicants e.g., by stressing the fact that the Chamber’s requirement to prove 
discrimination was unrealistic and illogical since discriminatory practices could also be 
transmitted “by well-intentioned actors through ignorance, neglect or inertia”.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
840Post, R. ‘Hate Speech’ In Hare, I, and Weinstein, J, (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy (OUP 
2009) p.136 
841 Simmons, W.P. Human rights law and the marginalized other (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
p.52 
842 47 E.H.R.R. 3 Application No.57325/00 [2008] 
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Furthermore, the Court problematised the government’s unlimited and unjustified margin of 
appreciation843 by considering the surrounding contextual and cultural circumstances and 
drawing links between statistical data and the disproportionate effects of the legislation in 
question.844 It was also open to the critical question of whether “European governments were 
capable of coping with increasing racial and ethnic diversity and of protecting vulnerable 
minorities”.845 As such, DH offers us with a crucial interpretation of Article 14 that potentially 
undoes, unsettles and transgresses liberal-utilitarian approaches and socio-political norms 
that tend to privilege the dominant consensual and homo-hegemonic positions (e.g. 
“presenting reasonable grounds” or “very weighty reasons”) as evinced in Eweida. 
 
In sum, DH gives us a more relational reading of Article 14 that does not misperceive, and 
disavow the alterity of the other. Turning back to our discussion of Article 14 and speech 
regulation (and following DH) it can be argued that although Article 14 tends to be read in a 
manner that sustains and extends the state’s banoptic and disciplinary power, its very textual 
ambiguity still holds out an “otherwise” unanticipatable promise of justice that is 
responsive/attuned to the singularity and speech of the other.846 
 
3) Article 7 
 
A recurring issue in this thesis has been whether or not the limitations on freedom of 
expression are compliant with the requirement for legality under the Convention. This 
question of compliance spectrally recurs because there is an apparent lack of clarity with 
regard to what constitutes incitement to terrorism and how this correspondingly impacts on 
our assessments of violent, threatening or harmful speech. Therefore, to understand this 
issue, it is worth our while to look more directly at Article 7 of the Convention.  
 
Article 7 of the Convention, provides: 847 
 
1) No-one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was 
committed. 
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844 Ibid Para 184 
845 Ibid Para 143 
846 I discuss this otherwise promise in chapter 5 using the notion of “the ghost dance”. 
847 Article 7 of the ECHR 
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2) This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 
the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
 
Article 7 is read in conjunction with Article 8(2) “in accordance with the law” and that in Article 
10(2) “prescribed by law”. Article 7 therefore requires that an offence must be clearly defined 
in law, with sufficient precision to enable a person to foresee, the consequences which a 
given course of conduct may entail. As my discussion in chapter two has shown, however, it 
appears that because of the wide-ranging nature of incitement to terrorism laws and their 
overlaps with other provisions, it becomes difficult for individuals to foresee whether or not 
they are liable for an offence. Is it then possible for individuals to rely on Article 7 in order to 
argue that incitement to terrorism laws are not sufficiently clear to enable them to determine 
with accuracy what speech acts would or would not incur criminal liability? This is a problem 
that I seek to interrogate in this section. 
 
First, in assessing the foreseeability of legal instruments it appears that the Court interprets 
the actions of the applicant in relation to the foreseeability of the measure in question. This is 
ultimately a matter of interpretation as established in Sunday Times:  
 
[...] one of the requirements flowing from the expression “prescribed by law” was a 
measure's foreseeability. A norm could not be regarded as a “law” unless it was 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he 
had to be able—if necessary with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that 
was reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which certain action might 
entail.848 
 
Put differently, an individual’s actions or omissions and their contextual consequences  (in 
relation to the interpretation of the law at issue) are crucial in determining whether or not a 
law is foreseeable. This may simply be saying that for the Court, if an individual committed a 
crime and there was a reasonable expectation from the wording of the statute that such an 
act or omission was a crime, the relevant law would be sufficiently precise and foreseeable. In 
addition to the above criteria, the ECtHR will sometimes require under a quality of law test 
that a national law provide safeguards against arbitrary application.849 Moreover, the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law argues that unrestricted state power runs 
contrary to the rule of law and that laws must indicate the scope of the discretion that they 
afford to the state to protect against arbitrary application of national laws. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
848 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1978-1979) 2 EHRR 245, Para 49 
849 n.776: court requires that the law must provide safeguards against arbitrary application to 
meet the quality of law test. 
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To further probe the workings of foreseeability, it is worth turning to the decision in Cantoni v. 
France.850 Here, the applicant, Cantoni was convicted under Article L. 511 of the French 
Public Health Code at the instigation of the Yonne Pharmacists’ Association for unlawfully 
selling pharmaceutical products. The applicant had sold in his shop aqueous eosin at 1% 
strength, 70% modified alcohol, 10-volume hydrogen peroxide, vitamin C (tablets of 500 mg 
and sachets of powder of 1000 mg), inhalations made out of plant essences, pocket inhalers, 
antiseptic sprays and mineral supplements. In taking this matter to the Court the applicant 
argued that the code on which his conviction had been based (i.e., Article L. 511 of the Public 
Health Code and its definition of “medicinal products”) was not sufficiently clear to enable him 
to determine with accuracy what acts would incur criminal liability. The Commission upheld 
the decision of the national courts stating that the law was sufficiently clear. Importantly, the 
commission was of the view that legal statutes “often leave grey areas at the fringes of 
definition”851 and for this reason, the law was as “sufficiently precise” as it possibly could 
be.852 Thus for the commission, the applicant “Mr. Cantoni, who was, moreover, the manager 
of a supermarket, should have appreciated at the material time that, in view of the line of 
case-law stemming from the Court of Cassation and from some of the lower courts, he ran a 
real risk of prosecution for unlawful sale of medicinal products”.853  
 
The judgment in Cantoni has been echoed in a number of cases where the ECtHR has 
upheld that the applicants ought to have anticipated that their acts or inactions would have 
incurred liability. For instance, the ECtHR has reached a similar conclusion in respect to the 
convictions of directors of a cigarette distribution company for printing on its cigarette packets 
a phrase, which was not prescribed by law in Delbos and Others v. France.854 Here, the 
applicants complained that there had been a breach of the “principle of legal certainty”. They 
submitted that the wording of the Articles L. 355-27 II of the Public Health Code was not 
“reasonably foreseeable” and could thus not be seen to give rise to a criminal conviction. The 
wording of Article L. 355-27 II required that the statement: “Tobacco seriously damages 
health” should appear in full and unaltered. In this case, the lack of clarity was with the term 
“unaltered”. The Court held that the law was clear and that the applicants’ addition of the 
words “according to Law no. 91-32” was a reasonably foreseeable alteration of the message 
and hence a “breach of the provisions” of Article L. 355-27 II. Similarly, in Radio France and 
Others v. France,855 (where Radio France an audio-visual company made statements through 
a series of news flashes and bulletins in 1997 that affirmatively mentioned a contested article, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
850 (45/1995/551/637) Judgment of 15 November 1996 
851 Para 35 
852 There is a hermeneutic tension here, in the sense that sufficient precision affirms that that 
sufficiency a priori falls short of the requirement of precision. 
853 Ibid 
854 Application No. 60819/00 [2004] 
855 Application No. 53984/00 [2004] 
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which alleged that a civil servant, Mr. Michel Junot, the deputy prefect of Pithiviers, had 
supervised the deportation of a thousand Jews) it was held that there was no breach of Article 
7 because the domestic courts’ interpretation of the French law on public defamation was 
consistent with the nature of the offence of defamation and reasonably foreseeable. 
 
If these decisions are read in the context of incitement to terrorism, speech crimes like 
“encouragement” and or “glorification” of speech, despite their textual excesses, could still be 
(read as consistent with the nature of the offence, and thus) reasonably foreseeable, they 
could be read as crimes that meet the “quality of law” test too. Put differently, the wording of 
the text does not have to be precise. This is impossible, as vagueness of the law does not 
negate foreseeability and sufficient precision. Precisely because of Article 7’s legitimisation of 
opacity, one’s speech can still be legitimately criminalised even in situations where the harm 
accruing from one’s speech is conjectural. 
 
To belabour this point, if say, an individual said something that glorified terrorism –– however 
widely interpreted it is and it was deemed that the “members of the public could reasonably 
be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be 
emulated by the them” –– the Court could potentially maintain the view that the individual 
could have reasonably foreseen that his speech would incur criminal liability. A key structural 
antagonism ensuing from reading the law in such an elastic manner is that it privileges the 
sovereign’s deterministic calculation of what constitutes incitement to terrorism (whether it be 
“glorification”, “encouragement” or apologie) from the outset and prevents questions of the 
law’s substantive legality from being interrogated even when the law is tenuously drawn and 
disproportionately applied. As mentioned in chapter two, this problem is compounded by the 
fact that the very notion of “terrorism” is already notoriously difficult to define and that it tends 
to be drawn incalculably. This returns us back to the liberal-utilitarian calculus of deterrence 
and utility oriented justice, which as I have argued so far is always already susceptible to 
disavowing the alterity of the other.  
 
The fact that the Court has stated that it is not concerned with the appropriateness of the 
methods chosen by the legislature of a contracting State (a statement perhaps prompted by 
the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation) suggests that in any event, the 
ECtHR would be hesitant to intervene in this matter. Ultimately, this deference to the national 
legislature and national courts instigates an asymmetrical tension that to a great extent 
makes Article 7 redundant especially in the context of inchoate speech offences like 
incitement to terrorism. 
 
In determining “foreseeability”, the circumstances within which certain criminal laws are 
passed and the wording of such laws in relation to the relevant national circumstances are 
given a high level of credence by the Court. This formulation has an affinity to the operations 
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of the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity to the extent that the Court defers to the 
national authorities by giving them a degree of discretion on how to deal with domestic 
matters. Thus, if a domestic matter entails inconceivable, unforeseeable crimes to-come, 
(such as terrorism and incitement to terrorism) it is highly likely that the relevant law will also 
be broad and inconceivable in order to attempt to deal with the exigencies of the situation. For 
this reason, the ECtHR has accepted that vague definitions and vague legal enactments can 
be sufficient even in situations where they carry with them penumbrae of doubt. Hence “there 
will often be grey areas at the fringes of the definition. But crucially, this penumbra of doubt in 
relation to borderline facts does not in itself make a provision incompatible with Article 7”.856 
This position, (that states have a wide latitude to define and enforce crimes and that good law 
can have grey definitional areas) has been reiterated in the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece857 
where the applicant Kokkinakis who had converted to the Jehovah’s Witness faith was 
sentenced and imprisoned for acts of proselytism under Greek law (section 4 of Law no. 
1363/1938), which made proselytism an offence. Kokkinakis applied to the Commission on 22 
August 1988 claiming inter alia that his conviction for proselytism was in breach of the rights 
secured in Article 7 on the grounds that the law was not sufficiently precise and clear in 
regard to how proselytism was defined.858  
Kokkinakis is significant because it suggests that broad legal proscriptions are not necessarily 
in conflict with Article 7. Furthermore, it upholds that the issue of constitutionality of the law is 
a domestic issue, a matter of subsidiarity. A fair assessment of legality in Kokkinakis was 
arguably hindered from the outset owing to the fact that Article 7 is always already 
inextricably entangled with the notions of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. This 
sovereignist entanglement (so to speak) means that Article 7 determinations are precluded 
from being reviewed transnationally altogether. To this end, perhaps owing to sovereignist 
and socio-political reasons, states are guarded from criticism and review in regard to how 
they formulate their laws even when these laws could be extra wide and opaque (e.g., 
through their overlapping nature) as I have argued in chapter two. Which is to say, that for the 
most part, a state’s hauntological excesses in respect to legislating widely are likely to remain 
unchallenged and this in turn is likely to enable an arbitrary application of the law through the 
state’s wide “margin of appreciation”. This is an irreconcilable weakness of Article 7 with 
regard to individual human rights protections.   
 
Another significant factor that plays a role in determining foreseeability under Article 7 
(especially in the context of post-9/11-7/7 terrorism) is an assessment of terrorism that takes 
into consideration the current framework of international law and international treaty law. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
856 Cantoni v. France, Para 32 
857 Application No. 14307/88  
858 Ibid Para 40-41 
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mode of determining foreseeability seems to spring from Article 7(2), which refers to the 
general principles of law recognised by western “civilised nations”. Such an interpretation i.e., 
of international law as a determinant of foreseeability has been confirmed in the case of 
Jorgic v. Germany.859 In this case, Jorgic, a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Serb 
origin, was arrested when entering Germany and placed in pre-trial detention on the grounds 
that he was strongly suspected of having committed acts of genocide. The applicant argued 
that it had not been foreseeable for him at the time of the commission of his acts that the 
German courts would qualify them as genocide under German or public international law. The 
German government claimed that the crime of genocide was foreseeable because it was 
recognised as a crime under the principle of universal jurisdiction which all States establish 
over crimes against international law, such as acts of genocide, which were directed against 
the interests of the international community as a whole, irrespective of where or by whom 
those crimes had been committed.  
 
In its unanimous decision the ECtHR held, siding with the German government, that: 
 
[W]hile many authorities had favoured a narrow interpretation of the crime of 
genocide, there had already been several authorities at the material time which had 
construed the offence of genocide in the same wider way as the German courts. In 
these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant […] could reasonably have 
foreseen that he risked being charged with and convicted of genocide for the acts he 
committed in 1992. In this context the Court also has regard to the fact that the 
applicant was found guilty of acts of a considerable severity and duration: the killing 
of several people and the detention and ill-treatment of a large number of people over 
a period of several months as the leader of a paramilitary group in pursuit of the 
policy of ethnic cleansing […]. Therefore, the national courts’ interpretation of the 
crime of genocide could reasonably be regarded as consistent with the essence of 
that offence and could reasonably be foreseen by the applicant at the material time 
[emphasis].860 
 
In light of the decision in Jorgic, one ought to discuss the impact of international principles of 
international crime pertaining to incitement to terrorism in order to examine how they impact 
on how foreseeability under Article 7 in the context of incitement terrorism.  
 
The offence of incitement to terrorism under international law is covered under the UN 
Resolution 1624 (2005) which was adopted on 14 September 2005, two months after the 7/7 
bombings in London, which had killed 52 commuters and injured 700 people. Following the 
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July 2005 (7/7) bombings, the UK adopted a series of retaliative counterterrorism 
management measures, including the deportation of foreign extremist Muslim clerics, the 
closure of mosques, the proscription of extremist Muslim groups in order to cope with the 
urgent or emergency nature of the crisis. It is in this context that the UK sponsored Resolution 
1624 (2005)861 stressing that speech associated with terrorism was a crime connected to 
terrorism and a crime on its own that was deserving of proscription by all means.  
 
Briefly, in terms of scope, the preamble of Resolution 1624 (2005),862 which condemns 
incitement to terrorist acts and the glorification of terrorist acts and restates that incitement to 
terrorism is in conflict with the purposes and principles of the UN. The resolution also calls 
upon states to adopt such measures by all means as may be necessary and appropriate and 
in accordance with their obligations under international law to: 
 
a) Prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; 
b) Prevent such conduct; 
c) Deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and 
relevant information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been 
guilty of such conduct.863 
 
It is worth noting that the textual nature of these international resolutions is opaque. They are 
in essence opaque, adopted in order to deal with the unpredictability and presumed 
imminence of terror – a ghostly operation. Moreover, Resolution 1624 (2005) in an 
intertextual movement, extrapolates from UN Resolution 1373 (2001), which was adopted 
unanimously on 28 September 2001 following the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks on the US and 
expressly demands also in vague, wide-ranging precalculated terms864 that criminal measures 
be implemented in the fight against terrorism. 
 
The opacity within both the aforementioned resolutions sets the tone (a moral and persuasive 
one) for most contemporary incitement to terrorism regulations internationally. In this way, the 
very vague and overdetermined or wide-ranging manner of both resolutions suggests that the 
offence of incitement to terrorism is intentionally constructed so as to reflect attempts to deal 
with the recalcitrant fear and undecidability of terrorism as a threat in the post-9/11-7/7 
continuum. Consequently, if one were to try to use Article 7 as a means of challenging the 
scope and foreseeability of incitement to terrorism laws in the UK, it is also at the same time 
unlikely that they would succeed for the simple reason that the “essence of incitement to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
861 Resolution 1624 (2005), adopted on 14 September 2005 by the Security Council 
862 Ibid 
863 Ibid: point 1 of UN Resolution 1624 (2005) 
864 The already vague term “indirect encouragement” which later appears in the Terrorism Act 2006 
appears specifically in the UN Security Council resolution 1624. 
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terrorism” as proscribed in international law is exceptionally wide-ranging and thus somewhat 
self-destabilizing despite its intentions of preemption, closure, capture, and containment. 
 
In any event, it is clear that the international community has agreed to proscribe speech 
inchoately, pre-emptively and (un)foreseeably in order to deal with the dynamic and recurrent 
challenges of and immediacies or urgencies of terrorism in the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. 
There is not much Article 7 can do to undo this problem which is also psychically tied to 
persuasive moral forces and questions of a geo-historical and socio-political nature (scenes 
of subjection) that accrue from and yet move spectrally way beyond the closure of law.865    
 
Thus, in spite of the lack of clarity and breadth of the law in this area, and in spite of the fact 
that the law does not provide clear indications of what exactly it targets, it remains highly 
unlikely that incitement to terrorism offences would be seen to infringe Article 7 of the 
Convention. This is due to the sovereignist/imperial liberal-utilitarian impulse of international 
law and its totalising perception of post-9/11-7/7 terrorism. In other words, the post-9/11-7/7 
emergency era, justifies, rationalises and extends or completes international law’s empire in 
its aim of fighting international terrorism.866 Which is to say, courts and public authorities are 
sympathetic to the sovereign’s need to defend itself from potentially harmful terrorist 
speech.867 Their very authority and survival depends on it. As such, Incitement to terrorism 
laws are always already spectrally configured as good international laws (with sufficient 
precision) despite their definitional excesses. In this sense, Article 7 serves to reinforce the 
legality of counterterrorism laws for the sovereign’s own liberal-utilitarian ends. But as I have 
argued through out this thesis, the very expansiveness of such international arrangements 
opens itself to a multitude (or spectral proliferation) of cross-jurisdictional definitions that 
render any notion of clarity undecidable with regard to what constitutes incitement to terrorism 
despite the law’s intentions. This is an irresolvable ghostly hermeneutics, a hauntological 
aporia. 
 
Part IV: Negated rights?  
 
At the risk of sounding needlessly repetitive, I want to stress that I raise these seemingly 
conflicting human rights fair balancing approaches in this chapter not to suggest that human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
865 The move to legislate widely against terrorism even in international law can be read as an 
amplification of violent western liberal-utilitarian epistemes of securitocracy. It is a sensus communis 
measure that arguably serves the banoptic or biopolitical purposes of maintaining normative structures 
of political power, i.e., of subjection, sustaining dialectics (e.g. the west v. Islam) and silencing dissent.  
866 Humphreys, S. Legalizing lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception. European Journal 
of International Law 17, no. 3 (2006): 677-687 
867 Goold, Benjamin J., Liora Lazarus, and Gabriel Swiney. "Public Protection, Proportionality, and the 
Search for Balance." Ministry of Justice Research Series 10, no. 07 (2007) 
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rights law should be renounced, dispensed with or rejected; (I am acutely aware of the 
pragmatic limits involved with the espousal of such critiques of human rights, even though 
they do remain to some degree pertinent) but rather, to stress that the interpretive human 
rights principles which intend to be conceptually and structurally calculable (like all law) also 
display intrinsic conceptual and textual tensions (e.g. subjectivity vs. subjection) and plays of 
différance that open up the indeterminate and incalculable. Put another way, my appraisal of 
human rights in this chapter has attempted to explore the ethical hauntological fraught 
accruing from human rights 868 as well as the (im)possibilities869 of justice immanent in the 
human rights interpretive principles.  
 
Importantly, the concerns underscored in this chapter may suggest that we could do better if 
we radically dismantled law and did away with human rights. This direction however is not a 
viable alternative given the ethical exigencies of the ongoing situation of law making and 
enforcement in the post 9/11-7/7 continuum. Thus, as a conceptual compromise (in lieu of an 
abolitionary legal ethics and politics to come),870I suggest that human rights and speech 
restrictions could be read in a deconstructive mode that gestures towards law’s impossible 
reserve for justice)871 so as to preserve and secure a relational leeway, or an interstitial ambit 
for the irreducible speech and identity of the other.872  
 
Inverting human rights? 
  
If read in a transgressive counter movement, the textual and hermeneutic limits of opacity 
within the human rights principles (i.e., its non-firm improvisatory changeability) always-
already presents us with a strategic possibility to recover and unfold the protective 
possibilities of human rights. This turn towards a reparative configuration of rights has been 
evident in my discussion of cases such as Ivanova, R (Laporte) and DH as well as, Yildirim, 
Incal and Ceylan. Granted, it is extremely difficult to get a definitively clear or predictable 
sense of this operation of possibility within rights. But nevertheless, with my discussion of 
Ivanova, R (Laporte), Incal, Ceylan and DH, I have intimated that human rights always-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
868 “The Undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost—but an essential ghost (un fantome 
essentiel) —in every decision, in every event of decision”. Derrida, Force of Law, p.965; Grosz, E. "The 
time of violence: Deconstruction and value." Journal for Cultural Research 2, no. 2-3 (1998): 190-205. 
869 I explain the notion of impossibility in greater detail in the following chapter. 
870Saleh-Hanna, V. Black Feminist Hauntology: Rememory, the Ghosts of Abolition? Champ 
pénal/Penal field 12 (2015); Davis, Angela Y., and Dylan Rodriguez. "The challenge of prison abolition: 
A conversation." Social Justice 27, no. 3 (81 (2000): 212-218; Kaba, Mariame Towards the Horizon of 
Abolition: A Conversation with Mariame Kaba ”Interview by John Duda 9/11/ 2017: available at < 
thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/towards-horizon-abolition-conversation-mariame-kaba> 
871 I expound on this idea using the concept of the ghost dance in Chapter 5 
872 Marks, S. Human rights in disastrous times. In Crawford, J and Koskenniemi, M (eds.) The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012) pp. 309-
326 
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already hold a promise or potentiality/malleability to go beyond the banoptic, disciplinary and 
homo-hegemonic logics of human rights, –– through their responsive consideration of the 
singularity, particularity, and heterogeneity of the other in divergent situations. I have 
suggested that human rights interpretive principles if read in an otherwise mode remain 
transcendentally open to interpretations that are responsive to the heterogeneous speech of 
the other.  
 
It is the very structural and textual opacity within human rights that can also (paradoxically) 
allow for interpretations that reroute or detour human rights in an ethico-transgressive register 
of unanticipatable justice that is more attuned to the heterogeneity of the other. Such a 
transgressive reading occurs through incalculable processes and estimations that move 
beyond pre-set or pre-calculated thresholds or boundaries of liberal-utilitarian risk and instead 
function in an unanticipatable register of justice that pays attention to the difference and 
alterity of the other. Arguably, such considerations are what allow for the possibility of 
infinitely responsive interpretations that not only critique monologic calculations of violence 
but also relational in their absorption of the heterogeneity and plurivocality of the other. I show 
how these considerations could be intimated in greater detail through the concept of “the 




This chapter has held a sustained discussion of questions that are concerned with the ethical 
challenges of balancing the right to freedom of expression with counterterrorism practices 
generally. To address these questions it started off with a conceptual exposition of the fair 
balancing principles and discussed some of their merits as well as their limits with regard to 
freedom of expression and its related rights. In doing so, this chapter has underscored the 
irreconcilable aporias of freedom vs. unfreedom /subjectivity vs. subjection/singularity v. 
heterogeneity that are embedded within the very structure of human rights.   
 
Notwithstanding, this chapter has also noted that although the extensive, opaque and 
calculably aporetic nature of human rights can be manipulated by the sovereign in a 
suppressive fashion873for its own liberal-utilitarian ends, this very aporia, simultaneously (in a 
somewhat inverted/otherwise movement) allows for the possibility of a shifting or counter-
conjuring of human rights in a different incalculable register of unanticipatable justice that is 
open to the alterity of the other. As decisions like Hashman, Ivanova, 
Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs, Sürek (No.1) and DH have shown, this 
“inverted”, or “otherwise” movement eschews liberal-utilitarian foundations of exclusion and 
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carceral/penal (e.g. the aporia of subjectivity v. subjection) and presents the possibility of a 
genuine ethical responsibility based on the precedence of the heterogeneity of the other and 
not on monolithic state sovereign or self/group interests.874    
 
The ethical challenge then for us is to navigate the aporetic double bind of human rights in a 
“hyperethical”875 incalculable mode of a justice always “yet to come” that betrays the liberal-
utilitarian logics of calculation and is more attuned to the alterity and heterogeneity of the 
other. I show how such a tentative ethical navigation could work using the notion of “the ghost 
dance” in the following chapter.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
874 Thurschwell, A. "Specters and scholars: Derrida and the tragedy of political thought." German Law 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Ghosts Demand 
How this thesis has progressed so far  
 
This thesis has interrogated some of the textual difficulties and socio-political materialisations 
that plague incitement to terrorism law making and regulation in the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. 
The discussion in chapter one was concerned with looking at some often overlooked 
characteristics of speech itself. I suggested that speech was inherently divergent, 
heterological and iterable. I then pointed out similarities between fear (or the desire of 
unconscious) and speech and suggested that online communication technologies are texts in 
and of themselves that amplify both fear and speech interminably. Speech thus becomes 
extra-citational, polycentric, extra territorial and iterant. In making this point, I suggested that 
the iterant nature of speech has proximal links to an “other”, an “unconscious” other 
(différance) that is always absent yet always returning or coming back in the multiple 
ecological contexts (i.e., the visual, aural and audio-visual configurations) within which it 
occurs. I also made the claim that the heterological nature of speech combined with its 
magnitude and speed overwhelms876 and befuddles regulatory determinations. This I 
observed is what makes speech powerful and phantasmic and is what enables speech to 
resist frames that seek to contain it. This conceptual observation guided my critique of 
regulation and law making in the subsequent chapters. Moreover, in introducing the concept 
of différance in this chapter, I also showed how speech regulation tends to disavow or defer 
forms of speech that do not fit within its pre-calculated monolithic liberal-utilitarian framework. 
This hypothetical stipulation would underpin much of my discussion and critique in the rest of 
the thesis. 
 
In chapter two, I scrutinised the laws that attempt to calculably restrict forms of speech that 
incite terrorism. This analysis focused first on incitement to terrorism provisions such as the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and the Terrorism Act 2006 and their key components of indirect 
encouragement, glorification and possession and dissemination. My discussion engaged with 
the nature of the offences and how they have been interpreted within the UK courts. An early 
and significant observation in this chapter was that the law in this area contains ambiguities 
and distortions that seemed to go against conventional criminal law principles such as 
“causation”. For instance, my discussion of glorification and encouragement as crimes 
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revealed that were are not based on observable or identifiable empirical proof but on 
conjectural inferences like “recklessness”. These conjectural inferences suggested 
definitional opacity. That is to say, my discussion suggested that incitement to terrorism 
offences are opaque in the sense that they make it highly probable for the hypothetical citizen 
to be punished for saying something that a reasonable citizen or a legal adviser could not 
foreseeably have known or seen to constitute a breach of the law. Although on the one hand 
opacity is functionally convenient, (in that it reactively acts as a cushion to the incalculable 
fear and insecurity caused by terrorism), my discussion has shown that on the other hand 
opacity can also worsen situations by creating more undecidability through its mishmash of 
incomprehensible laws for example, through the overlaps between glorification and an older 
criminal law provision such as soliciting to murder which in trying to widen its reach by pre-
proscribing the unpredictable generality of terrorism offences end up inescapably exposing 
the singularity law (exteriorly) to illimitable interpretational conundrums. In any event, the 
general observation I make in this chapter is that the extensive legalisation/criminalisation of 
incitement to terrorism laws is highly self-undermining for the reason that the power or force 
of law spectrally morphs into a paradoxical powerlessness/self-inadequation of legal 
uncertainty and unpredictability that also signifies an interminable hauntological loss inherent 
within all contemporary incitement to terrorism laws. 
 
To test how these “opaque” laws were applied, and to determine their efficacy (with regard to 
delivering their promise of containing speech that incites terrorism), chapter three chronicled 
the intersection of incitement to terrorism laws with online regulation. Although not expressed 
in an explicit manner, it seems that in trying to compensate for the heterogeneity of speech, 
as discussed in chapter one, the laws and policies in this area were driven by a calculable or 
deterministic fixation on liberal-utilitarian conceptualisations of “ideological speech” as a 
cause for terrorism. This reasoning seemed to drive Internet regulators such ISPs and the 
CTIRU to implement vigilant notice and take down practices (that involved the use of AI and 
automated filtering tools) in an aim to pre-empt the dissemination of terrorist–related speech 
online. However, despite the regulators’ efforts to take down terrorist speech and to keep it 
offline, such speech always returned, spectrally, sometimes in an even more concealed way. 
Moreover, individuals who transmitted the speech at fault could always dis-embed and re-
embed from the Internet or manipulate the itinerant heterological texts of speech and 
computer code/protocol to avoid censorship and detection. This induced an apparent 
interminable feeling of besiege, inadequacy, fragility or helplessness on the part of the 
regulators. There was always an overbearing feeling of hauntological anxiety, besiegement, 
inadequacy or helplessness that occurred especially when the regulators struggled to deal 
with the repeatability, substitutability and mutations not only of speech but also of technology. 
Attempts to proscribe the offending extremist speech online then correspondingly became a 
proscription founded on an interminable apprehension, anxiety and vulnerability. 
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Chapter four was interested in exploring the connections between human rights 
considerations and incitement to terrorism laws with particular regard to the fair balancing 
principles. Central to this discussion was an attempt to navigate the apparent tension 
between extensive incitement to terrorism legislation under liberal-utilitarian rubrics of human 
rights particularly in the context of free speech. Other rights in relation to Article 10 speech 
rights such as the Article 7 right that requires offence to be clearly defined in law with 
sufficient precision and the Article 14 right from discrimination were also considered. A point 
of interest was identifying how majority rights are balanced with minority rights under the fair 
balancing or interpretive principles of the ECtHR. My discussion revealed and highlighted an 
overarching aporia of subjectivity and subjection within human rights principles. This I argued 
was down to the liberal-utilitarian logics of law that calculate a means-oriented justice of utility 
or deterrence. Crucially, however, there were also decisions that intimated an otherwise 
reading of rights (a sort of rights without rights) wherein the Courts initiated extemporaneous 
readings of unanticipatable justice that were attuned to the alterity of the other.  
 
My discussion of Article 7 in chapter four was also significant. It addressed the underpinning 
issue of opacity, i.e., the lack of foreseeability and sufficient precision within current 
incitement to terrorism legal provisions that runs through chapters two and three. In 
discussing Article 7, this chapter drew from leading cases from the ECtHR such as Cantoni v. 
France to suggest that the determinants for foreseeability under the Convention can be 
contradictory in the sense that Article 7 capaciously accommodates for a degree of precision 
that (yet, at the same time) engenders opacity, vagueness or undecidability within the law.877 
Thus, one’s speech can still be legitimately criminalised even in situations where links to 
actual harm or violence are non-existent or conjectural. One’s subjectivity hence always 
already becomes subtracted, subjugated. The discussion of Article 7 ended by suggesting 
that the efficacy of Article 7 is undermined due to the fact that incitement to terrorism under 
International law (and indeed International human rights law) is still considered good law that 
is necessary and proportionate despite its excesses. In sum, this chapter is critical of the 
current human rights interpretive principles, their presuppositions of harm and their 
correspondingly inconsistent application and opaque or undecidable disciplinary logics. 
However, at the same time, this chapter suggests that if such undecidable human rights 
interpretive principles are read beyond their calculable liberal-utilitarian rubrics, they could still 
hold out “otherwise” intimations of unanticipatable justice878 that embrace the alterity and 
heterogeneous speech of the other. I draw together and expound on these particular 
intimations using the notion of “the ghost dance” later in this chapter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877 See: Endicott, Law is necessarily vague; Endicott "Interpretation and Indeterminacy”; Endicott, 
Proportionality and Incommensurability 
878 A similar reading of human rights is developed by de Sousa Santos: de Sousa Santos, B. If god were 
a human rights activist (Stanford University Press, 2015)   
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A re-contextualisation of hauntology  
 
My discussion thus far teased out certain aporias, undecidabilities or vulnerabilities within the 
law. It has grappled with recurring tension of excess, inadequacy, helplessness and 
powerlessness that plague incitement to terrorism laws. Put differently, my analysis of 
incitement to terrorism laws and regulatory practices was haunted with recurring spectral 
slippages and obfuscations that can be summed up generally in two interrelated points 
namely: 1) indeterminably wide definitional ambiguities or undecidabilities and interpretive 
principles pertaining to incitement to terrorism that led to interpretational inconsistences and 
arbitrariness with regard to how speech is enforced or regulated, and 2); pre-calculated legal 
and regulatory frameworks and processes that seek to contain, yet still struggle to contain the 
heterogeneity of speech and the other. 
 
A hauntological impasse? 
 
This thesis has offered the notion of hauntology as a conceptual lens within which I have 
unpacked the underlying undecidability that haunts the regulation of incitement to terrorism in 
the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. In using hauntology, I have moved this discussion towards a 
conclusion that indicates that incitement to terrorism laws are embedded within a conceptual 
structure that is susceptible to reproducing the very terrors that it seeks to contain. I have also 
suggested that hauntology can turn the state’s very calculating tools of regulation against 
itself.	  
 
Hauntology has functioned as a conceptual tool that articulates the problem of law’s 
intention/motive to contain the uncontainable iterations of speech that return and simply 
cannot go away. My discussion in chapter two has revealed the extent of this dilemma by 
showing our inability to discern and distinguish harmful speech from harmful terrorist speech. 
It has suggested that the law in this area is an open undecidable generality, with no closure 
no, boundaries, no distinctions. This blurring of distinctions is spectral, phantasmic or 
hauntological. It is a problem of spectres, a problem of disavowed non-irreducible desires and 
anxieties that trouble our modern collective consciousness in the post-9/11-7/7 continuum. 
That is to say, it is a problem of the originary ghosts of fear that recur from the sovereign’s 
exercise of power to foreshadow terror through the notions of pre-crime and predictive 
policing even in conjectural instances. It is also, all at once, a problem of the interminable and 
heterological ghosts of the other that befuddle these predictive legal and technological orders 
of knowledge by undermining their pre-calculated homo-hegemonic and monologic 
determinacy.  
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Towards a reconjuring of hauntological logics 
 
Based on my reading of the law and of the regulatory practices concerned with incitement to 
terrorism, this thesis suggests to a large extent, that we are somewhat transfixed in an 
undecidable position, or a place of heterological challenges and difficulties. However, being in 
this undecidable place does not mean that there is no way out, or in, but that there is an 
opening for us to reinvent, renew, renegotiate and undo our current hauntological logics and 
the implications of their demands.879 Hence, although hauntological fear is everywhere, 
inasmuch as it haunts us everywhere, compromising, inadequating, and confounding us, it 
still (in a double movement) unfolds possibilities for a way out. 
 
As Derrida elaborates: 
 
This is not only a problem, but the aporia we face constantly. For me however, the 
aporia is the condition of walking: if there was no aporia we wouldn’t walk, we 
wouldn’t find our way; oath breaking implies aporia. This impossibility to find one’s 
way.880 
 
This inability to find one’s way, (which is also replicated in the hauntological motif of “a 
thinking paralysis”) follows the arguments of undecidability, opacity, disproportionality and 
inconsistency which I have laid out over the course of this thesis. It is a hauntological logic 
that mimics a state of being unhinged, an interruption, and a strange halting, to-and-fro i.e., a 
failed or hesitant kind of movement.  
 
I want to stress that with undecidability  (or the indeterminate) there is always a kind of neutral 
double affirmation that holds an infinite potential or reserve for justice.881 That is to say, to be 
in this neither-no place of undecidability is not necessarily a bad thing. For a neither-nor place 
is a neutral place, which as Freccero suggests, is a place of self-shattering passivity that 
rejects the re-enaction of a messianic or homo-hegemonic impulse882 to act aggressively e.g., 
through securitisation. It is to enter the place of paused reflection, or of waiting, or weighing, 
which is also the place of différance, i.e., of attending to the other’s unfamiliar /unforeseeable 
ghosts or arrivals with an un-anticipatable concern for justice.883 The point I am raising here is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
879Césaire, A. Letter to Maurice Thorez 1956 Présence Africaine, Social Text 103 Vol. 28, No. 2 (Duke 
University Press 2010) 
880 Derrida, J. Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida, in M. Dooley and 
R Kearney (eds) Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, (London Routledge 1999) 
p.73 
881 Saghafi, K. Apparitions--of Derrida's Other (Fordham Univ Press, 2010) p.120 
882 Freccero, C. (2013). Queer spectrality: Haunting the past. The Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and 
Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory p.351 
883 Ibid 
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that the possibility of an ethics of justice, can only occur when we are undone, in a vulnerable 
and neutral state of undecidability, Hence, we do not lose anything from interrogating, 
admitting, and pointing out the autoimmunary and hauntological logics of law and regulation 
as this thesis has done. Rather, we begin to notice their undergirding inimical limits 
embedded within a calculated legal/ethical framework, and we start to reroute them by 
fashioning more ethically responsive readings from beyond their pre-calculated limits.884 
 
Reconfiguring Incitement to terrorism laws and regulatory practices 
 
As things stand, incitement to terrorism laws seem for the most part to paint a gloomy picture 
with regard to freedom of expression and other related human right considerations. And even 
though one would wish that some of these laws would be repealed, one doubts that such 
changes will occur given the unavoidable spectral effects of terrorism in the historical present. 
 
What seems to be happening as current legal developments indicate is a push to widen 
powers through newer hauntological legislation in the form of the Counter-Terrorism and 
Border Security Act 2019, which still endeavours to contain speech that incites terrorism –– 
for example through its proscription of: 1) expressions of support for a proscribed 
organisation;885 2) the publication of images886 and 3); obtaining or viewing material over the 
internet;887 and still fails to take into consideration the irreducible heterological divergences of 
speech both online and offline e.g., by using self-referential hauntological concepts like 
“reasonable suspicion”.  
 
Thus, I remain ambivalent and sceptical about the pros of legislative reform, or repealment for 
that matter. That is to say, doing away with the legal provisions in this area or repealing them 
would not at any point absolve incitement to terrorism law of its incommensurable opacities. 
For law is always concerned with the undecidable, the litigious, the contestable and the 
adversarial. This is the very inescapable predicament and condition of law, its imperfection, 
its imprecision its undecidability. There can never be a perfect law,888 which is another way of 
saying; there can never be such a thing as a “properly defined” law.  
 
Perhaps then the problem here is not one only and essentially concerned with the content of 
law and its undecidability (for this is a problem of all law) but also, crucially a problem of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 Ramshaw, Justice as improvisation, p.115  
885 See section 1 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 c.3 
886 Ibid section 2  
887 Ibid section 3 
888 The imperfectability of law can be read as its pharmakon. This means that there is always a 
possibility for law to be rerouted otherwise in an incalculable register that is attuned to the justice of the 
other. I elaborate on this “rerouting” in the following sections.  
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interpretation and ethics i.e., ––a problem of how we interpret or translate and relate to law’s 
incalculable limits or boundaries in the face/speech of the other.889 In other words, this is 
essentially a problem of how the violence/force of law disavows the speech of the other as 
well as a problem of how the law spectrally calculates and projects crime and terror onto the 
other. 
 
Can we then, as Freccero asks, in an imperative concern for justice (a justice that secretly 
resides and pivots differently, around, and beyond the confines of the force of law)890, open 
up or remain open to “the uncanny and the unknown but somehow strangely familiar, not to 
determine what is what – to know- but to be demanded of and to respond [?’]” 891 Can we give 
these ghosts’ memory a place in the historical present? ––Yes. Impossibly yes.  
 
We should not be thrown off by the seeming impossibility and undecidability of hauntological 
ghosts, and their “failure of certainties”.892 After all, if we are to live with them and their 
recurring failures, as we already do, we have to yield relationally to their impossible 
exigencies. Perhaps, this is our only viable option seeing as we are in this neither-nor place, 
where we are bound to these ghosts and their absolutely unique demands.  
The ghost dance  
 
Perhaps, what we should do (with an urgency) is to dance differentially at a distance from the 
law’s boundaries  –– listening to, and unsounding the ghosts that it disavows more 
relationally, attentively and differentially towards justice, in a patient, meticulous, questioning, 
to-and-fro, off-beat, hesitant, aporetic, ethical register even when on the cusp of terror, –– for 
there is always an imperceptible “contact, juxtaposition, porosity, osmosis, friction, attraction 
and repulsion,”893 i.e., an inevitable intractability to ghosts that requires an anticipation of 
justice and radical responsiveness (responsabilité) in relation to the other.894 Rather than 
looking at ways in which the letter of the law could be changed, perhaps a better way of 
dealing with this quandary is to rethink the ways in which incitement to terrorism laws are 
interpreted and enforced in the now. For inasmuch as interpretation can oppressive, 
interpretation can also be otherwise i.e., redemptive or reparative. But the 
redemptive/reparative (a kind of mourning work that undoes the brutality of violence inherent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
889 I ought to emphasise here that “the other” is a complex heterogeneous identity (or identities) that is 
disenfranchised, different or deferred (i.e., in différance) from prevalent societal and speech norms.  
890 I want to insist following Derrida in Force of Law that justice is always yet to come and beyond the 
confines of the force of law  
891 Freccero, C. Queer spectrality: Haunting the past In del Pilar Blanco, M. & Peeren, E.(eds) The 
Spectralities Reader: Ghosts and Haunting in Contemporary Cultural Theory (2013): p.351 
892 Malabou, C. & Derrida, J. Counterpath (trans). Wills, D. (Stanford University Press, 2004) p.28 
893 Nancy, J.L. The creation of the world, or, globalization (Suny Press, 2007) p.110 
894 Derrida, J. The Gift of Death, & Literature in Secret (University of Chicago Press, 1995) pp.26-27 
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within law)895 can only occur if we are attuned to an ethical register of justice that is open to 
the heterogeneity of the other.  
 
Thus, rather than thinking of terrorism in terms of a pre-emptive urgency to self-protect 
(especially during crises of terror that disorient, fascinate and trouble us) we could then start 
to think of it in the terms of an “incomplete”896 vulnerability, i.e., a vulnerability to a sudden 
address from elsewhere that we cannot pre-empt,897 a vulnerability that acknowledges that 
the questions of terrorism are often incalculably unanswerable (especially as legal truth 
claims), a spectral vulnerability that uncovers and conjures the ghosts of the other in us, 
around us, and within us, through a considered responsiveness towards the un-anticipatable. 
This reconfiguring of the illimitable vulnerabilities or ghosts within law and accepting these 
problems as un-anticipatable would be in essence an uncovering of law’s secret promise, it 
would be a double affirmation of law’s reserve for justice. Hence, this impossibility would 
uncover the possibility of different ways of addressing current ethical problems that haunt us, 
as it would tether us irresolvably into an ongoing spectral relation with the heterogeneity and 
singularity of the other. 
 
In looking at the illimitable ghosts of the other, Derrida looks at these ghosts in terms of an 
undifferentiated spectral mass i.e., “who are not yet born or who are already dead be they 
victim of wars political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist colonialist sexist or other 
kinds of exterminations victims of oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any other”.898 
Although Derrida’s notion of the illimitable is highly illuminating, it is susceptible to certain 
erasures, particularly in its undifferentiated universal tone. It therefore needs an interruptive- 
corrective intervention. It requires as Ramshaw has suggested an improvised reading of the 
(im)possible that no longer dares to speak of “the universal concept of responsibility” but 
demands on the one hand an attunement,899 a general answering-for oneself with respect to 
the general, hence the idea of substitution, and on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute 
singularity, hence non-substitution, non-repetition, silence, and secrecy.  
 
In light of this, I propose that we embrace another im-possible reading of law (away from but 
toward justice) that emerges from the ethical compass of the ghost dance, a concept I have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
895 For Derrida mourning is a transformative “attempt to ontologize remains or spirits, to make them 
present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the dead”. Derrida, Specters 
of Marx, p.9  
896 Incompleteness here infers a move towards a conviviality that emphasises reconstruction and 
mitigates delusions of permanence, mastery, perfection and closure: Nyamnjoh, F.B., "Incompleteness: 
Frontier Africa and the currency of conviviality." Journal of Asian and African Studies52, no. 3 (2017): 
253-270 
897 Butler. J, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso, London, 2004) p.29 
898 Derrida, Specters of Marx pp.15-16 
899 Or a kind of non-teleological weighing/ listening/ that relates to the other. 
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purloined here from Spivak.900 The ghost dance can be described as “an attempt to establish 
an ethical relation with history in the present”.901 Such a relation entails “a prayer to the 
haunted, a learning to live at the seam of the past and present, a heterodidactics between life 
and death”.902 In other words, the ghost dance happens in an impalpable/undecidable void, 
when we linger in a position of doubt (interstitially, in the fault, between life and death) and 
free from a desiring imagination so that we can “better understand how to establish the 
necessary distance”.903 Further, it is important to stress that the performance of the ghost 
dance only occurs within a subversive freedom – “without subjecting oneself, to the 
automatic, rotating movement, by remaining as free as possible with regard to the rotation”904 
and a deconstructive mode of faith (“a leap [/plunge] of faith into the unforeseeable abyss”905 
or a “self-suspending leap into the other’s sea”)906 that can not be confined or imprisoned in 
the logocentric calculability907 of time and its determinable horizons.908 As Cixous observes:  
 
One cannot do it [dance] on purpose or calculate. These things, directions, everything 
is sent, everything arrives, happens.909 
     
Accordingly, the ghost dance is a speculative movement or poise devoid of preliminary 
positioning and without preconditions, a surrender to the undecidable that thinks beyond the 
present in the present by conjuring up a counterfactual past-future, or a play of past and 
future. It is a place of incompleteness, of interminable suspension, of paused assiduous 
attentiveness. The rationale for the ghost dance is to imagine an unprogrammable movement, 
akin to a “wandering”,910 beyond homo-hegemonic logocentric assumptions so as to assign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
900 The Ghost-dance religion involved a dance practice that reunited the living with spirits of the dead, 
and conjured spirits so as to destroy borders, fight colonialism and bring wellness to indigenous peoples 
of the Americas: Mooney, J. The ghost-dance religion and Wounded Knee (Courier Corporation, 1991); 
The motif of a ghost dance is also inferred in the work of African and Afro-diasporic writers, most 
prominently Amos Tutuola and Toni Morrison. Tutuola, A. The Palm-wine Drinkard; And, My Life in the 
Bush of Ghosts (Grove Press, 1994); Morrison, T. "Beloved. 1987." (Plume 1988)  
901 Spivak, From Ghostwriting, p.325 
902  Ibid  
903 Derrida, Specters of Marx p.12 
904 Naas, M. Derrida at the Wheel. Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature (2006): 
p.60 
905 Edwards, I. Derrida’s (Ir) religion: A Theology (of Différance). Janus Head 6, no. 1 (2003): 142-153 
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906 Spivak G.C, E. Lyons, L. & Franklin, C. On the Cusp of the Personal and the Impersonal: An 
Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Biography (2004): 207-208. See also Derrida, J. Justice, law 
and philosophy—an interview with Jacques Derrida. South African Journal of Philosophy18, no. 3 
(1999) p.280-281 
907 A stretch “toward the horizon of what cannot be seen with ordinary clarity yet.” See Gordon, Ghostly 
Matters, p.195 
908 See Caputo, J.D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Indiana 
University Press 1997) p.63; Derrida, J. The Gift Of Death (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1995)  
909 Cixous, H. Jacques Derrida as a proteus unbound. Critical Inquiry 33, no. 2 (2007): 389-423. 
910 Cervenak, S. J. Wandering: Philosophical performances of racial and sexual freedom (Duke 
University Press, 2014)   
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subaltern, silenced (revenant as well as arrivant)911 ghosts with new pathways of access, 
sociality and agency.912 This unprogrammable movement is a sort of remembering (of 
forgotten spaces, absences or silences) that does not eschew a colonial melancholia,913 or 
mastery but permits and demands of us to mourn (for deliverance is inseparable from death 
or mortality)914 and pray, to the haunted, in an alternating register that attends to tensions and 
forms reciprocal links between the past and the present.915 In this sense, the ghost dance 
provides us with the conceptual tools to live more responsibly with the other in times of 
interminable haunting and undecidability. It calls for a different kind of reading, a hermeneutic 
injunction that betrays law’s interminable frames of subjection and violence ––in the post-
9/11-7/7 continuum –– by insistently clamouring that we keep in touch with the 
“unadressable” uniqueness of ghosts (within and without); that we mourn (complain/grieve) 
and live unbearably with them, knowing that “what concerns ghosts also concerns us,”916 and 
demands “an infinite witness,”917 response, address and attentiveness from us.  
 
Some actualisations of the ghost dance  
 
A number of cases discussed in this thesis have suggested a transgressive gesturing towards 
the ghost dance. These cases have suggested the ghost dance is not only that which will be 
or which is not yet, but also what is achievable, now, in the living present, in terms of 
evolutive legal interpretation. In chapter two for example, I looked at cases concerning the 
regulation of speech that incites terrorism and how they embrace the heterogeneous other in 
their renegotiations of what constitutes risk or harm. My reading of cases such as Siddique, 
Zafar, Samina Hussain Malik, and Chambers echoed the choreology of the ghost dance. In 
these cases, the judges were context-sensitive and transgressive (in the sense that they 
moved beyond normative social-cultural-political understandings of speech and harm) and 
heeded the iterable address, or call, of speech in its incommensurable particularity and 
difference. Many of these decisions involved a conceptual rerouting of the liberal-utilitarian 
calculus of harm, deterrence and utility and its predicated means-oriented justice. Rather than 
focusing on harm and what such legal-juridical calculations and determinations of harm 
(could/should) entail, the courts are more concerned with an ethical repositioning or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911 Spivak, From Ghostwriting p.324 
912 Ibid p.326  
913 Gilroy, P. Postcolonial melancholia (Columbia University Press 2004) 
914 For Nancy the limits of existence ought to be thought of together in a manner akin to mourning if we 
are working towards freedom: Nancy, J.L., The inoperative community (University of Minnesota Press, 
1991) 
915 Ghostwriting p.325  
916 Derrida, J. & Stiegler, B. Echographies of Television (Polity 2002) pp.120-121  
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recalibration918 of justice or responsibility that is responsive to the speech and alterity of the 
other.  
 
The modes of judicial interpretation in these cases ultimately intimate a ghost-dance-
responsiveness towards the un-anticipatable speech of the other. These cases also 
deconstruct, unsettle and destabilise the over determination of the harm principle and the 
precalculated monolithic grammar of its liberal utilitarian calculus and in so doing, they 
whittle away the force of law. Which is to say, the ghost dance does not differentiate. It is 
able to roam and play around, in, and beyond the indeterminate groundlessness of the law 
(rather than fixing it) and in so doing it attunes to the unanticipatable speech of the other. 
  
The concept of the ghost dance has also permeated my discussions of human rights law in 
this thesis. For example, in chapter four, I looked at human rights cases like R (Laporte) and 
Sunday Times where the Court has set out limits to breach the overdetermined liberal-
utilitarian calculus of law so as to allow for speech restrictions to be applied in a manner that 
is attends to the incalculable, the heterogeneous, the unanticipated i.e., the other. 
Furthermore, my reading of some human rights cases concerning Article 9 and Article 14 
reflected spectral symbolic moments where the ECtHR has paid particular attention to the un-
anticipatable alterity and the sonic demands or expression of the other. In DH for instance, 
the Court transgresses and repositions normative legal calculations of evidence and 
determinability i.e., through its reliance on submitted statistical evidence of racism as a 
problematisation of the state’s margin of appreciation. In this sense, the Court undoes law’ 
categorical liberal-utilitarian imperatives of pre-calculated means-oriented justice, and instead 
ees and responds to the underlying structural and conceptual limitations, contradictions and 
inabilities of the existing legal-juridico schema to grasp the concerns and the speech of the 
minoritarian other. The Court also admits that judicial interpretations of human rights are 
susceptible to privileging an idealised model of speech or logos over others. This for me is a 
symbolic reading that initiates and undulates the ghost dance in a movement that gestures 
toward the heterogeneous alterity of the other. It is a mode of interpretation that embraces the 
other’s speech hospitably, responsively and conscientiously with sonic pathways of 
answerable access, agency, relation, and sociality.   
 
Similarly, my reading of Ivanova in chapter four also accentuates the ghost dance in the 
sense that the Court acknowledges the applicant’s particularity and singularity of injury i.e., 
her “feelings of distress helplessness, and emotional suffering” 919 as a result of her Article 9 
violations. Thus, the Court foresightedly recognises that a desire for rights limitations should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
918 Lindahl, H. Fault lines of globalization: Legal order and the politics of a-legality (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) p. 233 
919 Ivanova v. Bulgaria (Application no. 52435/99) Para 95  
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not get in the way of relating to the difference and selfhood of the other. In doing so, the Court 
does not disregard assimilate or reduce the difference of the other. Rather, it allows for 
human rights to be read more relationally, in a reparative mode, that holds out an incalculable 
relational justice920 towards the other. 
 
If read together, DH, and Ivanova, (and indeed Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten 
Osterreichs) offer a crucial “otherwise” reading of human rights that undoes, unsettles and 
transgresses univocal hauntological approaches that tend to immure plurivocal 
understandings of speech. In this regard, they counter-conjure the banoptic disciplinarity of 
rights by imbuing them with an “attentiveness” to (the on-going heterogeneity of a being-
together and) the illimitable iterability and plurivocality of speech. These cases test, question, 
and interrupt the liberal-utilitarian presuppositions that hold monolithic/homo-hegemonic 
hauntological frames of “public order and security” together. In this respect, they reorient 
human rights considerations away from their liberal-utilitarian pre-calculated desires and 
towards “illiberal”921 interpretations that expand notions of justice by remaining sensitively 
open to the alterity of the other (and indeed the other’s speech) in all its particular ghostly 
returns, presences and arrivals.  
 
My readings of these cases suggest that even against the closure of boundaries and 
opacities that laws reinscribe, even against the hems of the law, judges are interpretively 
capable of a conjuring a sustained “proximate presence”922 that suspends and reroutes the 
existing limits of “anterior” law in order to gesture towards a “roamable ground”923 that holds 
incalculable reserves of justice and freedom for the most marginalised and dispossessed in 
society. These same “roaming” precepts of rerouting boundaries, limits, and reconfiguring 
what constitutes harm (in a manner that betrays the force of law and stretches towards 
justice) are also applicable to the “targeted” filtering and blocking practices of ISPs and other 
regulators of online communication technologies. My discussion of the decision in Yildirim for 
instance outlines certain determinations that can provisionally be useful if we are interested in 
trying to reconfigure speech regulation and its corresponding human rights considerations 
online so to speak. Yildirim establishes that interferences and collections of data in 
cyberspace should not be indiscriminate and 2); that they should have proper oversight and 
procedural safeguards. In doing so, Yildirim suspends pre-crime and its deterministic or 
calculated biopolitical positionings. In other words, it does away with the force of law and its 
aporetic means-oriented justice (of pre-calculating and weighing threats accruing from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920 “Law is an element of calculation […] but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the 
incalculable”: Derrida, Force of Law, p.14 
921 Chuh, K. The Difference Aesthetics Makes: On the Humanities “After Man” (Duke University Press, 
2019) preface xi 
922 Cixous, H. Jacques Derrida as a proteus unbound Critical Inquiry 33, no. 2 (2007): p.404; Derrida, J. 
The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow) Critical Inquiry 28 (Winter 2002): pp. 379–80 
923 Cervenak, Wandering p.152 
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incitement to terrorism) and in doing so; it begins to address the heterogeneous alterity of the 
other in an unanticipatable or incalculable mode of justice from elsewhere.   
 
At the risk of being needlessly repetitive, I want to insist, that the notion of the ghost dance 
extends itself far beyond the moment of the judicial decision, It occurs in all regulatory and 
enforcement decisions including those online that involve a relational engagement with the 
speech of the other i.e., as a communication of “life being lived relationally”. As has been 
suggested, more pragmatically, such a counter-conjuring engagement can only happen with 
an unprogrammable exercise of unanticipatable justice that eschews the calculability of terms 
like “terrorism”, “glorification” and “encouragement” as well as human rights principles like 
“proportionality”, “living together” and “the margin of appreciation”924 and instead gives 
precedence to the alterity and speech of the other.925  
 
Admittedly, AI, algorithms and online communication technologies will still present us with 
undecidable and indeterminable regulatory conundrums. Such conundrums are intertextual 
and inescapable. They already dissolve into the indeterminate/spectral milieus of speech and 
terrorism. But the lessons of the ghost dance (i.e., responsiveness, attentiveness, 
attunement, and roamingness) can also be applied in the context of online speech regulation. 
And thus, perhaps, if we extemporaneously attend to technology regulation with a singular 
reflective/ attentive disposition that reads and listens to the interminable questions of 
heterogeneity beyond the calculative “human”926 impulse to “render the indeterminate 
determinate”927 (i.e., a responsiveness that heeds to the iterable plurivocality of the demands 
and desires of their “text”/“speech”), maybe then, many of the hypervisual ghosts that 




Whilst this chapter may be viewed as merely “speculative”, it is important.928 Without 
speculative imaginations, we are spectrally transfixed (as we have been for the last 18 years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 As noted in the introduction, my reluctance to define terrorism or harm is an ethical stance that is 
guided by the idea that attempts to define any legal term (or even an attempt to defend the rule of law, 
legal institutions, as well as the integrity, coherence/ stability of legal rules is logocentric), always 
already engender and sustain the spectral effects and exclusionary violence of liberal-utilitarianism. 
Thus the ghost dance has to be unprogrammable, un-anticipatable, and improvised i.e., “unrecognisable 
and beyond all knowledge”. Derrida, Rogues p.60 
925 Thurschwell, Specters and scholars 
926 Wynter, Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom 
927 Malabou, C. Morphing intelligence: from IQ measurement to artificial brains (Columbia University 
Press, 2019) p.103 
928 For James, speculative thought is an indispensible way of imagining otherwise in order to overcome 
systems of oppression: James, C.L.R. Lectures on the black Jacobins: How I wrote the Black Jacobins 
(14/06/1974) p.74 available at: < https://libcom.org/files/c-l-r-james-lectures-on-the-black-jacobins.pdf > 
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since 9/11) in a “neutral directionless gleam –– the gaze turned back upon itself and closed in 
a circle”929 that constantly rattles us. I am concerned (hauntingly) to see how we might undo 
this transfixion, but I am even more concerned about how we might counter-conjure it.  
 
The reality (both conceptually and pragmatically) is that nothing else seems to be turning 
things round. As this thesis has demonstrated, apart from marginalizing minoritarian speech, 
contemporary legal and enforcement practices that aim to pre-empt harmful speech self-
compromise, perhaps because they are based on a framework that privileges an idealised 
model of speech or humanity (i.e., an overrepresentation of the western ethnoclass of 
European man as Sylvia Wynter might say)930 over others. To this end, they regenerate a 
spectral resurfacing of violence and spectral vulnerabilities within regulation that persists 
interminably. We therefore need different conceptual imaginations, speculative imaginations 
that radically/intentionally embrace difference, in order to offer us pathways through which we 
can reckon with the insistence of the ineffable ghosts of the other in the past and present. For 
this reason, post-9/11-7/7 hauntological problems of terrorism (writ-large even beyond 
questions of “incitement”) require a kind of counter extra-legal speculation in order to deal 
with their interminable conceptual difficulties as well as their legal enforcement and regulatory 
difficulties. As I have suggested, part of this speculation may involve a supplementary 
exercise of patient-irretrievable reading, roaming, and listening that is attentive to the 
precedence of the heterogeneous speech and alterity of the other,931 and not on the closure 
of liberal-utilitarian self/group interests. 
 
This thesis has shown how this could be done provisionally through the unprogrammable 
notion of the ghost dance so as “to better understand the past’s omnipresence now, in the 
present”932 and in the future. Until we dare to imagine this space of radical relationality 
between law, policy, regulation, and speech is conceptually re-configured, the unheimlich 
ghosts of the other’s unspeakable speech will always return to haunt us interminably ––thus, 
to invoke Hamlet, “the readiness is all”.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
929Blanchot, M. The Essential Solitude, The Space of Literature (University of Nebraska Press, 1982) 
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930 Supra n.867 
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political logic of sovereignty, rights and categorical imperatives and opens out a different potentiality/ 
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Ghost dance. See: Vázquez, R., Translation as erasure: thoughts on modernity's epistemic 
violence. Journal of Historical Sociology 24, no. 1 (2011): 27-44; Glissant, E. Caribbean discourse: 
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Me (M): So I am interviewing you because you said you worked at Facebook, right? 
 
Mod: I was not working for Facebook I was a content moderator but I was using Facebook policies 
in order to decide whether content needed to be removed or not. 
 
M: OK, so where you one of the people removing the content or where you one of the people who 
were deciding if content should be removed or not? 
 
Mod: Yes I was but I was basing my decisions on the policies so if there’s something that is clear 
we would remove but if there is something that isn’t we don’t take that decision we ask Facebook 
employees because they are the ones who make the policies and they are the ones who implement 
them. We have all the policies and we take a decision based on the policies. 
 
M: What is the difference between you and an algorithm. 
 
Mod: I guess an algorithm is a computer it is systematic. I do not know much about algorithms but I 
know that they are not able to see the background when making decisions whereas we as humans 
can see this and we are more sensitive to it. 
 
M: So you would be more sensitive to the contextual issues say with regard to a post? 
 
Mod: I guess so but it’s hard. Because for example if we have a picture with say nudity, whether it 
is an algorithm or us; the decision is the same because either way we don’t allow nudity on 
Facebook. But if it is hate speech, then its going to be different because, for hate speech you can 
have words that are hateful and based on our understanding of the context we would not remove 
them but it may be different for an algorithm. It depends on what you are working on. 
 
M: So in your role as a moderator, which kinds of content did you get to look at, you mentioned hate 
speech and nudity but which other kinds of content did you look at? 
 
Mod: It was very diverse. We were doing nudity, pornography not really?  It depends on the market 
really. I mean the French market. The Spanish one mainly was concerned with pornography and 
nudity. Whilst we the French one had more hate speech. We also looked at posts related to suicide 
so if we saw an account with people trying to harm themselves we would have procedures for that.  
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M: So you talked about escalation. I find this very interesting. When you escalate do you get to talk 
to the person at Facebook who is going to look at the content after you have looked at it? 
  
Mod: In cases of escalation we ask the question to a Facebook employee and the employee gets 
back to us with an answer. It's not necessarily through a manager. I also prefer not to go in too 
many details on that because there isn't one particular way to do it. 
 
M: What are some of the interpretational challenges you faced whilst looking at content. Did you 




M: Yes did you come to certain decisions with opinions like; O, ‘this is immoral’? 
 
Mod: Well, we needed to put this on the side. Because we all have different opinions and if we, we 
worked based on our opinions there would be no consistency. Of course sometimes we really want 
to remove certain things but we have to let go. Our job is to follow the policy so we do that. And if 
we strongly feel that something is different we ask the Facebook employees and see what next to 
do because nothing is perfect you know? 
 
M: Are you trying to say that there are certain things in the policy that you were not satisfied with or 
you thought were insufficient? 
 
Mod: Its just you know that everyday, new challenges, new scenarios come up and maybe 
something that has never happened before will come up and in these situations there is no policy 
about it. But in general they have thought about the policies and it is hard to disagree with them. So 
at the start you get training and after this you may still disagree with some of them but it doesn’t 
matter. You apply them anyway. Because there are people working on these policies. I am sure 
there are lawyers, so you do not want to go against these policies. 
 
M: So your background isn’t law is it? 
 
Mod: Yes it is. I studied law but I didn’t do anything related to the Internet.  
 
M: Right, because I was going to ask, did you find anything in the policy that you thought was going 
beyond the law? Was the policy in your opinion flexible enough to work within legal principles? 
 
Mod: As I said, I do not know much about Internet law, I am not sure; I don't know all the 
procedures. 
 
                                                                         	  
264	  
M: I did have an interview with the UK Facebook Policy manager a few weeks ago and he told me 
that it depends on the country sometimes but at the same time, he said that they were mainly 
driven by US law because they are primarily a US company. It seems to me that generally this is 
something they determine based on whatever situation is thrown at them.  
 
Mod: I need to clarify here that we were not doing legal removals. We were doing removals based 
on the policy of the company that is Facebook. So we were applying the company’s global policy. I 
know that in certain circumstances Facebook may take different decisions per county. But we were 
not working based on countries we focused more on the global policy.  It is different. So I am sure 
that they have policies that are different per country but for the type of content I was working on it 
was the same for everyone because it was global. I think for other issues like privacy defamation 
etc. they make take such decisions on a country-to-country basis. Even then still, a Facebook 
employee and not a content moderator would make such a decision.   
 
M: That’s clear. What kinds of training do you undergo as a content moderator is it just a basic 
study of the user policy or does it go beyond that? 
 
Mod: It is basic but it is through. For the first three weeks, a lot of people come through because, 
well, they need to hire people. So, you have someone who trains you and they would have a power 
point presentation. They would then go through the slides and would explain to you what the policy 
is and give relevant examples. And at the end, you would work on test scenarios and apply what 
you will have learnt. At the end they do a kind of auditing to make sure that you have understood 
the policies well. I think this was a good thing because they were hiring a lot of people and in such 
situations auditing is a good thing. The training was well done. You know they are hiring people 
from everywhere people from every background and from different languages.  And they have to 
explain things like hate speech nudity and all those other things to them.  
 




M: Could you go through some of the kinds of hate speech you dealt with? 
 
Mod:  Much of what was going through the French Market. So obviously there were situations like 
you know during terrorist incidents… then there would be lots of hate speech against those people. 
There was also hate speech directed to Jewish people you know making jokes about them but not 
funny jokes, racist jokes. There was a lot of hate against immigrants, a lot of hate against Muslims. 
These were the main cases. 
 
M: So in your opinion was this mainly politically motivated hate or was it ideological? 
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Mod: Politically driven? Hmm I think people just don’t realise that what they write online has a huge 
impact because it is not just like you say something and we forget about it. I mean it is written down 
and a lot of people see it. Most of the cases were political I guess because they occurred during the 
period of French elections so, most people I guess became racist towards Arabs. A lot of people 
voted for Marie Le Pen and they would express themselves boldly in this manner. So if it was 
political I guess it would be directed towards Arabs. But the hate towards Jewish people, I don’t 
think it is political (you know) it is more historical because they always refer to awful jokes about the 
gas chamber etc. 
 
M: But the political is always historical also, because I mean in France, if you talk about the Arab 
question you are always going to have to talk about the French empire. 
 
Mod: Yes true. 
 
M: Anyway you said something about people not being aware of what they post and not being 
aware that what they post can have an impact on whoever reads it. Do you honestly believe that 
posting something online has an impact on readers? 
 
Mod: I feel that sometimes it does. I don’t have any friends on Facebook who post hateful content. 
So, I never see such content myself. But I feel that if you have this type of speech then all your 
friends on Facebook must be similar to you and because you all have it around you every time you 
feel safe and encouraged to post such content yourself .It happens when there is a terrorist attack 
so you see things like: “O again an Arab, so typical lets kill them all!” .I feel that because people see 
that its written somewhere else, they think its fine for them to rewrite or share it. And some people 
know this and still do it. So they will say somehwere in their post: “I am probably going to get kicked 
off Facebook for 24 hours but who cares” you know? !  Maybe, sometimes people just don’t realise 
that they are insulting people, they don’t realise the impact this may have. 
 
M: This is something I am struggling with in my thesis at the moment because I have to have a 
stand and I am not so sure I am a minority person myself and people have said hateful insultful 
things to me But do you know sometimes I don’t care if they say such things as long as I can say 
something back? Sometimes I think maybe we are too obsessed with regulating content. But, you 
seem to say that actually there is a point in regulating because if we don’t regulate then people feel 
encouraged. It sort of becomes normalised. 
 
Mod: I think sometimes yes it goes too far but sometimes it doesn’t It depends on the situation. … 
Well, unless you mention a particular category of people. I don’t know I think there’s a lack of 
education too. I hope I am being clear.  
 




Mod: I think policies and regulation are important because if you did not have any if someone sees 
that something is acceptable they are going to do it and they are going to probably say something 
worse. Sometimes it feels that people are testing the Facebook policies. They reach certain limits 
(in between free speech and hate speech) and they know that it’s very hard for us to decide in 
these situations whether it’s a removal or not. But if we didn’t do anything then there would be 
horrible things. 
 
M: Hmm I am trying to think now outside Facebook. I know that in the US they have wider speech 
freedoms so people say hateful speech and in France and Germany they have tighter speech laws. 
So you cannot win one way or the other? It seems to me that hateful people will always have a 
voice. 
 
Mod: I am not sure. Don’t you think that there’s more hate in the US. ? I do not think that we are as 
racist as people in the US. You know the white supremacists and all? We don’t really have those 
types of things here in France … but we probably do in Germany. 
 
M: Maybe not in France but in Germany you know they have the neo-Nazi... 
 
Mod: That’s true that’s true. But I think that people in America can be more easily brain washed? 
So if you are child and you don’t have an opinion on things and then you read such hateful content 
it might influence you differently in a way it wouldn’t if you hadn’t read it. (I think hearing my self 
speak; I would say I am more for removal). I feel that in America its either completely restricted, or 
they don’t do anything about it. And I like to think that it’s good to have a balance between the two. I 
think here in Europe we have that. I know that Germany is trying now to remove hate speech on 
platforms within 24 hours. 
 
M: Do you think that’s feasible? Do you think that’s possible? 
 
Mod: From the way Facebook was dealing with it I think it is feasible. Because you know as content 
moderators we worked both day shifts and night shifts. So there would be people from 9 to 6 and 
then people from 7 to 6. The only problem would be maybe the amount of content they would be 
required to take down. But I think I also read an article where Facebook were against applying this 
law claiming that it should be the courts that are responsible for deciding on something like this and 
not Facebook. But if Facebook really had to, I am sure that they would because they have the 
people and resources to do it. 
 
M: Obviously you were dealing with very clear standards but to me it seems that being a content 
moderator you are a kind of ‘pseudo-judge’ would you say so, because you have to make these 
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difficult decisions and in a way, you are directing the ways in which speech should work within a 
society/public sphere? 
  
Mod: But I don’t feel that I was a ‘judge’ because I was not the one making the policy  
 
M: But you are interpreting a sort of law or a procedure a way of doing things? 
 
Mod: Interpretation not really, because everything would be clearly written down and like I said if 
there was a new scenario we would ask someone from Facebook, so, we did not have the freedom 
to say Right I think like this so … It’s a good question. Sometimes yes it would seem like we would 
make these decisions but like I said in the end we would not be applying our own opinions. 
 
M: So, the people who ultimately make these decisions are your managers? Or the people at 
Facebook you escalate these issues to? 
 
Mod: Like I said. We had this document/tool in which we would ask questions about the issue from 
some one at Facebook and then they would get back to us with the relevant information. It was not 
a direct physical contact it was only all written. So we would raise a question and they would get 
back to us.  
 
M: Could you give me an example of a scenario where more information would have been sent 
back to you?  
  




Mod: Sometimes we have to make big decisions but it is always based on the policy.  
 
M: I guess it’s a very human thing and we all make mistakes. 
 
Mod: Yes, we all make mistakes.  
 
M: Ah you were talking about the news. So apparently Facebook was criticised for taking down 
content in the context of the Rohingya massacre. There was an opinion that Facebook should have 
left the content because in taking them down they were denying a minority group representation 
especially in a politically charged situation.  
 
Mod: Is it Facebook that changed its decision or is it the newspaper that said that Facebook should 
have done it differently? 
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M: Facebook did not change its decision but the newspaper said that Facebook should have acted 
differently, so Facebook was in this very difficult situation. I talked to the Facebook manager about 
this. He said they do get some decisions wrong and they have to apologise to the parties involved. 
But I guess it’s very hard. 
 
Mod: Well it is but like I said if we have a question that is hard we ask a Facebook employee and 
then they have to answer these questions and its hard for them because new situations crop up 
and these can be really tough questions. I am sure for them it is difficult because they need to take 
so many countries and cultures into consideration, what is acceptable and what is not acceptable 
etc. And I am sure that it is very difficult for them. 
 
M: I mean even words, just words, if used by different people can change the meaning of a whole 
sentence you know? 
 
Mod: Right, that is why Facebook is very complicated because there’s a lot of thought around 
context. So for one post, for every single post there is a comments section. So how do you interpret 
what all these people are saying? You know sometimes things are not said directly and so they 
could be talking about people without exactly talking about them thus, it may not be hate speech, or 
not.  Other times it is very straight forward e.g. “I hate Muslims and I want to kill them etc.”, so it is 
difficult, you may not want to restrict freedom of speech … but this is one of these situations 
 
M: And I guess it is even more complicated with terrorist speech. I know you did not do anything 
much with terrorist speech but you could talk about it? What are your opinions on the challenges of 
regulating terrorist speech?  
  
Mod: Well again sometimes, it is very obvious, and easy to tell e.g., when someone says “go bomb 
this place etc.” but other times it can be difficult because we may not have the knowledge of what 
may be considered as terrorism and what can not be. For countries in a dictatorship, who decides 
what a terrorist organisation is, for example? Facebook are basing their knowledge on this off very 
different sources. And these vary from country to country. At the same time they do not want to 
restrict speech. So, it is very complicated. 
 
M: In my research, I use a theoretical lens, which I call a hauntology. This is basically the idea of a 
haunting. Like ghosts, so I imagine how this affects the way we think about things like regulation  
 
Mod: By hauntology do you mean? … Haunting thoughts, haunting, how people think? 
 
M: Yes, generally about how we think and regulate terrorism…about how things come and go, 
about how things are shared online, on Twitter on the news etc. 
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Mod: Well its about two guys that work for the FBI who interview criminals so that they know how 
they think so that they can prevent them from committing future crimes because if you know how 
they think and how they act then you can prevent them… so it makes me think of that  
 
M: ha-ha yes. I should watch it! 
 
Mod: So, why not. Why should we not look after how people think or act? What is wrong in that? 
But I guess in the Internet it is complex because how can you know the behaviour how would you 
be able to predict crime. You would maybe need a lot of engineers to think of tools to do that…  
 
M: I mean I could have mentioned this before but academics like Russell Brewer have questioned 
whether or not looking at something can cause crime. In some cases yes, but in others no. So, it is 
very hard to draw a consistent causative link between crime online and offline.  
 
Mod: Maybe, it does not happen for each case but for the cases in which it happens it could be very 
helpful. It doesn’t harm to look into it because, a lot of people search say how to make a bomb 
online so making such information online is a big factor. 
 
M: But do you honestly think that a terrorist would go onto Google and search how to make a bomb 
or would they not take measures say use tor browsers to evade law enforcement?  
 
Mod: I am not sure it depends on the person, but yes, if you are a proper terrorist then you may 
take measures to evade Google because they would know. But it seems that since the terrorism 
attacks started things are escalating and people are getting ideas from the Internet but also from 
the news. We haven’t always had this. Things changed after that truck attack in Nice. Of course 
they would get their information from elsewhere too, but I feel that the Internet really helps and 
there are so many things that are accessible and there are so many things that make it hard for 
such companies to be proactive about. For instance they, (the terrorists) would put such content on 
say online drives Google drives but they would use multiple accounts so its not easy to know if it’s 
the same person. They can easily create different accounts and they are actually tech savvy from 
what I’ve heard. So I think the Internet helps them.  
 
M: So in my interview with the UK policy manager he said that terrorist/ hate speech cannot be 
prevented but he was of the view that Facebook and other platforms are improving, that they are 
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using more algorithms, employing more content moderators etc.  But … do you think that we are 
fighting a losing battle; are you hopeful? 
 
Mod: Well I am hopeful it is my job. It’s my job but I am hopeful because you really get to help 
people. Sometimes people are experiencing things like sextortion you know, when people get with 
someone and they pretend to be a nice girl and they get them to do a sex tape and they ask for 
money. So we can intervene in these situations and tell them basic things like how to reach the 
police basic issues of safety. I think of children too who are small and easily influenced and harmed 
online. I also think that as content moderators we are removing a lot of content I don’t have the 
numbers but we are doing well.  So I think its good what we are doing. I kind of feel that I am the 
police. I don’t feel like I am a judge but I feel like I am the police. But we don’t really investigate … 
so, it is very important that we are here because if we were not here, no one would be using 
Facebook. It would be unsafe and you wouldn’t want to go on there anyway. We make the online 
experience better. 
 
M: I like to think that you are a good cop. 
 
Mod: Yes, and I think we are winning as well. Because now we have algorithms that scan images 
like neo-Nazi flags etc. That’s what it is.  
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P (Me the interviewer): What is your position within the organisation you work for and what 
organisation is this? 
 
M (the interviewee): I work at the ACEU National Police; the ACEU police are a single organisation 
since 2012. It is one ACEU national police now, but before we used to have different forms of 
organisation or areas of jurisdiction like for instance the metropolitan police in the UK, but its all one 
organisation now.  
 
P: So, could you paint a picture of what happens when the ACEU police are faced with a scenario 
of having to regulate something of a terrorist or extremist nature online? 
 
M: Well, there is an official legal regulation, which is currently under review, but it is not out until god 
knows whenever politics decides. And there is another ‘not completely law-based’ (I would have 
said legal: however law-based is more accurate) framework that we use. For the official legal part, 
we have a notice and takedown procedure, which is rather convoluted, I will explain to you why. 
Back when the internet came to the ACEU, the would be providers made a lot of noise and argued 
heavily to the legislators that as a mere conduit they could not be responsible and criminally liable 
for whatever happened on their networks unless they were aware of it. It gets really complicated… 
 
So, in order to ensure co-operation the ACEU public prosecutor informs these parties the ISP’S that 
they are hosting radical extremist content and that this content in the public prosecutors opinion is 
illegal. Now the way this works this not a warrant or an order; he cannot currently order them to 
take it down. So in the law they have a criminal liability exclusion clause933 which states that as long 
as they are unaware they cannot be: a) held responsible/complicit for the crime and b) as long as 
they do not continue abetting the crime after being informed that it exists they can never be 
criminally liable. Thus, in practice, the public prosecutor sends usually an email or a fax (or one is 
sent on behalf of) to the ISP telling them of where they saw the content, on whatever domain, the 
nature of the content and asking them to take it down or else face prosecution. The problem with 
this is that the procedure of it was never codified in the code of criminal procedure so all the private 
ISPs did it in their own way, so out of frustration, the ISPs at some point wrote a code of conduct 
which the police and prosecutors would follow when requesting a Takedown. The thing is all the 
rules we work with were invented by the private sector, which is weird.  
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The next problem is that you now have a public prosecutor and an ISP who together censor this 
content because essentially a take down request is censorship. But there is never any judge 
involved since it is not in the code of criminal procedure there is no complaint procedure either. 
Now as a third party you may complain to the private party on the one hand and they may not listen 
to you and on the other hand if you complain to the public prosecutor you risk prosecution (note: 
this is assuming the poster of the (allegedly) illegal content ID remains unknown) so guess who 
wins. 
 
P: The public prosecutor? 
 
M: Yes, that is rather clear; not many people complain [in the context of terrorist content]. With 
regard to the kinds of content deemed illegal, there has been a lot of it especially with a lot of 
Islamic, hate speech, solicitation for (hesitates) becoming a soldier for a Jihadist cause elsewhere 
etcetera etcetera. However, it is important to note that in ACEU some public prosecutors are rather 
forward in their decisions with the kinds of content they deem illegal. So more and more people 
have started complaining saying things like: hey, I wrote a piece about the Koran it is not 
necessarily critical… but that doesn’t mean that it is ‘Jihadi’ or whatever so why are you taking it 
down. There have also been complaints from journalists and reporters saying: “hey I can’t do my 
job because if I publish this criticising ACEU government policy it will get removed” and journalists 
do not like their pieces removed. So there has been a sort of counter/lobby to change the law. 
 
As things stand legally, in the ACEU parliament there is currently a computer crime iii law, (a bill) 
under advisement which has new provisions one of which aims to do away with the peculiar old 
construction of criminal exclusion of liability clause to allow for a proper criminal code procedure934 
and an opportunity to complain to an independent judge as the European Court demands.  
 
Now, what we have found is that due to the …amount of work involved with getting a public 
prosecutor to look at the content and send a message to the ISPs, combined with the amount of 
terrorist related things that the police tend to find, -“it takes up too much capacity and effort” –– 
mind you, I do not agree with this but this is the position of the ACEU police and public prosecutors.  
 
P: Why do you say you strongly disagree with it? Are there any ways you think it could be more 
effective or…? 
 
M: I think that the amount of capacity involved should not be the ultimate deciding factor in deciding 
whether or not we should make the rules more lax. Crime prevention and crime fighting just always 
will take up a lot of people and resources. We basically should stop whining about this. The police 
are whining and the public prosecution is whining and we always want it more efficient but I have 
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found that in my more than X years of experience with the ACEU police as a legal advisor, I have 
found that whenever the law constricts them (the police or Public prosecutor) some within the 
organisation will bring up the efficiency argument. I spend a lot of hours behind my desk writing 
papers not doing ‘actual’ police (or legal) work. Police work is about putting in such hard work, like 
writing these papers so if you are not a street cop, sitting behind a desk and doing paperwork is 
part and parcel of the job and if you don’t like it you should find another job. This is my personal 
opinion; the opinion of the ACEU police is rather different. The thing is, legal safeguards do not 
exist to bother the police. Well, legal safeguards exist to protect the public from say, censorship and 
other things. If the rules take up to much capacity perhaps it is time to increase funding instead of 
reducing rules.  
 
Now with this out of the way, lets look at the non-law based part. We have a unit now that is 
specifically tasked to find radical extremist jihadist content, content for solicitation of jihadist fighters 
abroad for the caliphate etcetera. Now what this unit does is scour the Internet for these things as 
long as they appearing to be aimed at harming ACEU society. 
 
P: Just to clarify is this informal body also part of the ACEU police? 
 
M: This is a group, a unit of police people working for the police under the direction of the police 
yes. But let me be absolutely clear, they for this specific part of the job] are not operating under the 
code of criminal procedure or any such law. And so they might be legal questions about it if you 
ask. What they do is the following… 
 
P: What is the name of this unit, if I may ask? 
 
M: I’d have to look up that for you but its one of those abbreviations that governments are fond of; 
remind me after the interview.  
 
Now what they do is they find content, which is, lets say objectionable -I cant say illegal [because 
that would require a judicial decision]- what they think is objectionable and then they look at the 
ISPs in question and their EULA’s or policies (of any social media and hosting sites I am not 
mentioning names) and all of these user policies usually reserve the right to remove content or 
temporarily or permanently ban the user or whatever…. There is a range of penalties in these 
policies. So, what this unit does is that they say to the ISP or company in question: we are not 
ordering you or anything we are not asking you or anything we are pointing it out to you that this 
content is objectionable to your own user policy and then they leave it be. The idea obviously being 
that this ISP or company looks at the content and decides on its own merits whether or not to take it 
down. From a private law point of view, this is obviously not an issue because there is an 
agreement between this service and the third party users and technically, anybody in the world, any 
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person, including the ACEU police can inform the company that something is amiss and in 
accordance with this user policy the company can take it down.  
 
The thing is, the ACEU police are not just any citizen, they are an official/officials of the state and 
they are prompting this removal. Now there are people saying [just to emphasise: not necessarily 
my position – just opposing voices] that they should not leave this decision (of removal) to private 
companies who are not usually even based in the ACEU, as they would not be able to rightly 
assess the kinds of content aimed at harming ACEU society.  
 
Moreover, these companies are a non-body a non-judge but they are now judge, jury and 
executioners of the content. Well, one could say that it is fair for any one including the ACEU police 
to point out that this content is a violation and the rest is up to the company; they are simply 
prompting them. I’ll leave you to form your own opinion on this … 
 
Now, lastly if the content is truly and fully more than objectionable thus criminal and not taken down 
because of the user licence the ACEU Police may get the foreign authorities to execute an order. 
Obviously, most companies for what you might call good reasons will say ‘this is apparently illegal’ 
and proceed to remove without any orders or warrants. This will reduce paperwork and the ACEU 
police rejoices. 
 
P: Would you say then that the ACEU Police exerts a shadow of control a kind of coercion in this 
matter? 
 
M: No. Well no, I advised them on this thus, in doing this, [I don’t sit at their desk when they make 
the calls, so should is the maximum I can state] they should make it explicitly clear that they have 
no legal basis, no warrant, and no power. But it still, it is still the ACEU Police asking them. The 
mere fact that they, that is, the police present themselves as a government official changes things, 
if you made the same request or complaint as a regular citizen, it would be different. Make of that 
what you will, but it is not illegal. 
 
P: You have given me a very legal answer but I can read… get, where you are coming from 
  
M: It is efficient. It is very efficient but is it right? This is the question I’m still not quite sure how to 
answer myself. So what I do is, I try to make sure is that the police stay within the legal boundaries. 
I couldn’t stop this even if I wanted to so the maximum I could do is to make sure that [this stays] 
within the legal boundaries. It was going to happen. 
 
P: Yes, it was going to happen anyway. So, in my research I have devised this framework where I 
look at contemporary terrorist regulation and indeed terrorism through the lens of hauntology i.e., 
haunting. Thus for example, I view terrorist content as a ghost a spectre, a spook that haunts the 
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legal and socio-political imaginary. Would you say that this hauntology of terrorism, with its 
mutations and regulatory phantoms is generally present in the ACEU? 
 
M: I am really not the person to talk to for the average ACEU opinion on this nonetheless, yes. I 
really think that the spectre of terrorism is a problem in the ACEU. The definition of what terrorism 
actually is as its being used in society right now has nothing to do with the definition of terrorism as 
proscribed in the law or even ten years ago. For me, terrorism is strictly (I am doing this by 
[memory] so I may falter here and there)…  its directed forceful action aimed to instil fear or 
damage with the ultimate intent to overthrow legitimate government for whatever reason or ideal; it 
could be a theocracy with Muslim intent, the communists, the Francoists -I don’t really give a 
damn…  
 
If you see how terrorism is used in the common language, and I am not speaking of legally trained 
people, a lot of things get called terrorism that I’d disagree with. So even where one may say that 
“Islam is the best religion and all people should convert” this may already border on what some 
people may call a jihadist or terrorist-related statement –– and I am just saying that they are 
expressing a religious opinion. I live in a small town with very strict protestant people and I hear 
them say the same things but nobody is bothered.  
 
Now, we have these groups of immigrants that are obviously non–European lets describe them like 
that and they tend to have an ‘outside-culture’ very much opposed to what the ACEU are 
accustomed to. Especially the men between the ages of say 16 and 26, they cause issues, and 
sometimes true issues, but now this is called ‘street-terrorism’ (we both laugh) this is bullshit. Well, 
they act together and may cause threats, and yes they are sometimes violent and yes they are rude 
but they have absolutely nothing to do with overthrowing the ACEU government, they are just being 
pains in the *** (we both laugh) like any number of males between the ages of 16 and 26!  
 
 
P: Oh yes, and what about “ACEU males”, does the same happen? 
 
M: Then, you get this weird thing where if its an originally ACEU guy, the chances of somebody 
calling him a street terrorist are noticeably lower in my personal opinion than if its someone who 
looks as if they may have a connection to Islam. And I am not saying that this is completely 
unjustified, but it does tend to indicate some form of bias which is very hard to exclude but should 
be excluded as much as possible when dealing with the public as a police officer. There are groups 
that are responsible for a larger part of criminality (or terrorist acts) for a much larger extent as say 
percentages of the population in general would indicate and for this reason you could say that from 
a strict numbers point of view these groups are [over-averagely] responsible for such crimes in 
ACEU.  
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However, this is likely to lead to false positives and tunnel vision and stigma etcetera. And so even 
if it is true (which it is) it should never be a reason for singling out these groups. You should always 
check against other factors objectively to determine whether or not this ‘hunch’ is right and based 
on facts. Especially where terrorism is involved, you see that many people in the ACEU public and 
also the ACEU police and ACEU prosecution (hesitates) seem to be a little less strict about how 
much of that objectivity they need to do. I am being very careful in my wording because I do not 
want to paint a picture of an extremely biased racist or ethnnicist ACEU police because this does 
not exist [in my experience!]. But there are issues with the whole societal zeitgeist. 
 
P: Oh, I can relate to this. Here in the UK, you find that there is legislation now that obliges public 
authorities like say, schools to have a duty of care to prevent children and vulnerable from being 
radicalised. 
 
M: Yes, they are actually starting to push this in schools here too but that’s a very recent 
development. 
 
P: And so, there is a kind of (hesitates)… one would say, an unconscious bias, ––I think? 
 
M: Well it’s not unconscious. Its not a personal bias now, it is a system bias and system biases are 
always bad. They may feel less a bias as they become part of systems and habits and procedures 
etc, – so there’s no actual ‘decision’ about a single thing anymore. A personal bias can be solved 
by having another person look at it, but a system bias is much harder to solve.  
 
P: Yes … 
 
M: And I have always fought against system biases as a legally trained person. Even though I do 
have great respect for the hunches of detectives, or their gut feeling -they are more often than not 
right- but then still they need to do some form of objective analysis before they act.  
 
P: Just a follow up question similar to what you’ve just said I just want clarity, would you say then 
that the police or this informal body you were talking about? 
 
M (interjects): It is not an informal body as such it is a unit, a sub-sub-sub department of the ACEU 
police of about maybe 20 or so police officers who were just given this task. 
 
P: OK, I will call it the department for our purposes, would you say that, that this department 
experiences these same problems of objective judgement and reasoning? 
 
M: The way I interpret it, and they probably will not look at me kindly for saying so, they wash their 
hands of this responsibility in that regard. They are merely pointing to user transgressions of user 
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policies of online services. Differently put: they explicitly refrain from making a judgement 




M: So, we (as the police) don’t decide anything, we point it out to the company and then they place 
the responsibility for this judgement as a matter of completely in the hands of that company. In my 
opinion, if an ACEU police official asks anybody it is their responsibility to make that judgement that 
judgement of objectivity. I don’t go asking you whether I should shoot a running suspect either. And 
well one might say but guns are different but no; they are not different at all!  
 It’s the exact same method but now there is a gun involved and it’s all of a sudden different. No its 
not. It’s a matter of correct reasoning and that’s what I struggle with. I see the effectiveness. I see 
the point of pointing out specific harm but I think its part of a bigger move by the government of 
shifting more responsibilities into the hands of private persons and companies, a move, which I am 
against. We have a government for a reason. And one of these reasons is to assume responsibility 
and make and take decisions. But now, we are pushing them back to the private. I am not sure 
what this situation is like in the UK, but you might also ask is not the government absconding from 
its public duties? Why should a foreign-based company do our enforcement for us or even have an 
opinion on whether or not… there is a lot of room for nasty stuff right there. Officials have to be fully 
responsible for whatever happens within their roles for this particular problem and solution. That is 
my opinion and this opinion will go against the grain of many ACEU policemen and the public 
prosecution. 
 
 P: OK. Would you say that the process of regulating extremist or terrorist content is very different 
from something like the regulation of illegal child sexual images? 
 
M: No, it carries the same emotional and moral stigma or bias that reduces the [perceived] 
responsibility to reason objectively. They are both very socially and emotionally laden concepts. 
 
P: Wouldn’t you say though for something like child sexualised images or child pornography we 
have got clearer, agreed upon international standards? 
  
M: No [in hindsight I probably should have said: yes, but….], because what is considered a sexual 
act differs from jurisdiction, from country to country and the age of consent for sex is different (not 
wildly different though, a woman of 40 years in consent is not an issue in most places) In Germany 
the legal age of consent is 16, but there are countries where the legal age of consent is 21. So, 
there is rather a large difference. In ACEU we have had this whole discussion about virtual child 
porn where there is no actual child involved no actual child harmed but just images computer-
processed images that look real enough. Now is this objectionable or not? Some may say it is 
morally objectionable but is it a legal issue? Some will say well law is moral and one shouldn’t look 
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at children at all in a sexualised manner following this line of reasoning One could say that those 
who look at these images are deviants (and may harm children later) and need to be punished! 
[To make it clear, virtual crime pornography is forbidden in ACEU. Any depiction of sexual acts or 
content seemingly involving persons under the age of consent is forbidden.] 
 
P: I have a few questions left; I am going to move back briefly into human rights, which we have 
flirted with. So if an individual posted something deemed objectionable and it was taken down how 
would they get redress, would they do this through the company...or? 
 
M: We will split this answer. Under current Notice and Take down procedure they have no redress 
and I am in no doubt that this would lead to a conviction by the European Court of Human rights 
[should someone pursue it, but they wont….for obvious reasons] because censorship without a 
justifiable reason is wrong at least that’s what this Court systematically says [and they deem judicial 
review a subcondiction for jurifiably].  
 
So, current law is not right.  But, now like I said, there is a law being debated in parliament that 
changes this,935 allowing an infringed third party to complain to a judge. This does not mean 
however that the judge is involved in the process of take down and this could be problematic. An 
ACEU minister has said that they still prefer to use the voluntary method of take down where no 
judge looks at the content before it is taken down. Thus, the improvement would be that one would 
complain to a judge to have it [the content] reinstated. Whether this is good enough for the 
European Courts Human rights standards, one could have different opinions on it….  
 
Obviously, if an individual has a dispute with a company on this issue they could go to a private law 
judge in a civil court and bring a claim against the company for damages and/or to reinstate the 
content. Now with the other procedure, which I call Notice and Take Action instead of Notice and 
Take Down, where the action would be informing the private company of the objectionable content, 
as the ACEU government is not liable/addressable as they are not the acting party. So, any legal 
protection in dependent upon the companies policies and ‘ home law’. 
 
P: So there are some legal protective gaps? 
 
M: Well, it does not feel like a comprehensive system to me as a lawyer! I am sensing this is not a 
satisfactory answer? 
 
P: well, No. Whatever I have done in these past two and a half years of my research shows that, I 
mean, I keep learning that most things about Internet regulation are unsatisfactory. 
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M: Yes they are very unsatisfactory  
 
P: This is one of the reasons I think about it through this conceptual framework of hauntology, of 
ghosts of phantoms…. I think it sort of explains the unexplainable it explains why we have all these 
grey areas and gaps. 
 
M: Yes, it’s partly a ghost, in the sense that it is something scary, that we cannot explain how it 
works. All European countries have this. There is some apprehension. I am not sure you should call 
it fear, but apprehension, yes, and the other thing is in general, law moves slower than 
technological developments.  So, the police try and do what is societally acceptable [I meant: 




M: Yes fragile! That is correct, and sometimes this works out well in my professional opinion and 
sometimes, the result is a little less … satisfactory (we both laugh)  
 
P: OK, finally, what are your closing thoughts Do you think that there is hope? Do you think 
regulation could be improved and if it could be improved what are some recommendations that we 
could think of? 
 
M: Right. I think that any content taken down, and this is a personal opinion, should be through a 
judge not a public prosecutor and not a police officer why? Because they [judges] are legally trained 
and independent. 
 
P: So they the judges can do the whole objectivity-proportionality-balancing thing better? 
 
M: Yes they can do these things better. Traditionally, these kinds of decisions are made by judges 
and so I think that it’s odd that for other crimes we insist on this and yet for terrorism this is 
something completely different 
 
P: But based on the size and information overload of the Internet would you say that this would be a 
pragmatic move having judges make these decisions? 
 
M:  Obviously, as a long term police lawyer there are some situations where the law is tight and 
pragmatism has to take over but I also know that there are people in the public prosecution or the 
police that will take things one or two or three steps further than they should. Once you leave strict 
legality, drawing a boundary wherever else, becomes a very hard thing. It becomes increasingly 
hard to say well this is the right side of right and this is the wrong side of right.  So I prefer for 
myself for society and for certainty for the police that there are judges and that there is more 
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objective criteria that the judges apply this is also taking into consideration the fact that in civil law 
countries the judges only interpret law and do not make law.  
 
P: So, the problem in your view is not law per se, its legal interpretation execution? 
 
M: It is interpretation. The amount of interpretation required currently, and the people doing the 
interpretation is not up to the same standards as we have for many other things. This is not 
anybody’s fault. The problem is; Law is slow. It is a condensation of the societal average and some 
problems are not at the centre of society they are at the edge currently. I think for this particular 
issue law is too slow. One big legal issue remains obviously, the transnational differences. And so, 
what we, ACEU citizens, might deem objectionable or illegal and what the Germans deem 
objectionable and what the Hungarians deem objectionable are different. It gets even weirder if you 
go beyond Europe say China and South America or even average officially Islamic countries, which 
may be less inclined to address or co-operate on certain issues, because their societal issues are 
different and because they may have differences on how they view extremism. I do not know how 
to solve this…  
 
We need more research on this topic to make some issues clear and cut away some wrong 
reasoning.  
 
So what else is needed? You now go beyond the purview of law. I think that child pornography and 
terrorism ought to be looked at as any other form of serious crime, but they are not because they 
are emotionally and societally laden concepts. As long as society itself does not normalise its 
response to it, neither will the authorities, because the authorities are not immune from societal 
opinions and fears. This should happen but I do not know how change it. There is an issue here, 
but I haven’t got the expertise. That’s it.  
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Me (the interviewer ‘M’ hereinafter): What is your general view about terrorism and terrorism 
content? 
 
K (Karim Palant the interviewee, ‘K’ hereinafter): So, the opening for any comment that you’ll get 
from Facebook is really that terrorism and terrorism content has no place on Facebook. That 
includes the fact that anybody who is involved with a terrorist organisation or who is a member of a 
terrorist organisation will not be allowed on our platform and that is very clear. 
 
M: So your understanding of who a terrorist is based on the kind of organisation they belong to? 
 
K: No, no, I think predominantly, there are various global attempts to define what global terrorist 
organisations are and obviously, any one who is a member of pretty much those internationally 
accepted organisations definitely falls within the brackets. But then we have content. If such content 
praises or glorifies terrorist content without condemnation, or without it being for the purposes of a 
news report or so on, then we would remove that content. But on an individual level, you are either 
conceptually committing a terrorist act by planning a terrorist act or being a member of a terrorist 
organisation.  
 
M: Could you paint a picture of what happens if I say posted extremist or terrorist content? 
 
K: First all extremism and terrorism are separate.  
 
M: Do you separate them? 
 
K: Yes absolutely. So, extremist content does not have a definition. Terrorism has an element of 
advocating for violence, which does give you a distinction at least even if it is not a legally 
internationally accepted definition. There is a qualitative distinction between violent content (i.e., 
advocating for violence and being part of an organisation that commits violence) and merely very 
extreme views left or right on the political spectrum. And so, we do draw this distinction. For known 
terrorist organisations that are reasonably recognised as such, we are building a bank of known 
terrorist propaganda that goes into what is known as a hash-sharing database that is then blocked 
from being uploaded, reviewed at that point and removed before its posted the content. Other 
content, we identify largely due to reports to us these are then reviewed by a human being judged 
against our community standards our community standards are publicly set out.  
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So, to answer your question, you as an individual, if you posted terrorist content, because you do 
not belong to a known terrorist group that posts known terrorist propaganda, such content would be 
reported to us by a range of means, in most cases, another individual another platform user would 
click on the report button. The report would then come to us, and then a human being would review 
it, if it breaks our community standards, the content comes down. If you are an individual that 
repeatedly posts content, or a group or a page then the group or page will come down as well. But 
at that point, you as a group or page will have to be repeatedly violating our community standards.  
 
What we also do is we try, and this is not easy, to define hate organisations, that is organisations 
that define themselves based on the hatred of another group or protected category and protected 
categories are listed in our community standards.936 So if you are group that regularly defines itself 
by its hate of a particular group, and hate is a very difficult thing to justify because…. it is perfectly 
legitimate to say, actually, I hate this person! But to say that I hate all people who have or belong to 
this protected category is not fine, in other words, to say that I hate this religion is fine but to say 
that I hate all people who belong to this religion is probably not fine. If you say I dislike this religion 
because of X and therefore people who share that view I don’t like, it becomes a difficult boundary. 
 
M: So your definitions are mostly based on your community standards?  
 
K: We start from our community standards; we respect local law in whatever jurisdiction. But there 
will be scenarios where we will not respect local law and we will have disputes with the local legal 
authorities. Generally speaking, in a country like the UK here you have liberal Democratic norms, 
an openness of processes and a clear defining of what is illegal and legal we will respect them.  
 
M: What are your thoughts about the current government saying Facebook doesn’t do more than it 
should to regulate? 
 
K:  We have had an extensive discussion with the government for the last 6 to 12 months.  The 
government has a duty and a right to insist on action when they see a problem that they feel may 
well be leading to the radicalisation of young people or their recruitment into terrorist groups –and 
have real world consequences in terms of the safety of citizens. They have a right to find out what 
is being done. There is a whole load of detailed points. However, that I feel they lie behind on one 
of them which is that they want more visibility and more pressure on the companies to build the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
936 We define the term to mean direct and serious attacks on any protected category of people based on their 
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or disease. We work hard to 
remove hate speech quickly; however there are instances of offensive content, including distasteful humour, that 
are not hate speech according to our definition. In these cases, we work to apply fair, thoughtful, and scalable 
policies. This approach allows us to continue defending the principles of freedom of self-expression on which 
Facebook is founded. Available at: < https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and-
hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054/ > accessed 06/11/17 
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tools that we have been open about –I don’t know if you saw the blog by Monika Bickert and Brian 
Fishman?  … This is something you certainly should read.937  
 
M: Oh, yes I did  
 
K: So, we’ve been quite open about the kinds of technologies that we are trying to develop, to deal 
with terrorist content from known terrorist organisations as quickly as possible. Here known terrorist 
organisations are Al Qaeda or Daesh and so on and they basically try to use our platform in an 
organised way.  Speed is of the essence because they will use it in a highly effective way, to get out 
that propaganda quickly. And we have talked to the government openly and publicly online about 
the fact that we are working to develop intelligence-led tools to get ahead of that.  By this, I mean 
that we identify the propaganda very quickly, we bank it into a hash-database very quickly because, 
and you know it can spread within an hour or two very far.  
 
We have been open about this. A lot of the government’s pressure publicly in particular is focused 
on this process, they want to see more evidence of progress in this area and they want us to talk 
more openly about this process because the public has a right to know. And I think, to a large 
degree, that is legitimate pressure and to a large degree we are working with the other companies 
through the Global Internet Forum to deliver on that transparency side of it as well as the 
technology sharing side of it.  Some of it is about sharing technology e.g. that hash-sharing 
example and some of is going to be platform specific because of the nature of some platforms, you 
can not share certain AI tools outside a particular platform because they will not work elsewhere. 
And some of it is about smaller companies. This is a big area of governmental concern and indeed, 
there are platforms that are well intentioned but do not necessarily have the capacity to build their 
systems to prevent them being used by hyper-organised terrorist groups. So, they need this 
knowledge and technology sharing. It is more about knowledge sharing. So in working with them, 
we show them how we deal with legal law enforcement requests, how we define our community 
standards, how we operationalise our notice and takedown system etc., in order to capture those 
things that we worry about.  
 
M: Would you not say that its tricky territory because the government’s definitions or even the legal 
definitions of terrorism seem to stretch? 
 
K:  Absolutely …It would be easier if the government was coming to us with a clear definition what 
it defined as terrorist content but this is not easy. If the government were to say: ‘this is the pile of 
content you need to take down and I define what is OK and what is not’, there would be a problem.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937 See Bickert, M. & Fishman, B. Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism, available at: < 
 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/ > accessed 06/11/2017 
                                                                         	  
284	  
What the government is saying is that this accepted definition of terrorist content [where companies 
have come to a sort of view as to what it is which fits within their community standards (e.g. defining 
terrorism based on violent organised groups like Daesh and AL Qaeda and this is really clear)] is 
what companies should be doing something about. I do not think the governments view is that there 
is loads of content that we are not taking down. They are not trying to stretch the definition. I do not 
think at the moment that they are being pushy about the definition. The reason why they are not 
being pushy about the definition is because they know that we would say: hold on a second, if you 
cannot pass a law that clearly says this-is-what-terrorism content-is don’t expect us to do it! And so, 
we use our community standards. We have kind of had a go at defining what they are and so the 
government cannot just say that they think that our standards are not right. 
 
M: That is interesting; I thought it was the other way round. Having looked at the ambiguity with 
regard to the legal definition of terrorism and how it links to things like radicalisation the Prevent 
strategy, and the notion of British values I thought that the government would be more unyielding? 
 
K: Well look, this is not an easy space. It is not simple for the government to navigate…. It is clear 
that there is a lot of evidence that says that counter narratives and finding ways to disrupt 
radicalisation by interventionist measures, it is clear that some of this works. It is also clear that it is 
very difficult for the government to balance what it deems appropriate to do in this respect, which is 
one of the reasons why we are independently doing our own thing for the Online Civil Courage 
initiative938, –– I don’t know if you’ve seen that? 
 
M: No  
 
K: You should look it up, it is run through the institute of strategic dialogue and it’s a counter-
speech/counter-narrative campaign which we fund independent of the government, I know Google 
do something similar, because government can only do so much. There’s only so far government 
can go in a way. Government counter-narrative is by definition problematic, the fact that it is coming 
from the government means that it is going to be undermined. It could be brilliant, but it is still 
coming from the government. So, we try and support independent counter-narrative work that is not 
necessarily about British values or anything like that. We work with and support NGOs who come 
up with good ideas. So on the whole, we will do a range of things from reporting and takedown to 
developing proactive technologies to counter speech and counter narratives. 
 
M: How would you compare the regulatory process of terrorist content with other kinds of criminal 
content? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
938 See Facebook’s Online Civil Courage Page available at: < https://www.facebook.com/OnlineCivilCourage/ 
> accessed 06/11/2017 
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K: I would say that terrorism and child sexual exploitation are probably the most two similar areas. 
The difference between child sexual exploitation and terrorism is that whilst there is a lot of terrorist 
content that is clearly just illegal, and just bad, there are then grey areas around the outside. Child 
sexual exploitation is much clearer it is illegal or its not it’s a bit easier than terrorism. This is why 
we did a hash-database for child sexual exploitation first because it was a lot easier to define. One 
of the other differences is that for terrorism we will have human review, so we will not automatically 
rely on the hash-database. With child sexual exploitation we just remove the content. 
 
M: So, how does one review or moderate this content. I can imagine it can be hard if one doesn’t 
speak say, Arabic? 
 
K: Absolutely, we employ native speakers. We have about 4500 right into 7500 human reviewers 
around the world. And they cover many languages. 
 
M: Is it a team of reviewers or is it individual? 
 
K: The reviewers operate in teams in different locations an individual reviews each piece of content 
but they’ve got people they can explain to and the process can be explained to them as necessary. 
The vast majority of reviews are, Justin Bieber fans reporting the one direction page or, Everton 
fans reporting the Liverpool page trying to take it down. So, there’s a lot of noise, but within this 
noise there are particular trends that the individual reviewers and teams see and respond to, or 
bring forward for discussion. 
 
M: What are the pros and cons of using human reviewers as opposed to algorithms or AI tools? 
 
K: Context; so there is not an algorithm that judges context sufficiently at the moment. This means 
that they (algorithms) can bring up many false positives. And false positives take up a lot of time, 
because then you are going to have to review the things that you took down. So, it doesn’t save you 
a lot of time when you have false positives. Then there are obviously Human rights and free speech 
implications to false positives as well. But human review is slower. With an algorithm you can …so 
one of the things we do with algorithms is that we surface proactively for terrorist to detect accounts 
terrorist accounts that are behaving like terrorist accounts and after this, we point them out for 
human review. We don’t do it automatically because the human review aspect is an important 
safeguard.  
 
M: But humans can also be hyper subjective and rash? 
 
K: No, we don’t give them a free reign, we don’t say, what do you think. There are set out 
standards (publically set out community standards) that they use. So content is judged 
independently of any other piece of content against those community standards. Furthermore, there 
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is detailed training beyond those community standards on issues like interpretation etc. We also try 
and make sure that native speakers (of a particular language) view particular content so that they 
can get the nuances and the context right.  
 
M: But things can be politically charged with regard to context; you may find a dominant voice that 
can overpower or erase some other important voice. 
 
K: Absolutely, we are really conscious of the fact that we are making judgments based on the 
information and context that we have, that we are aware of. We are aware of the fact that we owe a 
duty of care to users to try and be as… impartial… and people could argue whether or not 
impartially is actually possible, whether or not we can be totally devoid of bias and so on. I don’t 
think we claim that we can be impartial. I think what we try and do as much as possible is to rest on 
existing norms that existing organisations have tried to define so we work with NGO partners in 
countries around the world who have more expertise in these areas than we do. We have a kind of 
symbiotic relationship with them to help with correcting and interpreting our policies. For example, 
we have a process whereby we can ask our NGO partners to become, not trusted flaggers like the 
Google model. So we don’t speed up reports because we don’t think that’s the right approach. But 
we do think that if people make certain reports that are biased or reports that they are not critically 
informed about, there should be a channel where they can talk to our teams who devise these 
policies and have a sort of two-way conversation. We try to make sure that this team includes as 
broad a range of organisations, NGOs as we can get going. We are really conscious that its far 
from perfect but it is an attempt to try and deal with the issue we are talking about which is this 
ability to define what is acceptable and what is not. The truth is the users of our platform are very 
vocal… and so where there are really controversial issues about what is and isn’t truth what is and 
isn’t extremism in parts of the world where there is a real tension around that like parts of the 
middle east ––where you can have two very sharp and divergent views on these things, we have to 
tread that line of trying to accommodate, of trying to find a balance. And sometimes, biases can be 
a good thing, sometimes you can say actually you think this you think this and we are going to find 
a fudge in the middle that’s not great! What is better is to say; ‘our bias is these internationally 
accepted norms and we will judge this by that’ … that might be the right approach because it gives 
you somewhere to stand … but its hard.  
 
M: I can imagine it being harder for you to assess content from groups, from people who may have 
minority viewpoints especially if such views are internationally disputed? 
 
K: I think to some degree we cannot solve the problems of the world. I can see that there are 
challenges if there is a minority group involved. Somebody pointed it out to me the other day. 
Generally, we can be attacked for removing a piece of content and silencing a particular group, at 
the same time as being attacked for leaving up the same content because it is upsetting or graphic. 
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Sometimes the same publication or group will do both, at different times, because these are hard 
judgments and people can hold two contradictory views about what the right thing to do is. 
 
M: So in many ways, these decisions are reflective of the real world we live in? 
 
K: Absolutely. They are very much reflective of the real world and they are not taken lightly. The 
key thing I had not really covered is that we hire legal experts, terrorist experts and language 
experts and so on, whose job it is not to make these decisions in an ivory tower, but to absorb all 
the evidence and to help us make decisions based on certain norms. It is not easy. The thing is, 
most of the vast majority of content on our platforms has nothing to do with this. It’s the edge cases. 
It is not easy. 
 
M: Let us talk Human Rights. Let us return to our scenario earlier, say, I posted something of a 
terrorist nature online, my account gets suspended, what happens next in terms of redress? 
 
K: So you get a message… 
 
M: Is the message clear enough to tell me what is going on or is it a general message? 
 
K: I cannot remember actually what it says, I think it will also vary on the circumstances but it will 
pretty much say your account has been suspended because of repeated violation of community 
standards…. There is a balance. I cannot see your account suspended for one single violation, 
unless it is a child sexual exploitation violation 
 
M: I say this because I have a friend who posted something about tube noise. She lives in an area 
where the night tube was running and she was part of a tube noise protest group, she has posted 
photos on Facebook 
 
K: Photos of what? 
 
M: Protest photos, photos of her protesting with banners– to do with the Tube noise thing, pretty 
standard photos in my view, they had nothing to do with race, ideology or anything. I understand 
that she also posted complaints on the London Mayor’s page and her account was suspended.  
 
K: Was it suspended permanently? 
 
M: No, it was suspended for a short while 
 
K: How long? 
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M: I think a few days? 
 
K: Ok, sometimes, there will be a number of different things. I don’t know much about this situation 
and I don’t know if I should comment on it. But the community standards are pretty clear. You can 
have a look at them and see whether or not she violated the community standards. Without seeing 
the content she posted, it is hard to judge what it could have been. Sometimes it simply is spammy 
activity or material. So, it could be that she was posting a lot, very quickly, within a very small space 
of time and so the system could have flagged that material. It is very hard to say.  
 
M: So what you are trying to say is, sometimes the system makes mistakes? Mistakes are 
inevitable, no? 
 
K: Well, I think I would say that there are systems in place to avoid the platform from being used in 
an abusive manner. Some of them around speech, we have a lot of safeguards around e.g. human 
review. Sometimes, around other parts of the process like spam those safeguards may be less, as 
these areas may be less core to human rights. So, if someone pointed out that their account was a 
target of spam that is, being quite spammy, that may impact their account in a different way, the 
safeguards may be lesser. Now, I have no idea whether the tube protest photos had anything to do 
with her account being suspended, or if what she had posted on the Mayor of London’s page had 
anything to do with it. It is not my experience that one piece of content could get your account 
suspended for 24 hours unless it was quite a serious violation. But then again, there is not a hard 
cast rule about this. This doesn’t mean that there was no error about this. Maybe she had had other 
content in the past? 
 
M: There are also other scenarios from the US like the Black Lives Matter activists  (I guess its 
similar to the Rohingya example you gave) So, a person may say white people have done such and 
such a thing and if taken out of context, the system may flag it as hateful and it may lead to a 
suspension. 
 
K: Its very hard. Context matters. And if I am saying that black people did this, the bar in your head 
and in my head is different because we both live in a western liberal democracy where we are all of 
a certain kind of outlook. But the bar for saying something is racist is probably individually different, 
right?  So if a black person said that white people have oppressed us for generations, –– that is not 
racist. That is a statement of historical view, so this is really hard to operationalise and to draw up 
rules that can apply fairly. 
 
M: I guess it is even harder because different jurisdictions like the US have got different 
understandings of freedom of expression and what it entails.  
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K: Yes. My understanding of it is (and I am not really close to the Black Lives Matter scenario) 
because our teams in the US handle that. But my understanding is that there have been some 
cases, high profile cases, where we have removed stuff that maybe on reflection was about 
highlighting particular instances, and then we kind of apologised and put it back up. We have 
thought long and hard about how we can prevent these situations from reoccurring. But some of 
this language stuff is a challenge. I do not know so much about, it would be wrong of me to 
speculate, because I do not have the details. I know that whenever there is a tension like that of the 
Black Lives Matter, a sort of tension that deals with a massive issue like racial tensions in the US, 
this presents real challenges that always blow back on us. We are always a bit of a battlefield in 
these situations. Now, I also know that we took down a lot of the Charlottesville white extremist 
content, we took a lot of that down, which was again controversial the other way and there was also 
a lot of debate as to whether that was terrorist content or not … I wouldn’t want to be too definitive 
because I don’t know too much about this.  
 
M: It is kind of hard, because language changes and situations cause language to change, the 
words that are used in one scenario won’t necessarily be the same in another. 
 
K: Yes, that is why the training behind the scenes as to how reviewers interpret the community 
standards is a lot more detailed. During their training, we will talk about how certain words fall under 
certain categories for certain reasons. And that’s why we also have those relationships with the 
NGOs because they are often on top of these things more than we are  
 
M: Sorry, I forgot to ask, do you also work with law enforcement? I would imagine that you do 
 
K: So, we publish in our transparency report I don’t know if you have seen our transparency report 
online, we publish country by country law enforcement requests for data, data retention and for take 
down requests. In these three areas we show how many we received and how many we acted 
upon. We publish these reports every six months for each country. We do have people who work 
with law enforcement liaison, who are in contact with law enforcement. We are very clear about the 
grounds on which we will provide any data to law enforcement. We are very much governed by US 
law on this and so there’s a limit on what we can and cant do with foreign law enforcement. Clearly, 
any individual, any government agency and that includes law enforcement can report anything to us 
that violates our community standards. In a way this is helping us to police our own standards and 
we have no objection to this. But if it is not against our community standards, then we will not take it 
down anyway.     
 
M: Do you think it is naïve for us to think that we can ever get rid of terrorist content online? 
 
K: Online generally?  Yes. There is clearly going to be somewhere else online for terrorists to take 
advantage of, like the dark web etc. It is going to be like a game of cat and mouse trying to stop 
                                                                         	  
290	  
these people. But can we continue to improve and reduce the amount of terrorist content online on 
major platforms that the vast majority of Internet users spend their time on? I think we can, we can 
get better and better and better at that. Can we completely eliminate it? ––you know? …  
 
M: Is this not undermining the very subversive element of terrorism? 
 
K: I am not saying that we could ever be in a situation whereby there will ever be no terrorist 
content that makes society feel uncomfortable. I think that is an inevitable consequence of freedom 
of speech and the world at large. So, I do not think we will ever get to that point. But with regard to 
content form actual terrorist groups, I think we can get somehwere. That said we are a long way 
from: a) defining norms that everyone shares and b); operationalising our systems such that when 
we have these norms we can quickly and efficiently remove content that violates these norms no 
matter who is posting them.  
 
M:  If you were to have input from lawyers and the government and counterterrorism experts etc. in 
this area how do you think you would improve regulation in this area? 
 
K: We are always improving. We are always getting information on what constitutes a terrorist 
group and what their activities are like. We are always improving our AI, building new ones, we are 
hiring more people to review content, so there’s loads of things we could keep doing but regulation 
is really hard for the reasons that you said; language changes context changes and so forth… 
 
M: And on the government’s policy generally, do you have any views on that do you think 
countering terrorism is only about the Internet?  
 
K: One of the problems the government has got is that some of the things they are talking about 
are fundamental problems facing society, and the Internet is just a manifestation of some of them. 
Therefore, to try and solve them involves taking decisions and acting in a way that no government 
has succeeded before. Defining extremism defining hate speech in a clear way for example is a 
challenge.  One of the things, say, for smaller platforms would be to have a clear understanding of 
who terrorist organisations are, of what they are. But even this changes all the time. And 
governments do not necessarily always agree on who such organisations are and what they are, so 
how could you speed that up? How could you expect governments to come and internationally 
agree on these things? That is really hard. 
 
M: It really is, especially in the context of authoritarian governments 
 
K: Yes that’s why you never operate on the basis of one government .You would certainly need to 
have a criteria for believing the government. Its obviously different in a western democracy like the 
UK where there is oversight. Jurisdictional differences would still emerge though. So, what would 
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make a difference perhaps is the passing of some international standards to agree upon certain 
things. This is contentious and I don’t think it will ever happen. Far outside the online space it has 
never happened why is that?  It is hard. It is hard. What the Internet is bringing to the fore is areas 
where governments and societies have difficult judgements to make and they may not necessarily 
want to have to make them.  And the danger may then be that the government and society will say 
–– well, that’s the Internet’s challenge! Actually, is it? We try and do our best to mitigate negatives, 
but we cannot define what terrorism is and terrorism is not – you know, for the world at large 
 
M: Would you then say that regulating the Internet and terrorism is a kind of haunting an evasive 
spectrality?  
 
K: Interesting. It’s not the way I have looked at it, but I can see why you look at it that way. I think 
that the Internet is bringing in front of society conflicts and problems that have already existed and 
almost saying, right, you need to deal with it! And that’s hard, and scary! 
 
M: So, problems that have always existed such as cross-cultural conflicts or political? 
 
K: Yes, and the thing is there is going to have to be a rebalancing. Because we are used to having 
people say from minority groups having a voice in different spaces but now there are these digital 
spaces and this is an uncomfortable process. In some cases, this means new ways of enforcing 
against extreme views need to be devised and in other cases we will need a different 
accommodation. These are big questions for society they are not really ones that a platform can 
solve on their own. 
 
M: Final note, what are your general views on the law and I reiterate you talked of international 
standards, do you think that this is something possible? 
 
K: I think trying to solve everything is not going to be possible, but establishing quite narrow and 
specific areas say, e.g., ‘in this area or conflict we are all going to agree that this is wrong and this 
is what terrorist groups do this etc.’ This may help, but it may be a long shot.   
 
M: But you see, the UK definition of terrorism expands terrorism to include non-violent content at 
the same time it carries racial political and ideological elements so it is rather wide. 
 
K: As I said there is not much push and pull between us and the UK government in defining who a 
terrorist is etc., I think they (the government) focus on those people we know are terrorists and you 
know are terrorists. They share that kind of view. They focus on those. It is something that we are 
very wary of because we know that there is a tendency (not necessarily with the UK government 
but) with governments in general to expand the definition to include those that they feel 
uncomfortable with. And I think the UK government would acknowledge certainly, that success is 
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not them seated there going: ‘we are comfortable with everybody who is online.’ If they are not 
going to be uncomfortable at some point then we have probably gone too far. 
 
M: Thanks ever so much for your time, I think that’s it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
